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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the pattern of Financial Instrument Disclosures (FIDs) within 
the annual reports of Australian listed extractive resource companies (mining and 
petroleum) over a four year longitudinal period encompassing the 2003 to 2006 
financial years. This is an important period to investigate FID patterns as it 
encompasses those years leading up to and immediately following formal adoption of 
the Australian equivalents to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
 
Using an index (FIDI) comprising 120 items of financial instrument information to 
measure the extent of FIDs, there is a statistically significant increase in disclosures 
over the four year period with the greatest percentage increase occurring on transition 
to IFRS. Under IFRS, direct comparability with firms internationally can be made. 
Although the financial instrument disclosure requirements are the same pre- and post-
IFRS adoption, the introduction of a new form of regulation makes a difference to 
managements’ financial reporting disclosure incentives. Total financial instrument 
disclosures, as measured by FIDI, increased from 34% in Yr 1 (year ending 31 
December 2002 or year ending 30 June 2003) to 52% in Yr 4 (year ending 31 December 
2005 or 30 June 2006), the latter representing the first full year annual reporting period 
under IFRS. Similar trends are observed for mandatory financial instrument disclosures 
(comprising 57 items) and discretionary financial instrument disclosures (comprising 63 
items).  
 
The results of the main model regression analysis demonstrate that the independent 
variables of corporate governance, capital management, overseas listing and income 
tax characteristics of firms are factors which are variably significantly associated with 
FID patterns for panel data. Statistically significant associations are achieved for 
pooled regression results. Control variables comprising firm size, leverage, top 20 
shareholder concentration, sub-industry and return on assets are statistically significant 
predictor variables of financial instrument disclosures. In contrast, overseas stock 
exchange listing of firms and additional income tax characteristics that are related to 
financial reporting transparency are found to be significantly negatively associated with 
FID patterns.  
 
Discrete items that comprise FIDI are individually statistically significantly associated 
with the independent and control variables. Similarly, discrete items that comprise the 
independent variable scores are individually statistically significant predictor variables 
of financial instrument disclosures. This thesis contributes to an understanding of the 
extent, trends and rationale behind resource firms’ financial instrument disclosure 
practices in Australia. Further, this thesis examines the association of financial 
instrument disclosures with corporate governance, capital management, overseas listing 
and income tax characteristics of firms leading up to and immediately following IFRS 
adoption in Australia. 
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS (Source: AASB 132 and AASB 139) 
 
Derecognition: The removal of a previously recognised financial asset or financial 
liability from an entity’s balance sheet. 
 
Derivative: A derivative is a financial instrument or other contract within the scope of 
AASB 132 and AASB 139 with all three of the following characteristics: 
(a) its value changes in response to the change in a specified interest rate, 
financial instrument price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of 
prices or rates, credit rating or credit index, or other variable, provided in the 
case of a non-financial variable that the variable is not specific to a party to the 
contract (sometimes called the ‘underlying’); 
(b) it requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller 
than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to 
have a similar response to changes in market factors; and 
(c) it is settled at a future date. 
 
Embedded Derivative: An embedded derivative is a component of a hybrid (combined) 
instrument that also includes a non-derivative host contract – with the effect that some 
of the cash flows of the combined instrument vary in a way similar to a stand-alone 
derivative. 
 
Equity Instrument: An equity instrument is any contract that evidences a residual interest 
in the assets of an entity after deducting all of its liabilities. 
 
Fair value: The amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, 
between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction. 
 
Financial Instrument: A financial instrument is any contract that gives rise to a financial 
asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. 
 
Financial asset: A financial asset is any asset that is: 
(a) cash; 
(b) an equity instrument of another entity; 
(c) a contractual right: 
(i) to receive cash or another financial asset from another entity; or 
(ii) to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under 
conditions 
that are potentially favourable to the entity; or 
(d) a contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments 
and is: 
(i) a non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to receive a 
variable number of the entity’s own equity instruments; or 
(ii) a derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed 
amount of cash or another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own 
equity instruments. For this purpose the entity’s own equity instruments do not 
include instruments that are themselves contracts for the future receipt or 
delivery of the entity’s own equity instruments. 
 
Financial Liability: A financial liability is any liability that is: 
   xi
(a) a contractual obligation: 
(i) to deliver cash or another financial asset to another entity; or 
(ii) to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under 
conditions that are potentially unfavourable to the entity; or 
(b) a contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments 
and is: 
(i) a non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to deliver a variable 
number of the entity’s own equity instruments; or 
(ii) a derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed 
amount of cash or another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own 
equity instruments. For this purpose the entity’s own equity instruments do not 
include instruments that are themselves contracts for the future receipt or 
delivery of the entity’s own equity instruments. 
 
Hedge effectiveness: The degree to which changes in fair value or cash flows 
attributable to a hedged risk are offset by changes in the fair value or cash flows of the 
hedging instrument. 
 
Hedged Item: A hedged item is an asset, liability, firm commitment, highly probable 
forecast transaction or net investment in a foreign operation that (a) exposes the entity to 
risk of changes in fair value or future cash flows and (b) is designated as being hedged. 
 
Hedging Instrument: A hedging instrument is a designated derivative or (for a hedge of 
the risk of changes in foreign currency exchange rates only) a designated non-derivative 
financial asset or  non-derivative financial liability whose fair value or cash flows are 
expected to offset changes in the fair value or cash flows of a designated hedged item. 
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GLOSSARY OF KEY ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AASB: Australian Accounting Standards Board 
APRA: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority  
ASIC: Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
ASX: Australian Stock Exchange 
ATO: Australian Taxation Office 
CA 2001: Corporations Act 2001 
CGS: Corporate Governance Score 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The Australian Financial Reporting Council (FRC) announced on 3 July 2002 that 
Australia would formerly adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) for reporting periods commencing on or after 1 January 2005. The FRC 
reconfirmed this decision in its meeting of 31 March 2004 (FRC, 2005). The FRC 
advanced the argument that the adoption of IFRS by Australian companies would 
facilitate cross-border comparisons by improving comparability and transparency in 
financial reporting thereby leading to more efficient contracting between various 
capital market participants, a lower cost of capital and an increased ability to raise 
finance or list overseas (FRC, 2005). The ninth amendment to Australia’s 
Corporations Act 2001 (CLERP 91) Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the 
Financial Reporting Framework (effective 1 July 2004) recommended that IFRS be 
adopted in Australia by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) for the 
aforementioned reasons (Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 2002).   
 
1.1 Research Problem 
This research study provides a longitudinal examination of financial instrument 
disclosure practices (mandatory and discretionary) by Australian extractive resource 
firms. For the purpose of this study, resource firms are defined as mining and 
petroleum (oil and gas) sub-industry firms that are engaged in extractive or 
production activities. The first primary objective of such an examination is to 
determine if financial instrument disclosure patterns in the three financial reporting 
years immediately prior to IFRS adoption period changed in the immediate post-
IFRS adoption period. The pre-IFRS period comprises the 2002, 2003 and 2004 
annual financial reporting periods for 31 December year end companies and the 
2003, 2004 and 2005 annual financial reporting periods for 30 June year ending 
companies. The three year pre-IFRS adoption period comprises important IFRS 
transitional years (Figure 1.1). Findings from this analysis will determine if IFRS 
                                                 
1 CLERP 9 or Corporate Law Economic Reform Program represents the ninth amendment to the 
Corporation Act 2001 in Australia. 
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adoption had a significant impact on disclosure practices amongst Australian 
extractive resource firms and the timing of such changes.  
 
The second primary contribution of this study is to examine whether the concepts of 
corporate governance, capital management, overseas listing status and income tax are 
significant determinants of financial instrument disclosure patterns pre- and post-
IFRS adoption.  
 
A time line of important accounting pronouncements and events with implications 
for financial instrument disclosures leading up to formal adoption of IFRS in 
Australia is provided as Figure 1.1.  
 
FIGURE 1.1: Timeframe of Significant Accounting Pronouncements and Events  
 
 
Financial instrument disclosures prior to formal adoption of IFRS were administered 
under AASB 1033 Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments (AASB, 
1999). Following formal adoption of IFRS, financial instrument disclosures were 
initially administered under AASB 132 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and 
IFRS transition date: AASB 1047 Disclosing the impacts of adopting IFRS for 
annual reporting periods ending on 31 December 2004 and 30 June 2005.
3 July 2002 
31 March 2004 
1 July 2004 
1 January 2004 
1 January 2005 
1 July 2005 
31 Dec. 2005  
AASB 1033 Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments, effective 
for financial years ending on or after 31 December 2000 
FRC announces IFRS adoption in Australia
FRC confirms its decision to adopt IFRS in Australia
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) effective date 
IFRS adoption: AASB 132, AASB 139 effective 
AASB 1047 no longer effective
First full year IFRS compliant annual report for 31 December year end 
i
1 January 2007 
1 January 2007 AASB 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures effective
First full year IFRS compliant annual report for 30 June year end 
31 Dec. 2000 
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Presentation (AASB, 2004a). Application of AASB 132 commenced with the first 
annual reporting period beginning on or after 1 January 2005. AASB 132 applied for 
annual reporting periods ending 31 December 2005 and 30 June 2006. Entities that 
comply with AASB 132 are simultaneously in compliance with IAS 32 (AASB, 
2004a).  
 
The primary difference between AASB 132 and AASB 1033 is that the former may 
change the required classification of some convertible financial instruments from 
equities to liabilities. Under AASB 1033, contracts for the delivery of gold are 
treated as if the contracts were financial instruments giving rise to financial assets 
and financial liabilities. In contrast, AASB 132 requires commodity based contracts 
that give either party the right to settle in cash or another financial instrument to be 
accounted for as if the contracts were financial instruments. Consequently, disclosure 
requirements for commodity-based contracts will differ under the two standards. 
AASB 132 requires disclosure of fair value information while AASB 1033 requires 
disclosure of net fair value information. The inclusion of transaction costs in the 
determination of net fair value under AASB 1033 will cause AASB 132 and AASB 
1033 to result in different values particularly where transaction costs are substantial. 
However, this difference does not deter disclosure of fair value (or net fair value) 
information within the annual report. Where there are investments in unquoted equity 
markets and fair value cannot be measured reliably, AASB 132 requires disclosure of 
that fact, a description of financial instruments involved, the carrying amount, an 
explanation of why fair value cannot be reliably measured and a range of fair value 
estimates. In contrast, AASB 1033 assumes that net fair value of financial assets and 
financial liabilities can always be reliably determined and requires disclosure of net 
fair values of financial assets and financial liabilities which are not readily traded on 
organised markets. AASB 1033 requires disclosures about the entity’s objective for 
holding and issuing derivatives which is not a requirement under AASB 132. 
 
AASB 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures, introduced in August 2005, superseded 
the disclosure requirements of AASB 132 and AASB 130 Disclosures in the 
Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions. AASB 7 applies to 
risks arising from the use of financial instruments for financial reporting periods 
beginning on or after 1 January 2007. AASB 7, however, may be adopted early for 
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financial reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005 (AASB, 2005). 
Although AASB 7 details mandatory disclosure requirements, the AASB indicates 
that the extent of disclosures required depends on the extent of the entity’s use of 
financial instruments and on its exposure to risks arising from financial instruments 
(AASB, 2005). 
 
AASB 139 Recognition and Measurement of Financial Instruments applies to 
financial asset and financial liability recognition and derecognition, measurement of 
financial assets and financial liabilities, fair value measurement considerations, 
derivatives and hedging on or after 1st January 2005 (AASB, 2004b).  Prior to the 
adoption of IFRS, there was no Australian Accounting Standard that dealt with the 
recognition and measurement of financial instruments.  
 
AASB 1 First-time Adoption of Australian Equivalents to International Financial 
Reporting Standards requires entities to restate prior period information and present 
this as comparative information within the annual financial report (AASB, 2004c).  
AASB 1 exempts an entity to restate comparative information in relation to financial 
instruments as if the requirements of AASB 132 and AASB 139 had always applied. 
The comparative information in the annual financial report for the year ending 31 
December 2004 and the annual financial report for the year ending 30 June 2005 
need not comply with AASB 132 and AASB 139. However, this is an optional 
exception under AASB 1 so entities can elect to provide comparative financial 
instrument information within these annual financial reports. 
 
The adoption of IFRS is expected to have a profound impact on the financial 
reporting of companies in the mining and petroleum sub-industries (Ernst and 
Young, 2005). In particular, the adoption of AASB 7, AASB 132 and AASB 139 
have the potential to introduce significant volatility to earnings, impact on reported 
profits, debt covenants, balance sheet ratios, net assets, dividend policy, hedge 
accounting and the classification of financial instruments with consequent income 
tax impacts (Honey, 2004). How the impact is communicated and understood by 
individual investors, fund managers, financial intermediaries, auditors and regulatory 
bodies is thought to have a bearing on the:  
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 company’s ability to undertake capital management initiatives (Leyden, 
Mason and Croft, 2004; Ernst and Young, 2005);  
 company’s ability to comply with rules in relation to, for example, debt and 
equity classification, thin capitalisation and tax consolidation (Leyden et. al., 
2004);   
 ability of users to understand the significance of financial instruments to an 
entity’s financial position, performance, cash flows and the nature and extent 
of risks arising from financial instruments to which an entity is exposed 
(paragraph 51 of AASB 132); and 
 formulation of accounting policies and the regulation of financial disclosure 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004; 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 2004; Brown and Tarca, 
2005). 
 
Prior theoretical research focusing on asymmetry information suggests that full 
disclosure is in the best interests of a firm. By reducing ex-ante uncertainty through 
full disclosure, a firm will be able to reduce its cost of capital (Botosan, 1997). 
Whilst previous empirical work (Choi, 1973; Frankel, McNichols and Wilson, 1995; 
Botosan, 1997; Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2004; Chenhall and Moers, 2007) has 
supported the theoretical justification for greater disclosure these investigations 
routinely show firms are reluctant to provide full disclosure. For example, firms do 
not provide disclosures due to the lack of a structured risk management system or the 
proprietary nature of specific disclosure items (Verrecchia, 1990; Chalmers and 
Godfrey, 2004). Empirical studies (Frankel et. al. 1995; Chalmers and Godfrey, 
2000; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Cabedo and Tirado, 2003; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004; Mitchell, 2006), nonetheless, have indicated various 
determinants that may influence firms to provide more disclosure on specific issues. 
For instance, recent corporate governance advocates (Eng and Mak, 2003; Beekes 
and Brown, 2006) have strongly suggested a firm’s corporate governance structure is 
an important determinant of a firm’s transparency policy (Beekes and Brown, 2006).  
 
Whilst corporate governance structure may influence managerial disclosure practices 
particular to financial instruments, other factors may affect disclosure incentives. For 
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example, financial instruments are increasingly central to a firm’s financing structure 
which in turn will influence its capital management policy (Beattie, Goodacre and 
Thomson, 2006). A firm’s capital management policy, therefore, is likely to have 
ripple-on effects on the disclosure practices of the firm related to financial 
instruments (Beatty and Weber, 2003).  
 
A major consequence of IFRS adoption is that under AASB 132 a wider span of 
financial instruments will have to be classified as liabilities rather than equity. This 
adjustment is likely to have significant affects on the income tax position of the firm 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001; Mills and Newberry, 2005). It is expected that tax 
considerations will have a bearing on management’s financial accounting policy and 
reporting decisions through the impact that these decisions may have on a company’s 
cash flows (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Given the sensitivity of the income tax 
implications, firms may be reluctant to provide full disclosure on financial 
instruments following adoption of IFRS (Mills and Newberry, 2004; 2005).  
 
Based on the preceding analysis, the major research questions of this study are: 
1. Does the adoption of IFRS have a significant affect on the pattern of financial 
instrument disclosures (mandatory and discretionary) by Australian resource 
firms? 
2. Is a firm’s corporate governance structure, capital management exposure, 
overseas listing status and income tax characteristics significant determinants 
of financial instrument disclosure practices (mandatory and discretionary) by 
Australian resource firms both pre- and post-IFRS adoption? 
 
To answer the first question, the extent of financial instrument disclosures are 
examined for the three full financial reporting years immediately pre-IFRS adoption 
and for the full financial year immediately post-IFRS adoption. For 30 June financial 
year ending companies, the 2003, 2004 and 2005 annual financial reports are 
examined for pre-IFRS financial instrument disclosures and the 2006 annual 
financial report is examine for post-IFRS financial instrument disclosures. For 31 
December financial year ending companies, the 2002, 2003 and 2004 annual 
financial reports are examined for pre-IFRS financial instrument disclosures and the 
2005 annual financial report is examine for post-IFRS financial instrument 
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disclosures. Two reasons justify the importance of examining the extent of financial 
instrument disclosures for the three years pre-IFRS adoption:  
1. Announcements made by the Financial Reporting Council leading up to 
formal IFRS adoption between 2002 and 2005 may have encouraged 
firms to prepare documentation and systems requirements early which in 
turn may be reflected in disclosure patterns. 
2. The requirement under AASB 1047 Disclosing the Impacts of Adopting 
the Australian Equivalents to the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (AASB, 2004d) to disclose the expected impacts of IFRS 
adoption in the annual reports ending 31 December 2004 and 30 June 
2005. Although there is an option for companies not to provide full year 
GAAP-IFRS comparatives in relation to financial instruments, the 
expected impacts of adoption of AASB 132 and AASB 139 could be 
disclosed within the annual report.  
 
1.2 Corporate Use of Financial Instruments 
Financial derivatives are one avenue for firms to manage financial risks and are often 
used to hedge exposures to foreign currency, interest rate and commodity price 
movements (AASB, 2004b). Derivative financial instruments can be used as a means 
of increasing certainty with regard to future cash flows, to manage risks and to lock 
in a minimum cash flow and income stream for producers and lenders (Berkman, 
Bradbury, Hancock and Innes, 2002).  
 
Hancock (1994) noted that the dramatic increase in the use of derivatives has caused 
growing concern to corporate regulators and accounting standard-setters around the 
world. He (Hancock, 1994) attributes much of this concern to highly publicised 
losses that many corporations have suffered as a result of positions taken in 
derivative financial instruments. Hancock (1994) argued that the major difficulty for 
accounting lies in unambiguously identifying the ‘transaction’ associated with many 
derivatives. 
 
Berkman et. al. (2002) examined the relation between derivatives use and financial 
characteristics of Australian industrial and mining firms. Using annual financial 
reports of 106 industrial firms and 52 mining firms for the 1995 year, Berkman et. al. 
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(2002) examined the influence of firm-specific variables on the likelihood of a firm 
using interest rate, foreign currency and commodity derivatives. Firm specific 
variables examined comprised firm size, leverage, costs of financial distress, 
managerial ownership, tax losses carried forward, growth opportunities, investment 
cash flow and liquidity. Berkman et. al. (2002) found that firm size and leverage 
were the main explanatory variables for derivative use for both industrial and mining 
firms.  
 
Using a sample of 469 firm-year observations drawn from Australian listed firms in 
the period 1999 to 2000, Nguyen and Faff (2002) found that a firm’s leverage, firm 
size and liquidity were important determinants of aggregate financial derivative use. 
Employing the same sample of firms, Nguyan and Faff (2003) found that firms are 
more likely to use foreign currency derivatives if firms are large and have higher 
levels of debt. Leverage, size, liquidity and dividend payout were shown to be 
important determinants of interest rate derivative use. 
 
Benson and Oliver (2004) distributed a questionnaire to the chief executive officer 
(CEO) or chief financial officer (CFO) of Australian listed firms in June 2000 to 
determine: (a) what managers incentives were for the use of derivative financial 
instruments; (b) the nature of the derivatives used and (c) the extent to which 
derivatives were used to cover their firm’s financial exposure. From 100 usable 
responses, Benson and Oliver (2004) found that in general, managers used derivative 
financial instruments to reduce risk and volatility of cash flows and earnings 
ultimately leading to an increase in firm value and a reduction of risk faced by 
management. Questionnaire responses also indicated firm management used 
derivatives for a number of important ancillary purposes such as reduction of the cost 
of capital, provision of an alternative means to manage financial risks, for budgeting 
and to reduce the likelihood of financial distress. Benson and Oliver (2004) noted 
that derivative financial instruments were not necessarily used to hedge all exposures 
across a range of financial risks. For instance, questionnaire responses indicated 
firms predominantly hedge foreign currency risk and interest rate risk using 
derivatives. Derivatives are used to a lesser extent to hedge commodity price risk and 
firm specific risk. 
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Benson and Oliver (2004) stated that use of derivatives has assisted in the 
management of financial risks through a reduction in the likelihood of breach of debt 
covenants and agency costs, a reduction in financial distress costs, reduced volatility 
in earnings and by assisting the firm to minimise the costs of external financing. 
Benson and Oliver (2004) postulated that volatility in earnings and consequent 
taxable income will increase the overall tax expected to be paid as well as lower firm 
value. Further, Benson and Oliver (2004) cite that derivative use is likely to be the 
result of complex agency relationships existing within the firm and is not driven by 
one particular management objective.  
 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) analysed derivative financial instrument disclosures 
over the period 1992 to 1996. They noted the dramatic increase in the use of 
derivatives had caused growing concern to corporate regulators and accounting 
standard-setters globally. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) attributed much of this 
concern to highly publicised losses that corporations have suffered as a result of 
positions taken in derivative financial instruments. For instance, there have been 
several prominent Australian cases where mining companies have gone into 
administration and/or liquidation as a direct consequence of mismanagement of their 
hedging activities. In August 2004, Sons of Gwalia Ltd, an Australian gold mining 
company, went into administration following a downgrade in gold resources and 
reserves ultimately leading to its inability to meet hedge-book commitments. Sons of 
Gwalia Limited’s hedge book was $350 million ‘out of the money’ on a mark-to-
market basis on 30 June 2004 (Australian Financial Review, 2004). Also, in June 
2006, Croesus Mining NL, an Australian gold mining company went into 
administration following the inability of the company to reach agreement with a 
counterparty to restructure hedging commitments following a downgrade in gold 
resources and reserves at the firm’s Norseman operations.  
 
Collapses of the nature of Sons of Gwalia Ltd and Croesus Mining Ltd often occur 
very quickly much to the surprise of shareholders. This raises the question whether 
firm management have adequately communicated relevant information to 
stakeholders, in particular, shareholders concerning the mechanics of hedging 
arrangements, associated risks and consequences. In these cases, potentially 
important information relating to hedge restructuring, the engagement of 
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counterparties and unrealised loss positions may not have been fully disclosed to 
various stakeholder groups. 
 
1.3 Significance of Research 
This particular research is significant for several key reasons. Firstly, this study is the 
first comprehensive analysis of financial instrument disclosures within the mining 
and petroleum sub-industries leading up to and immediately following formal 
adoption of IFRS.  
 
Secondly, past disclosure studies of financial instrument information (Chalmers, 
2001; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004) utilised only a relatively small number of items 
of financial instrument information to derive a disclosure index. In addition, prior 
research focused solely on disclosures in relation to derivative financial instruments. 
This study utilises 120 items of both mandatory and discretionary financial 
instrument information to derive a disclosure index and examines disclosures made 
in relation to all categories of financial instruments. 
 
Thirdly, empirical evidence of the relationship between financial instrument 
disclosures and capital management and income tax characteristics of firms within 
the Australian context is limited or non-existent (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001; 
Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). The relation between financial reporting disclosures 
and income tax characteristics or preferences of firms has only recently received 
some attention internationally. This study will attempt to fill that gap in knowledge 
through an examination of the relationship between financial instrument disclosures 
and specific income tax characteristics of firms, in particular, international tax 
arrangements and strategies. The impact of IFRS on the income tax position and 
compliance of companies highlights the importance of this aspect of the study. 
 
Finally, there is a high degree of interaction between the corporate governance 
structure of a firm and its capital management initiatives and income tax preferences 
or strategies. Importantly, this study examines how these three key areas relate to the 
extent of financial instrument disclosures. 
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1.3.1 Corporate Financial Communication 
Clarity of communication in relation to financial instruments is important as some 
instruments can be complex and even sophisticated investors may not have a 
complete understanding of the processes and valuation inputs involved in the use and 
measurement of these instruments. Failure to understand the nature of financial 
instruments could potentially lead to a negative impact on earnings (Honey, 2004; 
Ernst and Young, 2005). 
 
Currently, substantial resources are devoted to the disclosure of information within 
annual reports and other media without any clear indication of matching benefits 
passing to either the users or producers of these annual reports (Stocken and 
Verrecchia, 2004). Financial instrument disclosures are important to companies, to 
stakeholders and information intermediaries (Hancock, 1994; Benson and Oliver, 
2004). Researchers are interested in advancing an understanding of the link between 
the extent and quality of disclosures and the risks, cost of capital and ability to raise 
finance. 
 
1.3.2 Importance of Financial Instruments 
The use and complexity of financial instruments has increased substantially over the 
past decade in line with financing arrangements to ameliorate a firm’s business risks 
(Nguyen & Faff, 2002; Nguyen & Faff, 2003; Benson & Oliver, 2004). As shown in 
Table 1.1 average daily turnover in Australian Over-the-Counter derivatives (OTC) 
increased from US$3.8 billion in April 1995 to US$17.6 billion in April 2004. This 
marks a 363 percent increase in ten years (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2005). 
Resource firms will be significantly affected by IFRS because these firms routinely 
engage in widespread hedging of commodity prices, interest rates and foreign 
exchange risks (Benson and Oliver, 2004). 
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TABLE 1.1: Australian OTC Derivative Use, Average Daily Turnover  
Foreign Exchange Derivatives April 1995 April 1998 April 2001 April 2004
Options 0.8 1.3 0.5 1.2
Cross Currency Interest Rate Swaps 0.3 0.4 1.6 3.6
TOTAL US$b 1.0 1.7 2.1 4.9
Interest Rate Derivatives         
Forward Rate Agreements 2.0 1.5 5.5 5.6
Swaps 0.5 1.3 4.0 6.7
Options 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.5
TOTAL US$b 2.8 2.8 9.8 12.8
TOTAL OTC DERIVATIVES US$b 3.8 4.6 12.0 17.6
(Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, 2005, p.6) 
 
Resource firms, in conjunction with financial intermediaries, developed a wide 
variety of innovative instruments over the past decade for use by companies seeking 
to mitigate risks (Berkman et. al., 2002; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). Intense 
competition among designers of structured financial products increasingly has lead to 
the existence of off-balance sheet or unrecorded financial positions. Furthermore, 
diversity in financing practices flourished (Berkman et. al., 2002). The circumstances 
in which financial instruments are used and the objectives of structuring of financing 
arrangements varied significantly in terms of economic substance (Berkman et. al., 
2002). In line with the increase in use and complexity of financial instruments, the 
recognition, measurement and disclosure of financial instruments are areas of 
accounting that have become increasingly important.  
 
1.3.3 Financial Instrument Disclosures Pre- and Post-IFRS  
The method by which financial instruments are recognised, measured and presented 
will vary greatly under IFRS and is likely to significantly affect how resource firms 
treat financial instruments (Jubb, 2005; 2006). Jubb (2005) analysed narrative 
disclosures made by different industries leading up to formal adoption of IFRS and 
found that 63% of energy and 69% of Australian materials companies disclosed 
information on financial instruments under AASB 1047 (AASB, 2004a). The impact 
of IFRS on financial instruments has caused concern for capital market participants 
for the following five key reasons. First, AASB 139 mandates measurement of 
derivative and available-for-sale financial instruments at fair value. Second, 
companies will be required to review existing contracts to determine whether there 
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are any embedded derivatives2 that are required to be separated and recorded at fair 
value as separate financial assets or liabilities (AASB 139, Paragraph 11). Third, in 
accordance with AASB 139, a hedging relationship will only qualify for hedge 
accounting if strict conditions relating to hedge designation, documentation and 
effectiveness are met. Fourth, resource companies are exposed to volatility in 
commodity prices, interest rates and foreign exchange rates. Finally, reflecting the 
concerns of users, there are changes to the presentation and the classification of 
financial instruments under AASB 132. Each of these areas of concern is discussed 
in more detail below.  
 
The first area of concern regarding financial instruments is the fair value 
measurement and recognition of derivative financial instruments and available-for-
sale financial instruments. Fair value measurement is required for those financial 
assets and financial liabilities actually held for trading, assets and liabilities 
designated at the outset by the company as at fair value through profit and loss, all 
derivative financial instruments and any part of a hedged asset or liability where a 
fair value hedge is used (AASB, 2005). Paragraph 85 of AASB 139 stipulates that 
the purpose of hedge accounting is to recognise the offsetting effects on profit and 
loss of changes in the fair values of the hedging instrument and the hedged item. A 
hedging arrangement involves use of a hedging instrument, usually a derivative, 
whose fair value or cash flows are expected to offset changes in the fair value or cash 
flows of an underlying designated hedged item. Concerns have been raised by listed 
Australian companies of the fair value basis of measuring financial instruments (Tan, 
Hancock, Taplin and Tower, 2005). Proponents of fair value accounting argue that 
fair value measurement provides more relevant information to stakeholders which in 
turn allows these stakeholders to make more informed and timely decisions and risk 
assessments. In contrast, opponents of fair value accounting claim that fair value 
measurement and recognition leads to excessive and artificial volatility (Tan et. al. 
2005).  
 
Under AASB 139, there will be recognition of any financial instruments that were 
previously off-balance sheet such as derivatives. Financial instruments such as 
                                                 
2 An embedded derivative is a clause or section within a contract that modifies the cash flow of the 
contract based on a specified variable such as interest rates or foreign exchange rates.  
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derivatives were previously only disclosed in the notes to the accounts under AASB 
1033. This has created concern because both realised and unrealised3 gains and 
losses of derivative financial instruments will be measured and recorded at fair 
value4 in the balance sheet with changes recorded in the profit and loss account at 
financial year end under IFRS5. Potentially, this may lead to volatility of earnings of 
Australian listed resource companies (Ernst and Young, 2005). This has been an 
issue of concern to equity analysts, financial intermediaries and industry members. 
 
Management’s stewardship, when determining the fair value of financial assets and 
liabilities requires a number of judgements concerning valuations (AASB, 2004a; 
AASB, 2005).  For instance, management will need to make a number of judgments 
concerning valuation methodologies used to estimate the fair value of the hedged 
item and hedging instrument. There is a vast array of factors that management will 
need to consider in this process such as financial risks relating to interest rates, credit 
limits, commodity prices, equity prices and exchange rates, valuation sources and 
significant assumptions (Ernst and Young, 2005). This process will require formal 
documentation. For instance, major changes may be required to the contracts 
management and system requirements in order to satisfy valuation and hedge 
accounting requirements (Ernst and Young, 2005). 
 
Estimation of fair value presumes that the entity will continue as a going concern 
without any intention or need to liquidate, to substantially curtail the scale of its 
operations or to undertake a transaction on adverse terms (AASB, 2004a). Fair value 
reflects the credit quality of the instrument. In the process of estimating the fair 
value, the following considerations need to be reviewed by management: 
                                                 
3 Gains could be taxed before being realised. Furthermore, dividends could be paid out of profits 
before they are realised. For example, an increase in fair value of derivative instruments could give 
rise to unrealised profits. Subsequent payments may be made from these unrealised profits. 
4 Fair value is defined as the amount for which an asset could be exchanged or a liability settled 
between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction (AASB 139). 
5 Derivatives may include futures and forwards, swap and option contracts. Paragraph AG16 of AASB 
132 states that derivative financial instruments create rights and obligations that have the effect of 
transferring one or more financial risks of the underlying primary financial instrument between the 
parties to the instrument. A hedged item can be an asset, liability, firm commitment, highly probable 
forecast transaction or net investment in a foreign operation that exposes the company to the risk of a 
change in fair value or cash flows and has been designated as being hedged. Only hedge instruments 
that involve a party external to the reporting entity can be designated as hedging instruments. Hedge 
accounting attempts to match the offsetting changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedged item 
with changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument and recognise these changes in 
the profit and loss. 
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1) An appropriate quoted market price for the financial instrument in an active 
market will need to be determined. Management will need to arrive at the 
price at which a transaction would occur at reporting date in that instrument 
in the active market to which that entity has access. Adjustments to the 
market price will be required to reflect any differences in the counterparty 
credit risk between instruments traded in that market and the one being 
valued. The existence of published price quotations in an active market 
provides concrete evidence of fair value (AASB, 2004a).  
2) If the market for a financial instrument is not active, management will need to 
establish fair value using a valuation technique on the measurement date 
(AASB 139, AG74). Management will have to assess the validity of choosing 
a particular valuation technique based on normal business and economic 
considerations and is expected to represent a realistic estimate of fair value. 
Valuation techniques comprise use of recent arm’s length market transactions 
between knowledgeable, willing parties, reference to the current fair value of 
another financial instrument that is substantially the same, discounted cash 
flow analysis and option pricing models (AASB, 2004a).  
3) The appropriate technique for estimating the fair value of a financial 
instrument would incorporate management’s assessment of any of the 
following factors: (a) time value of money; (b) credit risk; (c) foreign 
currency exchange prices; (d) commodity prices; (e) equity prices (and index 
of prices); (f) volatility6; (g) prepayment risk and surrender risk; and (h) 
servicing costs of a financial asset or financial liability. An assessment of 
each of these factors will involve determination of reasonable estimates based 
on historical and/or current observable market conditions (AASB, 2004a).  
 
AASB 132 explains the importance of disclosing information about the fair value of 
financial instruments (AASB 132, paragraph 87). This standard states that fair value 
assists in determining an entity’s overall financial position and in making decisions 
regarding use of financial instruments (AASB, 2004b). Fair value reflects the 
judgement of management concerning the present value of expected future cash 
flows relating to a financial instrument and permits comparisons of financial 
                                                 
6 Volatility refers to the magnitude of future changes in price of the financial instrument.  
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instruments having substantially the same economic characteristics (AASB, 2004b). 
AASB 132 provides that (AASB 132, paragraph 87): 
 
Fair values provide a neutral basis for assessing management’s stewardship 
by indicating the effects of its decisions to buy, sell or hold financial assets 
and to incur, maintain or discharge financial liabilities. When an entity does 
not measure a financial asset or financial liability in its balance sheet at fair 
value, it provides fair value information through supplementary disclosures. 
 
The second area of concern relates to the recognition and measurement of embedded 
derivatives. Embedded derivatives are commonly used in the oil and gas industry 
(KPMG, 2003). If an entity is required to separate an embedded derivative from the 
host contract, but is unable to measure the embedded derivative separately either at 
acquisition or at subsequent financial reporting date, it is required to treat the entire 
combined contract as a financial instrument held for trading (AASB 139, Paragraph 
12). The prospect of derivatives being disaggregated or bifurcated from host 
contracts for financial accounting purposes can be complex and time consuming, 
particularly for companies with large volumes of embedded derivatives (Frost, 
2005). 
 
Third, new strict conditions of hedge designation, documentation and effectiveness 
are required under AASB 1397. The implementation of AASB 139 undoubtedly has 
led to important changes to systems, processes and documentation. A refurbishment 
of existing treasury policies or advent of new treasury policies would have been 
likely leading up to, and immediately following formal adoption of AASB 139 (Ernst 
and Young, 2005). Existing treasury policies may have been reviewed and re-written 
particularly in light of the required systems and documentation changes required 
under AASB 139 (Ernst and Young, 2005). Other treasury policies may have been 
written for the first time and endorsed at board level.  
 
For those firms that have or potentially may have significant fair value movements of 
derivative financial instruments and/or hedging positions taken to the income 
                                                 
7 Hedge effectiveness refers to the degree to which the changes in fair value or cash flows attributable 
to a hedge risk are offset by changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument. Because 
hedge effectiveness is assessed by examining the changes in fair value of the hedging instrument and 
the designated hedge item, the practice of netting several hedge positions does not qualify for hedge 
accounting. Each hedge contract must be designated to an underlying asset, liability or income stream. 
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statement with consequent volatility of earnings, there may be increased pressure to 
explain this volatility by way of increased disclosures within financial reports (Ernst 
and Young, 2005). Furthermore, identification of the hedged item or transaction, the 
hedging instrument, the nature of the risk being hedged and an assessment of hedge 
effectiveness are required to be formally documented prior to hedge accounting 
treatment being applied pursuant to AASB 139. Failure to establish this 
documentation could mean that hedge accounting cannot be adopted regardless of 
how effective the hedge actually is in offsetting risk (Ernst and Young, 2005). 
Documentation of a hedging financial arrangement is also required in order to be 
eligible for hedge tax treatment (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
2006)8. These stringent documentation requirements would only further enhance the 
already heightened awareness of hedging arrangements by top level management and 
the board of directors of resource firms leading up to and immediately following 
IFRS adoption, and, therefore, may have increased the pressure to disclose derivative 
instrument information in their financial reports. The pressure to disclose more 
information is internally generated via the documentation, reporting and transparency 
requirements by senior management and the board of directors and externally 
generated through important stakeholder groups such as investors and auditors 
demanding explanations for major accounting adjustments following implementation 
of IFRS.  
 
The next area of concern regarding financial instruments is that resource companies 
are exposed to a range of financial risks (Cabedo and Tirado, 2003). These risks, 
however, are mitigated through the design and use of an array of derivative hedging 
instruments9 provided by financial institutions. Financial institutions often require 
resource companies to implement sufficient hedging to cover repayments on project 
financing with these conditions stipulated in debt covenants (PWC, 2005b). Analysts 
and industry members have expressed concern that Australian mining companies 
face earnings volatility if unrealised gains and losses on derivative hedging 
instruments are recorded on a fair value or marked-to-market basis in the balance 
                                                 
8 Press release No. 031 Extension of tax-timing hedging rules dated 10th May 2005, available at 
http://assistant.treasurer.gov.au. 
9 A hedging instrument is a designated derivative or (for a hedge of the risk of changes in foreign 
currency exchange rates only) a designated non-derivative financial asset or non-derivative financial 
liability whose fair value or cash flows are expected to offset changes in the fair value or cash flows of 
a designated hedge item (AASB, 2005). 
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sheet and profit and loss statements provided that the conditions of hedge accounting 
have been met in accordance with IFRS (West Australian, 2006). Management of 
resource firms need to understand and communicate a complex set of issues with 
respect of hedge accounting such as a company’s: 
1. policy to hedge or not to hedge,  
2. hedging strategy,  
3. hedging instruments,  
4. control and monitoring of hedged transactions,  
5. communication of hedging strategy, and  
6. accounting implications (PWC, 2005b).  
 
The final area of concern regarding use of financial instruments is that AASB 132 
established the principles for distinguishing liabilities and equity. More financial 
instruments will be classified as liabilities rather than equity under IFRS (Ernst and 
Young, 2005). This means that distributions on these instruments will be treated as 
interest as opposed to dividends. This has important income tax consequences which 
will place a greater compliance burden on affected companies (Leyden, Mason and 
Croft, 2004). 
 
Overall, the accounting standards that deal with financial instruments have the 
potential to introduce significant volatility to earnings and reported profits, introduce 
changes to conditions stipulated under debt covenants, result in changes in balance 
sheet ratios, net assets, dividend policy, hedge accounting and the classification of 
financial instruments for resource firms (Honey, 2004; Ernst and Young, 2005). 
 
1.4 Assumptions and Limitations 
This study has certain limitations and assumptions. This study focuses only on 
financial instrument disclosures of extractive resource companies. Financial 
instrument disclosures of firms engaged purely in the exploration phase of mining 
will not be examined because those firms are far less likely to be exposed to a full 
range of financial risks and undertake hedging activities. Further, there are firms 
operating in other industries that actively utilise financial instruments such as 
financial institutions and utilities which will not be the subject of this study.  
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There are several medium to large resource companies that are actively involved in 
extractive operations in Australia that are not listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) such as Chevron Pty Ltd. These entities utilise and variably 
disclose financial instrument information within the annual report. As these 
companies are not listed on the ASX and hence do not have to report under the ASX 
listing rules, these companies are excluded from the study. 
 
Further, this study is confined to a four year period encompassing the 2003, 2004, 
2005 and 2006 financial years. It is assumed that this period will be sufficient to 
adequately test for changes in the extent of financial instrument disclosures leading 
up to and immediately following adoption of IFRS, and to explore whether firm 
specific factors relating to corporate governance, capital management and income tax 
significantly impact on disclosure patterns. 
 
Empirical analysis in this study may not incorporate all the corporate governance, 
capital management or income tax items that may influence financial instrument 
disclosure policy. Further, factors that are correlated with both the dependent and 
independent variables may potentially be driving statistical associations. Although 
there may be statistically significant correlations or associations between the 
independent and dependent variable, it may not always be possible to infer a causal 
link between these variables. Endogeneity may potentially be a problem. This study 
attempts to deal with this issue through: (a) the inclusion of a diverse set of 
independent and control variables in the statistical analysis; (b) analysis of data on a 
year by year basis; and (c) analysis of the change in variables between consecutive 
years over the study period.  
 
The study relies solely on annual reports to derive the dependent, independent and 
control variables. Potentially a company may disclose information relating to 
financial instruments in media releases, internal reports, treasury manuals, analyst 
reports or the website that has not been incorporated within the annual report. 
Further, a company may not disclose complete information relating to governance 
structure or capital management activities (such as the nature and frequency of 
capital raisings) within the annual report. Additional information relating to 
corporate governance might be largely contained within stand alone corporate 
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governance policies and procedure documents on company’s websites. Similarly, 
additional information relating to capital management activities might be largely 
contained within analyst reports or media releases rather than the annual report. A 
comparison of corporate governance and capital management information contained 
within the annual report and that contained within separate reports located on the 
company’s website revealed that there were no material differences in the disclosed 
information. 
 
Items of information that comprise the disclosure index are considered applicable to 
all companies in the sample. The issue of applicability of disclosure to all sample 
companies has been largely overcome by focussing on those companies that are 
extractive or production companies within the mining and petroleum sub-industries. 
Consequently, the disclosure items that make up the disclosure index will be of some 
relevance to each of the firms within the study population. A potential bias is 
introduced in the study as several disclosing firms did not actively use a particular 
financial instrument or were not engaged in a particular financial arrangement 
(Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). Although some firms may not have used a particular 
financial instrument, these firms may have disclosed the reasons for not using that 
instrument. For instance, although thirty firms did not have open derivative or hedge 
positions at financial year end, these firms variably discussed (a) prior use of those 
instruments; (b) why those instruments were not currently being used; (c) the 
possibility of using the instruments again at some future point in time; and (d) 
accounting policies and/or treasury policies in respect of such instruments. These 
firms exerted a disclosure choice in that non-use of derivative financial instruments 
or hedging instruments was considered important enough to disclose within the 
annual report. For these reasons, the financial instrument disclosure index was 
applied consistently across all sample firms in all years.  
 
The requirements to disclose financial instrument information in the annual financial 
report as specified in AASB 1033 or AASB 132 depend on whether the application 
or influence of that information is material in accordance with AASB 1031 
Materiality. It is submitted that some financial instruments will be applicable to 
sample firms but may not be disclosed or only partially communicated based on 
materiality of transactions and events involving financial instruments. 
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 The aforementioned assumptions and limitations are common issues encountered 
with past disclosure studies and do not detract from the study’s quality. Overall, this 
study represents a comprehensive analysis of the factors that influence financial 
instrument disclosures.  
 
1.5 Overview of the Thesis 
This study comprises eight chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the research questions, 
importance and assumptions and limitations and outlines the thesis structure. Chapter 
2 provides an overview of the underlying conceptual framework used to provide 
insights into why firms disclose or not disclose financial instrument information, a 
discussion of the literature on this topic and the extent to which the variables of 
corporate governance, capital management and income tax impact on financial 
instrument disclosure patterns. 
 
Chapter 3 advances hypotheses to test if the extent of financial instrument 
disclosures in the immediate pre-IFRS adoption period changed in the post-IFRS 
adoption period and the degree of association between corporate governance, capital 
management and income tax characteristics of firms and their financial instrument 
disclosure patterns. Chapter 4 explains the research methodology, the data collection 
process, industry selection and development of the disclosure index and assumptions 
relating to its construction. Chapter 4 also develops the Financial Instrument 
Disclosure Index (FIDI) that is used to measure the extent of financial instrument 
disclosures made by resource firms engaged in extractive or production activities. 
The FIDI comprises 120 disclosure items inclusive of both mandatory (57) and 
discretionary (63) disclosure items. The FIDI is used as the dependent variable in 
statistical analyses. 
 
Chapter 5 highlights the descriptive findings of financial instrument disclosure 
patterns in the immediate pre-IFRS adoption period as compared to the immediate 
post-IFRS disclosure patterns. Chapter 6 reports on the statistical analysis of the 
independent variable predictors: corporate governance, capital management, overseas 
listing status and income tax characteristics of firms hypothesised to be associated 
with financial instrument disclosure patterns. Further exploratory statistical analysis 
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is provided in Chapter 7. Finally, Chapter 8 offers the conclusions, implications and 
recommendations of the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the empirical findings of extant literature 
covering financial instrument disclosures specifically and other disclosure studies 
generally. Findings of this review offers insights into corporate managerial disclosure 
incentives, provide support for the use of and construction of the dependent, 
independent and control variables and provide a benchmark with which to compare 
the results of this study. This review forms the background to one of the fundamental 
objectives of this study; i.e. to test whether corporate governance, capital 
management, overseas listing and income tax characteristics of firms are significant 
determinants of financial instrument disclosures. A review of the Australian 
accounting and tax regulatory environment is provided as several important 
accounting, tax and regulatory pronouncements took place during or immediately 
prior to the period of study. Agency theory is theory advanced as the underlying 
theoretical framework to explain financial instrument disclosure patterns. The 
theoretical benefits and costs of disclosure and non-disclosure of financial instrument 
information are also examined. 
 
2.1 The Australian Accounting and Regulatory Environment 
Brown and Tarca (2005) provided a comprehensive overview of the current 
Australian financial reporting framework by analysing the roles and activities 
undertaken by rule makers, financial report preparers and rule enforcers. Significant 
changes to this framework were introduced by Australian rule makers (government 
bodies and accounting standard-setters) in the period 2002 to 2004. These changes 
were initiated following the decision by the FRC to adopt IFRS. This initiative took 
effect for reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005. Further changes to 
the accounting and regulatory framework were implemented as a result of 
implementation of the ninth amendment to the Corporations Act 2001 (CA 2001) 
under CLERP 9, effective from 1 July 2004. Financial reporting framework changes 
initiated by IFRS adoption were due not only to the nature of the standards 
themselves but the activities of constituents appraising and influencing the reporting 
framework (Brown and Tarca, 2005). Table 2.1 adapted from Brown and Tarca 
   24
(2005) identifies the relevant groups and significant activities and pronouncements 
that impacted on the Australian financial reporting framework.  
 
TABLE 2.1: Australian Accounting and Regulatory Pronouncements 2003-2005 
Body Role Pronouncement 
Date of 
pronouncement/ 
Effective Date 
Australian 
Stock 
Exchange 
(ASX) 
Regulation of 
financial reporting 
and disclosure, 
provision of listing 
rules and 
monitoring 
activities  
Issued a report Principles of Good 
corporate Governance and Best 
Practice Recommendations that 
companies have to report on in 
their annual report in accordance 
with ASX listing rules  
Report date: March 
2003 
Australian 
Accounting 
Standards 
Board 
(AASB) 
Provision of 
accounting 
standards to be used 
in financial 
reporting 
AASB 1047: Disclosing the 
impacts of adopting IFRS 
required reporting entities to 
disclose transition to IFRS and 
known or reliably estimable 
information about the impacts on 
the financial reports. 
Companies were 
required to make 
disclosures for annual 
reporting periods 
ending on 31 December 
2004 and 30 June 2005 
Financial 
Reporting 
Council 
(FRC) 
Oversight of the 
Australian 
Accounting 
Standards Board 
and Australian 
Auditing Standards 
Board (CLERP 9)
Adoption of Australian 
equivalents to the International 
Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) 
First announced: 3 July 
2002 
Reconfirmed: 31 March 
2004 
Effective date: 1 
January 2005 
Australian 
Securities 
and 
Investment 
Commission 
(ASIC) 
Promote 
compliance with 
financial reporting 
requirements. 
Monitoring role.  
ASIC announced monitoring 
activities with respect to 
compliance with AASB 1047. 
CLERP 9: Additional 
requirements in relation to the 
production, auditing and oversight 
of financial reports. 
Directors have additional and new 
reporting requirements.  
November 2004 
 
 
CLERP 9: Effective 
date:1 July 2004 
(Source: Adopted from Brown and Tarca, 2005, p.70-71) 
 
The roles and activities of rule making bodies also greatly influence the content and 
quality of financial reporting. Examples include the listing rules and Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations issued by the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003) 
and the Guide to Review of Operations and Financial Condition issued by the Group 
of 100 (The G100, 2003). The roles and activities of the AASB and the Australian 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AuASB) are pivotal in influencing the 
nature and quality of financial reporting and auditing standards. Company directors 
and executive management, as preparers of financial statements, are charged with the 
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responsibility of ensuring that financial reports are provided to shareholders, 
company regulators, the Australian Taxation Office and contracting parties.  
  
Several bodies enforce the financial reporting requirements such as external auditors, 
the ASX, ASIC and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). 
Regulators are critical to the monitoring of firms and their decision makers in two 
ways: (a) by providing direct scrutiny and (b) by collecting information that can be 
accessed by various stakeholders. The role of the ASIC, for example, was to ensure 
that Australian listed companies comply with accounting standard AASB 1047 
(AASB, 2004d). The purpose of AASB 1047 was to keep stakeholders informed of 
the likely impacts of IFRS adoption as well as how companies were preparing for 
adoption. This standard, which applied to all reporting entities for reporting periods 
preceding the adoption of IFRS, required entities to disclose, pursuant to section 334 
of the Corporations Act 2001: 
 
 information with respect to planning for the transition to IFRS and any key 
differences in accounting policies that are expected to arise on the adoption of 
IFRS for interim and annual reporting periods ending on or after 30 June 
2004; and 
 known or reliably estimable information about the impacts on the financial 
reports of annual reporting periods on or after 30 June 2005 had the financial 
report been prepared using IFRS. 
  
Where quantitative information was not known, or was not reliably estimable, the 
entity was to make a statement to that effect. Where possible, the impact of IFRS on 
operating profit before tax, profit after tax, net profit, total assets, total liabilities and 
net assets for example was to be disclosed.  
 
A November 2004 review by the ASIC of more than 1100 listed companies found 
that 99% had disclosed information to investors about the effect of implementation 
of IFRS. However, ASIC issued letters to 11 small to medium sized companies and 
their auditors after those companies failed to provide adequate information about the 
transition to IFRS within their annual reports (ASIC, 2004). As evident by the role 
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undertaken by the ASIC, rule enforcement bodies played an important role in 
ensuring compliance with financial reporting requirements. 
 
The roles and responsibilities of regulators, auditors and company management and 
directors changed during the period 2002 to 2004.  Some of the changes occurred in 
response to events in both Australia and overseas. Corporate collapses such as 
WorldCom and Enron in the US and HIH in Australia resulted in these and other 
countries reviewing and making changes to their respective financial reporting 
frameworks (Brown and Tarca, 2005). For example, following the implementation of 
CLERP 9, both CEOs and CFOs are required to provide an annual declaration that 
the company’s financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the CA 
2001 and Australian Accounting Standards and give a true and fair view of the 
company’s financial position, and that the company’s financial records have been 
properly maintained. CLERP 9 sought to improve the quality of the financial 
statements by ensuring directors and executive management not only have the 
responsibility for the financial statements, but clearly demonstrates this responsibility 
(Brown and Tarca, 2005).  
 
CLERP 9 may influence company disclosure practices by introducing civil liability 
to directors and executives for breach of the ASX’s continuous disclosure 
requirements under section 647 of the CA 2001 which is likely to increase the 
motivation of directors and executives to make full and timely disclosures (ASIC, 
2004). Further, the requirement under the CA 2001 to provide detailed information in 
relation to operations and financial position of the company within the director’s 
report and additional information in such areas as director and executive 
remuneration and the amount paid to auditors for non-audit work adds to financial 
reporting transparency (Brown and Tarca, 2005).   
 
Disclosure requirements of CLERP 9 are similar to those stipulated by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) which mandate assessment of the effectiveness of a firm’s 
internal controls and minimum disclosure requirements for U.S listed firms. SOX 
was introduced to enhance stakeholder confidence by improving corporate 
governance around documentation and internal controls following a suite of 
corporate failures in the U.S. (Kulzick, 2004).  Australian listed resource firms that 
   27
seek access to U.S. capital markets are required to be registered with the U.S. 
Security and Exchange commission and therefore are required to comply with the 
SOX. Begley, Cheng and Gao (2007) empirically examined the corporate 
governance reforms following enactment of SOX to ascertain whether the quality of 
information flow in capital markets improved. Begley et. al. (2007) found that, while 
the quality of publicly available information temporarily increased immediately post-
SOX, private information quality and total information quality declined. Although 
boards and audit committees contained significantly more independent directors and 
met more frequently post-SOX, there was no evidence of a flow-on impact in terms 
of improving disclosure quality. 
 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council suggests that the board’s monitoring ability 
will depend on the size, complexity and the ownership structure of the company. 
Further, the ASX Corporate Governance Council states the board’s monitoring 
ability will be influenced by tradition and corporate culture and by the skills of 
directors and managers (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003). The board of 
directors is charged with the responsibility of monitoring management to ensure that 
managers’ interests are aligned with the goals of the firm10 (Shailer, 2004). Boards 
typically delegate oversight risk management and control of specific areas of 
responsibility to key committees comprising audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees (Shailer, 2004). The board has a key role to play in monitoring 
management’s communication strategy in terms of content and timing of disclosure 
of information within the annual report (Brown and Tarca, 2005).  This process 
became even more rigorous following the implementation of CLERP 9 on 1 July 
2004. Additional and new reporting requirements under CLERP 9 are: 
1) Civil liability for breach of ASX continuous disclosure requirements 
extended to individuals. 
2) Additional operating and financial review information required in director’s 
report. 
3) Disclosure of remuneration to auditors for non-audit services in the director’s 
report. 
                                                 
10 Under the Corporations Act 2001, directors are required to act in good faith and for a proper 
purpose, act with care and diligence, avoid improper use of information, avoid improper use of 
position, disclose certain interests and avoid conflict of interest. 
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4) Disclosure of remuneration for the top five directors and executives. 
 
Where disclosure of information concerning financial instruments is discretionary 
and could impact on the welfare of all stakeholders of the firm, the board has a vital 
role to play in ensuring that management’s financial communication mechanism is 
effective in terms of both content and timing (Shailer, 2004). Given the board has 
ultimate responsibility for the preparation and presentation of financial statements, 
the board requires a high level understanding of how IFRS affects the financial 
performance and financial position of the company (PWC, 2005a; 2005b). The board 
should also understand the processes and systems management has in place for 
managing business issues arising from IFRS (PWC, 2005b). The board’s role is to 
ensure that information is adequately captured in a firm’s annual financial report. 
Affirming the board’s monitoring role, the ASX Corporate Governance Council 
commented that the board should be responsible for monitoring senior management’s 
performance and implementation of strategy and monitoring financial and other 
reporting (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003).  
 
Adoption of IFRS affected company accounting practices as early as 1 January 2004 
because of the general requirement to provide comparative figures in annual reports 
ending 31 December 2004 (Figure 2.1). Figure 2.1 shows that full year reporting 
under IFRS took place firstly for those companies with a balance sheet date ending 
31 December 2005. Full year reporting for those companies with a 30 June balance 
sheet date took effect on 30 June 2006.  Reporting of the expected impacts of IFRS 
were required in the period 1 January 2004 to 30 June 2005 depending on whether 
the company has a financial year ending 31 December or 30 June. Adoption of IFRS 
has given rise to issues under the ASX’s continuous disclosure regime. Any impact 
of IFRS that is expected, or will result in significant changes to the company’s 
financial position, or ability to undertake operations, should be disclosed11. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 An Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICAA) survey indicated that by July 2004, 49% 
of companies had commenced adoption of IFRS and 35% had started to communicate the impact of 
IFRS to stakeholders (The Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, 2004). 
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FIGURE 2.1: Reporting Timeline on Transition to IFRS Adoption. 
 
 
 
Jubb (2005) assessed the expected impacts of IFRS adoption as disclosed under 
AASB 1047 in the annual reports of Australian listed companies. Jubb (2005) 
examined half year and annual reports and counted the number of words devoted to 
AASB 1047 disclosures for 808 Australian listed companies. Jubb (2005) found that 
that the most frequently cited expected accounting policy differences, in order of 
frequency, were AASB 112 Income Taxes, AASB 136 Impairment of Assets, AASB 
2 Share-based Payment, AASB 132 and AASB 139 and AASB 3 Business 
Combinations. For sample companies within the S&P/ASX 200, AASB 139 and 
AASB 132 represent the most frequently cited transition accounting policy 
difference (79%). This accounting policy difference ranked second in the S&P/ASX 
300 at 72% and fourth at 49% for all observations with AASB 1047 disclosure. This 
clearly indicates that financial instrument disclosures were more prevalent in larger 
companies. Financial instruments were most frequently cited by companies within 
the materials (69%), energy (63%), financials (57%) and utilities (56%) industry 
segments. Reclassification of equity to debt was most frequently cited by companies 
within the materials, financials and utilities industry segments. These observations 
support the focus of this study on financial instrument disclosures made by 
companies within the mining and petroleum sub-industries. 
 
Studies examining the impacts and importance of IFRS adoption in the Australian 
context are limited. Jones and Higgins (2006) conducted a structured telephone 
survey on adoption of IFRS with 60 Australian firms drawn from the ASX 200. 
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Jones and Higgins (2006) found that the majority of the respondents perceived the 
transition to IFRS would have a substantial impact on the role of external auditors, 
the accounting and finance departments and board of directors.  Firm management 
was more concerned about how IFRS adoption would impact on their firm’s 
financial performance rather than the perceived benefits of IFRS adoption 
promulgated under CLERP 9. Jones and Higgins (2006) then determined which IFRS 
was expected to have the greatest impact on Australian accounting practices and how 
these IFRS were likely to affect financial position and financial performance reported 
to internal and external users. They found that many respondents were concerned 
with adoption of AASB 139 relating to the mixed model used to measure financial 
instruments, the use of market values for certain hedge transactions and volatility of 
reported profits, particularly for firms belonging to financial services and energy 
sectors which commonly engage in extensive hedging transactions. Respondents 
attributed the expected negative impact of IFRS adoption on the financial position to 
increased liabilities associated with the reclassification of some financial instruments 
as liabilities (debt) rather than equity (Jones and Higgins, 2006). Furthermore, some 
40% of respondents stated that IFRS would impact significantly on corporate 
governance practices attributable to increased disclosure requirements mandated 
under certain standards. Many of the surveyed firms were sceptical about the widely 
claimed benefits of IFRS adoption in Australia.  For instance, respondents stated that 
adoption of IFRS will put them out of step with major capital markets such as the 
U.S. capital market, that there was little evidence of real international harmonisation, 
and that IFRS are complex and less understandable than Australian accounting 
standards. An example cited relating to the latter was AASB 139 (Jones and Higgins, 
2006).  
 
Jubb (2006) extended earlier work (Jubb, 2005) by examining the GAAP-IFRS 
reconciliations within the half year and annual reports of 146 Australian listed 
companies to determine the extent of disclosure of expected IFRS impacts. Using an 
IFRS disclosure score ranging from 0 to 11, Jubb (2006) found 66% of firms 
voluntarily disclosed information on GAAP-IFRS reconciliations above the 
minimum requirements mandated under AASB 1. Companies belonging to the 
materials and energy sectors achieved an IFRS disclosure score of 5.3 with seven out 
of the top 9 IFRS scores attributable to mining or petroleum firms. IFRS adoption 
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impacted negatively on equity in all reconciliation statements while impact on profit 
was variable. Jubb (2006) also found that the frequency of expected accounting 
policy changes relating to financial instruments rated relatively highly with financial 
instrument classification changes (frequency of 30.4%) and hedge accounting 
changes (frequency of 31.2%) disclosed in 31 December reconciliation statements. 
Jubb’s (2006) study provides evidence that voluntary disclosures of expected impacts 
on transition to IFRS adoption rated relatively highly for the extractive industry, 
particularly in the area of accounting policy changes relating to financial instruments.  
 
Goodwin, Cooper and Johl (2007) found that 356 Australian listed firms changed the 
GAAP-IFRS reconciliations for earnings, cash flows or equity in the firm’s annual 
financial statements. Changes in reconciled financial statements included some large 
individual negative adjustments to equity following application of AASB 139 
(Goodwin et. al. 2007). Adjustments to reconciliations related largely to a lack of 
knowledge of the accounting standards or incorrect application of accounting 
standards by the CFO and their auditors. 
 
Becis, Ng and Roca (2007) found that larger firms disclosed more aggregate IFRS 
reconciliation data compared to small to medium size firms. Becis et. al. (2007) 
attributed this to the additional resources available to larger firms and more intense 
analyst scrutiny of these firms. Becis et. al. (2007) concluded that the adoption of 
IFRS in Australia was value relevant in that it impacted on security prices of firms 
following adoption of these standards. 
 
Palmer (2008) investigated the extent and quality of disclosures in the annual reports 
of 150 Australian companies complying with AASB 1047 and whether disclosures 
were related to firm size, profitability, leverage, industry and auditor size. Palmer 
(2008) measured quality of disclosures by counting the number of sentences devoted 
to AASB 1047 disclosures and assigning a qualitative score to each sentence based 
upon a decision usefulness framework. Statistical tests provided limited support for 
an association between quality of disclosure and auditor size and profitability. A 
positive association was found between the extent of disclosure and firm size, 
profitability, leverage and auditor size (Palmer, 2008). 
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Prior IFRS studies in the Australian context have focused on the value relevance or 
expected impacts of changes in key standards on transition to IFRS, GAAP-IFRS 
reconciliations or related mandated disclosures under AASB 1047 to firm specific 
variables. These studies variably demonstrate that the introduction of AASB 132 and 
AASB 139 on transition to IFRS is of concern to firm management. However, past 
IFRS studies have placed far less emphasis on disclosure of the actual IFRS impacts 
as they relate to financial performance. This is important as Jones and Higgins 
(2006) state that management is concerned with the impact of IFRS on financial 
performance. For this reason, this research includes an analysis of disclosures of the 
impacts of AASB 132 and AASB 139 on firm performance. 
 
Adoption of IFRS has important income tax implications (Leyden and Croft, 2004). 
Historically, Australian income tax law has evolved relatively independently from 
Australian accounting standards. However, over the past five years, there have been 
several amendments made to key provisions within the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936 (ITAA 1936) and Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997) that now rely 
directly or indirectly on accounting standards and accounting principles for the 
purpose of determining the income tax liability of an entity. For example, accounting 
standards must be used in the application of income tax consolidation, thin 
capitalisation and taxation of financial arrangements (Leyden and Croft, 2004). The 
introduction of IFRS has a direct impact on those taxation provisions in the ITAA 
1936 and ITAA 1997 specifically linked to Australian accounting standards and 
accounting principles (Leyden and Croft, 2004). An understanding of the impact of 
IFRS on the application of these taxation provisions is required by company 
management. These impacts will need to be factored into reporting disclosure 
practices. In addition, IFRS impacts on the tax treatment of hedging transactions 
under the Taxation of Financial Arrangements (TOFA) reforms (Frost, 2005). 
 
2.2 Agency Theory 
Whilst financial instrument disclosures in the post-IFRS adoption period are 
expected to be higher than pre-IFRS, changes across individual resource firms are 
unlikely to be uniform (Palmer, 2008; Becis et. al. 2007). That is, corporate 
management in different firms is likely to be the subject of different incentives when 
deciding on a corresponding disclosure policy following the adoption of IFRS. The 
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mainstream literature explains accounting policy choice on the basis of agency 
theory (Godfrey, Hodgson, Holmes and Tarca, 2006). Agency theory provides a 
conceptual framework for examining the nature and extent of disclosure relating to 
financial instruments in the annual reports of Australian listed companies. The 
motivation of the directors and executive management, as financial statement 
preparers, to disclose or not disclose financial instrument information has largely 
been explained in literature using agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Many 
determinants of disclosure patterns within annual financial reports have been driven 
by economic or welfare considerations (Godfrey et. al. 2006). For example, Choi 
(1973) found that firms increased the extent of financial disclosure immediately prior 
to entering the Eurobond market in order to obtain capital at a lower cost. In this 
instance, firms had an economic incentive to provide increased financial disclosure 
as the marginal benefits of increased disclosure exceeded the marginal costs of doing 
so (Choi, 1973). Extant literature (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Welker, 1995; 
Desai, Dyck and Zingales, 2003; Crocker and Slemrod, 2004; Tzovas, 2005) has 
utilised agency theory as a means to explain managerial behavior in the areas of 
corporate governance, capital management initiatives and income tax compliance 
issues. 
 
Determination of the level of detail of financial instrument information to be 
disclosed requires the exercise of judgement by firm management and the board 
(AASB, 1999; AASB, 2004a). The decision to disclose information can be 
dependent not only on the relative significance of those instruments (AASB, 1999; 
AASB, 2004a) and arrangements to the business objectives of the firm, but also on 
management’s personal welfare considerations to disclose that information (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Extant literature (Welker, 1995; 
Douglas, 2003; Monem, 2003; Liang, 2004; Cheng and Warfield, 2005) cites agency 
theory to explain managerial disclosure decision making. Management’s disclosure 
decisions affect credibility with investors and other stakeholders (Mercer, 2005).  
 
Agency relationships occur whenever the principal employs the services of an agent 
or agents to perform some activity on the principal’s behalf (Godfrey et. al. 2006). 
Agency relationships can exist between agents such as executive management and 
the board of directors and principals such as shareholders or debtholders. Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976) postulated that separation of company ownership and control 
provides management with the incentive to serve personal interests at the expense of 
shareholder interests. Management may act opportunistically and, therefore, can use 
discretion to disclose or not disclose information depending on how this impacts on 
the wealth of not only the manager, but all contracting parties to the firm (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). Management and the board, as self-interested agents, typically 
possess economic information that shareholders or bondholders, as principals do not 
possess and, thus, may engage in opportunistic behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). For instance, Cheng and Warfield (2005) report 
that manager’s with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that 
meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts. Earnings management activities may result in 
documentation of financial and accounting information within the annual report 
where disclosures deviate from mandated accounting standard disclosure 
requirements (Liang, 2004).  
 
The separation of decision-making and the risk-taking functions of the firm cause 
problems because the agent may not always act in the best interests of the principal 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). For example, firm 
management, who are delegated decision-making authority by the principal 
(shareholders), may make some decisions that maximise management’s own wealth 
such as increasing consumption of perquisites or shirking responsibility rather than 
that of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Godfrey et. al. 2003).  
 
An inevitable consequence of the separation of ownership and control is that 
management acquires information about the present and likely future performance of 
the firm that is superior to that acquired by shareholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990). Agents may, therefore, take advantage of the fact that the bulk of decision 
making and use of superior knowledge of the firm that is not observable by the 
principals, to engage in activities to enhance personal utility or welfare. Losses 
resulting from such decisions, and expenditures incurred to mitigate them are 
referred to as agency costs. Formal contracts are negotiated between the agents and 
shareholders or debtholders to ameliorate these agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) categorised agency costs as those comprising 
monitoring expenditures by principals (such as auditor fees), bonding expenditures 
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by the agent (such as the cost of preparing periodic financial reports) and a residual 
loss. 
 
Managerial opportunistic behavior can be ameliorated through a range of 
mechanisms designed to align agent and principal activities. Douglas (2003) cites 
accounting covenants are used to control adverse managerial investment decision 
making. Debt contracting may impact on voluntary changes made to accounting 
methods (Beatty and Weber, 2003). The provision of monitoring facilities (such as 
contractual guarantees, compensation arrangements, auditors, audit committees) and 
governance mechanisms, are other devices that may lead to efficient contracting to 
provide audited financial statements (Emanuel, Wong and Wong, 2003). If financial 
information is useful for monitoring purposes, and if management has a comparative 
advantage in collecting this information, it will pay to prepare financial reports that 
comply with regulatory authorities and stakeholder expectations. Alternatively, 
managers may contract not to disclose certain financial information within annual 
reports or other means of communication to competitors (Emanual et. al., 2003).  
 
In the manager-shareholder relationship, monitoring costs are transferred to the 
manager by adjusting remuneration packages according to the perceived level of 
monitoring required behavior (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). By providing appropriate incentives for the agent, and incurring expenditure 
in monitoring management’s action, the extent of divergence from the principal’s 
interests can be limited behavior (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). For example, a manager is more likely to act in the interests of a 
firm’s owners (shareholders and debtholders) if the manager gets a share of the 
firm’s profits as part of a remuneration package (Godfrey et. al. 2003). Employment 
contracts incorporating remuneration form the basis to align the interests of the agent 
and principal by acting as a self-enforcing mechanism for the manager to act in the 
best interests of the shareholders. Performance based pay in the form of bonuses, 
provision of shares or options to acquire shares or profit sharing arrangements have 
increased in prominence (Van der Zahn and Brown, 2005). These mechanisms serve 
to provide managers with the motivation to maximise the firm’s profits and to align 
the interests of managers and shareholders (Godfrey et. al. 2003). 
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In the manager-debtholder relationship, monitoring costs are transferred using debt 
covenants that place restrictions on the investment and financing activities of the 
firm (Douglas, 2003). Debt covenants are written to control the inherent conflict of 
interest between managers and debtholders (Douglas, 2003).  
 
It may also be effective for agents to incur expenditures in bonding themselves to act 
in ways consistent with the interests of the principal. For example, agents may 
disclose information not only to meet regulatory requirements but additional 
information to the satisfaction of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is 
assumed that monitoring and bonding expenditures are only incurred to the extent 
that these expenditures bring about an equivalent reduction in the costs to the 
principal of divergences from their interests. Thus, some divergences will remain and 
the consequent reduction in firm value is the residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Godfrey et. al. 2003). 
 
The aforementioned discussion of agency theory is based on positive accounting 
theory. Theoretical models explaining disclosure patterns can also be developed from 
an information economics and a contracting perspective (Akelof, 1970; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Core, 2001 and Verrecchia, 1990; 2001). This broader view of agency 
theory is important as more extensive disclosures are likely to be more informative 
and valuable to capital market participants (Beekes and Brown, 2006; Kent and 
Stewart, 2008). More extensive disclosures can also mitigate information asymmetry 
issues relating to adverse selection and moral hazard (Akerlof, 1970). Legitimacy 
theory has also been used to explain disclosure patterns (e.g. Chalmers and Godfrey, 
2004). Managers have incentives to disclose information to demonstrate that the 
company is complying with the norms and expectations of society (Deegan and 
Blomquist, 2006). Legitimacy theory was not used to explain disclosure incentives in 
this study as financial instrument disclosures are considered to be predominantly 
driven by economic, welfare, information and contracting perspectives rather than 
through compliance with social contracts. 
 
2.3 Agency Costs and External Financial Reporting 
The literature has identified two key areas where financial reporting can assist in 
reducing agency costs: (a) minimisation of management manipulation and (b) 
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transparency (Emanuel et. al. 2003, Mercer, 2005). Management can manipulate 
accounting numbers to benefit from the contracting process. In this instance, 
accounting standards can assist in reducing agency costs by minimising the capacity 
of managers to adjust accounting numbers (Mitchell, 2006). For example, financial 
instrument disclosure requirements under AASB 132 in respect of derivative 
financial instruments means that these instruments will have to be recorded on a fair 
value basis with disclosure of significant assumptions and a range of likely estimates 
if fair value is not readily discernable (Tan et. al. 2005). These disclosure criteria 
mean that management manipulation is minimised. The possibility for management 
to choose between diverse accounting methods is limited. Capital market participants 
such as investors and debtholders can then be kept aware of potentially material 
positions and in doing so, reduce agency costs of monitoring and bonding (Emanuel 
et. al. 2003, Mercer, 2005). 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide an example of the way in which audited 
financial statements might reduce agency costs. They state that:  
 
Suppose, for example, that the bond holders (or outside equity holders) would 
find it worthwhile to produce detailed financial statements such as those 
contained in the usual published accounting reports as a means of monitoring 
the manager. If the manager can produce such information at lower costs than 
bond holders (perhaps because the manager is already collecting much of the 
data they desire for the manager’s own internal decision-making purposes), it 
would pay him or her to agree in advance to incur the cost of providing such 
reports and to have their accuracy testified to by an independent outside 
auditor (p.338). 
 
A detailed review of early empirical evidence supporting the role of agency costs and 
other contracting costs (information, renegotiation and bankruptcy costs) in 
influencing accounting policy choices is provided by Watts and Zimmerman (1990). 
They state: 
 
The set of accounting procedures within which managers have discretion is 
called the accepted set. It is voluntarily determined by the contracting parties. 
Managerial discretion over accounting method choice (i.e., the accepted set) 
is predicted to vary across firms with the variation in the costs and benefits of 
restrictions. These restrictions produce the best or accepted accounting 
principles even without mandated accounting standards by government (p. 
136).  
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Whittred (1987) investigated the incentives of management of Australian 
corporations to adopt the consolidated form of financial reporting before there was 
any specific institutional requirement for them to do so. He concluded that the 
disclosure of consolidated financial statements was more likely to be adopted in high 
agency cost cases; that is, where cross-guarantees were established between lenders 
and shareholders within the group and manager’s had a small proportionate equity 
interest in the parent company’s shares.  
 
2.4 Debt Covenants and Accounting Choices 
In recent years, the number and type of finance instruments have grown 
considerably. Many instruments such as hedging contracts exhibit a strong reliance 
on accounting data such as borrowing limitations. Godfrey et. al. (2003) notes that 
numerous studies have found that managers make individual accounting policy 
choices that increase reported profit as the firm come closer to breaching debt 
covenants, and also that management manipulates accounting profits in general in 
years proceeding and following violation of debt covenants. It is possible for 
managers to manipulate accounting profits using not only accounting policy choices 
but also discretion regarding matters such as valuation techniques to record fair value 
of financial instruments. 
 
Debt contracts do not specify in detail the accounting principles to be adopted in all 
circumstances. Hence, management is left with considerable discretion. However, a 
firm may be reluctant to suffer a loss of reputation amongst lending institutions if 
actions are taken that would be viewed as opportunistic (Whittred, Zimmer, Taylor 
and Wells, 2004). Nevertheless, incentives may exist that could lead to the violation 
of debt covenants. The magnitude of the incentive is partially dependent upon what 
the manager perceives will be the lender’s reaction to the violation of an accounting 
based covenant. Chen and Wei (1993) show that the reaction of lenders varies 
systematically depending upon the characteristics of the firm that violates the 
financial ratio covenant. Chen and Wei (1993) find that violation is of less concern 
where the firm has a lower leverage ratio, or where the loan agreement involves 
satisfactory security or is smaller in size.  
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2.5 Accounting Policy Choices 
The analysis of agency theory in subsections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 suggests that the 
financial contracts into which a firm has entered, and the environment (political, 
regulatory, taxation, capital markets) in which the firm operates, are likely to be 
important determinants of management’s accounting policy choices. Management 
usually has at its discretion a wide range (or portfolio) of accounting techniques from 
which to choose what impacts on reported financial position and financial 
performance as well as disclosure of information in annual reports and other media 
(Godfrey et. al. 2003). 
 
In this thesis, disclosure of information concerning financial instruments leading up 
to and following implementation of IFRS presents an ideal opportunity to apply 
agency theory. Introduction of Australian accounting standards AASB 132 and 
AASB 139 under IFRS has introduced significant changes to the presentation, 
recognition and measurement of financial instruments. This set of accounting 
innovations provides firm management with the opportunity to apply discretion 
regarding qualitative and quantitative financial instrument information disclosures to 
shareholders. Managers have access to important information concerning the 
policies, consequences and risk management practices in relation to the use of 
financial instruments not available to shareholders (Cabedo and Tirado, 2003). While 
managers may comply with the disclosure requirements mandated under accounting 
standard AASB 132 following implementation of IFRS, the quality of this 
compliance will likely vary. Furthermore, the disclosure of additional information 
not mandated under AASB 132 will also vary considerably. Managers have 
discretion and the opportunity to disclose important information over and above that 
mandated under AASB 132 in a manner that will maximise returns to shareholders. 
Conversely, managers may fail to comply or only minimally comply with the 
requirements of AASB 132 on the basis that managers wish to pursue personal goals 
(Whitted et. al., 2004).  
 
2.6 Financial Instrument Disclosures 
The evolution of the Australian financial reporting framework over the past five 
years is likely to have had a significant impact on disclosures in general, and the 
disclosure of financial instrument information specifically within annual reports 
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(Brown and Tarca, 2005). The motivation of the directors and executive 
management, as financial statement preparers, to disclose or not disclose financial 
instrument information has largely been explained in recent literature using agency 
theory as many determinants of disclosure patterns have been driven by economic or 
welfare considerations (Godfrey et. al., 2003). In this section, a summary of the 
major recent studies of financial instrument disclosures within annual reports both in 
Australia and overseas are reviewed. The results of these studies may assist in 
explaining disclosure patterns and the timing of such disclosures within the current 
study period. 
 
Malone, Fries and Jones (1993) used a weighted index of disclosure items to measure 
the extent of financial disclosure within 1986 annual reports for 125 U.S. firms in the 
oil and gas industry. The dependent variable, extent of financial disclosure, was 
measured as the ratio of the firm’s total disclosure score to the firm’s possible 
disclosure and consisted of 129 items of information. Items were compiled from an 
examination of 1986 annual reports, (i.e., what was already disclosed by sample 
firms). The extent of financial disclosures within annual reports was compared 
against a firm’s debt to equity ratio, number of shareholders, total assets as a proxy 
for firm size, inter-industry diversification, rate of return on net worth, earnings 
margins, audit firm size, stock exchange listing, material foreign operations and 
proportion of independent directors on the board. Malone et. al. (1993) found that 
exchange listing status, ratio of debt to equity and number of shareholders was 
significantly and positively associated with financial disclosure within annual 
reports. 
  
Matolcsy and Petty (2001) analysed internal reporting of derivative financial 
instruments of The Group of 100 (G100) companies12. Using 34 valid responses from 
93 questionnaires13, Matolcsy and Petty (2001) found that the majority of companies 
provided monthly reports on derivatives to the board of directors and had well 
established internal accounting and administrative policies and procedures dealing 
with derivatives. Specifically, 85.3% of the sample companies had formal board 
                                                 
12 The G100 companies, supported by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and the 
Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants (now CPA Australia) comprised publicly listed 
and private companies and government business enterprises. 
13 This included nine responses from mining companies. 
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directives relating to derivative use and 84.8% of companies specified the nature of 
derivatives used in the company’s treasury function. Further, 87.5% of companies 
had policies limiting financial risks and 85.3% reported to the board of directors on 
derivatives. Despite a high percentage of sample firms with controls in place relating 
to derivative use, more than half of the sample companies failed to assess and revalue 
the risks associated with the use of derivatives on a continuous basis.  
 
Although the nine mining companies included in the sample did not assess financial 
risk on a daily or weekly basis, Matolcsy and Petty (2001) attributed this to the 
longer term nature of derivative contracts for mining companies. Whilst 54.2% of the 
sample companies had internal procedures to revalue derivatives, only 67.4% of the 
audit committees reviewed exposure to derivatives. External auditors were found to 
monitor derivatives on a semi-annual or annual basis. Some 35.2% of firms that used 
derivatives did not have directors on the board with the necessary expertise to 
approve or understand derivative transactions. Matolcsy and Petty (2001) suggested 
that the absence of continuous monitoring of derivatives by management and 
directors could lead to substantial real losses or opportunity costs and raises concerns 
in respect of corporate governance and the fiduciary duties of directors.  
 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2000) investigated the diversity in hedge accounting policy 
choices, and hedge accounting disclosure, recognition and measurement practices of 
108 Australian firms which had outstanding contracts at 30 June 1998. They found 
that firms were significantly lacking in disclosure of hedge accounting policies, net 
fair value methodology and important assumptions relating to determination of net 
fair value of derivative financial instruments under AASB 1033 (AASB, 1999). 
Many of the disclosures relating to derivative instrument information were vague and 
clearly failed in terms of contributing to the overall understandability, comparability 
and consistency of the body of information within the annual report. For example, of 
the 77 sample firms that used interest rate derivatives, only 47 specifically discussed 
the firm’s accounting policy in relation to swap instruments (Chalmers and Godfrey, 
2000). Chalmers and Godfrey (2000) concluded that the disclosure requirements in 
respect to hedge accounting under AASB 1033 were too general and that more 
specific disclosure requirements were required. 
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Chalmers (2001) examined voluntary derivative financial instrument disclosures of 
140 Australian listed firms in the period 1992 to 1998. Discretionary disclosures of 
derivative instrument activity within annual reports increased during this period 
(Chalmers, 2001). Leading up to 1995, derivative disclosures were limited and 
largely confined to firms within the extractive industries. This suggested extractive 
industry firms considered derivative information more useful to users compared to 
firms operating in other industries. In 1995, coinciding with the issue of professional 
body recommendations and accounting Exposure Draft 65: Presentation and 
Disclosure of Financial Instruments (ED65), the number of firms making voluntary 
disclosure of derivative information within annual reports increased significantly 
(Chalmers, 2001). Chalmers (2001) purported that the introduction of ED65 caused 
firms to reassess derivative disclosure strategies. The other significant increase in 
disclosures corresponded to the reporting period when AASB 1033 became 
mandatory in 1997. However, on balance, Chalmers (2001) found that disclosure of 
derivative financial instrument information lacked completeness relative to 
disclosures recommended in ED65. 
 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) extended the research of Chalmers and Godfrey 
(2000) and Chalmers (2001) by investigating managerial responses to derivative 
financial instrument disclosure requirements proposed by the Australian accounting 
standard setting bodies G100 and the Australian Society of Corporate Treasurers 
(ASCT). The 1992 to 1996 period investigated by Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) 
coincided with the release of Exposure Draft 59: Financial Instruments and ED65. 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) propose that managers and firms both have reputation 
capital at stake if managers fail to adequately disclose financial instrument 
information within critical documents such as the firm’s annual report as this may 
have consequences for the firm in terms of achieving cost of capital targets in 
financing activities14.  
 
Using a sample of 199 top 500 ASX listed firms, Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) 
found that the change in the voluntary reporting disclosure index for derivative 
financial instruments was statistically significant for the 1993-1994, 1994-1995 and 
                                                 
14 Legitimacy theory and costly contracting theories were used as the framework to explain 
managerial disclosure behaviour. 
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1995-1996 reporting periods. There was a statistically significant relationship 
between the disclosure index (comprised of 14 items) and G100 and ASCT 
affiliation for all reporting periods. Change was greater in 1995 coinciding with the 
release of ED65 and the ASCT Industry Statement (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). 
The presence of professional scrutiny, proxied by affiliation to the G100 and ASCT, 
was associated with increased voluntary derivative financial instrument disclosures 
within annual reports. Control variables of size (natural log of total assets) and 
industry classification (mining and oil firms as opposed to non-mining and oil firms) 
were significantly associated with derivative disclosures in each year of the analysis. 
Firm leverage, as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets, was 
significantly positively associated with firm disclosures only in 1996. Also, there was 
a significant positive association between voluntary disclosures and a firm issuing 
new capital in the proceeding year only in 1994. On balance, the results of the 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) study demonstrate that in an essentially unregulated 
environment, firms voluntarily disclosed more derivative instrument information as 
greater pressure was exerted for firms to increase transparency of financial reporting 
and to comply with professional norms and institutional pressures (Chalmers and 
Godfrey, 2004). 
 
Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) examined the nature and determinants of voluntary 
disclosures of currency derivative usage within the 1993 annual reports by large 
industrial firms in the U.S. under SFAS 107: Disclosure about Fair Value of 
Financial Instruments, effective 1991. SFAS 107 encouraged users to disclosed 
detailed information concerning derivative usage without mandating it. Under SFAS 
107 some firms voluntarily disclosed extensive information regarding currency 
hedging practices whilst other firms divulged: (a) little or no information or (b) 
aggregated data so as to meet the minimum disclosure requirements stipulated in the 
guidelines. The dependent variable measured the level of currency derivative 
disclosures using a five point Likert scale (1 being poor disclosure and 5 being 
extensive disclosures). Results of univariate tests indicated smaller firms exhibit 
higher quality voluntary disclosures. Firms with higher levels of currency 
derivatives, higher market/book value ratios (ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity), lower leverage (total debt/total assets) and higher percentage 
institutional stock holdings also exhibited higher quality disclosures. Aggarwal and 
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Simkins (2004) state that the association of higher quality voluntary disclosures with 
higher market/book value ratios was consistent with the view that disclosing risk 
management practices enhances shareholder value. In contrast, firms that paid larger 
equity based (stock option) remuneration tended to disclose lower quality voluntary 
disclosures consistent with agency theory views that managers act in their own self 
interest. Firms exposed to greater currency risk or firms with higher levels of 
currency derivatives did not provide greater voluntary disclosures.  
 
Using structured interviews, Mallin, Dunne, Helliar and Ow-Young (2004) examined 
institutional investors’ perceptions on why UK firms belonging to the FTSE 100 
index voluntarily disclosed financial derivative information in annual reports prior to 
the introduction of FRS 13 Derivatives and Other Financial Instruments – 
Disclosures. FRS 13, introduced in September 1998 and effective for accounting 
periods ending on or after 23 March 1999, required UK publicly traded entities and 
financial institutions that use financial instruments, to provide sufficient qualitative 
and quantitative disclosures regarding use of derivatives and other financial products. 
The standard required disclosure of the risks arising in connection with the use of 
derivative financial instruments and how the risks are managed and a description of 
the objectives, policies and strategies for holding and issuing financial instruments. 
Mallin et. al. (2004) found that companies chose to disclose derivative information 
prior to the introduction of FRS 13 because of well known scandals associated with 
derivative use, the relative importance of the finance function within the firm and the 
finance department’s attitude towards transparency and the influence of changing 
corporate governance regulation. Other reasons cited by fund managers for early 
disclosure of derivative information by UK firms are: (a) industry peer pressure; (b) 
commercial incentives designed to increase certainty and information flow to capital 
markets and investors; (c) the size of underlying exposures and risks relating to 
derivative use and; (d) company size with larger companies utilising their resources 
to disclose early (Mallin et. al. 2004). Fund managers also indicated that in some 
cases companies were using financial instruments inappropriately and disclosures 
were only made when absolutely required to do so under FRS 13.  
 
Dunne, Helliar, Power and Mallin (2005) undertook a content analysis of derivative 
financial instrument information within annual reports of listed companies within the 
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UK to examine disclosure practices immediately before and after adoption of FRS 
13. Dunne et. al. (2005) found derivative related information, as measured by actual 
pages or percentage of the annual report devoted to this information, increased 
following implementation of FRS 13. Companies belonging to the FTSE 100 index 
were the largest disclosures of derivative related information. Clearly, 
implementation of FRS 13 was associated with an increase in derivative financial 
instrument information disclosed within annual reports. 
 
Using data collected over a five year period (1989 to 1993) for 313 UK companies, 
Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002) investigated the association between voluntary 
accounting ratio disclosures and firm profitability, return on investment, gearing, 
liquidity, company efficiency, size and industry within annual reports. A 
dichotomous measure of ratio disclosure was used where companies were grouped as 
ratio disclosers or ratio non-disclosers. The majority of companies disclosed ratios 
with investment, gearing and profitability ratios being the most commonly disclosed 
ratios. Using multivariate analysis, ratio disclosure and company performance, size 
and industry were found to be positively associated.  
 
In a similar study, Mitchell (2006) examined the annual reports of 528 Australian 
listed firms belonging to several industry classifications with financial year ending 
30 June 1991 to determine the extent of financial ratio disclosures. A selective or 
signaling motivation for disclosure of financial ratio information was proposed. 
Mitchell (2006) found that firms voluntarily report financial ratio information when 
the ratios provide favourable information about the business performance of the firm. 
The frequency of disclosures was considerably lower for firms belonging to the 
mining industry with 30% of mining firms disclosing information on financial ratios. 
 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2006) applied content analysis to the 2001 annual reports of 
55 listed Portuguese companies to gauge compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of IAS 3215 and the measurement and recognition criteria of IAS 39. To 
measure the extent to which these companies disclosed financial instrument 
information, Lopes and Rodrigues (2006) used a comprehensive index comprising 
                                                 
15 IAS 39 and IAS 32 became effective in Portugal in the year ending 31 December 2001. 
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120 applicable items of financial instrument information16. Although IAS 32 and IAS 
39 require fair value measurement of certain financial instruments and disclosure of 
the fair value methodologies and significant assumptions, 45 of the 55 companies did 
not disclose any information with respect to fair value methodologies. Also none of 
the sample companies disclosed information regarding assumptions relating to fair 
value measurement. Of a sample of 19 companies that used derivative financial 
instruments, 47.4% failed to disclose any information concerning accounting policies 
whilst 44.4% did not disclose accounting methods respectively with respect of these 
instruments. Further, 42.1% (22.2%) of the full sample failed to provide a description 
of the hedge (disclose the fair value of financial instruments designated as hedging 
instruments). Only one company disclosed the period in which the hedging forecast 
transactions were expected to occur. Lopes and Rodrigues (2006) concluded that 
disclosure of financial instrument information by the 55 Portuguese sample 
companies was poor and indicative of a high degree of non-compliance with IAS 32 
disclosure requirements. In the majority of cases, even if financial instrument 
information was disclosed, it was too general in nature and not particularly useful to 
users for comparing company annual report information.     
 
Several recent studies of financial risk management activities, particularly in the UK, 
reflect the increasing importance of risk related research. For example, using a 
sample of 79 UK companies, Linsley and Shrives (2006) examined risk disclosures 
in annual reports. Based on content analysis, a positive and significant association 
was found between risk disclosures and firm size, and between the number of risk 
disclosures and an environmental risk rating. No significant association was found 
between risk disclosures and: (a) gearing ratio; (b) asset cover; (c) book to market 
value of equity; and (d) beta. Linsley and Shrives (2006) conclude that the general 
nature of risk disclosures made did not allow stakeholders to adequately assess a 
company’s risk profile.  
 
Abraham and Cox (2007) extend the work of Linsley and Shrives (2006) examining 
the disclosures of three major categories of risk (i.e. - business, financial and internal 
control risk) in the annual reports of 71 UK FTSE 100 companies. They then relate 
                                                 
16 Items of financial instrument information disclosed were allocated a one [1], otherwise a score of 
zero [0] applied. 
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disclosures to governance, ownership, industry and listing characteristics. Using 
content analysis, Abraham and Cox (2007) found that the quantity of narrative risk 
information disclosed in annual reports is positively associated with both the number 
of executive and independent directors but not with the number of non-executive 
directors. Abraham and Cox (2007) attribute this association to agency tenets where 
independent directors are able to draw on their external expertise and experience 
relating to risk and ensure that disclosures to the business community are made. 
Further, Abraham and Cox (2007) found that risk disclosure is negatively related to 
share ownership by long-term institutions attributed to private information 
acquisition by the institutional investors and positively associated with US dual 
listing status. Abraham and Cox (2007, p. 244) propose that dual listed firms provide 
more risk disclosures “to convince shareholders that they are behaving optimally” 
and that there was little additional cost to make those disclosures.  
 
In summary, derivative financial instrument disclosures mandated under AASB 1033 
in Australia demonstrated a high degree of non-compliance with this standard 
(Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). Even if derivative instrument information was 
disclosed pursuant to AASB 1033 requirements, it tended to be too brief, vague or 
general in nature to represent useful, reliable and comparable information to the 
various users of annual financial reports and would be unlikely to assist them in 
making informed economic decisions. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) demonstrated 
that firms voluntarily disclosed more derivative instrument information as greater 
pressure was exerted through compliance with professional norms and by 
institutions. Institutional pressure can act as a substitute for an effective corporate 
governance structure of the firm and may enhance a firm’s disclosure policy where 
corporate governance mechanisms are weak or lacking. Similarly, Mallin et. al. 
(2004) showed that firms are willing to disclose financial instrument information if 
appropriate incentives exist such as firm size, financial instrument risk, the 
importance of the treasury function in the firm as well as external factors such as 
peer pressure and improved corporate governance regulation. Research by Chalmers 
(2001), Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) and Dunne et. al. (2005) highlight the positive 
association between the announcement and adoption of new accounting standards, 
exposure drafts and regulations or recommendations and the extent of disclosure of 
voluntary derivative financial instrument information. In this study, a similar 
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approach will be adopted whereby financial instrument disclosure patterns will be 
analysed over a period of time and related to firm specific characteristics 
(governance, capital management, listing status and income tax) to determine the 
likely causes of variability in these disclosure patterns 
 
2.7 Corporate Governance Structure and Disclosure Patterns 
There is no explicit uniformly applied definition of corporate governance. Larcker, 
Richardson and Tuna (2005, p1) defined corporate governance as “the set of 
mechanisms that influence the decisions made by managers when there is separation 
of ownership and control”. The ASX Corporate Governance Council, meanwhile, 
defines corporate governance as the “system by which companies are directed and 
managed” (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003, p 3). In this study, the 
definitions of corporate governance as applied by both Larcker et. al., 2005 and the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council are applied. 
 
Corporate governance influences how the objectives of the company are set and 
achieved, how risk is monitored and assessed and how performance is optimised 
(Dunne et. al. 2004). An increase in the application of corporate governance 
mechanisms occurred over the past five years on the back of (a) corporate failures; 
(b) changing expectations of capital markets; (c) increased regulatory requirements 
and; (d) changes in accounting standards and (e) the information needs of 
shareholders, capital market participants and an increasing array of other 
stakeholders (Shailer, 2004). 
 
Despite prominent recent attention to the role of corporate governance in the 
performance and management, little research has been conducted investigating its 
relation to corporate financial reporting disclosures. Eng and Mak (2003) examined 
whether corporate governance (ownership structure and board composition) is 
associated with voluntary disclosure of 158 Singapore stock exchange listed firms. 
Eng and Mak (2003) found that lower managerial ownership and significant 
government ownership are associated with increased disclosures. Meanwhile, a 
higher proportion of outside directors on the board was associated with reduced 
disclosures. Eng and Mak (2003) attribute the latter result to the relatively high 
representation of external directors on the board of Singapore firms who acquire and 
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use information directly rather than disseminate that information to the public via 
annual reports. 
 
Mallin et. al. (2004) examined UK institutional investor’s attitude towards the 
introduction of FRS 13. One fund manager cited the influence of changing corporate 
governance regulation as a possible reason for disclosing non-mandated information 
prior to the introduction of FRS 13 (Mallin et. al., 2004, p.16) stating “The Turnball 
Report was starting to prompt boards and audit committees to ask certain questions 
and anticipate changes that would be required of a disclosure and risk control 
nature”. Despite the extra administrative burden in disclosing information, fund 
managers’ stated that there had been an increase in incentives to make disclosures 
following corporate governance reforms. All the fund managers interviewed stated 
that the benefits of mandated disclosure outweighed the costs (Mallin et. al. 2004). 
 
Brown, Robinson and Caylor (2004) created a broad measure of corporate 
governance (Gov-Score) for 2,327 firms as at 1st February 2003 using data derived 
from Institutional Shareholder Services in the U.S. Gov-Score is a composite 
measure of 51 items encompassing eight corporate governance categories – audit, 
board of directors, charter/by-laws, director education, executive and director 
compensation, ownership, progressive practices and state of incorporation. Gov-
Score was related to firm performance, firm valuation and shareholder payout. Gov-
Score ranged from 13 to 38 with a mean of 22.5 and a standard deviation of 3.45. 
Performance measures used were return on equity, profit margin, sales growth, 
Tobin’s Q, dividend yield and share repurchases. Adherence to charter/by-laws, a 
proxy used for ‘good’ corporate governance, is strongly associated with poor 
operational performance. Brown et. al. (2004) purport that the composite measure of 
corporate governance is superior to previous studies based on the extent and 
composition of corporate governance items used.  
 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) used management earnings forecasts to test the 
relation between corporate governance structure and financial disclosures by 275 
firms between 1995 and 2000. They found firms with effective governance 
mechanisms were more likely to make or update earnings forecasts, particularly 
when management was faced with bad news. Forecast updates were more likely for 
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firms which had more independent directors on the board and for firms which had 
audit committee members with financial expertise. Forecast updates were also more 
likely for firms in which insiders and institutions had greater equity ownership 
(Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
 
Beekes and Brown (2006) investigated the association between the quality of the 
top17 250 Australian firms’ corporate governance structure (CGQ18) and the degree 
of informativeness of disclosed information. Informativeness was measured using six 
attributes: (a) the frequency of announcements of price sensitive information to the 
share market; (b) the extent of its security analyst following; (c) the accuracy; (d) 
bias; (e) disagreement in analysts’ earnings forecasts for that firm and; (f) the 
timeliness with which its share price reacts to value-relevant information. Better 
governed firms were considered to be those that more closely adhered to the ASX 
principles of good corporate governance. These firms were considered by Beekes 
and Brown (2006) to be more transparent in that these firms made more timely 
disclosures and disclosed information incorporating both good news and bad news. 
Beekes and Brown (2006) found that better governed firms disclosed information 
more frequently and faster to the market and importantly found that “natural resource 
firms release on average 2.2 more documents annually than firms in other industries” 
(p.441). Overall, Beekes and Brown (2006) found that better governed firms make 
more price sensitive disclosures, these firms have a larger analyst following, 
analysts’ consensus forecasts are less biased and overall made more informative 
disclosures. 
 
Kent and Stewart (2008) related mandated disclosures under AASB 1047 to 
corporate governance structure of Australian listed firms for financial reporting 
periods ending on or after 30 June 2004. They found that firms with more frequent 
board and audit committee meetings, smaller audit committee teams and audit 
committee teams with members that lack financial expertise and firms that engage a 
big four or medium size auditor tend to disclose more information about expected 
IFRS impacts. No significant association was found between disclosure level and 
board and audit committee independence. Overall Kent and Stewart (2008) provide 
                                                 
17 By market capitalisation as at 30 June, 2001. 
18 Comprising fourteen corporate governance attributes. 
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evidence of a direct link between strength of governance structures and a greater 
level of financial reporting disclosures.  
.  
2.8 Link Between Corporate Governance Structure and Agency Theory  
An agency relationship provides the opportunity for firm management to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour that enhances their welfare at the expense of the firm (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The corporate governance principles developed by the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council constitute a mechanism to ameliorate agency 
problems in shareholder-manager relationships. Transparency relating to corporate 
governance attributes serves to minimise agency conflicts between shareholders and 
managers that arise as a result of separation of ownership and control of firms 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
A major aspect of corporate governance is concerned with how best to reduce 
managerial opportunistic behaviour. Agency theorists suggest that that there are 
internal (e.g. monitoring by the board of directors, compensation contracts and 
ownership structures) and external (e.g. regulatory bodies, ASX listing rules, 
legislation) governance mechanisms designed to limit agency costs arising from the 
aberrant activities of managers (Jensen, 1986; Fama, 1980).  
 
Brown et. al. (2004) tested the association between a composite measure of 51 
corporate governance items and firm performance, valuation and shareholder payout 
in the US. Brown et. al. (2004) maintain managers have incentives to expropriate a 
firm’s assets by undertaking projects that benefit themselves personally but that 
impact shareholder wealth adversely. Effective corporate governance reduces the 
controls that shareholders and creditors need to confer to managers thereby 
increasing the likelihood that managers invest in positive net present value projects.  
 
2.9 Capital Management and Disclosure Patterns 
Schadewitz and Blevans (1998) examined interim disclosures of Finnish firms over 
the period 1985 to 1993. They found that the extent of disclosure is directly related to 
proxy measures of capital structure together with other variables (e.g. risk, size and 
market maturity). In relation to capital structure, Schadewitz and Blevans (1998) 
hypothesised disclosure is dependent on leverage. Results of this study indicate that 
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increases in relative changes in a firm’s equity yield significantly greater interim 
disclosures. Schadewitz and Blevans (1998) purported Finnish firms in the process of 
expanding equity positions used interim financial reports to advertise requirements 
for additional equity. The need for enhanced disclosure was made to raise new 
capital and this was particularly important in the thin Finnish capital market.  
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) identified six capital market hypotheses why firm 
management would voluntarily disclose information. The first is the capital markets 
transactions hypothesis where voluntary disclosure of information is made by 
management who anticipate making capital market transactions to reduce 
information asymmetry and to reduce the cost of external financing. The second is 
the corporate control contest hypothesis where information is voluntarily disclosed to 
increase firm valuation and to explain poor earnings performance. The third is the 
stock compensation hypothesis where information is voluntarily disclosed by 
recipients of stock compensation to reduce the likelihood of insider trading 
allegations, to correct any perceived undervaluation of the firm and to reduce 
contracting costs between the firm and its management. The fourth is the litigation 
cost hypothesis where management has the incentive to disclose bad news to reduce 
the likelihood of legal action for inadequate or untimely disclosures. The fifth is the 
management talent signaling hypothesis where talented managers may voluntarily 
disclose information such as earnings forecasts to signal to investors as early as 
possible that management can anticipate future changes in the firm’s economic 
environment. The sixth is the proprietary cost hypothesis where disclosures might be 
constrained if information is deemed to provide competitor firms with proprietary 
information.  
Empirical evidence provides support for the capital markets transactions hypothesis 
of Healy and Palepu (2001). Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) for example, provide 
strong empirical support for the negative causal relation between the quality of 
information disclosed by a firm and its cost of capital after taking into consideration 
unobservable firm specific factors such as costs of disclosure and management 
reputation that are also correlated with the cost of capital.  
 
Collett and Hrasky (2005) examined the relationship between voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures of 299 Australian listed companies in 1994 and their future 
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financing intentions. Collett and Hrasky (2005) found a positive association between 
voluntary corporate governance disclosures and future equity financing decisions. 
However, no significant association was found between voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures and firms’ future debt financing decisions (Collett and 
Hrasky, 2005). Overall, findings are consistent with the capital markets hypothesis of 
Healy and Palepu (2001). Further, they found that resource companies were more 
likely to disclose corporate governance information than firms belonging to other 
industries and that firms’ with multiple stock exchange listing were also more likely 
to disclose this information. It should be noted, however, that the findings of Collett 
and Hrasky (2005) are limited as only 30 companies out of the 299 surveyed actually 
disclosed corporate governance information. 
 
Disclosure practices may vary with takeover or merger activities. Brennan (1999) for 
example, examined disclosure of profit forecasts by target companies during 
takeover bids for listed UK companies between 1988 and 1992. Brennan (1999) also 
related disclosure patterns to the type of bid, bid horizon, target firm managerial 
ownership, the existence of large block shareholders and industry. Profit forecast 
disclosures in takeover documents were more common during takeover activity. 
Disclosures were found to be associated with the type of bid with greater disclosures 
made during contested bids. Greater disclosures were made for bids with a shorter 
bid horizon and for firms with large block shareholdings. Although Brennan (1999) 
examined disclosures made in takeover documents, similar reasons for disclosures in 
the annual reports of firms engaged in takeover or merger activity may apply. 
 
Malone et. al. (1993) examined the extent of financial information disclosures by oil 
and gas firms with purely domestic operations and compared these with material 
foreign operations. They suggested that firms with overseas operations are subject to 
additional reporting requirements levied by the foreign government of the country in 
which the firm was operating and/or the overseas stock exchange on which the firm 
was trading. Malone et. al. (1993) did not find a statistically significant relation 
between extent of disclosures and the existence of overseas operations. 
 
Multinational firms that have operations in Australia and overseas are exposed to a 
complex legal, operational, financial and regulatory environment that generates a 
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range of risks, additional managerial decision making and associated monitoring 
activities (Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith, 2004).  This complexity may interact 
with governance structures. Riahi-Belkaoui (2001) for example, examined variation 
in analysts’ evaluations of disclosure practices of 313 large US firms over the period 
1986 to 1990. He provided evidence that disclosure, as measured by the analysts’ 
ratings, increased with firm size, growth opportunities and degree of multi-
nationality19.  
 
2.10 Link Between Capital Management Structure and Agency Theory  
Capital market considerations such as the cost of capital, availability and choice of 
external financing and analyst following are important drivers of management’s 
voluntary disclosure practices (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Botosan (1997) and 
Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) found firms can achieve lower costs of capital 
through voluntarily increasing disclosures of credible information. Similarly, a 
positive association between firms seeking to obtain external financing and earnings 
forecast disclosures were found by Frankel, McNichols and Wilson (1995). They 
concluded firm management provide forecast disclosures to increase the flow of 
information to capital market participants and that management consider these 
disclosures to be value relevant. 
 
2.11 Overseas Listing Status and Disclosure Patterns 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2001) hypothesised that disclosure should be positively associated 
with multi-nationality for two reasons. The first reason was the requirement to raise 
capital at the lowest possible cost. This places pressure on firms to voluntarily 
disclose more information. The second reason was that firms with multiple listing 
status are more likely to be subject to greater scrutiny from a diverse shareholder set, 
thereby increasing monitoring costs. Monitoring costs can be reduced through greater 
disclosure in annual reports.   
 
Lang, Raedy and Wilson (2006) compared the earnings management and value 
relevance of accounting information between purely U.S. listed firms and U.S. cross-
listed firms. They found that cross-listed firms face different reporting incentives 
                                                 
19 The proxy measure for multi-nationality was foreign profit divided by total profit. 
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allowing management to use their discretion when applying accounting standards. 
Reporting incentives are considered to be largely driven by market forces and 
institutional factors rather than accounting standards. U.S cross listed firms that are 
subject to potential U.S. Security and Exchange Commission enforcement were 
shown to substantially increase annual report disclosures. However, despite the fact 
that both sets of companies use U.S. GAAP, cross-listed firms exhibit more earnings 
management and lower value-relevance than data for purely U.S. listed firms. Leuz 
(2006) attributed this variance to differences in ownership concentration between the 
two set of firms with cross-listed firms having more concentrated ownership 
structures, and the influence of non-U.S. (home country) institutions on reporting 
behaviour in addition to weak U.S. legal enforcement. These results support a similar 
study undertaken by Street and Bryant (2000). 
 
The aforementioned studies provide evidence that capital management and overseas 
stock exchange listing issues are important determinants of information disclosure. 
As financial instruments provide one of the primary means by which a firm can raise 
capital, any analysis of financial instrument disclosures will need to assess the impact 
capital management and cross-listing considerations have on disclosure patterns. 
 
2.12 Income Tax Characteristics and Disclosure Patterns 
It is expected that tax considerations will have an important bearing on 
management’s financial accounting policy decisions and reporting incentives given 
the influence of tax on a firm’s cash flows (Dhaliwal, Newberry and Weaver, 2005). 
The link between disclosure policy and income tax has received surprisingly limited 
attention in the literature. This section provides an analysis of the link between 
disclosure policy and practices and the international income tax characteristics of 
resource firms. 
 
Slemrod (2001) suggested that multinational corporations use a set of inter-related, 
globally orientated tax planning methods to minimise group tax. A foreign 
multinational corporation’s average tax rate is likely to reflect a mix of operations in 
both high tax rate jurisdictions and those in lower tax rate jurisdictions, and, 
consequently, how aggressively these firms are likely to pursue tax minimisation 
strategies and tax-motivated reporting. Using a sample of 5,379 firm years over the 
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period 1990 to 1997, Slemrod (2001) found that multinational corporations with 
more extensive foreign operations have lower worldwide effective tax rates20 (as 
measured by the ratio of income taxes payable to pre-tax accounting income) than 
other firms. Slemrod (2001) suggests that these results are indicative of economies of 
scale in tax planning. Multinational corporations have the opportunity to reduce 
taxation by locating operations in lower tax jurisdictions, by shifting income from 
high tax jurisdictions to low tax jurisdictions and by exploiting differences in the tax 
rules of different counties (Slemrod, 2001). Firms that consistently report low 
worldwide tax payable, measured by low effective tax rates, have greater after-tax 
cash flows. This in turn will have flow-on impacts for a whole suite of performance 
indicators disclosed within reporting media.  
 
Mills and Newberry (2004) used both publicly available financial data on foreign 
multinationals and confidential income tax return data on their U.S. subsidiaries 
(Foreign Controlled Corporations or FCCs) over the period 1987 to 1996 to examine 
whether tax incentives of these foreign multinationals influenced their U.S. taxable 
income reporting. They found that the taxable income levels of 125 FCCs varied 
significantly with world wide tax incentives of their foreign parent companies and 
economic determinants. Foreign multinationals with relatively low foreign tax rates 
sourced more debt and reported less taxable income in the group’s U.S. FCCs than 
those with relatively high average foreign tax rates.  Consistent with tax motivated 
income reporting, the difference between firm-specific average foreign tax rates 
(Ratediff) was found to be negatively related to either FCC taxable income/assets or 
FCC taxable income/sales21. This result suggests that foreign multinationals with 
relatively low average foreign tax rates reported lower taxable income in U.S. 
subsidiaries than those with relatively high average foreign tax rates.  
 
Mills and Newberry (2004) also estimated a model of debt financing that-tested 
whether foreign multinationals’ tax incentives influenced U.S. debt policy. FCC 
                                                 
20 Effective tax rates reflect the relative tax burden of firms as they measure the proficiency of a firm 
to reduce its current tax liability relative to pre-tax accounting income. They capture differences in 
financial accounting income and taxable income. 
21 Taxable income/assets and taxable income/sales were used as a measure of U.S. income reported by 
foreign multinationals in the tax returns of U.S. subsidiaries. The proxy measure for tax incentive 
consisted of either the difference between firm-specific average foreign tax rates (Ratediff) or the 
difference between statutory tax rates in the U.S. as compared to those in the foreign multinational’s 
tax jurisdiction (Statutorydiff). 
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interest expenses/sales provided a proxy of foreign multinationals’ debt tax shields. 
Consistent with a tax motivated debt policy, they found that Ratediff was positively 
associated with either the U.S. debt ratio (FCC debt/assets) or the percentage of U.S. 
interest expense to U.S. sales (FCC interest expense/sales). These findings suggest 
that foreign multinationals with relatively low foreign tax rates source more debt in 
their U.S. FCCs than those with relatively high foreign tax rates. This provides 
evidence that FCCs source debt in the U.S where greater deductions are available on 
the interest and loan fees payable on that debt22. Clearly financing methods are 
influenced by tax minimisation strategies and this in turn influences the FCCs 
income reporting objectives23.  
 
Mills and Newbery (2005) extended earlier work (Mills and Newberry, 2004) by 
examining large U.S. firms’ use of off-balance sheet and hybrid debt financing over 
the period 1989 to 2001 by matching tax return and financial statement information. 
They found that firms with relatively poorer or constrained credit ratings or higher 
leverage reported greater amounts of interest expense in income tax returns 
compared to that reported in financial statements. Mills and Newbery (2005) 
reported that not all interest bearing debt was being recognised in the financial 
statements and disclosed in the financial notes. This relates to the firm’s use of 
hybrid securities which have both liability and equity components that can be 
reported differently for tax and financial reporting purposes. Another reason for the 
lack of recognition and disclosure of interest bearing debt relates to the use of 
structured financial arrangements principally controlled by special purpose group 
entities. Mills and Newbery (2005) also demonstrate firm’s use more structured 
financing arrangements, off-balance sheet and hybrid debt financing when entering 
into contractual debt covenants that provide incentives to manage credit ratings. 
These arrangements are pronounced when credit is constrained and the firm is close 
to violating the conditions of these debt covenants.  
 
                                                 
22 Greater debt sourced in the U.S. is evident from FCC debt/assets and FCC interest expense/sales. 
23 Similar findings of tax motivated income shifting were found by Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001) 
who found evidence that U.S. multinationals source interest deductions in different tax jurisdictions to 
shift income and that tax incentives influence manager’s decisions regarding the location of debt. 
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Graham and Harvey (2001) find that the interest deductibility of debt is an important 
determinant of corporate capital structure. They also posit that foreign tax advantages 
relative to the U.S. are also important, particularly for large, regulated and dividend 
paying firms that have greater tax incentives to use debt. In a similar study, Beattie, 
Goodacre and Thomson (2006) note UK firms’ choice of financing decisions and 
associated use of financial instruments was based on target debt levels. They report 
that target debt levels are related to long term survival of the firm (i.e. reducing 
bankruptcy risk), maintenance of earnings and cash flows, restrictive covenant 
conditions, interest rates and the tax deductibility of interest payments. Further, 
Beattie et. al. (2006) indicate that more highly geared firms are more likely to adopt 
a target capital structure. Overall, Beattie et. al. (2006) provide evidence that taxation 
and agency costs play an important role in UK firms’ financing decisions24.  
 
Beuselinck, Buysschaert and Deloof (2005) investigated the tax consequences of 
financing transactions and earnings management for group Belgium firms over the 
period 1997 to 2001. Beuselinck et. al. (2005) found that Belgium corporate groups 
make use of business affiliations by shifting taxable income amongst group member 
firms to lower the overall tax burden. This confirmed findings in earlier studies (e.g. 
Rego, 2003; Mills and Newberry, 2004) where U.S. multinational firms were found 
to allocate revenue to members in low tax rate jurisdictions and expenses to higher 
tax rate jurisdictions to reduce overall tax burden. Specific intra-group financing 
transactions are used as income shifting mechanisms between affiliated business 
groups. Beuselinck et. al. (2005) purport that these tax incentives bias reported 
financial statements of holding group firms leading to potential misinterpretation by 
external users. Group membership makes firms less reliant on external capital 
providers and hence reduces their incentive to manage reported earnings for financial 
contracting reasons. In general, financial contracts between creditors, lenders, 
customers, suppliers and other stakeholders use accounting numbers to specify the 
terms of trade, and, thereby lower the individual firm’s willingness to report lower 
income for tax purposes (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001).  
 
                                                 
24 In a related study, Tzovas (2005) concluded that a firm’s objective to reduce taxable income, to 
raise capital or to minimise the potential for technical default provided explanations for a firm’s 
depreciation policy and reporting decisions. 
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Several studies, however, have identified the existence of important internal capital 
markets at the corporate group level lead to less financing constraints for group 
members (Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Consequently, group 
firms are less dependent on negotiated financial contracts with external financial 
institutions to fund business activities which in turn may reduce motivation to 
disclose information of a voluntary nature. Beuselinck et. al. (2005, p.9) posits that 
“it can be expected that group firms are less concerned about their individually 
reported profitability for financial contracting matters, which potentially enlarges 
their flexibility to prefer tax minimization above financial reporting considerations”. 
 
Negrea (2005) examined 265 firms operating in the Netherlands belonging to three 
classes – independent companies, domestically-controlled subsidiaries and foreign-
controlled subsidiaries - over the period 1995 to 2003 to investigate tax minimisation 
through transfer pricing and managerial performance. Negrea (2005) concluded 
strategic choices regarding internal transfer prices reduced the informativeness of 
accounting performance measures within the reports of foreign subsidiaries.  
 
Based on findings detailed above, there clearly are income tax implications arising 
from a firm’s financing strategy, policies and procedures. For instance, Australian 
resource companies commonly undertake debt financing both in Australia and in the 
U.S. to fund operations and investments globally and hence tax strategies and 
impacts could be an important influence on reporting in the public domain. Financial 
accounting management and tax management are interdependent. Tax planning 
considerations are an important driver of financial accounting choices and “tax 
minimization strategies often result in lowering reported income” (Shackelford and 
Shevlin, 2001, p. 326). A key implication of the aforementioned studies (Slemrod, 
2001; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Mills and Newberry, 2004; 2005; Tzovas, 2005; 
Beuselinck et. al. 2005; Negrea, 2005 and Dhaliwal et. al. 2005) is that tax 
considerations could be potentially an important determinant of managerial financial 
reporting decision making. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001, p. 327) highlight the 
importance of these areas of research stating that “financial accounting 
considerations may be an important omitted correlated variable in tax studies, and 
tax considerations may be an important omitted correlated variable in financial 
accounting studies”. 
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2.13 Link Between Income Tax Characteristics and Agency Theory 
Agency theory can be used as the conceptual framework for explaining managerial 
disclosure behaviour in relation to the tax impacts and tax minimisation strategies of 
firms, particularly where tax strategies relate to financing methods, type and source 
and associated use of financial instruments. Recent studies (e.g. Shackelford and 
Shevlin, 2001; Crocker and Slemrod, 2004; Tzovas, 2005) used agency theory as a 
framework for explaining corporate tax minimisation or tax evasion. Firm 
management is assumed to possess private information regarding the extent of 
legally permissible reductions in taxable income. Consequently, management could 
engage in behavior to minimise tax payable through use of strategies such as 
sourcing debt in higher tax jurisdictions and shifting income to lower tax 
jurisdictions. Managerial incentives to engage in tax minimisation or evasion are 
affected by the nature of the compensation arrangement. Board of directors, for 
example, will structure compensation packages to provide incentives for them to act 
in the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Mecking, 1976).  
 
Effective tax planning reduces the present value of tax payments and generally 
increases the after-tax rate of return to shareholders (Rego, 2003). It is in 
shareholders interest for the taxation or finance manager to reduce the company’s 
effective tax burden so long as the marginal benefit of engaging in tax minimisation 
or evasion exceeds associated marginal costs25. In order to align the incentives of the 
managers, as decision makers of the firm with the shareholders, the firm has the 
incentive to tie the agent’s compensation to after-tax profitability of the firm. Walsh 
and Ryan (1997) found that both agency and tax considerations were important in 
explaining the issue of debt or equity by UK firms over the period 1984 to 1990.  
 
2.14 Voluntary Disclosure Decisions 
An examination of management motivation to voluntarily disclose information is 
important as it provides insights as to why additional financial instrument 
information may be disclosed within annual reports. Livermore and Blanchette 
                                                 
25 Tax reduction strategies increase the after tax income available to the firm. There are associated 
costs such as the political stability and infrastructure of countries that are lower tax jurisdictions 
leading to operational inefficiencies and uncertainty, transaction costs, costs associated with a tax 
audit, denial of deductions under the thin capitalisation rules and denial of a tax benefit under various 
taxation anti-avoidance provisions. 
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(2001) has identified two criteria that could play an important role in motivating 
management to voluntarily disclose information: (a) value relevance in capital 
markets; and (b) the ability of that information to reflect the economic impact of 
transactions. Value relevance relates to information that could impact on a firm’s 
share price and is indicative of how capital markets assess that information. Capital 
market prices are further influenced by the economic impact of a firm’s activities 
such as the economic impact of derivative transactions. Recent literature (e.g. 
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005; Mallin et. al., 2005) has examined 
management’s reasons for disclosing information by analysing questionnaire and 
interview responses. These responses have been particularly insightful in providing 
reasons why financial information may or may not be voluntarily disclosed.  
 
Choi (1973) maintained that publication of economic information relating to a 
business enterprise facilitates the making of investment decisions which in turn 
reduces the uncertainty from the outcome of future economic events. Reputational 
risk and institutional pressures are becoming an increasingly important factor driving 
the nature and extent of disclosures within reporting media (Choi, 1973). Mallin et. 
al. (2005) indicates that fund managers believe early disclosure in relation to 
financial instruments under FRS13 may have been undertaken for commercial 
reasons by increasing certainty and information flow to capital markets or to reassure 
investors of exposure to risk. This can focus management in adhering to mandatory 
disclosures and increase the disclosure of additional, non-mandatory information. 
These assertions are supported by Dunne, Helliar and Power (2003) who stated that 
the adoption of FAS 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities in the U.S. on 15 June 2000 imposed greater discipline on risk management 
as firms were compelled to communicate risk management strategies in respect of 
derivatives more clearly. Verrecchia (1990) investigated the link between 
information disclosure and the cost of capital. The conclusion drawn by Verrecchia 
(1990) was that enhanced disclosure reduces information asymmetry between capital 
market participants and thereby reduces the cost of equity capital.  
 
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) conducted a survey of CFOs to determine 
voluntary disclosure choices. They found that more than four in five respondents 
agreed that the cost of capital or reduction of information risk was a motivation for 
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voluntary disclosures. One CFO indicated voluntary disclosures assist in cultivating 
relationships with institutional investors which in turn could assist in obtaining 
finance at a lower cost of capital. In a related question, 56.2% of respondents agreed 
that predictability of financial results was a strong theme in the voluntary disclosure 
of information. Many surveyed CFOs stated that reducing investor uncertainty about 
the firm’s future prospects was the most important motivation to make voluntary 
disclosures. This in turn reduces information risk which occurs when the market 
lacks pertinent information about an event or the cash flows of the firm. Graham et. 
al. (2005, p52) state that this has value relevance as a reduction in information risk 
leaves only inherent risk to impact on stock prices and “potentially reducing the risk 
premium investors demand to hold the company’s stock”.  A vast majority of survey 
respondents (92.1%) placed a great deal of importance on acquiring a reputation for 
providing timely and accurate information and so transparent reporting was regarded 
as a key factor motivating voluntary disclosure. A summary of survey responses 
analysing motives for voluntarily communicating financial information is contained 
in Table 2.2. 
 
TABLE 2.2: Survey of 401 CFOs – Voluntary Information  
Question concerning voluntarily communicating information 
% agree or 
strongly 
agree 
1. Promotes a reputation for transparent/accurate reporting 
2. Reduces the ‘information risk’ that investors assign to stock 
3. Provides important information to investors that is not 
included in mandatory financial disclosures 
4. Increases the predictability of company’s future prospects 
5. Attracts more financial analysts to follow stock 
6. Corrects an under-valued stock price 
7. Increases the overall liquidity of company’s stock 
8. Increases company’s P/E ratio 
9. Reveals to outsiders the skill level of managers 
10. Reduces the cost of capital 
11. Reduces the risk premium employees demand for holding 
stock granted as compensation. 
 
92.1 
81.9 
72.1 
 
56.2 
50.8 
48.4 
44.3 
42.0 
41.3 
39.3 
9.2 
(Source: Adapted from Graham et. al. 2005, Table 11, p. 53.) 
 
Graham et. al. (2005) suggested that CFOs may limit voluntary disclosures on the 
basis of setting a precedent that would be difficult and costly to maintain in the 
future. Litigation was further posited as a reason why managers may disclose less 
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information. Some 46.4% of survey respondents agreed with this reason. The costs of 
voluntary disclosure comprise a) costs of information collection and b) dissemination 
and proprietary costs reflecting the concern that some disclosures may assist 
competitor firms at the expense of the disclosing firm (Aggarwal and Simkins, 2004, 
Graham et. al. 2005).  
 
Graham et. al. (2005) suggest agency costs may provide an over-arching reason 
explaining the lack of full disclosure. Management may have career concerns and 
external reputation can be an important driver in order to meet earning benchmarks 
which may in turn constrain voluntary disclosures. Graham et. al. (2005) indicate 
that whilst survey results suggest scrutiny by bondholders and stockholders are not 
important determinants of voluntary disclosures, they contend that this reason 
appears to be an important motivating factor when examining the survey responses 
as a whole. Survey participants disagreed or strongly disagreed with the view that 
avoiding the unwanted attention of regulatory bodies was a constraint to voluntarily 
disclose information. A summary of survey responses analysing motives for not 
voluntarily communicating financial information is contained in Table 2.3. 
 
TABLE 2.3: Survey of 401 CFOs-Disclosure Limitations  
Question concerning limitations on voluntarily communicating 
information 
% agree or 
strongly 
agree 
1. Avoid setting a disclosure precedent that may be difficult to 
continue 
2. Avoid giving away company secrets or otherwise harming 
the company’s competitive position 
3. Avoid possible lawsuits if future results do not match 
forward looking disclosures 
4. Avoid potential follow-up questions about unimportant items 
5. Avoid attracting unwanted scrutiny by regulators 
6. Avoid attracting unwanted scrutiny by stockholders and 
bondholders 
69.6 
 
58.8 
 
46.4 
 
36.7 
20.3 
16.8 
 
(Source: Adapted from Graham et. al. 2005, Table 12, p. 58.) 
 
The impact of recognition and measurement of derivative financial instruments on 
firm value may be difficult to assess and the costs of such assessment may be high 
for less informed investors. Consequently, the extent of financial instrument 
disclosed will involve balancing the costs and benefits of disclosure.  
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2.15 Summary 
The Australian accounting and regulatory framework has undergone substantial 
changes over the past five years following adoption of IFRS, changes to the CA 2001 
as part of CLERP 9, the imposition of the ASX best practice recommendations in 
relation to corporate governance and amendments made to the Australian Tax Acts 
so that certain provisions now rely directly on accounting standards and principles. 
These pronouncements are likely to have a substantial impact on a firm’s disclosure 
policy. Agency theory provides an ideal conceptual framework for evaluating the 
link between governance, capital management and income tax and financial 
instrument disclosures as economic based decisions are likely to be an important 
determinant of disclosure policy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided evidence from extant literature that a firm’s governance 
structure, capital management exposure, overseas listing status and income tax 
characteristics are important drivers in influencing managerial disclosure policy. 
Chapter 3 advances hypotheses to test if the extent of financial instrument 
disclosures in the immediate pre-IFRS adoption period changed in the post-IFRS 
adoption period and the degree of association between corporate governance, capital 
management, overseas listing status and income tax characteristics of firms and their 
financial instrument disclosure patterns. 
 
3.1 Extent of Financial Instrument Disclosures 
It is clear that effective disclosure of information on financial instruments is 
important to aid capital market participants’ decision making process (Chalmers and 
Godfrey, 2004). The adoption of IFRS is likely to add to this complexity and also 
increases the need for more effective disclosure (Jones and Higgins, 2006). Resource 
firms typically use a variety of financial instruments to manage project financing 
arrangements such as commodity hedges. To meet the needs of users in the post-
IFRS adoption period, therefore, it is not unreasonable to presume Australian 
resource firms are likely to be under greater pressure to disclose information on 
financial information. Thus, the study analyses the following overarching research 
proposition: 
 
Research Proposition: The level of financial instrument disclosures by 
Australian resource firms will be more extensive in the post-IFRS adoption 
period than the pre-IFRS period. 
 
 
3.2 Determinants of Financial Instrument Disclosures 
The strength of corporate governance structure, capital management initiatives and 
exposure, overseas listing status and income tax exposure and income tax 
transparency are hypothesised to be important determinants of financial instrument 
disclosures within the annual reports of Australian listed resource companies over the 
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2003-2006 period. These categories are considered to be important determinants of 
financial instrument disclosures based on the changes in the accounting, tax and 
regulatory framework that have taken place over the period encompassing the 2003 
to 2006 financial years as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
3.2.1 Corporate Governance Structure 
A major aspect of corporate governance is concerned with how best to reduce 
managerial opportunistic behaviour. Agency theorists (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) suggest that that there are internal and external 
governance mechanisms designed to limit agency costs arising from the aberrant 
activities of managers. The corporate governance principles developed by the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council that mandate disclosure within annual reports under 
ASX Listing Rules (March 2003) can assist in the amelioration of agency problems 
in shareholder-manager relationships. An effective corporate governance structure 
serves to minimise agency conflicts between shareholders and managers that are 
inherent in the separation of ownership and control of firms (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
 
Misuse of financial instruments can potentially exacerbate rather than mitigate 
financial risk (Ernst and Young, 2005; PWC, 2005b). Consequently, it is expected 
firms with effective corporate governance structures will be less likely to use 
financial instruments incorrectly or ineffectively (PWC, 2005c). It follows that firms 
with effective processes, policies and systems in place in relation to corporate 
governance will be expected to disclose more information of a discretionary nature 
as well as disclose mandatory information in relation to financial instruments.  
 
Over the past decade, various legal and regulatory bodies have emphasised the 
importance of corporate governance as a mechanism to enhance the quality of 
financial reporting. Examples include The Cadbury Committee Report on Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) in the UK, The Group of 100 and the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council and CLERP 9 in Australia (Brown and Tarca, 2005). 
The heightened regulatory environment is forcing companies to focus more on 
corporate governance.  
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The ASX Corporate Governance Council developed industry-wide corporate 
governance guidelines for Australian listed companies in March 2003. These 
guidelines were one of the first regulatory attempts to restore investor confidence 
after a series of corporate failures in Australia and overseas (e.g. HIH Insurance, 
Sons of Gwalia Limited).  
 
Whilst there is no single universally agreed upon model of what constitutes good 
corporate governance, the ASX Corporate Governance Council developed ten 
principles listed in Table 3.1 believed to constitute good corporate governance (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2003)26. Although the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council does not identify any particular framework used to develop its list, good 
corporate governance is stated to potentially include: 
 A code of ethical conduct, 
 A comprehensive set of policies and procedures, 
 An internal control framework to ensure controls are in place to mitigate 
business risks, and 
 A well defined set of risk functions (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2003). 
 
Though the ASX Corporate Governance Council considers each principle ranks 
equally in importance, those most applicable to this study are Principles 1, 4, 5 and 
7. Principle 1 aids transparency whilst principles 4 and 5 facilitate accountability. 
Principle 5 requires a company to implement mechanisms to ensure that all investors 
have equal and timely access to material information concerning the company 
encompassing its financial position, performance, ownership and governance.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 The Corporate Governance Council subsequently produced a revised set of corporate governance 
principles and recommendations in August 2007. There are now eight corporate governance principles 
instead of ten with principle 8 amalgamated into principles 1 and 2, and principle ten amalgamated 
into principles 3 and 7 (Corporate Governance Council, 2006; 2007). The number of corporate 
governance recommendations remains at 28. A complete list of revised corporate governance 
principles and recommendations released by the ASX Corporate Governance Council in August 2007 
are provided in Appendix A. 
   68
TABLE 3.1: ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles as at March 2003  
Principle No.   Description  
1 
          
Lay solid foundations for management and oversight: Recognise and 
publish the respective roles and responsibilities of board and management. 
2 
 
Structure the board to add value: Have a board of an effective 
composition, size and commitment to adequately discharge its 
responsibilities and duties. 
3 
 
Promote ethical and responsible decision-making: Actively promote 
ethical and responsible decision-making. 
4 
 
Safeguard integrity in financial reporting: Have a structure to 
independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company’s financial 
reporting. 
5 
 
Make timely and balanced disclosure: Promote timely and balanced 
disclosure of all material matters concerning the company. 
6 
 
Respect the rights of shareholders: Respect the rights of shareholders and 
facilitate the effective exercise of those rights. 
7 
 
Recognise and manage risk: Establish a sound system of risk oversight 
and management and internal control. 
8 
 
Encourage enhanced performance: Fairly review and actively encourage 
enhanced board and management effectiveness. 
9 
 
Remunerate fairly and responsibly: Ensure that the level and 
composition of remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its 
relationship to corporate and individual performance is defined. 
10 
 
Recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders: Recognise legal and 
other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders. 
(Source: ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003) 
 
In addition to the ten best practice corporate governance principles, the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council developed 28 supporting recommendations. The best 
practice recommendations cover corporate governance disclosures, director’s 
expertise, the link between executive pay and company results and whether the 
board’s performance is evaluated. The ASX recommendations serve as reference 
points on board and management accountability and represent a major enhancement 
of corporate accountability and practice in Australia (Taylor, Tower, Van Der Zahn 
and Neilson, 2008). The recommendations are consistent with the objective of 
enhancing accountability, highlighting the Council’s drive for greater emphasis on 
financial reporting disclosure (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003). 
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Although not mandatory under the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s rules, ASX 
Listing Rule 4.10.3 requires companies disclose in the annual report the extent the 
governance principles and recommendations were followed for the financial years 
commencing on or after 1 January 2003. If a recommendation is not addressed, a 
company must provide explicit reasons for not following that particular 
recommendation. In 2005, the ASX reinforced the quasi-mandatory requirements of 
the recommendations by issuing letters to listed companies that failed to disclose 
information in 2004 annual reports relating to new corporate governance 
recommendations provided in the ASX Corporate Governance Council Guidelines 
(Australian Financial Review, 2005).  
 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council’s principles and recommendations together 
with other regulatory inducements (e.g. CLERP 9) are likely to have a positive 
impact on disclosure of information by companies following adoption of IFRS. The 
corporate governance implications of shifting to IFRS are important and revolve 
mostly around disclosure of how IFRS will affect the financial reports (Palmer, 
2006). From 1 July 2005, companies had to quantify and disclose the impact of IFRS 
to stakeholders. The implementation of IFRS has triggered corporate governance 
issues around what to disclose and the timing of disclosure. Directors and 
management will be in a more highlighted position as a consequence of corporate 
governance reforms such as CLERP 9 and the ASX Corporate Governance Council 
principles and recommendations and will need to not only deal with but be seen to be 
dealing with issues concerning IFRS (Australian Financial Review, 2005). These 
principles and recommendations, together with CLERP 9, will mean boards will have 
greater interaction with executives and management, thereby, changing the culture of 
the organisation to one of compliance with regulatory authorities in terms of 
provision of adequate information disclosures (Jones and Higgins, 2006). The 
existence of written policies and procedures under the ASX best practice guidelines 
are designed to ensure effective corporate governance by Australian listed entities. 
These guidelines go beyond the existing continuous disclosure regime by promoting 
accountability at a senior management and board level who will in turn have to re-
evaluate the transparency and explicit content of current reporting practices. Well 
developed governance structures are likely to encourage disclosure (Australian 
Financial Review, 2005). 
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Australian public companies operate under continuous disclosure obligations and 
must disclose to the market any new information that a reasonable person would 
believe would have a material effect on the share price. ASX Listing Rules also 
require that any financial information or report given by a listed entity to the ASX 
must comply with applicable accounting standards. ASX listed companies were 
required to disclose the expected or actual effects of IFRS under the continuous 
disclosure regime. IFRS standards AASB 132 and AASB 139 will have a greater 
effect on some company’s financial position, financial performance, capital 
management and income tax position than others (Jones and Higgins, 2006). The 
nature and basis of any impact of these IFRS leading to formal adoption must be 
explained in a narrative that includes any significant information reasonably required 
for an informed assessment of that impact on the entity’s activities and results.  
 
Other countries such as the U.S. have undertaken corporate governance reforms to 
reduce the risk of corporate failures. For example, in the U.S., SOX was enacted 
primarily to improve the reliability of corporate financial reporting. Section 404 of 
the SOX requires management to document and assess internal control over financial 
reporting, report on the assessment and subject the assessment to audit by the firm’s 
independent auditor. International regulatory requirements such as SOX create an 
additional layer of mandatory corporate governance reporting that will influence 
management’s objective and strategy with respect to financial instrument disclosures 
for Australian firms (Salman and Carson, 2007). In particular, this will apply to 
Australian and U.S. dual listed companies. 
 
Corporate governance structures have an important influence on the use, controls and 
disclosure of financial instrument information. To formally test the influence of 
corporate governance on financial instrument disclosures pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption the following hypothesis is stated: 
 
H1: There is a positive association between the strength of corporate 
governance structure and the extent of financial instrument disclosures 
(mandatory and discretionary) by Australian listed resource firms.  
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3.2.2 Capital Management Structure 
Capital management policy is another factor that potentially determines financial 
instrument disclosure practices. The concept of capital management is composed of 
these key elements: a) capital raising; b) takeovers and mergers; and c) existence of 
international operations.  
 
3.2.2.1 Capital Raisings 
In the context of capital raisings it may be argued that this will induce the company 
to disclose more information in relation to financial instruments (Botosan, 1997). 
This is particularly relevant to resource firms because these firms regularly seek 
access to capital markets and may create hedging contracts, restructure existing 
hedge contracts or use derivative financial instruments as a direct or indirect 
consequence of entering into these funding arrangements (KPMG, 2003). Provision 
of accounting disclosures and reports are identified as an agency cost that managers 
are willing to accept to enable the firm to raise capital (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Clearly, information asymmetry between the various stakeholders of the firm can be 
mitigated by disclosure strategies linked to the capital structure and strategies of the 
firm (Botosan, 1997). The incentive is that a decrease in information asymmetry or 
enhancement of financial transparency will serve to reduce negative perceptions 
relating to riskiness and in turn, lower the cost of capital as the firm will be more 
competitive in obtaining financing.  
 
3.2.2.2 Takeovers and Mergers 
Takeover and merger activity amongst resource companies may involve the use of 
capital raisings, use of derivatives such as equity swaps or interest rate swaps, 
restructuring of hedge positions or acquisition of hedge books from target companies 
(KPMG, 2003). For instance, in Australia, BHP Billiton’s $9.2 billion takeover of 
Western Mining Resources in 2005 and the takeover of Portman Limited by 
Cleveland-Cliffs in 2005 are prime examples. Consequently, it is expected that 
financial instrument disclosures will be greater in the presence of merger and 
acquisition activity given the important role financial instruments can play in this 
process. 
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3.2.2.3  Internationalisation 
Firms with international operations are likely to be exposed to greater financial 
instrument risks and investor pressures than firms with purely domestic operations27. 
Adoption of IFRS in Australia will create greater financial reporting transparency 
and comparability because firm performance can be examined internationally (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001).  
 
Companies with foreign exchange transactions will have to consider hedging 
strategies for foreign exchange risk under AASB 139. Companies with extensive 
hedging programs, holding a large number of derivatives or with operations across a 
number of jurisdictions are expected to disclose more information concerning 
financial instruments under IFRS in the annual report (KPMG, 2003; Ernst and 
Young, 2005).  
 
Under AASB 139, some companies may also find contracts with overseas suppliers 
or customers contain embedded derivatives, which need to be recognised separately 
to the host contract and recorded at fair value. For example, many Australian 
resource companies will have purchase and supply contracts which have a clause 
stipulating prices linked to the price of oil or gold or another commodity or energy 
source which differs from the commodity bought and sold (KPMG, 2003; Ernst and 
Young, 2005). 
 
Whilst IFRS aids in harmonising Australian and international accounting practices, 
Australian firms with international operations are still likely to have to have to 
address a wider set of investor needs than domestically operating firms. For example, 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argued that there are incentives in the international 
market for capital to meet levels of disclosure expected by international investors. 
Mallin et. al. (2004) indicates that fund managers believe that early disclosure in 
relation to financial instruments under FRS 13 may have been undertaken for 
commercial reasons by increasing certainty and information flow to capital markets 
or to reassure investors of exposure to risk. This can focus management in adhering 
to mandatory disclosures and increase the disclosure of additional information. 
                                                 
27 Internationalisation refers to companies with operations overseas. 
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Capital raisings, merger and acquisition activity and the existence of overseas 
operations are important attributes of a firm’s capital management structure that may 
contribute to managements and the board’s financial instrument disclosure policy. 
Australian resource firms commonly raise capital (equity, debt or hybrid) to finance 
new developments or existing operations, may be engaged in takeover and merger 
activity and can have operations overseas (Honey, 2004). This leads to the 
development of the following hypothesis: 
 
H2a: There is a positive association between the capital management 
structure and the extent of financial instrument disclosures (mandatory and 
discretionary) by Australian listed resource firms.  
 
Overseas listing status may also have an important influence on disclosure practices 
because of regulatory differences across jurisdictions and associated differences in 
disclosure requirements and shareholder scrutiny. Ahmed and Courtis (1999), for 
example, analysed associations between corporate characteristics and disclosures 
within annual reports using disclosure studies between 1968 and 1997. They found 
that listing status was significantly and positively associated with disclosure levels 
with a mean correlation of 0.37. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) indicate that this 
observation reflects the need to disclose more information to meet stock exchange 
regulatory requirements, but cautioned that listing status can be correlated with firm 
size as larger firms will list on one or more stock exchanges because of their need to 
raise external finance. To formally test the association between the extent of financial 
instrument disclosures and overseas listing status of the resource firm, the following 
hypothesis is constructed: 
 
H2b: There is a positive association between firms with overseas listing 
status and the extent of financial instrument disclosures (mandatory and 
discretionary) by Australian resource firms. 
 
3.2.3 Income Tax Exposure and Income Tax Transparency 
The focus of this section is to determine if financial instrument disclosures of 
Australian listed extractive resource firms are associated with certain international 
income tax characteristics. This will further assist in determining the extent of 
financial instrument disclosure communication in the annual financial reports of 
these resource firms. In doing so, the conceptual link between Australian tax law and 
financial accounting is discussed. There are several key provisions in the Australian 
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tax law that are directly linked to financial accounting concepts and standards. An 
examination of the association between financial disclosures and Australian income 
tax is important as the Australian economy is characterised by a very high 
concentration of foreign investment (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2005).  
 
Given the capital intensive nature of the extractive industry, resource firms 
commonly seek access to domestic and international financial markets to fund the 
acquisition of assets or investments or to provide working capital for current 
operations (KPMG, 2003). In such a situation, the structure of the corporate group 
and the structure and nature of financing arrangements becomes important for 
income tax purposes (Beattie et. al. 2006). It is expected that tax considerations will 
have a bearing on management’s financial accounting policy decisions through the 
potential impact on a company’s cash flow (Dhaliwal, Newberry and Weaver, 2005). 
These observations provide support for the inclusion of income tax considerations as 
part of this study to determine if international tax structures play a role in influencing 
financial instrument disclosure patterns. 
 
Financial instruments have profound income tax ramifications. This is likely to be 
greater following the adoption of IFRS (Leydon and Croft, 2004). For instance, 
under AASB 132, reclassification of certain equity instruments such as hybrid 
securities as debt instruments will increase liabilities and under AASB 139, all 
financial assets and liabilities are required to be recognised in a firm’s financial 
statements. Generally, greater liabilities may be recognised under IFRS compared to 
GAAP (Frost, 2005). This will impact on a firm’s dividend and franking policy, its 
ability to fund projects or investments in Australia using debt funded by Australian 
sources under the thin capitalisation rules and the application of the Australian 
withholding tax regime (Leyden et. al, 2004). Financial accounting concepts or 
accounting standards underpin or support a number of key provisions within the 
ITAA 1936 and ITAA 1997 such as debt/equity classification.  
 
Hybrid financial instruments are classified as liabilities rather than equity under 
AASB 132 (Ernst and Young, 2005). Fair value movement of derivative and 
available-for-sale financial instruments under AASB 139 is measured and recognised 
in the financial statements with consequent changes to assets, liabilities, equity and 
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earnings (AASB, 2004b). Further, hybrid financial instruments may be treated as 
debt in one jurisdiction and equity in another jurisdiction. An example of tax 
motivated behavior relating to sourcing of finance and use of financial instruments is 
the exploitation of the character of payments (debt or equity) in order to reduce 
withholding taxes (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Walsh and Ryan, 1997). Substitution 
of payments such as the conversion of an interest payment to a payment under a 
forward contract to buy foreign currency not only ensures that the firm avoids 
interest withholding tax, but also ensures that the firm is not subject to limitations on 
deductibility of interest (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Walsh and Ryan, 1997).  
 
Other tax motivated behaviour may include (a) non-arms length transfer of payments 
and receipts between group members across different tax jurisdictions; (b) the 
sourcing of debt in higher tax jurisdictions where the deductible amount will be 
greater compared to sourcing that same debt in a lower tax jurisdiction; and (c) 
significant related party dealings with companies incorporated in tax havens, 
particularly with a financing or investment company in that tax haven with reduced 
transparency and accountability of transactions. For instance, Walsh and Ryan 
(1997) found that UK firms frequently issued debt from foreign finance subsidiaries, 
particularly in favourable tax jurisdictions such as the Netherlands (a tax haven) to 
(a) avoid payment of interest withholding tax and (b) to achieve tax deductibility on 
interest payments. They (p. 947) indicated that “arbitrage activities of this nature 
provide a rationale for a relationship between corporate financial decisions and the 
tax system”. In summary, firms can engage in jurisdictional financial arbitrage where 
these firms are engaged in financial arrangements across several countries with the 
principle purpose of reducing tax payable.  
 
Issues associated with a firm’s income tax exposure in relation to financial 
instruments that may affect a firm’s disclosure policy are the nature and level of 
international operations and foreign sourced revenue, corporate structure, thin 
capitalisation and Australian withholding taxes and associated debt/equity 
classification. The nature of these income tax issues and impacts may serve as strong 
motivating factors for management to either not disclose or to disclose financial 
instrument information to capital market participants. 
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3.2.3.1 Foreign Source Income 
In general terms, Australian tax law is based on the premise that a resident is subject 
to Australian tax on their worldwide income from all sources in or outside Australia 
(Sections 6-5 and 6-10 of the ITAA 1997). There are specific provisions that apply to 
international dealings. For Australian resident firms deriving foreign source income 
there are income tax impacts that will need to be taken into consideration. Associated 
entities can capitalise on group structure and differences across tax jurisdictions to 
shift income between group members to minimise average tax burdens (Beuselinck 
et. al. 2005). Given that multinational firms apply efficient tax planning across group 
entities, this is expected to impact on financial instrument disclosures given that 
differences in the legal form or economic characteristics of financial instruments can 
occur across tax jurisdictions. Consequently, it is expected that companies with 
entities in the corporate group that derive foreign source income will disclose less 
information with respect to financial instruments. 
 
3.2.3.2 Tax Havens 
At one extreme, global tax minimisation can be achieved if there are members of the 
corporate group that are residents of countries with tax haven status that offer 
beneficial financial, legal and tax regimes (ATO, 2004; The OECD, 2006). Tax 
havens may or may not have legitimate business purposes. The OECD identifies 
three key factors in considering whether a jurisdiction is a tax haven: (a) no or 
nominal taxes; (b) lack of effective exchange of information; and (c) lack of 
transparency. Tax havens have laws or administrative practices which prevent the 
effective exchange of information and lack transparency relating to financial and 
taxation arrangements, have weak regulatory, legal and administrative provisions and 
access to financial records (The OECD, 2006). For instance, tax haven incorporated 
companies may not prepare their financial accounts in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting standards. Tax havens differ in the extent of these 
characteristics. The OECD recognises a total of 33 tax havens (The OECD, 2006). 
Resource companies may potentially exploit the secrecy laws of tax havens in an 
attempt to conceal assets and income that may be subject to tax in Australia and also 
exploit a lack of effective exchange of information and transparency.  
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Companies incorporated in a country with tax haven status may play an important 
function for the entire corporate group. For instance, tax haven incorporated 
companies may control treasury, insurance, business and service functions for the 
entire corporate group or facilitate the tax efficient transfer of funds between 
members of a corporate group. Many transactions involving entities incorporated in 
tax havens are likely to be for legitimate business purposes (ATO, 2004). However, 
transparency of information relating to these transactions may still be lacking. 
Consequently, efficient tax planning across group entities involving tax haven 
incorporated companies may have an important influence on transparency and 
accountability of the corporate group in general (ATO, 2004). The general lack of 
transparency and accountability at the corporate group level may in turn influence 
the corporate mindset on issues such as provision of information on financing 
arrangements and associated use of financial instruments within annual reports. It is 
expected that companies that belong to a corporate group with at least one company 
incorporated in a tax haven will disclose less information with respect to financial 
instruments. This is considered more likely if the tax haven registered company is a 
financing or service entity for the corporate group.  
 
3.2.3.3 Thin Capitalisation 
Thin capitalisation rules apply to entities whose assets are funded by a high level of 
debt and relatively little equity. A thinly capitalised entity is an entity that has a level 
of debt in its capital structure that exceeds 75% of the total of its debt plus equity. 
This is known as the safe harbour limit. The thin capitalisation provisions apply to 
Australian entities investing overseas, associated entities, foreign controlled 
Australian entities and foreign entities investing directly into Australia. Allocation of 
a disproportionate level of the total of deductible funding expenses to its Australian 
operations could artificially lower taxable income in Australia whilst increasing such 
amounts in other lower tax jurisdictions. The rules seek to limit the amount of debt 
used to fund Australian operations or investments. This is achieved by disallowing 
the debt deductions (e.g. interest payment or loan fees) an entity can claim against 
Australian assessable income when the entity’s debt used to fund Australian assets 
exceeds the safe harbour debt to capital28 ratio of 3:1.  
                                                 
28 Capital refers to the sum of debt and shareholders equity and is equivalent to the assets of the firm. 
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Under the Australian thin capitalisation regime contained within Division 820 of the 
ITAA 1997, the accounting standards are used to determine what are assets and 
liabilities (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2003). Section 820-
680 of the ITAA 1997 requires compliance with ‘accounting standards’ both in 
determining what are a company’s assets and liabilities, and in valuing assets, 
liabilities, debt and equity capital under the thin capitalisation rules. Thin 
capitalisation is an asset based model. Changes in the recognition of liabilities and 
valuation of assets under IFRS (for example, reclassification of financial instruments 
such as redeemable preference shares) may result in some entities, previously able to 
comply with the thin capitalisation rules under GAAP, failing the test. This is not the 
result of any change in the financing mix of an entity or any change to the business 
operations, but as a consequence of complying with IFRS29. The introduction of 
IFRS may increase the quantum of assets and liabilities reported on the balance sheet 
(Joseph, 2005; Institute of Charted Accountants in Australia, 2005; 2006; The G100, 
2006; The Treasurer, 2006). For instance, unrealised losses of derivative financial 
instruments will be recorded as liabilities in the balance sheet. Overall, there may be 
a reduction in the net asset position of the company and the net asset position may be 
subject to volatility not previously encountered under GAAP.  
 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) found that companies with capitalisation structures 
showing higher proportions of fixed interest securities relative to equity are 
significantly and positively associated with greater information disclosures in annual 
reports of firms. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) posited that this association could relate 
to firm size given that larger firms tended to use proportionally higher amounts of 
fixed interest securities as a financing arrangement based on the tax benefit 
associated with the deductibility of interest. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) further 
argued that agency theory could adequately explain this observation because firms 
with proportionately more debt financing have more managerial discretion to shift 
resources away from debt holders, thereby increasing agency costs. Monitoring 
devices such as debt covenants are employed by fixed interest security holders or 
                                                 
29 Following adoption of IFRS, the Treasurer announced that the Government will provide a three year 
transitional period for the purposes of the thin capitalisation regime. During the transitional period, 
companies will be able to undertake calculations for thin capitalisation purposes using Australian 
General Accepted Accounting Principles as they existed pre-1 January 2005 (Treasurer’s press 
release, no. 002, January 2005).  
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trustees who will gauge firm performance and commitment to meet obligations 
through measurement and analysis of accounting information. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) posit that more highly leveraged firms incur more monitoring costs and will 
seek to reduce these costs by disclosing more information within annual reports. 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) also state that firms with commitment to debt financing 
will be motivated to maintain or reduce their present cost of capital or that the debt 
can be ‘rolled over’ when due so more information will be disclosed to reduce 
investor uncertainty. 
 
For some companies with high levels of debt in their capital structure, the debt to 
capital ratio could increase under IFRS to the extent safe harbour limit of 75% is 
exceeded. This situation may occur, for example, if a company had asset to capital 
ratios in the order of 60% to 75% prior to the introduction of IFRS (Nethercott and 
Smith, 2007). Larger multinational mining and oil and gas companies commonly 
undertake recapitalisation programs whereby debt to capital ratios of 50% to 75% are 
maintained for the Australian corporate group. This range of asset to capital ratios is 
achieved through the introduction of debt into the Australian corporate group and 
adjusting the asset position through asset revaluations (Nethercott and Smith, 2007).  
 
3.2.3.4 Australian Withholding Taxes 
Generally, withholding tax is levied on Australian interest (10%), unfranked 
dividends (30%) and royalties (30%) paid to non-resident entities (ITAA, 1936). In 
considering withholding taxes, it is necessary to determine whether a return on an 
investment is a debt interest or an equity interest. The rules for defining what 
constitutes equity or debt are set out in Division 974 of the ITAA 1997. The debt and 
equity rules control the demarcation between potential deductibility and potential 
frankability. If the equity interest is a share, dividends on the share would be 
frankable unless specifically prevented by the franking rules. If an interest is 
classified as a debt interest, it cannot be an equity interest and the returns are not 
frankable. This categorisation determines whether a return paid by a company on a 
financing interest that it has issued will be frankable (i.e. treated as a dividend) or 
deductible (i.e. treated as interest on a debt). If it is a return on a debt interest, it will 
be subject to interest withholding tax. In contrast, if it is a return on an equity 
interest, it will be subject to dividend withholding tax. Characterisation determines 
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whether interest withholding tax or dividend withholding tax may be payable on non-
resident distributions or whether an instrument is debt capital for thin capitalisation 
purposes.  
 
Treatment of a payment as a debt interest or an equity interest can also vary across 
different tax jurisdictions depending on the character of that payment and hence 
lower amounts of withholding tax could be paid. Further, application of the 
withholding tax rules could vary with the changes in the classification of financial 
instruments under AASB 132. Thus, IFRS will directly impact on the 
characterisation of financial instruments for tax (and accounting) purposes. 
Consequently, if Australian withholding taxes apply, it is expected that there will be 
more extensive financial instrument disclosures. 
 
3.2.3.5 Income Tax Hypotheses 
Based on the literature review in the previous sub-sections, Australian listed resource 
firms that derive foreign source income and have group members incorporated in a 
tax haven are likely to disclose less information in respect to financial instruments. 
These tax attributes are collected referred to as income tax transparency. In contrast, 
firms that are more thinly capitalised and subject to Australian withholding taxes are 
likely to disclose more extensive information in respect of financial instruments. 
These tax attributes are collectively referred to as income tax exposure. Disclosure of 
the significant financial risks relating to thin capitalisation and withholding tax 
arrangements forces management to examine this impact on the achievement of 
business objectives. Communication of financial instrument information allows the 
board of directors to examine the potential impact of these risks on the ability to raise 
further capital. To test these propositions, the following competing hypotheses are 
developed:  
 
H3a: There is a positive association between income tax exposure and the 
extent of financial instrument disclosures (mandatory and discretionary) by 
Australian listed resource firms.  
  
H3b: There is a negative association between the income tax transparency 
and the extent of financial instrument disclosures (mandatory and 
discretionary) by Australian listed resource firms. 
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3.3 Conceptual Schema 
Figure 3.1 provides a conceptual schema underlying the above stated hypotheses to 
be tested in this thesis. As evident in the conceptual schema, hypotheses will test the 
significance of associations between the strength of corporate governance structure, 
capital management exposure and income tax characteristics and financial instrument 
disclosure patterns. 
 
FIGURE 3.1: Conceptual Schema 
 
 
 
Legend: Conceptual schema showing the three principal hypotheses designed to test the degree of 
association between corporate governance (H1), capital management (H2a), overseas listing status 
(H2b) and income tax exposure (H3a) and income tax transparency (H3b) and financial instrument 
disclosures (FIDs).  
 
3.4 Summary 
The evolution of the Australian financial reporting framework over the past five 
years is likely to have had a significant impact on disclosures in general and 
disclosure of financial instrument information specifically within annual reports. It is 
hypothesised that the extent of financial instrument disclosures will increase in the 
immediate post-IFRS adoption period compared to the immediate pre-IFRS adoption 
period. Further, it is hypothesised that financial instrument disclosures will be 
positively associated with the strength of corporate governance structure, capital 
management exposure, overseas listing status and income tax exposure and 
negatively associated with the income tax transparency of resource firms over the 
study period.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Chapter 3 specified hypotheses designed to test the association between the extent of 
financial instrument disclosures and: a) governance; b) capital management; c) 
listing status; and d) income tax structures. This chapter outlines the rationale and 
methodology behind the choice of industry, firm population and sample selection 
parameters. The development of the disclosure index is also described.  
 
4.1 Industry Selection 
It is argued that the mining and petroleum (oil and gas) sub-industries that comprise 
the extractive resource industry will be significantly affected by changes to the 
measurement, recognition, presentation and disclosure of financial instruments 
following the adoption of IFRS (Honey, 2004; Ernst and Young, 2005). This is 
because firms belonging to the extractive resource industry participate in widespread 
hedging of commodity prices, interest rates and foreign exchange rates and 
utilisation of complex financial derivatives to hedge their exposure to risk30 (Godfrey 
and Chalmers, 2004; Ernst and Young, 2005).  
 
4.2 Sample Selection and Data Source 
The following criteria were applied in selecting the final sample: 
1. Firms are confined to production or extractive companies within the mining 
and petroleum (oil and gas) sub-industries. Firms should have been in 
production in at least one year of the four year study period. Diversified firms 
with a substantial component of revenue derived from extractive operations 
form part of the sample pool. 
2. Firms must have had a continuous listing on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) for at least two consecutive years over the period 2003 to 2006 (or 
2002 to 2005 for December year end companies). All sample firms were 
found to be listed on the ASX for at least two consecutive years. 
 
                                                 
30 Other industries significantly affected include the utilities and financial services industries. 
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For both 31 December and 30 June financial year ending companies, data was 
collected for three years pre-IFRS adoption and one year post IFRS adoption. For 
firms with a 30 June financial year end, data on financial instrument disclosures was 
collected from the 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 annual reports. For firms with a 31 
December financial year end, data on financial instrument disclosures was collected 
from the 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 annual reports. The first three years of the study 
period (pre-IFRS) for both 31 December and 30 June year end reporting firms are 
referred to as Yr 1, Yr 2 and Yr 3 while the reporting year post-IFRS adoption is 
referred to as Yr 4 in the statistical analysis.  
 
The original sample set comprised 122 resource companies. Eight companies were 
found to be engaged purely in exploration activities over the four year study period 
and were excluded from the sample set. An additional three companies reported 
under US GAAP and were excluded from the sample set. The final sample 
comprised 111 Australian listed resource firms.  
 
4.3 Development of the Disclosure Index 
The extant literature (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Marston and Shrives, 1991) adopts a 
variety of approaches to the analysis of narratives in annual reports. The implicit 
underlying construct of interest is generally the ‘quantity’ of disclosure. Disclosure 
index studies assume that the extent and type of information disclosure serves as a 
proxy for informativeness or quality of disclosure (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
Botosan (1997) notes that disclosure quality is difficult to assess and as a result, 
researchers tend to assume quantity and quality are positively related (i.e. greater 
quantity leads to better results). 
 
4.3.1 Assumptions Used in the Development of the Disclosure Index  
The following assumptions are made in relation to the construction and use of the 
disclosure index: 
 Items making up the disclosure index are representative of the dependent 
variable (i.e. the financial instrument disclosure index that is being measured 
is representative of financial instrument information).  
 Independent variables are independent from each other. Selection of inter-
related or correlated independent items (multicollinearity) will create a bias in 
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the disclosure index which will ultimately impact on the correlation 
coefficient between the variables measured. With correlated independent 
items, an item’s regression coefficient depends on which other item’s are 
included (and omitted) in any multiple regression model. In the presence of 
multicollinearity, a regression coefficient will only partially measure the 
effect of a specific independent variable on the dependent variable. The 
presence of multicollinearity can be detected using simple correlations of the 
independent variables. 
 Successive observations of the dependent variable are uncorrelated. Violation 
of this assumption is known as autocorrelation. 
 Independent variables and the dependent variable have a linear relationship. 
 Key disclosure items will be communicated within the annual financial 
report. This may not always be the case as the company can disclose 
information in a variety of media such as ASX announcements, interim 
reports, quarterly reports, media releases, as announcements over the internet 
and analyst briefings. As an example, discussion concerning the impact of 
IFRS on earnings volatility may be communicated as a company 
announcement and not within the annual financial report. 
 Items of information that comprise the disclosure index are applicable to all 
companies in the sample. The issue of applicability of disclosure to all sample 
companies has been largely overcome by focussing on those companies that 
are extractive or production companies within the mining and petroleum sub-
industries. Consequently, the disclosure items that make up the disclosure 
index will be of some relevance to each of the firms within the study 
population. A potential bias is introduced into the study by treating all 
disclosing firms in one sample even though some firms are not actively using 
a particular financial instrument or engaged in a particular financing 
arrangement31.   
 Companies may have been provided with succinct statements relating to 
disclosure by auditors and are provided with sample ‘template’ narrative to 
insert in annual reports (Mallin et. al., 2004). Consequently, disclosure items 
                                                 
31 For this reason, a separate study of financial instrument disclosures relating to sample firms that 
actively used all financial instruments such as derivative and hedge instruments and engaged in debt 
financing was made. The results of this additional analysis are provided within Chapter 7. 
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across companies may achieve the same score that do not necessarily relate to 
company specific characteristics. This was observed across several 
companies where identical discussion of financial instrument accounting 
policies was observed. The common thread linking these firms was that these 
firms had the same external auditor. 
 
These assumptions are consistent with that discussed in past literature and they do 
not detract from the value of this research. 
 
4.3.2 Reliability and Validity Assessment 
A certain degree of subjectivity is required in constructing a disclosure index 
(Botosan, 1997; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley, 2004). 
Consequently, there may be an issue in replicating results. The importance of clear 
instructions to achieving satisfactory levels of reliability is emphasised by Marston 
and Shrives (1991). They also emphasise that the index score can give a measure of 
the extent of disclosure but not necessarily the quality of disclosure. Marston and 
Shrives (1991) conclude that while the construction of disclosure indices inevitably 
involves subjective judgment, it has proved to be a valuable research tool in areas of 
company disclosure research.  
 
As with all disclosure indices, there are some limitations. In some instances the 
judgment of the researcher is required to assign a score to a piece of information. 
Also, there may be specific disclosures relating to financial instruments (for example, 
the success or lack of success of hedging arrangements or the nature and extent of 
financing activities that are detailed in media releases, analyst reports, internal 
treasury reports and manuals or web based announcements) that may not be 
incorporated within the annual report. The researcher believes the disclosure index 
represents a reliable means of testing the extent of financial instrument disclosures. 
 
4.3.3 Weighting of the Disclosure Index 
Weightings are achieved by conducting an attitude or importance survey amongst 
important stakeholders (Marston and Shrives, 1991). There are three issues pertinent 
to the use of a weighted index. Firstly, Marston and Shrives (1991) stated that these 
measurements may not be separated on an equal basis. For example, measurement 
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‘four’ [4] on a scale bar does not necessarily mean than it is four times as important 
as measurement ‘one’ [1] on a scale bar. Secondly, what may be important to one 
particular user group may not necessarily be as important to another interested party. 
Cooke (1989, p. 115) for example, states that ‘one class of user will attached 
different weights to an item than another class of user’.  
 
Development of weighted disclosure indices also involves subjective judgment. For 
instance, Wiseman (1982) rated disclosure according to the degree of specificity of 
each of the information items. A score of one was assigned where a piece of 
information was referred to in only general terms, two was awarded for specific but 
non-quantitative information and three for items disclosed in quantitative terms. In 
Wiseman’s (1982) study, a number may not be worth three times as much as a few 
words. Further, Botosan (1997) constructed an index to measure the voluntary 
disclosure level in 122 companies in the machinery industry. The index comprised 35 
major elements spread across five categories. Additional points were awarded for 
quantified information. Quantified disclosure scored ‘two’ [2], qualitative disclosure 
scores ‘one’ [1] while no disclosure scores ‘zero’ [0]. Further, past research has 
shown that weighted and un-weighted scores fundamentally give the same results 
where there are a large number of items (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Beattie et. al. 
2004). For the aforementioned reasons, weighting of disclosure scores was not 
undertaken in this thesis. 
 
4.3.4 Choice of Disclosure Items 
Beattie et. al. (2004) stated that a large number of disclosure studies were essentially 
one dimensional focusing purely on the presence or absence of an item of 
information disclosed as a means of assessing disclosure. Few disclosure studies 
attempt to assess the quality of information disclosed, particularly against the 
qualitative characteristics of understandability, comparability, relevance and 
reliability embedded in the AASB (or IASB) Framework (Beattie et. al. 2004). An 
assessment of the quality of information disclosed, in addition to quantity or extent 
of disclosures, would assist in determining how effective firm management have 
communicated information to stakeholders (Beattie et. al. 2004). This is of critical 
importance to stakeholders as it facilitates the making of informed economic 
decisions relating to that firm.   
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Beattie et. al. (2004) discussed a framework for classifying and describing 
information items as a way of assessing the quality of information disclosed. The 
framework consists of a hierarchical structure with specific information items nested 
within broad themes or categories of information disclosures. Each item of 
information has three attributes based upon the following dichotomous descriptors: 
historical/forward looking/non-time specific; financial/non-financial and 
quantitative/non-quantitative. Beattie et. al. (2004) posits that this framework would 
assist in measuring quality of disclosures.  
 
This thesis does not measure quality of disclosures. However, there is a ‘quality’ 
aspect to the measurement of disclosures made in this thesis in that several disclosure 
items relating to one particular piece of financial instrument information have been 
used to construct the disclosure index. For instance, there are several disclosure items 
that relate to credit risk or hedge accounting included within the disclosure index. 
 
4.4 Financial Instrument Disclosure Index (FIDI) 
The financial instrument disclosure index (FIDI) comprises both mandatory (54 
items) and discretionary (61 items) disclosure items. The 120 item index FIDI 
comprises information related to operational, management, investment and financial 
activities of the firm. Mandated disclosures as part of FIDI were directly derived 
from AASB 1033 (pre-IFRS) or AASB 132 (post-IFRS) (refer to Appendix B).  
 
Mandatory financial instrument information comprises a description of the extent of 
financial (foreign exchange, commodity price, credit, interest rate and liquidity) risk, 
a description of hedge contacts, financial instruments designated as hedging 
instruments, the nature of the risk being hedged, gains and losses of hedge positions, 
hedge maturity or contract period, accounting policies, terms and conditions of 
financial instruments and fair value information relating to financial assets and 
financial liabilities. The mandated disclosures of finance instrument information 
under AASB 1033 and AASB 132 are very similar.  
 
Discretionary financial instrument information comprises a discussion of issues 
concerning changes in accounting standards dealing with any financial instrument, 
quantification of key financial ratios, a description of financing arrangements, 
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structured financial instruments and financial risks and risk management. Further, 
discretionary financial instrument information comprise a description of the firm’s 
hedge or treasury policy, a discussion of hedge designation, documentation and 
effectiveness, compliance with financial covenants, hedge adjustments, qualitative 
and quantitative information relating to changes in derivative or hedge accounting 
policies and information relating to the volume and prices achieved of the underlying 
hedged item. The rationale for including certain discretionary financial instrument 
disclosure items within the FIDI relate to the actual or potential impact or impacts 
that changes in the measurement, classification, presentation and disclosure of 
financial instrument under IFRS. Management of these firms is concerned about 
these impacts.  
 
The discretionary financial instrument disclosure items were compiled following an 
examination of company annual reports and extraction of items of information listed 
in AASB 7 that are not mandated under AASB 1033 or AASB 132. AASB 7 applied 
for financial reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2007 but could be 
adopted early for financial reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005. 
Consequently, disclosure requirements listed under AASB 7 but not mandated under 
either AASB 1033 or AASB 132 were considered discretionary items. 
  
For each of the mandatory and discretionary fields, the financial instrument 
disclosure items were categorised according to common attributes for the purpose of 
conducting further descriptive or statistical tests on particular categories of disclosure 
items. These categories comprise risk and risk management, use and significance, 
hedge accounting, significant accounting policies and methods, terms and conditions, 
fair value accounting, financing arrangements and products, performance, 
compliance and impacts. 
 
FIDI comprises both mandatory and discretionary information, information relating 
to both primary and secondary financial instruments, financial risk, financing 
processes, financial instrument controls, objectives, strategies, policies and financial 
ratio information. Information disclosed on financial instruments was obtained from 
all sections of the annual report. FIDI therefore comprised items of information that 
relate to operational, management, investment and financial activities of the firm. 
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FIDI captures extensive financial instrument disclosures often comprising several 
items relating to a particular type of financial instrument or arrangement. For 
instance, the index comprises items of information that relate to the source of credit 
risk, areas of concentration of and extent of credit risk, the existence of credit 
derivatives that mitigate exposure to credit risk, the existence of credit enhancements 
and use of collateral with respect to credit risk exposure rather than one item of 
information devoted to any discussion concerning credit risk. The index has depth 
and in a sense, measures quality of disclosure as well as extent of disclosure.   
 
For each FIDI item disclosed by a firm in its annual report a score of one [1] was 
assigned, otherwise a zero [0]. An FIDIS score (FIDIS) was then computed by 
summing all items disclosed divided by the maximum number of items that can be 
disclosed. FIDIS was calculated for each firm and financial year of the study period 
for which annual report information was available. Assignment of scores was made 
irrespective of the quantum of information relating to a particular attribute within the 
annual report. For instance, one line or one page of information would result in a 
score of one. FIDIS can be mathematically represented as follows: 
 
 
Where: FIDISjt = Financial Instrument Disclosure Index Score for firm j in period 
t. 
 
4.5 Selection of Corporate Governance Items 
Thirteen corporate governance items were selected from the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council’s corporate governance principles and recommendations to 
construct a measure of the corporate governance structure of a firm (see Table 4.1). 
The first two items that are used to measure the corporate governance structure of the 
firm involve an assessment of the roles of the chairperson of the board of directors 
and CEO and whether the chairman of the board of directors is independent. Within 
the context of corporate governance, a central issue often discussed (Kang, Cheng 
and Gray, 2007) is whether the chair of the board of directors and CEO positions 
should be held by different persons or by one person. According to agency theory 
FIDISjt  = 
Total number of items disclosed 
Maximum number of items 
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advocates, the combined function can significantly impair the board’s most important 
functions of monitoring, disciplining and compensating senior managers and could 
significantly impair board oversight, governance and disclosure policies (Kang et. al. 
2007). Duality also enables the CEO to engage in opportunistic behaviour that may 
exacerbate information asymmetry between management and shareholders and the 
firm and bondholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gul and Leung, 2004).  
 
ASX Corporate Governance Principle 1 recommended formalisation and disclosure 
of functions reserved to the board and those delegated to management. The ASX 
Corporate Governance Council indicates that disclosing the division of responsibility 
assists in the understanding of the respective accountabilities and contributions of the 
board and management of a particular company. This understanding can be enhanced 
if an explanation of the division of responsibility between the chairperson, 
independent director and chief executive officer or equivalent is provided. The ASX 
Corporate Governance Council recommends that the chairperson be an independent 
director and that the roles of the chairperson and CEO should not be exercised by the 
same individual. ASX Recommendation 2.2 states that the chairperson be an 
independent director whilst ASX Recommendation 2.3 states that the roles of 
chairperson and chief executive officer should not be exercised by the same 
individual. The chairperson is responsible for “leadership of the board, for the 
efficient organisation and conduct of the board’s function, and for the briefing of all 
directors in relation to issues arising at board meetings” (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2003, p. 21).  
 
Using data obtained from the 1996 annual reports of 385 Hong Kong listed firms, 
Gul and Leung (2004) found that firms with CEOs jointly serving as board chairs 
exhibit lower levels of voluntary disclosure. Gul and Leung (2004) also found that 
the negative CEO-chairman duality and disclosures was weaker for firms with a 
greater proportion of independent and experienced non-executive directors on the 
board.  
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TABLE 4.1: Corporate Governance Items  
Item No. Description  
CG1   Is chairman of the board an independent director?  
CG2 
 
Are the roles of the chairman and chief executive officer performed by 
different persons?  
CG3 
 
Is the board of directors largely (>70%) made up of independent 
directors?  
CG4 
 
Does the nomination committee have a policy for the appointment of 
directors?  
CG5 
 
Has the board adopted a formal code of conduct that deals with personal 
behaviour of directors and key executives relating to insider trading, 
confidentiality, conflicts of interest and making use of corporate 
opportunities (property, information, position)? 
CG6 
 
Does the company have a formal plan, policy or procedures with respect 
to equity (shares and options) based remuneration paid to directors and 
key executives?  
CG7 
 
Does the company have a remuneration policy that outlines the link 
between remuneration paid to directors and key executives and 
corporate performance?  
CG8 
 
Does the audit committee have at least one member that has financial 
expertise (i.e. is a qualified accountant or other financial professional 
with experience of financial and accounting matters)?  
CG9 
 
Has the board adopted a formal integrated risk management policy that 
deals with risk oversight and management and internal control? 
CG10 
 
Has the CEO/CFO stated that the company’s risk management, internal 
compliance and control systems are operating effectively and 
efficiently?  
CG11  Does the company have an audit committee charter?  
CG12  Does the company have a formal written continuous disclosure policy?  
CG13  Does the company have a finance committee, charter or policy?  
 
 
The third item included to measure the corporate governance structure of the firm 
involves an assessment of the composition of the board of directors. ASX Corporate 
Governance Principle 2 recommended boards be structured in such a way so as to 
facilitate the efficient discharge of its responsibilities and duties. The ideal board 
structure as suggested by the ASX Corporate Governance Council would consist of a 
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majority of independent directors32. Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that independent 
directors have greater incentives than non-executive directors to act in the interests of 
shareholders. Independent directors possess knowledge and skill from occupying 
board positions in a number of corporations and this may assist in decision making 
(Kang et. al. 2007). Further, concern for reputation in the labour market provides 
independent directors with greater incentives to act in the best interest of 
shareholders as compared to non-executive directors (Kang et. al. 2007).  
 
Chen and Jaggi (2000) empirically examined the association between independent 
non-executive directors and the comprehensiveness of mandatory financial 
disclosure of 87 firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Chen and Jaggi 
(2000) found that there was a positive association between a larger proportion of 
independent non-executive directors and more extensive financial disclosures. Two 
main arguments were advanced by Chen and Jaggi (2000) to account for this 
observation. First, Chen and Jaggi (2000) stated that independent non-executive 
directors assist with economic and financial strategy decisions of the board. 
Secondly, independent directors on the board serve as a monitoring mechanism of 
actions and decisions of other board members and senior management (Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000). Chen and Jaggi (2000) further suggested that the monitoring of boards 
by independent non-executive directors in turn will mean that firm management will 
be more responsive to pressures exerted from regulatory bodies, standard setters and 
investors; hence, firms will more likely comply with financial reporting disclosure 
requirements. Further, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) find that board 
independence is associated with significantly lower debt financing costs suggesting 
that a more independent board provides greater monitoring of the financial 
accounting process. 
 
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Laides (2000) examined the relationship between 
instances of financial fraud for U.S. firms and industry and firm characteristics 
during the period 1987 to 1997. For all industries (technology, healthcare and 
financial services) examined, the percentage of boards with non-executive 
                                                 
32 The Council defines an independent director as being ‘independent of management and free of any 
business or other relationship that could materially interfere with – or could reasonably be perceived 
to materially interfere with – the exercise of their unfettered and independent judgement’ (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2003, p 19). 
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independent directors was much lower for fraud companies (33 percent or less) than 
no-fraud companies (74 percent or more). The findings indicate that non-executive 
independent directors serve to enhance board monitoring and consequently, the 
likelihood of financial distress is decreased. 
 
Using a sample of 284 non-financial firms in the S&P 500 in 1995, Borokhovich, 
Brunarski, Crutchley and Simkins (2004) provided evidence of a significant and 
positive relation between interest rate derivative used and the proportion of outside 
directors on the firm’s board. Mining firms were one of the largest users of any 
derivative instrument (77.8%). The evidence suggested that outside directors take an 
active role in derivative usage and those firms dominated by outside directors on the 
board employed hedging techniques in shareholders’ best interests. Borokhovich et. 
al. (2005) advanced that the composition of the board of directors can potentially 
affect the use of derivatives. Outside directors, as decision experts, may provide 
advice and expertise in the use of derivatives that management lacks.  
 
Kang et. al. (2007) argue that a predominately independent board of directors 
contribute to monitoring of the firms activities, may ultimately assist in making a 
positive contribution to firm performance and is less likely to result in fraudulent 
financial reporting. They examined the independence of boards of the top 100 
Australian listed companies by market capitalisation in 2003. Using the definition of 
board independence outlined by the ASX Corporate Governance Council, Kang et. 
al. (2007) found that, on average, 64.09% of boards comprise independent directors, 
73% of companies have boards with an independent chairperson and only one 
company appointed its CEO as the chairperson.  
 
Lim, Matolcsy and Chow (2007) examined the association between board 
composition and voluntary disclosure of forward looking, strategic, non-financial and 
historical financial information in the annual reports of 181 Australian companies. A 
positive and statistically significant association exists between board composition 
and total voluntary disclosure. Further, boards composed largely of independent 
directors voluntarily disclose more forward looking quantitative and strategic 
information. Board structure has no bearing on non-financial and financial voluntary 
disclosure. These results support the findings of Cheng and Courtenay (2006). 
   94
The fourth item used to measure the corporate governance structure of the firm is 
whether the nomination committee has a policy in place for the appointment of 
directors. ASX Recommendation 2.4 states that the board should establish a 
nomination committee. A nomination committee is involved in the selection and 
appointment or removal of board members and in the evaluation of board 
performance of the company. The ASX Corporate Governance Council posits that if 
the nomination committee has a plan for identifying, assessing and enhancing 
director competencies, this will enhance board effectiveness, particularly in the case 
of larger companies, which will in turn lead to enhanced corporate performance. This 
in turn is likely to influence a firm’s disclosure policy.  
 
The fifth item used to measure the corporate governance structure of the firm is 
whether the company has a formal code of conduct in place that deals with the 
personal behaviour of directors and key executives. A company’s code of conduct as 
suggested by the ASX Corporate Governance Council can be made of numerous 
factors ranging from disclosures with respect to conflicts of interest, compliance with 
laws and regulations and the behaviour of directors and executives (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003). Three factors suggested by the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council under corporate governance Principle 3 that have particular 
relevance to this study are: 
 Insider trading - ASX Corporate Governance Principle 3 and in particular 
Recommendation 3.2 stated that the company publish its position concerning 
the issue of board and employee trading in company shares or options.  
 Conflicts of interest – managing situations where the interest of a company 
employee interferes or appears to interfere with the interests of the company. 
 Corporate opportunities – preventing directors and key executives from 
taking advantage of property, information or position, or opportunities arising 
from these, for personal gain or to compete with the company. 
 
If the board has adopted a formal code of conduct that deals with insider trading, 
conflict of interest or corporate opportunities, it is considered that the company is 
more likely to disclose information on financial instruments. 
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The sixth item used to measure the corporate governance structure of the firm 
involves an assessment as to whether remuneration paid to directors and key 
executives includes an equity component. Managerial stock ownership is another 
mechanism well established in the literature that aligns the interests of shareholders 
and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Van der Zahn and Brown, 2005). Owner-
managers have similar motivations and interests to shareholders. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) outlined a rigorous theoretical argument that managerial stock 
ownership limits agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Stock 
ownership by the executives of a firm facilitates a convergence of interests (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Van der Zahn and Brown, 2005).  
 
The seventh item used as a measure of a firm’s corporate governance structure is 
whether the company has a remuneration policy in place that outlines the link 
between remuneration paid to directors and key executives and corporate 
performance. Executive corporate remuneration in terms of amount and composition 
and the role of remuneration committees have received increasing attention over the 
past decade (Van der Zahn and Brown, 2005). Firms have a variety of instruments 
when constructing remuneration packages for executive management and the board 
designed to align interests and reduce opportunistic behaviour.  
 
ASX Corporate Governance Council’s Principle 9 states that the company should 
disclose the relationship between the level and composition of remuneration and 
corporate and individual performance. Further, ASX Recommendation 9.1 states that 
the company should disclose the link between remuneration paid to directors and key 
executives and corporate performance. Van der Zahn and Brown (2005) posited that 
the remuneration committee can use compensation packages as a mechanism for 
aligning the interests of agents with those of the principals. The ability of the 
remuneration committee to develop an optimal contract from arm’s length 
negotiations with executive corporate management will be dependent on the level of 
cohesion in the principal-supervisor (committee) relationship. This will be reflected 
by the link between remuneration paid to executive management and corporate 
performance.  
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The eighth item included in the corporate governance structure measure involves an 
assessment of the structure of the audit committee. Companies within the S&P/ASX 
All Ordinaries Index are subject to ASX Listing Rule 12.7 which requires that an 
entity listed in that index at the beginning of its financial year have an audit 
committee during that year. The audit committee must consist of non-executive 
directors only. Also, the audit committee must be a majority of independent 
directors, and the chairperson must be independent and not the chairperson of the 
board. ASX Recommendation 4.3 states that the audit committee should include 
members that are all financially literate (i.e. able to read and understand financial 
statements) or at least one member that has financial expertise (i.e. is a qualified 
accountant or other financial professional with experience of financial and 
accounting matters). Audit committees are expected to assess the nature of the 
accounting policies used and accounting estimates made by firm management. Audit 
committees were also required to assess the reasonableness of methodologies, 
assumptions and disclosures of accounting information, why audit adjustments have 
been made, management’s role in the audit process and an assessment and evaluation 
of the integrity of firms’ financial reports. 
 
Mallin et. al. (2004) cited that one of the reasons why companies chose to disclose 
derivative usage prior to the introduction of FRS 13 by the U.K. Accounting 
Standards Board was the relative importance of the finance function within the firm 
and the finance department’s attitude towards transparency. Defond, Hann and Hu 
(2005) tested whether the market reacted favourably to the appointment of directors 
with financial expertise to the audit committee prior to the implementation of SOX. 
Defond et. al. (2005) found a positive market reaction to the appointment of 
accounting financial experts assigned to audit committees. The financial accounting 
skills of audit committee members were regarded as an important element in 
ensuring high quality financial reporting. Further, Defond et. al. (2005) found that 
positive market reaction was concentrated in firms with relatively strong corporate 
governance, “consistent with accounting financial expertise complementing strong 
governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward 
enhancing shareholder value” (p. 154).  Thus, as part of H1, it is considered that the 
level of financial instrument disclosures will be higher with firms that have members 
of an audit committee who are financially literate. 
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The ninth item incorporated within the corporate governance structure of the firm is 
whether the board has a formal integrated risk management policy in place that deals 
with risk oversight and internal control. ASX Corporate Governance Council’s 
Principle 7 states that the company should establish a sound risk management policy 
that deals with risk oversight, risk management, the company’s risk profile and 
internal control.  It is part of the board’s oversight role to oversee the establishment 
and implementation of a risk management system. Management should establish and 
implement a system for identifying, assessing, monitoring and managing material 
risk in the company. 
 
The tenth item included in the measurement of the corporate governance structure of 
the firm is whether the CEO/CFO state that the company’s risk management, internal 
compliance and control systems are operating effectively and efficiently. A company 
will require some means of analysing the effectiveness of the risk management and 
internal compliance and control system and of the effectiveness of the 
implementation. Under ASX Recommendation 7.2, the CEO and the CFO should 
state to the board in writing that the company’s risk management and internal 
compliance and control system is operating effectively and efficiently. 
 
The eleventh item used to measure the corporate governance structure of a firm is the 
existence of a formal charter established by the audit committee. The audit charter 
typically outlines the adequacy of the firm’s accounting system and internal control 
environment. In addition, the audit charter outlines compliance with laws and 
regulations, standards and codes, improvements that can or should be made to 
internal controls, policies and financial disclosures. The integrity and quality of 
financial information provided to the ASIC, ASX and shareholders and control and 
monitoring of risks associated with the use of financial instruments also typically are 
included within the audit charter.  
 
The twelfth item used to measure the corporate governance structure of a firm is the 
existence of a formal continuous disclosure policy. Continuous disclosure by 
Australian listed firms is mandatory under the ASX Listing Rules and is a statutory 
requirement under Chapter 6A of the CA 2001. Whilst the existence of these rules 
and provisions does not necessarily guarantee disclosure, firm management may 
   98
nevertheless embrace this through the establishment of a formal policy that deals 
with disclosure of all information that could materially impact on the business 
activities of the firm. An effective continuous disclosure regime is a key element of a 
governance framework for facilitating the flow of information in capital markets.  
 
The thirteenth item used to measure the corporate governance structure of a firm is 
the existence of a committee, charter or policy that deals exclusively with financial 
risk management. Firms may establish a financial risk management charter, 
committee or policy to deal specifically with risks relating to derivative use, hedge 
accounting, financial instrument governance and controls. 
 
The thirteen corporate governance items described above individually or collectively 
promote accountability at a senior management and board level (Chen and Jaggi, 
2000; Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley and Simkins, 2004; Shailer, 2004). A 
corporate governance structure comprising these items should encourage key 
executives and board members to revaluate the transparency and explicit content of 
current reporting practices. Enhanced corporate governance is likely to encourage a 
mindset of maximum rather than minimum financial instrument information 
disclosure. The strength of a firm’s corporate governance structure, as measured by 
the CGS, was used as an independent predictor variable in the statistical analysis. 
 
4.5.1 Corporate Governance Score Construct 
To create a composite proxy measure (denoted CGS) to capture the strength of a 
firm’s corporate governance structure a value of one [1] was assigned to the 
corporate governance conditions outlined in Table 4.1. A firm received a CGS score 
ranging from 0 to 13 depending on the number of conditions satisfied. A CGS score 
was calculated for each firm and financial year of the study period. The CGS, 
measured as a percentage, is treated as a continuous variable. The CGS can be 
mathematically represented as follows: 
 
   Where: CGSjt = Corporate Governance Score for firm j in period t. 
 
CGSjt  = 
Sum of items CG1 to CG13 
   Total number of CG items 
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4.6 Corporate Governance Score (CGS) 
Support for construction of the CGS using the thirteen corporate governance items is 
provided by extensive corporate governance literature (e.g. Mallin et. al. 2004, Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Beekes and Brown, 2006) which often addressed a particular 
corporate governance attribute such as board structure or remuneration structure. The 
ASX Corporate Governance Council’s recommendations provide an authoritative 
and objective source for selection of corporate governance attributes of a firm. Extant 
literature (Mallin et. al. 2004; Beekes and Brown, 2006) demonstrates better 
governed firms make more informed disclosures.  The corporate governance 
variables used to construct the corporate governance score (CGS) comprise 
conventional measures such as the composition and structure of the board of 
directors as well as items dealing with financial reporting integrity, financial 
expertise, risk oversight and the existence of formal governance tools such as 
policies, procedures, committees and charters.  
 
Recently, other studies (e.g. De Silva Rosa, Filippetto and Tarca, 2007) involving an 
assessment of corporate governance structures in Australia use constructs based on 
the ASX corporate governance principles. For instance, De Silva Rosa, Filippetto 
and Tarca (2007) developed a corporate governance score comprising six corporate 
governance items using ASX corporate governance principles 2, 4 and 9 relating to 
board structure, safeguarding integrity in financial reporting and remuneration 
respectively. Rosa et. al. (2007) used this score to determine if there was a 
relationship between corporate governance and the occurrence of any ASIC action 
for a firm. They found that the mean corporate governance score for energy and 
materials (including mining) firms was significantly lower than that of other GICS 
sector firms.  
 
Other constructs designed to measure corporate governance structure, whilst not 
directly drawing on the ASX corporate governance principles, nevertheless capture 
corporate governance using attributes closely aligned with those attributes stipulated 
by these ASX principles. For instance, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) captured 
governance structure using the percentage of outside directors, board size, board 
meetings, inside ownership and institutional ownership and audit committee structure 
was captured using percentage of committee outsiders, percentage of committee 
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members with financial expertise, size and meetings. Lo, Danbolt and Opong (2007) 
developed a corporate governance score comprising a checklist of 66 items derived 
from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Listing Rules which became effective 1 
January 2005 to measure the extent of corporate governance disclosure of small-cap 
firms.  
 
Linden and Matolcsy (2004) discussed the use of corporate governance scoring 
systems in Australia. They purport that implicit in all corporate governance scoring 
systems is that effective governance systems promote confidence in capital markets, 
promote accounting disclosures which in turn contributes to improved financial 
performance. However, Linden and Matolcsy (2004) note that the lack of a 
conceptual framework used in the development of these corporate governance 
scoring systems has led to the application of ad hoc corporate governance scoring 
systems that comprise some corporate governance attributes and not others, or apply 
varying weights to constituent attributes. Furthermore, whilst board size and 
composition are considered to be key governance issues, there is not always a clear 
relationship between board characteristics and governance practices or firm 
performance. Hence, a governance scoring system may not necessarily be applicable 
across a diversified group of firms. These are valid concerns that need to be 
considered in the development of any corporate governance (or other) scoring 
system. The application of key ASX principles and recommendations of good 
corporate governance to develop a corporate governance score in this study adds to 
the credibility of this construct given that these principles and recommendations are 
well known to industry, analysts, investors and accounting, finance and regulatory 
bodies and are applied by each company based on their individual circumstances 
with results discussed in annual reports (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003). 
Furthermore, the ASX Corporate Governance Council which devised these 
governance principles and recommendations, comprise representatives from 21 
industry bodies such as The Group of 100, Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Australia, CPA Australia, Business Council of Australia and the Australian Institute 
of Company Directors. 
 
Alternative measures to corporate governance indices have recently been utilised. 
For instance, Chavent, Ding, Fu, Stolowt and Wang (2006) used a divisive clustering 
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method address the problems inherent in use of disclosure indices. Larcker, 
Richardson and Tuna (2007) used a principle component analysis to determine 
governance variables rather than using an index.  
 
4.7 Capital Management Score (CMS) 
A proxy measure was developed to capture the strength of a firm’s capital 
management structure, defined as the capital management score (CMS), for each 
year. A value of one [1] is assigned to each of the three conditions stipulated within 
Table 4.2.  
 
A firm can receive a CMS score ranging from 0 to 3 depending on the number of 
conditions satisfied (see Table 4.2). A CMS score was calculated for each firm and 
financial year of the study period. The CMS, measured as a percentage, was treated 
as a continuous variable in the statistical analysis. The CMS can be mathematically 
represented as follows: 
 
Where: CMSjt = Capital Management Score for firm j in period t; CM1, CM2, 
CM3 = Capital Management Items as specified in Table 4.2. 
 
TABLE 4.2: Capital Management Items  
Item No. Description  
CM1 
 
Capital raisings: Capital management activities such as capital raisings 
will induce the company to disclose more information in relation to 
financial instruments. Has the company engaged in capital raisings such 
as a new share issue in the current year?  
 
CM2 
 
Corporate takeovers and mergers: Derivative financial instruments have 
recently been used in several Australian corporate takeovers and mergers 
and consequently, there should be greater disclosures in relation to these 
activities. Has the company engaged in takeover or merger activity in the 
current year?  
 
CM3 
 
International Operations: Companies with operations overseas are 
expected to disclose more information concerning financial instruments. 
Does the company belong to a corporate group that has operations 
overseas?  
 
CMSjt  = 
Sum of items CM1 to CM3 
  Total number of CM items 
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4.8 Overseas Listing Status (OvList) 
Overseas listing status was treated as a dichotomous variable in the statistical 
analysis consistent with literature (e.g. Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001). If a company is listed 
on both the ASX and an overseas stock exchange, it is allocated one [1], otherwise 
zero [0]. 
 
4.9 Income Tax Scores (ITS) 
Financial instrument disclosures are expected to be negatively associated with 
resource firms deriving foreign source income, belonging to a corporate group with 
at least one company incorporated in a tax haven and if that resource company 
belongs to a corporate group where one or more companies incorporated in a tax 
haven are also financing and/or service entities for that corporate group. To capture 
the firm’s income tax transparency (ITSt), a value of one [1] was assigned to the 
three conditions specified in Table 4.3. 
 
A firm receives an ITSt ranging from 0 to 3 and was treated as a continuous variable 
in statistical analysis. A negative association is hypothesised between FIDIS and the 
income tax transparency score. An ITSt score was calculated for each firm and 
financial year of the study period. The ITSt can be mathematically represented as 
follows: 
 
Where: ITStjt = Income Tax Score (transparency) for firm j in period t; ITSt1..3 = 
Income Tax Score transparency items. 
 
Financial instrument disclosures are expected to be positively associated with thinly 
capitalised resource companies and companies subject to Australian withholding 
taxes. To capture the firm’s income tax exposure (ITSe), a value of one [1] was 
assigned to the two conditions specified in Table 4.3.  
 
A firm receives an ITSe ranging from 0 to 2 and was treated as a continuous variable 
in statistical analysis. A positive association is hypothesised between thinly 
capitalised resource companies and companies subject to Australian withholding 
Sum of items ITSt1 to ITSt3 
    Total number of ITSt items ITSt jt  = 
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taxes and the extent of financial instrument disclosures (FIDI). An ITSe was 
calculated for each firm and financial year of the study period. The ITSe can be 
mathematically represented as follows: 
 
   Where: ITSejt = Income Tax Score (exposure) for firm j in period t; ITSe1, ITSe2 =   
Income Tax Score exposure items. 
 
The income tax scores used to explain the extent of financial instrument disclosures 
in a given year are summarised in Table 4.3. 
 
TABLE 4.3: Income Tax Items 
Item No. Description  
    Income Tax Score - Transparency (ITSt) (maximum score = 3) 
ITSt1 
 
Foreign Source Income: Does the company belong to a corporate group 
that derives foreign sourced income that is expected to be taxed in 
Australia?  
ITSt2 
 
Tax Haven Status: Does the company belong to a corporate group with at 
least one company incorporated in an OECD tax haven?  
 
ITSt3 
 
Financing company incorporated in tax haven: Does the company belong 
to a corporate group with at least one company incorporated in a tax 
haven AND is a financing and/or service entity for the corporate group?  
 
 
 
Income Tax Score - Exposure (ITSe) (maximum score = 2) 
ITSe1 
 
Thin Capitalisation: Is the company subject to the Australian Income Tax 
thin capitalisation provisions?  
ITSe2 
 
Withholding Taxes: Is the company subject to Australian withholding 
taxes?  
 
4.10 Control Variables 
Aside from the dependent and independent variables, five control variables - firm 
size, leverage, sub-industry, shareholder concentration and return on assets were 
ITSe jt  = 
Sum of items ITSe1 to ITSe2 
  Total number of ITSe items 
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included in the statistical analysis (Table 4.4). The five control variables and relevant 
proxy measure are defined below. 
  
4.10.1 Firm Size (FSize)  
Prior research (e.g. Ahmed and Courtis, 2002; Watson et. al. 2002) has generally 
shown that larger companies tend to disclose more information. Using 2,473 
corporate annual reports examined within 29 disclosure studies conducted between 
1968 and 1997, Ahmed and Courtis (2002) found a significant and positive 
association between firm size and disclosure levels. Watson et. al. (2002) cite that 
smaller companies will incur higher costs for voluntarily disclosing information, both 
in terms of the cost of collecting and disclosing data and information and also due to 
potential costs relating to loss of competitive edge with the release of proprietary 
information. 
 
TABLE 4.4: Control Variables – Rationale and Measurement Parameters  
Variable Rationale  Measurement 
Firm Size 
(FSize) 
 
An increase in firm size is associated 
with an increase in financial instrument 
disclosures 
 
 
Natural log of total 
assets. 
Leverage (Lev) 
 
Disclosure may vary as a result of the 
financing mix of the company. 
 
 
Square root of total 
liabilities divided by 
total equity plus total 
liabilities 
Sub-Industry 
(SubInd) 
 
Disclosures may vary according to sub- 
industry – i.e. mining compared to oil 
and gas. 
  
 
Mining = 1, Petroleum 
(oil and gas) = 0 
Top20 
Shareholder 
Concentration 
(Top20) 
 
Disclosures may vary according to the 
shareholder ownership concentration of 
the firm.  
 
Proportion of the 
ordinary shares held by 
the top 20 shareholders 
of the firm. 
Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 
Disclosures may vary according to 
financial performance. 
 
 
Profit before tax 
divided by total assets, 
truncated at the 5th and 
95th percentiles. 
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Larger companies may disclose information to market securities, to reduce investor 
uncertainty and potentially as a result of greater market scrutiny. In relation to 
disclosures of financial instrument information, Mallin et. al. (2004) stated that 
larger companies disclosed more in relation to FRS 13 in the U.K. because these 
firms were more likely to use and understand derivatives while smaller firms were 
less likely to have the in-house expertise to deal effectively with more complex 
financial instruments. The perceived pressure from institutional investors was also 
cited as a possible reason for the predominance of larger firms in disclosing 
information. Jones and Higgins (2006) found that larger firms tend to have greater 
knowledge of IFRS implementation issues and have potentially greater economic 
consequences and technical challenges associated with IFRS implementation than 
smaller firms. Jones and Higgins (2006) found a statistically significant association 
between managements’ knowledge of IFRS adoption issues and firm size, explaining 
this on the basis that larger firms were more likely to devote greater time and 
resources to IFRS adoption requirements than smaller firms. Consequently, larger 
firms may disclose more information in their annual reports.  
 
For this study, the size of the firm (denoted as FSize) was measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets to reduce the impact of skewed data in the statistical 
analysis. This measurement basis is consistent with that used in extant literature (e.g. 
Anderson et. al. 2004). 
 
4.10.2 Leverage (Lev) 
Financial institutions often require resource companies to implement sufficient 
hedging to cover repayments of project financing with these conditions being 
stipulated in debt covenants (PWC, 2005b). Firms with more debt in their capital 
structure are likely to be more motivated to disclose information concerning financial 
instruments, in particular derivative and hedge accounting information (PWC, 
2005b). Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Watson et. al. (2002) posit that more highly 
leveraged firms incur more monitoring costs and will seek to reduce these costs by 
disclosing more information within annual reports. Consistent with many past studies 
(e.g. Watson et. al. 2002), firm leverage (or debt divided by debt plus equity) was 
measured as the square root of total liabilities divided by total liabilities plus total 
equity. Taking the square root of leverage reduced the impact of skewed data in the 
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statistical analysis. Leverage (denoted as Lev) is treated as a continuous variable in 
the statistical analysis. 
 
4.10.3 Sub-Industry (SubInd) 
Previous research (e.g. Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004) has shown that firm’s reporting 
disclosures are likely to be correlated with industry classification. Chalmers and 
Godfrey (2004) observe that disclosure incentives of companies operating in the oil 
and gas or mining sectors can be conflicting. Consequently no sign was predicted for 
financial derivative disclosure levels (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). Information 
relating to financial instruments may not be disclosed owing to the commercial 
sensitivity of the operations particularly in the oil and gas industries. Alternatively, 
this information may be disclosed to reduce negative perceptions relating to risk 
(Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). Sub-industry (denoted as SubInd) is used as a control 
variable to defend the possibility of differences in financial instrument disclosures 
occurring between the mining and petroleum sub-industries. For this study, firms 
from the mining industry are scored one [1] otherwise zero [0]. 
 
4.10.4 Shareholder Concentration (Top20)  
A fourth control variable considers the influence of shareholder concentration. 
Shareholder concentration is measured as the proportion of total ordinary share 
capital owned by the firm’s top 20 shareholders (denoted as top20) at financial year 
end. Previous researchers (e.g. Malone et. al., 1993; Shailer, 2004) have proposed 
that a relatively dispersed shareholder ownership will result in increased scrutiny of 
managerial decision making processes, thereby, protecting the interests of 
shareholders and bondholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond, 2006) 
ultimately leading to enhanced disclosures (Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993). 
Alternatively, firms with large shareholdings owned by competitor firms and/or 
financial institutions have legal obligations and fiduciary duty to manage their 
investments and so will contribute to matters of corporate governance and disclosure 
policy (Shailer, 2004). Ashbaugh-Skaife et. al. (2006) state that large shareholders 
(blockholders and institutional investors) may bear considerable influence on firm 
management because large shareholders have a financial interest in the firm and 
considerable voting power to put pressure on management. Blockholders and active 
institutional shareholders, therefore, may lead to more efficient monitoring of 
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management reducing managerial opportunistic behaviour and potentially more 
informative disclosures. On the other hand, concentrated ownership may allow some 
shareholders such as a CEO who owns a substantial equity interest in the firm to 
exercise undue influence over management (Ashbaugh-Skaife et. al., 2006). There 
may also be interaction effects between shareholder concentration and corporate 
governance attributes. For example, Kang et. al. (2007) found a statistically 
significant and negative association between top 20 shareholder concentration of the 
top 100 Australian listed companies in 2003 and the percentage of independent 
directors making up the board of those firms.  
 
4.10.5 Return on Assets (ROA)  
Accounting based ratios such as ROA are often used as a measure of default risk 
where lower ROA values reflect greater default risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife et. al. 2006). 
A firm’s disclosure policy may vary according to ROA as a high level of default risk 
may necessitate restructuring of loan agreements, a review of credit rating status and 
further capital raisings and use of financial instruments. Malone et. al. (1993) and 
Watson et. al. (2002) suggested that firm management might be willing to disclose 
more information with higher earnings to support management compensation 
contracts and to assure investors of the profitability of the firm. Higher costs of 
disclosure are also justified with higher levels of earnings.  Malone et. al. (1993) did 
not find a statistically significant association between return on net worth and the 
extent of financial information disclosed by oil and gas firms. Return on assets 
(denoted as ROA) is measured as pretax profit divided by total assets. 
 
4.11 Statistical Analysis 
The thesis utilises various statistical techniques to test the general research 
proposition and hypotheses. Descriptive statistics provide information on the mean, 
median, standard deviation and range of dependent, independent and control 
variables. Pearson correlation coefficients provide information on the association of 
dependent, independent and control variables and potential multicollinearity issues. 
Test of means of total, mandatory and discretionary disclosures between consecutive 
reporting periods formed the prime technique for evaluation the change in extent of 
disclosures over the four year period. This technique facilitated a comparison of the 
extent of financial instrument disclosures pre- and post-IFRS adoption. Test of 
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means of the independent variables was additionally made to enable comparison with 
test of means of the dependent variable. Frequency distributions of the control 
variables were used to assess normality of these variables.  
 
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis was used to test the statistical 
significance of the association between the dependent and independent variables with 
the control variables included to control for cross-sectional variation. OLS 
regressions were performed for each year over the four year period. The dependent 
variable is the FIDI. The independent variables are CGS, CMS, ITSt, ITSe and the 
control variables are FSize, Lev, SubInd, Top20 and ROA. The development and 
rationale for use of independent variable scores and control variables has been 
provided within this chapter. Further, OLS regressions tested the association of the 
change in all variables between consecutive reporting periods to determine the key 
drivers of financial instrument disclosures over time. Stepwise regression was 
performed to derive the model with the greatest explanatory power. A pooled 
regression analysis was also performed. This involved testing the statistical 
significance of associations for the combined four year dataset with each year 
included as a dummy variable in the regression equation. The aforementioned 
regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses.  
 
4.12 Sensitivity Analysis 
A number of additional methods or treatments were undertaken to provide additional 
testing of the general research proposition and hypotheses.  First, an assessment of 
the association between the items comprising the independent scores and financial 
instrument disclosures was made to address the issue of endogeneity. An assessment 
of whether unobserved factors correlated with both the dependent and independent 
variables but not incorporated within OLS regressions were driving the observed 
disclosure patterns was made or whether firm heterogeneity contributes to the results. 
To add depth to the thesis, an examination of five important categories of financial 
instrument information disclosures was undertaken. The categories comprise 
derivative and hedge accounting, financial risk management, financial ratios, 
financial arrangements and expected and actual IFRS impacts in relation to financial 
instruments was made. An assessment of the extent of disclosures of each of these 
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categories of information over the four year period and their association with firm 
specific variables was made.   
 
In addition, the extent of financial instrument disclosures of a) mining and petroleum 
firms and b) firms with or without a going concern audit qualification are evaluated 
to determine if there are significant differences in disclosures made between these 
groups. A logistic regression tested whether distinct items of financial instrument 
information were contributing significantly to observed financial instrument 
disclosure patterns. 
 
4.13 Summary 
This is a positivist longitudinal study that employs quantitative techniques to test 
hypotheses. Hypothesis testing uses data from the annual reports of approximately 
111 Australian listed extractive resource firms. Adoption of IFRS is likely to 
significantly affect how extractive resource firms treat financial instruments (KPMG, 
2003). For this reason, an examination of the extent of disclosures made was 
confined to the extractive mining and petroleum sub-industries. Past disclosure 
studies such as that undertaken by Healy and Palepu (2001) and Marston and Shrives 
(1991) served as a basis for determining the best approach to measure the extent of 
financial instrument disclosures in this thesis. A comprehensive index of financial 
instrument disclosures was constructed for the purpose of delineating the extent of 
disclosures over the four year period encompassing the 2003 to 2006 financial years. 
The FID is measured using the FID Index (FIDI). A FIDIS score is computed by 
summing all items disclosed divided by the maximum number of items that can be 
disclosed. An FIDIS score is calculated for each firm and financial year of the study 
period for which annual report information is available. Conventional proxy 
measures are created for strength of corporate governance structure, capital 
management exposure and income tax exposure and income tax transparency 
characteristics of firms. Aside from the dependent and independent variables, control 
variables included in the statistical analysis are FSize, leverage, industry, shareholder 
concentration and temporal differences. The next Chapter discusses univariate 
statistical analysis of data to test the general research proposition. Chapter 6 then 
discusses the statistical testing of hypotheses.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of the items comprising the CGS, CMS and ITSs 
and the items of information that make up the disclosure index (FIDI), the dependent 
variable. Descriptive statistics, Pearson product-moment correlations, paired t-tests 
and frequency analysis comprise the univariate statistics designed to test the research 
proposition. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The FIDI is devolved into sixteen categories of financial instrument information. The 
FIDIS for each major category of financial instrument information is provided as 
Table 5.1. The extent of total, mandatory and discretionary financial instrument 
disclosures has increased from Yr 1 to Yr 4. The extent of total (mandatory; 
discretionary) financial instrument disclosures increased from 34.158% (49.991%; 
19.834%) in Yr 1 to 52.442% (65.225%; 40.877%) in Yr 4. The extent of mandatory 
financial instrument disclosures exceeds that of discretionary financial instrument 
disclosures for each of the study years. Further, the extent of disclosure of each of the 
major categories of financial instrument information documented in Table 5.1 
increased (or remained steady) over the study period, particularly from Yr 3 
(immediate pre-IFRS) to Yr 4 (immediate post-IFRS). Mandatory financial 
instrument disclosures that showed the greatest percentage increase from Yr 1 to Yr 
4 comprise a discussion of net fair value or fair value measurement of financial 
instruments (28.148% Yr 1; 48.515% Yr 4), an overview of the use and significance 
of financial instruments (26.910% Yr 1; 73.762% Yr 4) and a discussion of 
structured financial products (16.190% Yr 1; 47.525% Yr 4). Discretionary financial 
instrument disclosures that showed the greatest percentage increase from Yr 1 to Yr 
4 are hedge accounting (27.619% Yr 1; 54.653% Yr 4), financial risks (20.635% Yr 
1; 36.869% Yr 4), structured financial products (14.666% Yr 1; 32.475% Yr 4) and 
tax implications of use of financial instruments (2.857% Yr 1; 23.762% Yr 4).  
 
Disclosure of expected or actual changes to significant accounting policies, methods 
and estimates as a consequence of anticipated adoption or implementation of new 
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accounting standards relating to financial instruments approximately doubled from 
one year to the next over the study period. This provides evidence that firms 
commenced disclosure of expected impacts of IFRS adoption relating to financial 
instruments very early (i.e. Yr 1). However, disclosure of the full range of expected 
and actual impacts of IFRS adoption on financial instrument classification, 
measurement and recognition in the immediate pre- and post-IFRS adoption periods 
(Yr 3 and Yr 4 respectively) rated weak to moderate (26.689% and 58.055% 
respectively). Resource firms appear to have under-disclosed information relating to 
the impacts of adoption of AASB 132 and AASB 139 on earnings and specific areas 
of company performance. Further analysis and discussion of the disclosure of each of 
the principle categories of financial instrument information is made in Chapter 6. 
 
Descriptive statistics reported in Table 5.2 show great diversity in financial 
instrument disclosures over the observation period. Data in Table 5.2 indicate that 
the mean disclosure of total, mandatory and discretionary financial instrument 
information for sample firms has increased over the four year study period. Total 
financial instrument disclosures increased from a mean of 34.159% in Yr 1 to a mean 
of 52.442% in Yr 4. A similar pattern of disclosures is observed for mandatory and 
discretionary financial instrument information. The maximum level of mandatory 
financial instrument disclosures achieved of 65.225% (in Yr 4) suggests that firms 
were not fully complying with mandated disclosure requirements of accounting 
standards or the costs of disclosure outweighed any benefits. Alternatively, firms 
may also consider that the information is not material enough or potentially useful 
for stakeholders for inclusion within the annual report. 
 
Sample firms generally exhibit a moderate to strong CGS in the pre-IFRS adoption 
period (Yr 1 to Yr 3) with means in the range of 44% to 66%. Sample firms exhibit 
an overall moderate to strong corporate governance structure in Yr 4 (post-IFRS 
adoption period) with a mean CGS of 67.784%. However, the strength of corporate 
governance structure is highly variable as evident from the standard deviations 
ranging from 27% to 33%. Also, CGS ranged from a minimum of zero (none of the 
corporate governance items achieved) to 100% (all thirteen corporate governance 
items achieved).  
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Sample firms mean CMS remained relatively stable pre-IFRS adoption (means 
ranging from 41% to 44%) before increasing to 50.16% post-IFRS adoption. Firms 
measure of ITSt remained relatively stable over the study period with means of 23% 
(Yr 1) to 26% (Yr 4). The ITSe increased steadily over the four year study period 
from a mean of 41% in Yr 1 to 50% in Yr 4.  
 
Firm size, as measured by the natural log of total assets, increased marginally over 
the study period. Mean Lev, as measured by total liabilities divided by total liabilities 
plus total equity, decreased from Yr 1 (5.676%) to Yr 3 (5.392%) then increased to 
6.090% in Yr 4. Top20 shareholder concentration increased marginally from Yr 3 to 
Yr 433. Return on assets (ROA) increased over the study period from -11.272% in Yr 
1 to -2.507% in Yr 4. A discussion of the normal distributions and the existence of 
outliers for each of the control variables is provided in Appendix C34.  
 
The descriptive statistics of board and audit committee member independence are 
provided as Table 5.3. The mean percentage board membership independence and 
audit committee independence are 58.18% and 82.32% respectively. The median 
percentage board membership independence and audit committee independence are 
60.00% and 66.66% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Similar results are obtained for top10 and top5 shareholder concentration levels. 
34 Transformations of raw data were required for firm FSize and leverage as both were positively 
skewed. For this study, firm FSize was measured as the natural log of total assets and leverage was 
measured as the square root of total liabilities divided by total assets. The existence of extreme return 
on asset (ROA) values, measured as pre-tax profit divided by total assets, necessitated truncation at 
the 5th percentile and 95th percentile levels. This process of truncation is often referred to as 
winsorization. Return on asset values below the 5th and above the 95th percentiles assumed the same 
value as at the 5th and 95th percentiles respectively. Transformed and truncated values assumed a more 
normal distribution with skewness below or closer to the value of one. Despite the transformation and 
truncation process, the frequency distribution of control variables revealed the presence of some 
outliers (see Appendix C).   
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TABLE 5.1: FIDIS by Class and Category of Financial Instrument Information  
    FIDIS (%) per category 
Class     Category # Items per Category Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mandatory     Financial performance 1 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
     Hedge accounting 6 48.889 59.480 61.621 65.016
     Significant accounting policies and methods 10 63.047 62.752 64.771 75.742
     Risk and risk management 13 55.311 55.610 57.445 67.479
     Financial instrument terms and conditions 12 63.175 65.214 66.743 69.884
     Fair value accounting 9 28.148 30.071 31.600 48.515
     Financial arrangements 3 27.301 28.440 32.110 40.924
     Use and significance 2 26.190 29.358 34.862 73.762
     Structured financial products 1 16.190 21.101 28.440 47.525
 SUBTOTAL  57 49.991 53.082 55.158 65.225
Discretionary     Financial arrangements 7 44.625 47.444 51.376 49.929
     Hedge accounting 10 27.619 36.789 39.450 54.653
     Changes in accounting standards 11 7.878 13.761 26.689 58.055
     Risk and risk management 21 20.635 22.936 24.640 36.869
     Structured financial products 5 14.666 18.348 22.936 32.475
     Financial performance 8 8.095 8.830 8.945 10.024
     Taxation impacts 1 2.857 5.504 9.174 23.762
 SUBTOTAL  63 19.834 23.824 27.945 40.877
  TOTAL  120 34.158 37.722 40.871 52.442
Legend: The Financial Instrument Disclosure Index Score (FIDIS) comprises two classes of variables – mandatory and discretionary. The mandatory class consists of 57 items 
of information; the discretionary class has 63 items of information. Categorisation of items of financial instrument information was based on the common attributes exhibited 
by that information such as risk and risk management, fair value accounting, hedge accounting as examples. Statistical analysis of major categories of financial instrument 
information is provided in Chapter 8. The number of items per category of financial instrument information and the percentage of all items within each category disclosed by 
all firms for each of the study years are shown. Yr 1 to Yr 3 are pre-IFRS years; Yr 4 is the first full year annual reporting year following IFRS adoption. 
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TABLE 5.2: Descriptive Statistics: Sample Firms Yrs 1 to 4 
Yr 1 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA  
            
Mean 34.159 49.992 19.834 43.883 40.952 23.492 30.952 17.825 5.676 58.893 -11.272
Standard Error 1.330 1.291 1.473 2.211 2.716 3.219 4.246 0.222 0.226 1.990 2.792
Median 32.500 49.123 17.460 46.154 33.333 0.000 0.000 17.464 5.689 57.370 -1.699
Standard Deviation 13.626 13.232 15.091 22.652 27.834 32.987 43.512 2.271 2.318 20.395 28.611
Sample Variance 185.664 175.091 227.732 513.113 774.725 1088.116 1893.315 5.155 5.373 415.953 818.605
Kurtosis -0.819 -1.024 -0.164 -0.725 -0.464 0.523 -1.166 1.313 0.422 -0.791 0.631
Skewness 0.491 0.096 0.880 0.264 0.253 1.294 0.830 0.293 0.333 0.092 -1.286
Range 54.167 54.386 63.492 92.308 100.000 100.000 100.000 14.333 12.192 80.300 104.095
Minimum 10.833 21.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.136 0.878 18.320 -77.056
Maximum 65.000 75.439 63.492 92.308 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.469 13.070 98.620 27.038
Count 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
Conf. Level(95.0%) 2.637 2.561 2.920 4.384 5.387 6.384 8.421 0.439 0.449 3.947 5.537
 
Yr 2 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
            
Mean 37.722 53.082 23.824 59.986 43.731 24.771 33.945 18.313 5.553 61.453 -4.134
Standard Error 1.264 1.228 1.403 2.232 2.632 3.234 4.317 0.181 0.177 1.872 2.269
Median 36.667 54.386 22.222 61.538 33.333 0.000 0.000 18.042 5.751 62.750 2.542
Standard Deviation 13.193 12.818 14.653 23.308 27.479 33.764 45.072 1.890 1.849 19.546 23.689
Sample Variance 174.044 164.290 214.696 543.261 755.087 1139.993 2031.515 3.573 3.419 382.064 561.186
Kurtosis -0.835 -0.999 -0.393 -0.528 -0.465 0.193 -1.428 1.017 -0.527 -0.768 1.882
Skewness 0.286 -0.083 0.606 -0.355 0.169 1.191 0.684 0.907 -0.245 -0.078 -1.368
Range 55.000 50.877 58.730 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 9.899 8.875 85.240 104.095
Minimum 12.500 26.316 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.625 0.971 13.440 -77.056
Maximum 67.500 77.193 58.730 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.524 9.846 98.680 27.038
Count 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Conf. Level(95.0%) 2.505 2.434 2.782 4.425 5.217 6.410 8.557 0.359 0.351 3.711 4.498
 
   115
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics: Sample Firms Yrs 1 to 4 continued 
Yr 3 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
            
Mean 40.925 55.175 28.033 65.914 41.896 25.688 35.321 18.611 5.392 61.856 -4.402
Standard Error 1.322 1.240 1.508 2.061 2.585 3.241 4.387 0.179 0.194 1.976 2.316
Median 43.333 57.895 26.984 69.231 33.333 0.000 0.000 18.389 5.493 63.000 0.429
Standard Deviation 13.803 12.942 15.742 21.513 26.990 33.834 45.797 1.873 2.029 20.627 24.181
Sample Variance 190.526 167.487 247.810 462.817 728.471 1144.713 2097.350 3.509 4.117 425.493 584.719
Kurtosis -0.803 -0.847 -0.576 0.093 -0.363 0.052 -1.532 0.648 0.000 -0.738 2.127
Skewness 0.081 -0.301 0.422 -0.717 0.241 1.126 0.621 0.766 0.003 -0.178 -1.435
Range 60.000 50.877 68.254 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 8.992 10.812 84.710 104.095
Minimum 12.500 26.316 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.515 1.049 15.010 -77.056
Maximum 72.500 77.193 68.254 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.506 11.862 99.720 27.038
Count 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Conf. Level(95.0%) 2.621 2.457 2.989 4.084 5.124 6.424 8.695 0.356 0.385 3.916 4.591
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics: Sample Firms Yrs 1 to 4 continued 
Yr 4 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
            
Mean 52.442 65.225 40.877 67.784 50.165 25.413 40.099 19.039 6.090 64.014 -2.507
Standard Error 1.664 1.443 1.965 2.039 2.839 3.322 4.561 0.181 0.222 2.100 2.245
Median 55.000 66.667 42.857 69.231 66.667 0.000 0.000 18.902 6.418 65.340 1.841
Standard Deviation 16.723 14.498 19.746 20.488 28.528 33.383 45.837 1.816 2.231 21.104 22.563
Sample Variance 279.642 210.181 389.892 419.779 813.861 1114.411 2100.990 3.297 4.979 445.385 509.105
Kurtosis -1.012 -0.672 -1.043 -0.357 -0.592 0.210 -1.703 0.781 0.559 -0.732 1.122
Skewness -0.309 -0.418 -0.102 -0.487 -0.016 1.167 0.407 0.674 -0.006 -0.259 -1.138
Range 67.500 61.404 76.190 84.615 100.000 100.000 100.000 9.509 12.905 87.810 104.095
Minimum 15.833 29.825 3.175 15.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.384 1.081 12.040 -77.056
Maximum 83.333 91.228 79.365 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.893 13.986 99.850 27.038
Count 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101
Conf. Level(95.0%) 3.301 2.862 3.898 4.045 5.632 6.590 9.049 0.358 0.440 4.166 4.454
Legend: FIDIS=Financial Instrument Disclosure Index Score, MFIDIS=Mandatory Financial Instrument Disclosure Index Score, DFIDIS=Discretionary Financial Instrument  
Disclosure Index Score. CGS=Corporate Governance Score, CMS=Capital Management Score, ITSt = Income Tax Score (transparency), ITSe=Income Tax Score (exposure).  
FSize is measured as the natural log of total assets (used to avoid skewness issues), Lev = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total liabilities plus total equity),  
Top20 refers to the percentage ownership of ordinary share capital held by the top 20 shareholders and ROA = pretax profit/total assets truncated at the 5th percentile and 95th  
percentile. SubInd and OvList are not included as these are dichotomous variables. 
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TABLE 5.3: Board and Audit Committee Structure of Resource Firms 
  
Number of 
directors 
Independent 
Directors 
Number of 
Audit 
Committee 
Members 
Independent 
Audit 
Committee 
Members 
     
Mean 5.347 3.111 2.535 2.087 
Standard Error 0.097 0.094 0.062 0.062 
Median 5.000 3.000 3.000 2.000
Standard Deviation 1.988 1.939 1.286 1.283 
Skewness 1.488 1.018 -0.518 -0.022 
Minimum 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 14.000 10.000 6.000 6.000 
Count 424 424 424 424 
Conf. Level(95.0%) 0.190 0.185 0.123 0.122 
 
5.2 Correlation Coefficients 
Simple correlations between total, mandatory and discretionary financial instrument 
disclosures and each of the independent and control variables are computed using 
Pearson’s product-moment correlations over the four year study period (see Table 
5.4). There is a positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01) correlation between a 
firm’s strength of corporate governance structure, as measured by CGS, and total, 
mandatory and discretionary financial instrument disclosures. There is a marginal 
decline in the value of these correlation coefficients from Yr 1 to Yr 4.  
 
There is a positive and statistically significant (p < 0.10) correlation between a firm’s 
capital management exposure, as measured by CMS, and FIDIS in Yr 2 and Yr 3 
only. Correlation coefficients between overseas listing status and financial 
instrument disclosures have either a positive or negative sign. These correlations are 
not statistically significant for any of the years.  
 
There is a positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10) correlation 
between a firm’s income tax transparency characteristics (ITSt) and FIDIS and 
DFIDIS in Yr 1, Yr 2 and Yr 3. The directionality of these correlations differs from 
that hypothesised (i.e. a negative association between ITSt and FIDIS). There is a 
positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10) correlation between a 
firm’s income tax exposure (ITSe) and FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS for all years, 
consistent with that hypothesised.  
 
   118
FSize and Lev are both positively and statistically significantly correlated with 
disclosures in all years. In particular, correlations between FSize and FIDIS are very 
strong. Correlations between FSize and FIDIS decline marginally from Yr 1 to Yr 4 
(0.764 in Yr 1 and 0.629 in Yr 4). There is a positive and statistically significant 
association (p <0.10) between ROA and FIDIS in Yr 2, Yr 3 and Yr 4. Correlations 
between Top20 or SubInd and FIDIS are not statistically significant for any of the 
years.  
 
Overall FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS are moderately positively correlated with CGS 
and ITSe consistent with H1 and H3a respectively. FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS are 
also moderately to strongly positively correlated with FSize and moderately to 
strongly positively correlated with Lev. Correlation coefficients suggest that 
multicollinearity between the independent and control variables is not a concern as 
the correlation coefficients between these variables are less than 0.70 (Lind, Marchal 
and Walthen, 2004). Correlation coefficients between CGS and FSize are moderate 
to strong (0.539 to 0.654) across all years.  
 
An issue in interpreting correlation coefficients (and regression results in Chapter 7) 
is reverse causality (Lo et. al., 2007). The correlation coefficients provided in Table 
5.4 provide evidence of possible causality flow direction. Examination of correlation 
coefficients in each of the years reveals that both CGS and Lev are significantly and 
positively correlated with FIDIS. Also, CGS and Lev are not significantly correlated. 
This suggests that both the CGS and Lev influence FIDIS rather than the converse 
direction.  
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TABLE 5.4: Pearson Correlation Matrix: Sample Firms Yrs 1 to 4 
Panel A: Yr 1 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OvList ITSt ITSe FSize Lev SubInd Top20 ROA 
FIDIS 1.000             
MFIDIS 0.948* 1.000            
DFIDIS 0.968* 0.837* 1.000           
CGS 0.622* 0.586* 0.605* 1.000          
CMS 0.353*** 0.275 0.389** 0.274 1.000         
Overseas Listing 0.091 0.039 0.126 0.179 0.159 1.000        
ITSt 0.359*** 0.262 0.409** 0.402** 0.443** 0.299 1.000       
ITSe 0.655* 0.531* 0.705* 0.537* 0.531* 0.180 0.694* 1.000      
FSize 0.764* 0.658* 0.793* 0.654* 0.328*** 0.313*** 0.506* 0.655* 1.000     
Leverage 0.524* 0.531* 0.479** 0.239 0.074 -0.034 0.093 0.330*** 0.328*** 1.000
Sub-Industry -0.063 -0.076 -0.048 -0.272 -0.014 -0.041 -0.117 0.022 -0.138 0.124 1.000   
Top20 0.220 0.126 0.279 0.048 0.135 0.052 0.216 0.324*** 0.236 0.194 0.339*** 1.000  
ROA 0.264 0.239 0.264 0.268 0.040 0.220 0.242 0.272 0.465** -0.066 -0.118 0.072 1.000 
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TABLE 5.4: Pearson Correlation Matrix: Sample Firms Yrs 1 to 4 continued 
Panel B: Yr 2 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OvList ITSt ITSe FSize Lev SubInd Top20 ROA 
FIDIS 1.000             
MFIDIS 0.946* 1.000            
DFIDIS 0.966* 0.831* 1.000           
CGS 0.560* 0.552* 0.523* 1.000          
CMS 0.394*** 0.352*** 0.397** 0.192 1.000         
Overseas Listing -0.038 -0.088 0.004 0.002 0.207 1.000        
ITSt 0.330*** 0.205 0.403** 0.188 0.496** 0.249 1.000       
ITSe 0.583* 0.461** 0.636* 0.315*** 0.597* 0.200 0.700* 1.000      
FSize 0.720* 0.611* 0.751* 0.539* 0.446** 0.236 0.564* 0.679* 1.000     
Leverage 0.577* 0.598* 0.515* 0.221 0.304*** -0.055 0.113 0.395** 0.389** 1.000
Sub-Industry -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.180 -0.128 -0.040 -0.143 -0.032 -0.121 0.116 1.000   
Top20 0.269 0.217 0.290 0.048 0.229 0.005 0.226 0.340*** 0.322*** 0.117 0.383** 1.000  
ROA 0.336*** 0.316*** 0.326*** 0.171 0.181 0.123 0.214 0.250 0.474** 0.050 -0.003 0.333 1.000 
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TABLE 5.4: Pearson Correlation Matrix: Sample Firms Yrs 1 to 4 continued 
Panel C: Yr 3 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OvList ITSt ITSe FSize Lev SubInd Top20 ROA 
FIDIS 1.000             
MFIDIS 0.943* 1.000            
DFIDIS 0.969* 0.831* 1.000           
CGS 0.558* 0.579* 0.501* 1.000          
CMS 0.418** 0.317*** 0.462** 0.254 1.000         
Overseas Listing 0.012 -0.064 0.067 0.194 0.194 1.000        
ITSt 0.341*** 0.238 0.392** 0.350*** 0.489** 0.306** 1.000       
ITSe 0.500* 0.383** 0.550* 0.380** 0.590* 0.252 0.704* 1.000      
FSize 0.694* 0.585* 0.724* 0.571* 0.507* 0.221 0.520* 0.644* 1.000     
Leverage 0.471** 0.459** 0.445** 0.148 0.209 -0.074 0.043 0.255 0.272 1.000
Sub-Industry 0.360*** 0.310*** 0.371*** 0.117 0.113 -0.006 0.192 0.322*** 0.357*** 0.125 1.000   
Top20 -0.056 -0.017 -0.081 -0.202 -0.178 -0.032 -0.167 -0.032 -0.161 0.065 0.298 1.000  
ROA 0.391** 0.377** 0.373*** 0.382** 0.155 0.169 0.223 0.281 0.565* -0.119 0.282 -0.106 1.000 
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TABLE 5.4: Pearson Correlation Matrix: Sample Firms Yrs 1 to 4 continued 
Panel D: Yr 4 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OvList ITSt ITSe FSize Lev SubInd Top20 ROA 
FIDIS 1.000             
MFIDIS 0.953* 1.000            
DFIDIS 0.980* 0.874* 1.000           
CGS 0.511* 0.441** 0.531* 1.000          
CMS 0.338*** 0.328*** 0.327*** 0.182 1.000         
Overseas Listing 0.058 0.006 0.090 0.185 0.166 1.000        
ITSt 0.170 0.105 0.204 0.283 0.375*** 0.281 1.000       
ITSe 0.463** 0.390** 0.488** 0.431** 0.371*** 0.275 0.656* 1.000      
FSize 0.629* 0.492** 0.687* 0.610 0.352*** 0.214 0.449** 0.640* 1.000     
Leverage 0.577* 0.593* 0.537* 0.213 0.050 -0.093 -0.055 0.278 0.228 1.000
Sub-Industry -0.016 0.012 -0.034 -0.188 -0.280 -0.004 -0.091 -0.074 -0.126 0.130 1.000   
Top20 0.306 0.275 0.310*** 0.133 0.060 0.022 0.150 0.249 0.345*** 0.243 0.361*** 1.000  
ROA 0.348*** 0.305*** 0.358*** 0.327*** 0.049 0.232 0.169 0.277 0.492** -0.026 -0.140 0.230 1.000 
Legend: Table 5.4 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for all sample firms and for all years. FIDIS = financial instrument disclosure index (both mandatory and discretionary; 
MFIDIS = mandatory financial instrument disclosure index and DFIDIS = discretionary financial instrument disclosure index, CGS = corporate governance score, leverage measures as 
the square root of total liabilities divided by total liabilities plus total equity, control variables are FSize, measured as the natural log of total assets, and top20 refers to the percentage 
shareholding in the firm by the top 20 shareholders. Sub-Industry refers to either mining firms (score of 1) or oil and gas firms (score of 0). ROA refers to return on assets, measured as 
profit before tax divided by total assets. ROA data was truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles to remove the effect of extreme values; OvList = overseas listing. Associations * and ** 
are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 123
5.3 Paired t-Tests 
Paired t-tests were performed to examine differences between the means of the 
FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS for consecutive financial years over the study period. 
The purpose of the t-tests is to determine whether the mean of the distribution of 
differences in the values of FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS is zero. The results are 
shown in Table 5.5. As the research proposition is directional (i.e. that there is an 
increase in extent of disclosures over the study period), only the one-tailed 
significance is shown. 
 
In Table 5.5 (Panel A), the mean of the distribution of differences in the values of 
FIDIS is not zero; thus, the null hypothesis is rejected. The difference in means of 
FIDIS between consecutive years is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
largest change (28.771%) in mean FIDIS occurs between Yr 3 (pre-IFRS adoption 
period) and Yr 4 (post-IFRS adoption period). The general research proposition is 
supported by the results as the difference in means of FIDIS between all consecutive 
reporting periods is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
In Table 5.5, (Panels B and C), paired t-tests are performed to test whether the mean 
of the distribution of differences in MFIDIS and DFIDIS is zero. As evident from 
Table 5.5 (Panels B and C), the mean of the distribution of differences in the values 
of MFIDIS and DFIDIS is not zero. The increase in mean MFIDIS and mean 
DFIDIS between consecutive years is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
18.479% increase in mean MFIDIS from Yr 3 (pre-IFRS) to Yr 4 (post-IFRS) 
mirrors the marked increase in mean FIDIS from Yr 3 to Yr 4. The mean MFIDIS in 
Yr 4 is 65.225% as compared to 55.052% in Yr 3. Firms are disclosing far more 
financial instrument information of both a mandatory and discretionary nature in the 
post-IFRS adoption period compared to the pre-IFRS adoption period despite the fact 
that disclosure requirements mandated under AASB 1033 (pre-IFRS) and AASB 132 
(IFRS) are very similar.  
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TABLE 5.5: Paired t-Tests for Mean Financial Instrument Disclosures 
Panel A:  FIDIS Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean 34.159 37.675 40.725 52.442
Variance 185.664 171.684 187.917 279.642
Observations 105 105 108 101
% change FIDISt-FIDISt-1  10.293 8.098 28.771
Hypothesised Mean Difference  0 0 0
df  104 107 100
t Stat  -5.162 -5.366 -12.173
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.000 0.000 0.000
t Critical one-tail   1.660 1.659 1.660
 
Panel B: MFIDIS Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean 49.992 52.999 55.052 65.225
Variance 175.091 161.984 167.397 210.181
Observations 105 105 108 101
% change MFIDISt-MFIDISt-1  6.016 3.873 18.479
Hypothesised Mean Difference  0 0 0
df  104 100 100
t Stat  -3.851 -10.168 -10.168
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.000 0.000 0.000
t Critical one-tail   1.660 1.660 1.660
 
Panel C: DFIDIS Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean 19.834 23.810 27.763 40.877
Variance 227.732 213.239 242.133 389.892
Observations 105 105 108 101
% change DFIDISt-DFIDISt-1  20.046 16.605 47.235
Hypothesised Mean Difference  0 0 0
df 104 107 100
t Stat  -5.570 -5.528 -11.964
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.000 0.000 0.000
t Critical one-tail   1.660 1.659 1.660
Legend: Paired two sample t-test results for mean financial instrument disclosures for all sample firms: 
both mandatory and discretionary disclosures (Panel A); mandatory disclosures (Panel B) and 
discretionary disclosures (Panel C). For companies with a 30 June year end, Yr 1 is the 2003 financial 
year and Yr 4 is the 2006 financial year. For companies with a 31 December year end, Yr 1 is the 2002 
financial year and Yr 4 is the 2006 financial year. For both June and December balancing companies, 
Yr 1 to Yr 3 are pre-IFRS and Yr 4 is post-IFRS. The t-test was performed by comparing Yr 1 with Yr 
2, Yr 2 with Yr 3 and Yr 3 with Yr 4. The Yr 1 to Yr 2 t-test involved 105 companies, Yr 2 to Yr 3 t-
test involved 108 companies and the Yr 3 to 4 t-test involved 101 companies. The difference in 
number of pairs from one year to the next relates largely to takeover and mergers of companies. Thus 
not all 111 companies are represented in each of the study years. Also shown is the percentage change 
in financial instrument disclosures between consecutive years.  
 
There is a marked increase in mean DFIDIS from Yr 1 to Yr 4 with the largest 
percentage increase (47.235%) again occurring between Yr 3 and Yr 4. The two 
important changes in the extent of information disclosed occur from Yr 1 to Yr 2 and 
from Yr 3 to Yr 4. Specifically, the statistically significant increase in mean 
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discretionary disclosures from Yr 1 to Yr 2 coincides with a marked increase 
(35.559%) in the corporate governance structure of resource firms, as measured by 
CGS. The increase in CGS occurred at the time of release of the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council’s best practice principles and recommendations (March 2003).  
 
A paired t-test is then used to test for differences between the means of the CGS for 
consecutive financial years over the study period. Results are tabulated in Table 5.6.  
 
TABLE 5.6: Paired t-Tests for Mean Corporate Governance Score 
CGS Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean 43.883 59.487 65.883 67.784
Variance 513.113 552.192 467.039 419.779
Observations 105 105 108 101
% change CGSt-CGSt-1  35.559 10.752 2.885
Hypothesised Mean Difference 0 0 0
df  104 107 100
t Stat  -9.306 -4.534 -1.971
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.000 0.000 0.026
t Critical one-tail   1.660 1.659 1.660
Legend: Paired two sample t-test results for mean corporate governance score (CGS) for all sample 
firms. For companies with a 30 June year end, Yr 1 is the 2003 financial year and Yr 4 is the 2006 
financial year. For companies with a 31 December year end, Yr 1 is the 2002 financial year and Yr 4 
is the 2006 financial year. For both June and December balancing companies, Yr 1 to Yr 3 are pre-
IFRS and Yr 4 is post-IFRS. The t-test was performed by comparing Yr 1 with Yr 2, Yr 2 with Yr 3 
and Yr 3 with Yr 4. The Yr 1 to Yr 2 t-test involved 105 companies, Yr 2 to Yr 3 t-test involved 108 
companies and the Yr 3 to 4 t-test involved 101 companies. The difference in number of pairs from 
one year to the next relates largely to takeover and mergers of companies. Thus not all 111 companies 
are represented in each of the study years. Also shown is the percentage change in corporate 
governance score (CGSt-CGSt-1) between consecutive years. 
 
The difference in the mean CGS between consecutive years is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The largest change (35.56%) in mean CGS occurs between Yr 1 and 
Yr 2. This immediately followed the release of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council’s best practice corporate governance principles and recommendations on 31 
March 2003. Resource firms made significant adjustments to their corporate 
governance structure in the 15 month period following the release of these principles 
and recommendations as reflected by a 10.75% increase in CGS from Yr 2 to Yr 3. A 
further increase in CGS from Yr 3 to Yr 4 of 2.88% indicates further adjustment of 
the corporate governance structure by firm management. The rate of change in 
financial instrument disclosures (FIDIS), CGS, CMS, ITSt and ITSe over the study 
period is shown as Figure 5.1.  
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Paired t-test is also used to test for differences between the means of the capital 
management score (CMS) (Table 5.7) and income tax scores (ITSt and ITSe) (Table 
5.8) for consecutive financial years over the study period. 
 
TABLE 5.7: Paired t-Tests for Mean Capital Management Score  
CMS Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean 40.952 43.492 41.666 50.165
Variance 774.725 771.876 729.491 813.861
Observations 105 105 108 101
% change CMSt-CMSt-1  6.202 -4.197 20.396
Hypothesised Mean Difference  0 0 0
df  104 107 100
t Stat  -1.132 0.727 -2.710
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.129 0.234 0.003
t Critical one-tail   1.659 1.659 1.660
Legend: Paired two sample t-test results for mean capital management score (CMS) for all sample 
firms. For companies with a 30 June year end, Yr 1 is the 2003 financial year and Yr 4 is the 2006 
financial year. For companies with a 31 December year end, Yr 1 is the 2002 financial year and Yr 4 
is the 2006 financial year. For both June and December balancing companies, Yr 1 to Yr 3 are pre-
IFRS and Yr 4 is post-IFRS. The t-test was performed by comparing Yr 1 with Yr 2, Yr 2 with Yr 3 
and Yr 3 with Yr 4. The Yr 1 to Yr 2 t-tests involved 105 companies, Yr 2 to Yr 3 t-tests involved 108 
companies and the Yr 3 to 4 t-test involved 101 companies. The difference in number of pairs from 
one year to the next relates largely to takeover and mergers of companies. Thus not all 111 companies 
are represented in each of the study years. Also shown is the percentage change in mean capital 
management score (CMSt-CMSt-1) between consecutive years. 
 
 
TABLE 5.8: Paired t-Tests for Mean Income Tax Scores 
Panel A: Income Tax Score 
transparency (ITSt) Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean 23.492 24.126 25.617 25.412
Variance 1088.116 1100.326 1154.859 1114.411
Observations 105 105 108 101
% change ITStt-ITStt-1  2.703 6.177 -0.799
Hypothesised Mean Difference 0 0 0 0
df  104 107 100
t Stat  -1.421 -1.420 1
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.079 0.079 0.159
t Critical one-tail 1.659 1.659 1.660
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TABLE 5.8: Paired t-Tests for Mean Income Tax Scores continued 
Panel B: ITSe Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean 30.952 33.333 34.722 40.099
Variance 1893.315 2003.205 2077.492 2100.990
Observations 105 105 108 101
% change ITSet-ITSet-1  7.692 4.167 15.485
Hypothesised Mean Difference  0 0 0
df  104 107 100
t Stat  -1.215 -0.376 -2.030
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.113 0.353 0.022
t Critical one-tail   1.659 1.659 1.660
Legend: Paired two sample t-test results for mean income tax score transparency (ITSt) and income 
tax score exposure (ITSe) for all sample firms. For companies with a 30 June year end, Yr 1 is the 
2003 financial year and Yr 4 is the 2006 financial year. For companies with a 31 December year end, 
Yr 1 is the 2002 financial year and Yr 4 is the 2006 financial year. For both June and December 
balancing companies, Yr 1 to Yr 3 are pre-IFRS and Yr 4 is post-IFRS. The t-test was performed by 
comparing Yr 1 with Yr 2, Yr 2 with Yr 3 and Yr 3 with Yr 4. The Yr 1 to Yr 2 t-test involved 105 
companies, Yr 2 to Yr 3 t-test involved 108 companies and the Yr 3 to 4 t-test involved 101 
companies. The difference in number of pairs from one year to the next relates largely to takeover and 
mergers of companies. Thus not all 111 companies are represented in each of the study years. Also 
shown is the percentage change in mean income tax scores (ITStt-ITStt-1; ITSet-ITSet-1) between 
consecutive years. 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the change in disclosure of FIDIS, MFIDIS, DFIDIS, CGS, 
CMS, ITSt and ITSe over the observation period. Figure 5.1 shows an increase in 
FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS from Yr 1 to Yr 4. In particular, there is a marked 
increase in disclosure of FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS from Yr 3 (pre-IFRS) to Yr 4 
(post-IFRS). Mean CGS increased at a decreasing rate over the observation period 
reflecting the introduction and progressive acceptance of the ASX corporate 
governance principles and recommendations. Mean CMS remains relatively stable 
from Yr 1 to Yr 3 with a marked increase from Yr 3 to Yr 4 reflecting the increase in 
takeover and merger activity and financing arrangements in that period. Mean ITSt is 
relatively stable while mean ITSe increased marginally over the observation period. 
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FIGURE 5.1: Change in Dependent and Independent Variables  
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Legend: The rate of change in mean total, mandatory and discretionary financial instrument disclosure 
index (FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS), mean corporate governance score (CGS), mean capital 
management score (CMS), mean income tax score transparency (ITSt) and mean income tax score 
exposure (ITSe) from Yr 1 to Yr 4. Yr 1 to Yr 3 are pre-IFRS and Yr 4 is post-IFRS adoption. 
 
5.4 Frequency Analysis of Dependent Variable 
The change in frequency of each of the 120 financial instrument information items 
comprising the FIDI was examined to determine which items changed significantly 
over the study period. The results are provided in Appendix D. All items exhibit an 
increase over the observation period with the exception of FIDI item 14 and FIDI 
item 7235. The items that exhibit the greatest percentage increase over the 
observation period comprise information relating to liquidity risk (FIDI item 6: 761% 
and FIDI item 107: 623,762%), financial asset derecognition (FIDI item 23: 
514,751%) and impairment (FIDI item 106: 627%), reclassification changes (FIDI 
item 27: 3,954%), valuation and assumption issues concerning fair value (or net fair 
value) measurement (FIDI item 49: 792,079% and FIDI item 50: 835%), changes 
relating to adoption of any accounting standard dealing with financial instruments 
(FIFI item 59: 679%, FIDI item 60: 762%, FIDI item 63: 1,199%, FIDI item 64: 
850%, FIDI item 65: 297,029%, FIDI item 66: 4,950,049% and FIDI item 69: 
4,682%), concerns regarding the ability of the company to meet hedge accounting 
requirements (FIDI item 80: 1,173%).  
                                                 
35 Reference should be made to Appendix B for a description of each financial instrument item. 
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Several mandatory financial instrument items exhibit 100% disclosure over the four 
years. These are significant accounting policies and methods (FIDI items 22, 24, 25, 
26, 28 and 29) and terms and conditions (FIDI items 32, 33, 37 and 39). The 
mandatory items36 that exhibit consistently lower disclosure levels (i.e. less than 
40%) are those relating to the nature and amount of asset impairment (FIDI item 30), 
assets pledged as collateral (FIDI item 31), early settlement options (FIDI item 35), 
options to convert financial instruments (FIDI item 36), economic substance issues 
(FIDI item 43), terms and conditions of collateral used (FIDI item 52), a summary of 
the used and unused loan facilities (FIDI item 53) and defaults or breaches of loan 
agreements (FIDI item 55). The low level of disclosures of these items relate 
principally to credit risk and financing risk. 
 
Several discretionary items exhibit relatively higher (i.e. greater than 60%) level of 
disclosure over the four year study period. These items cover hedge accounting 
policies or treasury policies (FIDI item 78), the nature of loan agreements (FIDI item 
89), loan repayment terms (FIDI item 90) and methods used to measure financial risk 
(FIDI item 111). Discretionary items that exhibit relatively lower levels of disclosure 
(i.e. less than 40%) over the four years are financial ratios (FIDI items 73 to 76), 
compliance of hedge commitments to financial covenants (FIDI item 82), embedded 
derivatives (FIDI items 95 and 96), sensitivity analysis of financial instruments (FIDI 
items 101 and 102) and contractual payments (FIDI item 118). The low level of 
disclosures of these items may relate in part to potential breaches of loan or hedge 
agreements or in part to problems associated with highlighting potential liquidity 
issues for the company. 
 
5.5 Frequency Analysis of Independent Variables 
The frequency of items that make up the independent variables CGS, CMS, overseas 
exchange listing, ITSt and ITSe, measured as a percentage, for each year is shown in 
Table 5.9. The CGS is a measure of the strength of the corporate governance 
structure of the firm. All thirteen items comprising the CGS increased over the 
period encompassing the 2003 to 2006 financial years. Corporate governance item 
CG10 (Has the CEO/CFO stated that that the company’s risk management, internal 
                                                 
36 Reference should be made to Appendix D for percentage disclosure levels in each of the four years. 
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compliance and control systems are operating effectively and efficiently?) and item 
CG12 (Does the company have a formal written continuous disclosure policy?) 
exhibit the largest percentage increase across the observation period. CG10 and 
CG12 relate directly to financial reporting integrity and transparency. The increase in 
frequency of items CG10 and CG12 is likely to reflect both the application of the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council’s best practice corporate governance principles 
and recommendations and application of CLERP 9 provisions. Board of director 
characteristics (CG1, CG2 and CG3) are the most stable of the corporate governance 
items over the study period with minor (3% to 7%) increases being recorded.  
 
TABLE 5.9: Change in Independent Item Frequency  
Panel A: CG Items Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 % Δ Yr 1toYr 4 
CG1 64.762 66.055 66.972 69.307 7.018 
CG2 90.476 89.908 89.908 93.069 2.866 
CG3 32.381 33.945 33.945 34.653 7.018 
CG4 24.762 44.037 54.128 55.446 123.915 
CG5 42.857 74.312 82.569 85.149 98.680 
CG6 80.952 87.156 88.991 91.089 12.522 
CG7 67.619 80.734 83.486 89.109 31.781 
CG8 60.000 73.394 77.064 80.198 33.663 
CG9 28.571 54.128 65.138 62.376 118.317 
CG10 4.762 36.697 50.459 51.485 981.188 
CG11 33.333 62.385 76.147 75.248 125.743 
CG12 24.762 61.468 71.560 75.248 203.884 
CG13 15.238 15.596 16.514 18.812 23.453 
 
Panel B: CM items 
& overseas listing Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 % Δ Yr 1toYr 4 
CM1 60.000 66.055 60.550 64.356 7.261 
CM2 15.238 17.431 14.679 28.713 88.429 
CM3 47.619 47.706 50.458 57.426 20.594 
OvList 21.904 23.853 29.357 35.644 62.726
 
Panel C: IT Items Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 % Δ Yr 1toYr 4 
ITSt1 36.69 37.614 39.449 41.584 13.339 
ITSt2 22.857 23.853 24.77 21.782 -4.703
ITSt3 11.428 12.844 12.844 12.871 12.627 
ITSe1 25.714 29.357 31.192 33.66337 30.915 
ITSe2 36.19 38.532 39.449 46.53465 28.584 
Legend: Table 5.9 provides the frequency of individual items that comprise the corporate governance 
score (CGS) in Panel A, Capital Management Score (CMS) and overseas listing status (OvList) (Panel 
B) and ITStransparency (ITSt) and ITSexposure (ITSe) in Panel C. Also shown is the percentage 
change of the frequency of each item between Yr 1 (Pre-IFRS) and Yr 4 (Post-IFRS). For a 
description of individual items that comprise CGS, CMS, ITSt and ITSe, refer to Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 
5.3 respectively. 
 
 
 131
The three items that comprise the CMS and overseas listing status (Table 5.9, Panel 
B) exhibit an increase from the 2003 financial Yr to the 2006 financial Yr. Takeover 
and merger activity shows the greatest percentage increase from the 2003 financial 
Yr to the 2006 financial Yr. This increase relates primarily to the substantial 
increases in revenue and profitability in the Australian resources sector over that 
period. The items that comprise the income tax scores all exhibit an increase from the 
2003 financial Yr to the 2006 financial Yr except for tax haven status that declined 
marginally over that period.  
 
5.6 Summary 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter provides evidence of an increase in the extent 
of total, mandatory and discretionary financial instrument disclosures over the 
observation period. Thus, the general research question is supported. The increase in 
financial instrument disclosures between consecutive years is statistically significant, 
particularly between Yr 3 (immediate pre-IFRS adoption period) and Yr 4 
(immediate post IFRS adoption period).  
 
Total financial instrument disclosures (FIDIS), increased from a mean of 34.159% in 
Yr 1 to 52.442% in Yr 4. Mandatory (discretionary) financial instrument disclosures 
increased from a mean of 49.992% (19.834%) in Yr 1 to 65.225% (40.877%) in Yr 
4. FIDI comprises 120 items of financial instrument information, 57 of which are 
mandatory and 63 of which are discretionary.  
 
Mandatory and discretionary financial instrument information that exhibits lower 
levels of disclosure relate to financial risks, financial risk management, financial or 
accounting indicators including financial ratios, information relating to compliance 
with debt covenants, financing agreements and compliance with hedge accounting 
rules and volatility of profits, net asset or equity leading up to and following formal 
adoption of IFRS.  
 
All financial instrument items that comprise FIDI are considered applicable to 
sample firms. The full complement of mandatory financial instrument disclosures has 
not been made by resource firms. Compliance with the accounting standards that deal 
with financial instrument disclosures by these firms is potentially an issue. This 
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problem has also been raised internationally (e.g. Lopes and Rodrigues, 2006). 
However, non-disclosure of financial instrument information may also potentially 
relate to firm specific characteristics. This aspect will be further investigated using 
multivariate statistics in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Univariate statistics reported in Chapter 5 provide evidence of a statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) and positive correlation between financial instrument 
disclosures and a) CGS, b) CMS, c) ITSe, d) FSize and f) Lev. This chapter further 
investigates the association of financial instrument disclosures of Australian listed 
extractive resource companies and CGS, CMS, OvList, ITSt and ITSe. Additionally, 
this chapter examines the association between the extent of disclosures of selected 
categories (derivative and hedge accounting, financial risk management, financial 
ratios and financial structures) of financial instrument information and firm specific 
variables and trends in these categories of financial instrument information over the 
observation period. 
  
Multivariate analysis using ordinary least square regressions (OLS) was performed 
for the three years proceeding and one year following formal adoption of IFRS in 
Australia on 1 January 2005. The four year period allows for simultaneous testing of 
financial instrument disclosures against the hypothesised variables. The hypothesised 
variables are CGS, CMS, OvList, ITSt and ITSe and control variables FSize, Lev, 
SubInd, Top20 and ROA. Multivariate testing will determine the significance of 
associations well before the requirement to disclose expected IFRS impacts under 
AASB 1047, immediately before IFRS adoption when expected IFRS impacts were 
required to be disclosed under AASB 1047 and immediately following formal IFRS 
adoption.  
 
6.1 Multiple Regression Main Model 
First, a multivariate model (herein referred to as Main Model) was constructed to test 
the aforementioned associations. For each year of the observation period, estimates 
of the following equation were obtained: 
FIDISjt = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt 
+ β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj                                        [1] 
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Where: 
Dependent Variable: 
FIDISjt = Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; 
Independent Variables: 
CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; (maximum 13 
variables); 
CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); 
OvListjt = listing on the ASX and in an overseas exchange or exchanges for firm j 
in year t;  
ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 
variables); 
ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; (maximum 2 variables); 
Control Variables: 
FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; 
Levjt = square root of debt(/debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity + 
total liabilities) for firm j in year t; 
Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; 
SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); 
ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year t, truncated at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles; 
αj = intercept; 
β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; 
εj = error term 
 
In addition, FIDIS was devolved into mandatory (MFIDIS) and discretionary 
(DFIDIS) financial instrument disclosure scores. Using equation 1, the association 
between each of MFIDIS and DFIDIS and the independent and control variables was 
tested. 
 
Second, based on the equation 1, a stepwise regression was performed to derive the 
best subset of the independent variables that could explain the extent of financial 
instrument disclosures. The stepwise regression procedure involved removing an 
independent or control variable with the smallest absolute t value and highest 
absolute p value one at the time from the equation until the adjusted R squared value 
is maximised. The stepwise regression results provide the best set of independent and 
control variables associated with the extent of financial instrument disclosures. 
Further, interaction effects between the independent and control variables were 
incorporated into regression equation 1 to determine if these enhanced the predictive 
quality of the model. 
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Third, a pooled regression was performed to test the statistical significance of 
associations for the combined four year dataset with each year included as a dummy 
variable in the regression equation.  
 
6.2 Multiple Regression Results 
6.2.1 Equation 1 Results 
Multiple regression results based on equation 1 are shown as Table 6.1. H1 proposed 
a positive association between the strength of a firm’s governance structure and the 
extent of its financial instrument disclosures. The association between FIDIS or 
MFIDIS and CGS is statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels. Results support 
predictions of a positive association between the total and mandatory financial 
instrument disclosures and strength of corporate governance structure of all sample 
firms for all years. Further, there is a positive and statistical significant (at the 5% or 
10% levels) association between DFIDIS and CGS in Yr 2 (Panel B), Yr 3 (Panel C) 
and Yr 4 (Panel D). Thus, H1 is supported in each year of the observation period. 
Although a causal link between disclosures and the strength of corporate governance 
structure cannot be ascertained, these results nevertheless suggest that the strength of 
a firm’s corporate governance structure is a potentially important determinant of a 
firm’s financial instrument disclosure policy. Resource firms that have the necessary 
policies, procedures, plans, systems and governance tools in place that constitute part 
of an effective corporate governance framework appear to influence management to 
document and disclose more extensive financial instrument information. 
 
H2a proposed a positive association between a firm’s capital management structure 
and the extent of financial instrument disclosures. A positive and statistically 
significant association between sample firms’ total, mandatory and discretionary 
financial instrument disclosures and capital management structure (as measured by 
CMS) exists for Yr 4 only (p < 0.01). Although the association between total, 
mandatory and discretionary financial instrument disclosures and CMS is positive in 
Yr 1, Yr 2 and Yr 3, this association is not statistically significant. The statistically 
significant and positive association between FIDIS and CMS in Yr 4 is potentially 
related to the marked increase in takeover and merger activity of resource firms in 
that year (refer to Table 5.7, Panel B). Firms engaged in takeover and merger activity 
(28.71% in Yr 4) may utilise specific financial instruments such as derivatives (e.g. 
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equity swaps or interest rate swaps) as part of the scheme of consolidation, require 
additional financing (debt or equity) or restructuring of existing financial 
arrangements, may necessitate restructuring of financial instruments which in turn 
may expose the firm to new and different levels of financial risks. Firm management 
would also be acutely aware that the firm is exposed to additional capital market 
scrutiny during the course of this type of activity. This linkage may account for the 
observed association. Alternatively, the higher level of takeover and merger activity 
in Yr 4 may be related to higher metal and petroleum prices, increased revenue and 
profitability in the Australian resources sector and this coincides with the transition 
to IFRS.  
 
H2b proposed a positive association between overseas listed companies and the 
extent of financial instrument disclosures. However, H2b is not supported by the 
results (Table 6.1) as there is a negative and statistical significant association 
between total and mandatory financial instrument disclosures and overseas listing 
status in Yr 2 and Yr 3. The association between financial instrument disclosures and 
overseas listing status is not statistically significant in Yr 1 and Yr 4. A separate 
regression including a variable that differentiates firm’s listed on the U.S. stock 
exchange produced very similar results: firms listed on the U.S. stock exchange in 
addition to the ASX have less extensive disclosures. Resource firms with overseas 
listing status are predominately listed on the Berlin (15%), Frankfurt (15%), Toronto 
Stock Exchange (15%), London Alternative Investment Market (AIM) (13%) or the 
Port Moresby Stock Exchange (8%) which are typified (with the exception of the 
AIM) by thin capital markets. Firms list on exchanges such as the Toronto Stock 
Exchange and London Alternative Investment Market to raise equity capital. Equity 
capital raisings are facilitated by favourable taxation arrangements in Canada for 
example. Firms that list on these exchanges tend to be small to medium sized 
petroleum companies. These factors would explain the negative association between 
overseas listing status and Lev and SubInd. Lev is a statistically significant and 
positive predictor variable of financial instrument disclosure patterns (refer to Table 
5.3 for Pearson correlations and Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 for OLS regression results). 
Firms with an overseas listing status are consistently negatively associated with 
leverage in each of the four years (refer to Table 5.3). Consequently, firms with 
lower Lev tend to be listed on overseas stock exchanges. This relationship may 
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explain the lower level of financial instrument disclosures by firms listed overseas. 
That is, overseas listing status is acting as a proxy for low levels of debt relative to 
equity in a firm’s capital structure and this is reflected by lower levels of financial 
instrument disclosures. 
 
H3a stated that there is a positive association between a firm’s income tax exposure 
and the extent of its financial instrument disclosures. There is a positive and 
statistically significant association between sample firms’ total and discretionary 
financial instrument disclosures and income tax exposure (as measured by ITSe) in 
Yr 1 and Yr 2 only (Table 6.1). Resource firms subject to thin capitalisation and 
Australian withholding tax provisions have more extensive financial instrument 
disclosures. Credit risk and tax risk may potentially be the drivers behind firm 
managements’ incentives to disclose financial instrument information.  
 
H3b stated that there is a negative association between a firms income tax 
transparency characteristics and the extent of its financial instrument disclosures. 
There is a negative and statistically significant (at the 5% level) association between 
sample firms’ total and discretionary financial instrument disclosures and income tax 
transparency (as measured by ITSt) in Yr 1 only (Table 6.1). ITSt and MFIDIS are 
statistically significantly associated in Yr 4 only. Resource firms deriving foreign 
source income and with a capital structure that includes at least one subsidiary in a 
corporate group with OECD tax haven status and a financing and/or service company 
within tax haven status have less extensive financial instrument disclosures in Yr 1 
(and Yr 4). Reduced transparency with respect to their financing arrangements and 
financial instruments are likely drivers of observed associations. 
 
FSize and Lev are the only control variables that are consistently positively and 
statistically significantly (at the 1% or 5% levels) associated with total and 
discretionary financial instrument disclosures in all years (Table 6.1). MFIDIS and 
FSize are positively and significantly associated in Yr 1 and Yr 2 only. Mandatory 
financial instrument disclosures and Lev is positively and significantly (at the 1% 
level) associated in all years (Table 6.1). These are important predictor control 
variables of financial instrument disclosures. SubInd is positively and statistically 
significantly associated (at the 10% level) with total and discretionary financial 
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instrument disclosures in Yr 3 only (Table 6.1, Panel C). The ROA of sample firms 
is positively and statistically significantly (at the 5% level) associated with total 
financial instrument disclosures in Yr 4 only and with discretionary financial 
instrument disclosures in Yr 2, Yr 3 and Yr 4. Top20 shareholder concentration is 
not significantly associated with financial instrument disclosures in any of the study 
years (Table 6.1).  
 
One of the assumptions underlying multiple regression analysis is that that the 
differences between the actual and estimated values of FIDIS (residuals) are 
normally distributed and that the variation in the residuals is the same for all fitted 
values of the dependent variable, FIDIS. This is referred to as homoscedasticity 
(Lind et. al., 2004). These assumptions have been met as evidenced from graphs of 
the residuals provided in Appendix E. The graphs demonstrate that the distribution of 
the residuals is normal for each year. Further, the spread of the residuals is the same 
for any value of FIDIS, thus the assumption of homoscedasticity has been met. 
Furthermore, Variable Inflation Factors (VIF), a measure of the effect of the 
independent variables on the regression coefficient, are less than 10.0 indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a concern in the regression analysis (Lind et. al., 2004). The 
Pearson correlation coefficients provided in Table 5.3 also provide evidence that 
multicollinearity between the independent and control variables are not a concern. 
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TABLE 6.1: Multiple Regression: Main Model Yrs 1 to 4 
Panel A: Yr 1 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value   Coefficients                   t Stat P-value 
Intercept -34.070 -3.888 0.000* -5.460 -0.533 0.596 -59.955 -6.449 0.000*
CGS 0.096 2.129 0.036** 0.135 2.550 0.012** 0.061 1.277 0.205 
CMS 0.040 1.269 0.208 0.037 1.015 0.313 0.042 1.265 0.209 
OvList -3.119 -1.638 0.105 -3.577 -1.606 0.112 -2.704 -1.339 0.184 
ITSt -0.067 -2.045 0.044** -0.061 -1.607 0.111 -0.072 -2.069 0.041** 
ITSe 0.077 2.495 0.014** 0.041 1.144 0.255 0.109 3.337 0.001* 
FSize 3.046 5.542 0.000* 2.300 3.577 0.001* 3.721 6.380 0.000* 
Lev 1.438 3.973 0.000* 1.831 4.324 0.000* 1.082 2.818 0.006* 
SubInd -0.237 -0.120 0.905 0.068 0.029 0.977 -0.512 -0.244 0.808 
Top20 -0.002 -0.038 0.970 -0.039 -0.814 0.418 0.032 0.744 0.459 
ROA -0.005 -0.159 0.874 0.019 0.540 0.591 -0.026 -0.824 0.412 
 Adjusted R Square 0.708  Adjusted R Square 0.576  Adjusted R Square 0.732  
 Observations 105  Observations 105  Observations 105  
 F Statistic 26.175  F Statistic 15.113  F Statistic 29.353  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.1: Multiple Regression: Main Model Yrs 1 to 4 continued 
Panel B: Yr 2 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value    Coefficients                 t Stat P-value 
Intercept -34.292 -3.013 0.003* -4.381 -0.361 0.719 -61.355 -4.718 0.000* 
CGS 0.130 3.344 0.001* 0.162 3.896 0.000* 0.102 2.285 0.024** 
CMS 0.024 0.686 0.494 0.044 1.208 0.230 0.005 0.123 0.902 
OvList -4.556 -2.481 0.015** -4.434 -2.264 0.026** -4.667 -2.224 0.028** 
ITSt -0.036 -1.077 0.284 -0.048 -1.349 0.180 -0.025 -0.656 0.513 
ITSe 0.051 1.746 0.084*** 0.020 0.656 0.513 0.078 2.357 0.020** 
FSize 2.801 3.885 0.000* 1.783 2.319 0.022** 3.722 4.518 0.000* 
Lev 1.992 4.133 0.000* 2.564 4.987 0.000* 1.476 2.679 0.009* 
SubInd 1.320 0.655 0.514 0.816 0.380 0.705 1.775 0.771 0.443 
Top20 0.004 0.085 0.933 0.003 0.055 0.956 0.005 0.095 0.925 
ROA 0.042 1.146 0.254 0.071 1.811 0.073*** 0.016 0.382 0.703 
 Adjusted R Square 0.671  Adjusted R Square 0.603  Adjusted R Square 0.651  
 Observations 109  Observations 109  Observations 109  
 F Statistic 23.000  F Statistic 17.433  F Statistic 21.190  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.1: Multiple Regression: Main Model Yrs 1 to 4 continued 
Panel C: Yr 3 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value    Coefficients                 t Stat P-value 
Intercept -31.558 -2.430 0.017** 2.194 0.168 0.867 -62.095 -4.099 0.000* 
CGS 0.174 3.653 0.000* 0.241 5.031 0.000* 0.114 2.053 0.043** 
CMS 0.061 1.522 0.131 0.050 1.258 0.211 0.070 1.508 0.135 
OvList -3.953 -2.047 0.043** -5.268 -2.720 0.008* -2.764 -1.227 0.223 
ITSt 0.000 0.007 0.995 -0.003 -0.090 0.928 0.003 0.081 0.935 
ITSe 0.002 0.074 0.941 -0.014 -0.437 0.663 0.017 0.462 0.645 
FSize 2.308 2.885 0.005* 1.107 1.380 0.171 3.395 3.638 0.000* 
Lev 2.080 4.442 0.000* 2.159 4.602 0.000* 2.007 3.676 0.000* 
SubInd 0.082 1.715 0.090*** 0.059 1.247 0.215 0.102 1.831 0.070*** 
Top20 0.756 0.342 0.733 2.110 0.952 0.344 -0.469 -0.182 0.856 
ROA 0.066 1.462 0.147 0.099 2.177 0.032** 0.037 0.695 0.488 
 Adjusted R Square 0.618  Adjusted R Square 0.563  Adjusted R Square 0.600  
 Observations 109  Observations 109  Observations 109  
 F Statistic 18.452  F Statistic 14.913  F Statistic 17.212  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.1: Multiple Regression: Main Model Yrs 1 to 4 continued 
Panel D: Yr 4 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value    Coefficients                 t Stat P-value 
Intercept -38.609 -2.485 0.015** 13.031 0.883 0.380 -85.331 -4.688 0.000* 
CGS 0.142 2.188 0.031** 0.140 2.271 0.026** 0.144 1.892 0.062*** 
CMS 0.133 3.154 0.002* 0.149 3.697 0.000* 0.120 2.416 0.018** 
OvList -1.928 -0.830 0.409 -2.690 -1.219 0.226 -1.238 -0.455 0.650 
ITSt -0.052 -1.167 0.246 -0.047 -1.109 0.270 -0.056 -1.083 0.282 
ITSe 0.009 0.242 0.809 0.011 0.319 0.750 0.007 0.159 0.874 
FSize 2.869 3.014 0.003* 0.826 0.913 0.364 4.717 4.231 0.000* 
Lev 3.259 6.077 0.000* 3.133 6.148 0.000* 3.373 5.368 0.000* 
SubInd 3.123 1.103 0.273 3.655 1.358 0.178 2.641 0.796 0.428 
Top20 -0.002 -0.041 0.968 -0.004 -0.074 0.941 -0.001 -0.012 0.990 
ROA 0.128 2.305 0.023** 0.150 2.840 0.006* 0.108 1.664 0.100*** 
 Adjusted R Square 0.624  Adjusted R Square 0.548  Adjusted R Square 0.630  
 Observations 101  Observations 101  Observations 101  
 F Statistic 17.595  F Statistic 13.142  F Statistic 18.019  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
Legend: The regression equation (Equation 1) is stated as: 
FIDISjt (MFIDISjt; DFIDISjt) = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj     
 
Where: Dependent Variables: FIDISjt = Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; MFIDISjt = Mandatory Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in 
year t; DFIDISjt = Discretionary Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; Independent Variables: CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; 
(maximum 13 variables); CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); OvListjt = Overseas Listingjt (Listing on the ASX and an overseas 
exchange firm j in year t); ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; 
(maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root of (debt/debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity 
+ total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); ROAjt = 
return on assets, measured as pretax profit/total assets with values truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles for firm j in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); αj = intercept; β = estimated 
coefficient for each item or category; εj  = error term. 
 
Equation 1 tested the association between total, mandatory or discretionary financial instrument disclosures for all sample firms over each of the four years (Panel A: Yr 1; 
Panel B: Yr 2; Panel C: Yr 3 and Panel D: Yr 4) and the independent variables against the control variables. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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6.2.2 Stepwise Regression and Interaction Effects 
For each year, a stepwise regression was performed using regression equation 1. The 
stepwise regression results using regression equation 1 are provided as Table 6.2. 
Removal of predictor variables with low absolute t values and high absolute p values 
gave the following enhancements to equation 1: 
 In Table 6.2 (Panel A), overseas listing is statistically significantly associated 
with total financial instrument disclosures at the 10% level.  
 In Table 6.2 (Panel A), income tax score (transparency) is significantly 
associated with mandatory financial instrument disclosures at the 10% level.  
 In Table 6.2 (Panel C), CMS is significantly associated with total financial 
instrument disclosures and discretionary financial instrument disclosures at 
the 10% level. 
These results show that removal of predictor variables with low absolute t values and 
high absolute p values only enhances the overall predictive nature of the model 
marginally.  
 
No statistically significant results were obtained by incorporating interaction effects 
within regression equation 1.  
 
6.2.3 Pooled Regression  
A pooled regression of the entire four year dataset was performed to determine the 
significance of associations between the dependent and independent and control 
variables using regression equation 1. The results are provided in Table 6.3. There is 
a positive and statistical significant association between FIDIS and CGS, CMS and 
ITSe, FSize, Lev and ROA. A statistically significant and negative association exists 
between FIDIS and ITSt. H1, H2a and H3a, H3b are supported by these results. H2b 
which hypothesises a positive association between FIDIS and OvList is not 
supported by the results. Similar results are achieved for MFIDIS and DFIDIS and 
the independent and control variables. Overall, these results provide additional 
support for the hypotheses and are consistent with results of regressions on panel 
data. A potential problem with this analysis is that the same company is generally 
represented four times in the one dataset and repeated measurements of non-
independent items may lead to biased regression results. 
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TABLE 6.2: Stepwise Regression: Main Model  
Panel A: Yr 1 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -33.880 -4.416 0.000* -8.843 -0.980 0.330 -56.533 -6.900 0.000*
CGS 0.098 2.325 0.022** 0.142 2.850 0.005* 0.059 1.308 0.194
CMS 0.041 1.338 0.184 0.035 0.978 0.330 0.046 1.412 0.161
OvList -3.151 -1.688 0.095*** -3.482 -1.587 0.116 -2.851 -1.430 0.156
ITSt -0.066 -2.085 0.040** -0.062 -1.664 0.099*** -0.070 -2.060 0.042**
ITSe 0.075 2.582 0.011** 0.037 1.069 0.288 0.110 3.541 0.001*
FSize 3.015 6.103 0.000* 2.377 4.090 0.000* 3.593 6.809 0.000*
Lev 1.445 4.243 0.000* 1.741 4.346 0.000* 1.178 3.238 0.002*
 Adjusted R Square 0.717 Adjusted R Square 0.584  Adjusted R Square 0.736
 Observations 105  Observations 105  Observations 105  
 F Statistic 38.562  F Statistic 21.884  F Statistic 42.521  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.2: Stepwise Regression: Main Model continued 
Panel B: Yr 2 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -31.816 -2.904 0.005* -2.085 -0.178 0.859 -58.716 -4.693 0.000*
CGS 0.126 3.310 0.001* 0.159 3.920 0.000* 0.095 2.200 0.030**
OvList -4.434 -2.479 0.015** -4.188 -2.189 0.031** -4.657 -2.280 0.025**
ITSt -0.035 -1.097 0.275 -0.043 -1.251 0.214 -0.028 -0.770 0.443
ITSe 0.059 2.186 0.031** 0.033 1.138 0.258 0.083 2.681 0.009*
FSize 2.760 3.930 0.000* 1.747 2.326 0.022** 3.676 4.584 0.000*
Lev 2.087 4.520 0.000* 2.682 5.429 0.000* 1.550 2.939 0.004*
ROA 0.046 1.289 0.200 0.075 1.961 0.053*** 0.020 0.489 0.626
 Adjusted R Square 0.677  Adjusted R Square 0.609  Adjusted R Square 0.659  
 Observations 109  Observations 109  Observations 109  
 F Statistic 33.390  F Statistic 25.029  F Statistic 30.809  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.2: Stepwise Regression: Main Model continued 
Panel C: Yr 3 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -32.074 -2.771 0.007* 5.449 0.469 0.640 -66.022 -4.882 0.000*
CGS 0.175 3.713 0.000* 0.239 5.050 0.000* 0.117 2.127 0.036**
CMS 0.062 1.720 0.088*** 0.041 1.131 0.261 0.081 1.925 0.057***
OvList -3.927 -2.098 0.038** -5.446 -2.898 0.005* -2.552 -1.167 0.246
FSize 2.332 3.128 0.002* 0.953 1.273 0.206 3.581 4.110 0.000*
Lev 2.081 4.607 0.000* 2.153 4.747 0.000* 2.016 3.820 0.000*
SubInd 0.082 1.770 0.080*** 0.055 1.180 0.241 0.107 1.968 0.052***
Top20 0.770 0.357 0.722 2.037 0.940 0.350 -0.376 -0.149 0.882
ROA 0.066 1.483 0.141 0.101 2.265 0.026** 0.034 0.657 0.513
 Adjusted R Square 0.625  Adjusted R Square 0.570  Adjusted R Square 0.607  
 Observations 109  Observations 109  Observations 109  
 F Statistic 23.533  F Statistic 18.916  F Statistic 21.830  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.2: Stepwise Regression: Main Model continued 
Panel D: Yr 4 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -40.048 -2.847 0.005* 11.248 0.841 0.402 -86.460 -5.248 0.000*
CGS 0.143 2.227 0.028** 0.141 2.315 0.023** 0.145 1.923 0.058***
CMS 0.134 3.219 0.002* 0.149 3.773 0.000* 0.120 2.465 0.016**
OvList -1.853 -0.815 0.417 -2.593 -1.201 0.233 -1.184 -0.445 0.658
ITSt -0.046 -1.254 0.213 -0.039 -1.134 0.260 -0.052 -1.207 0.231
FSize 2.931 3.352 0.001* 0.900 1.083 0.282 4.769 4.655 0.000*
Lev 3.299 6.659 0.000* 3.182 6.758 0.000* 3.405 5.868 0.000*
SubInd 3.074 1.210 0.229 3.572 1.480 0.142 2.624 0.882 0.380
ROA 0.128 2.366 0.020** 0.150 2.911 0.005* 0.109 1.711 0.090***
 Adjusted R Square 0.632  Adjusted R Square 0.558  Adjusted R Square 0.638  
 Observations 101  Observations 101  Observations 101  
 F Statistic 22.460  F Statistic 16.759  F Statistic 23.014  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
Legend: Table 6.2 provides the results of stepwise regression using equation 1. The adjusted R squared results represent the maximum values that account for the extent of 
financial instrument disclosures. The regression equation 1 is stated as: 
FIDISjt (MFIDISjt; DFIDISjt) = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStranjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj     
 
Where: Dependent Variables: FIDISjt = Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; MFIDISjt = Mandatory Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in 
year t; DFIDISjt = Discretionary Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; Independent Variables: CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; 
(maximum 13 variables); CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); OvList = Overseas Listingjt (Listing on the ASX and an overseas 
exchange for firm j in year t); ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; 
(maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity 
+ total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); ROAjt = 
return on assets, measured as pretax profit/total assets with values truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles for firm j in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); αj = intercept; β = estimated 
coefficient for each item or category; εj  = error term. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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TABLE 6.3: Pooled Regression: Main Model 
  FIDIS     MFIDIS     DFIDIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -26.696 -4.503 0.000 5.893 0.970 0.333 -56.181 -8.199 0.000
CGS 0.145 6.127 0.000* 0.179 7.383 0.000* 0.114 4.176 0.000*
CMS 0.065 3.595 0.000* 0.070 3.789 0.000* 0.060 2.885 0.004*
OvList -3.328 -3.388 0.001* -3.918 -3.892 0.000* -2.795 -2.462 0.014**
ITSt -0.042 -2.323 0.021** -0.041 -2.204 0.028** -0.043 -2.061 0.040**
ITSe 0.033 2.088 0.037** 0.010 0.636 0.525 0.053 2.931 0.004*
FSize 2.694 7.473 0.000* 1.558 4.218 0.000* 3.722 8.932 0.000*
Lev 2.144 9.598 0.000* 2.375 10.374 0.000* 1.936 7.497 0.000*
SubInd 0.865 0.781 0.435 1.377 1.213 0.226 0.402 0.314 0.754
Top20 0.033 1.398 0.163 0.012 0.478 0.633 0.053 1.920 0.056***
ROA 0.049 2.454 0.015** 0.078 3.827 0.000* 0.022 0.975 0.330
 Adjusted R Square 0.713  Adjusted R Square 0.641  Adjusted R Square 0.706  
 Observations 427  Observations 427  Observations 427  
 F Statistic 83.555  F Statistic 60.112  F Statistic 80.680  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
Legend: Table 6.3 provides the results of a pooled regression using equation 1. The adjusted R squared results represent the maximum values that account for the extent of 
financial instrument disclosures. The regression equation 1 is stated as: 
FIDISjt (MFIDISjt; DFIDISjt) = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStranjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + Yr1jt + Yr2jt + 
Yr3jt +Yr4jt + εj     
 
Where: Dependent Variables: FIDISjt = Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; MFIDISjt = Mandatory Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in 
year t; DFIDISjt = Discretionary Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; Independent Variables: CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; 
(maximum 13 variables); CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); OvList = Overseas Listingjt (Listing on the ASX and an overseas 
exchange for firm j in year t); ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; 
(maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity 
+ total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); ROAjt = 
return on assets, measured as pretax profit/total assets with values truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles for firm j in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); αj = intercept; β = estimated 
coefficient for each item or category; εj  = error term. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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6.3 Disclosure Patterns of Financial Instrument Information Categories 
FIDI comprises several categories of financial instrument information. An 
examination of the association between five key categories of financial instrument 
information and firm specific variables was then made. These categories of financial 
instrument disclosures either constitute the more important disclosures (e.g. hedge 
accounting, financing arrangements and impact of IFRS on financial instruments) or 
are more sensitive disclosures that firms may choose not to disclose (e.g. financial 
risks and financial ratios). This section analyses the extent of disclosure patterns of 
the following five categories of financial instrument information leading up to and 
following adoption of IFRS:  
1) derivative and hedge accounting information;  
2) financial risk and risk management;  
3) financial ratio information;  
4) financial arrangements; and 
5) expected and actual impacts or changes relating to financial instruments 
leading up to and following IFRS adoption  
The purpose of this additional analysis is to determine the extent of change of each of 
these categories and to relate these changes to corporate governance, capital 
management and income tax scores over the four year study period. Tests of means 
formed the prime technique for evaluating the significance of the differences in 
disclosures between consecutive years. Further, OLS regression is employed to test 
the significance of the association between each of these categories of financial 
instrument information and corporate governance, capital management and income 
tax attributes. 
 
6.3.1 Derivative and Hedge Accounting Information  
Pre-IFRS adoption there was no accounting standard in force that required Australian 
firms to recognise the unrealised gains and losses of derivative and hedge positions 
in their financial statements. Post-IFRS adoption it is mandatory under AASB 139 
for Australian firms to recognise both the realised and unrealised gains and losses of 
derivatives and hedge positions at fair value in their balance sheet. In addition, 
changes in the fair value of derivative and hedge instruments are recognised and 
recorded in the income statement under AASB 139. The introduction of AASB 139 
forces management to evaluate what role derivative and hedge instruments play in 
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achieving the firm’s business objectives particularly given their can be potentially 
significant changes in fair value. There are a range of risks associated with the use of 
derivative and hedge instruments. For example, changes in the fair value of the 
hedging instrument may not effectively offset changes in the fair value of the hedged 
item. Hedge arrangements can be a significant suppressant of revenue growth in 
periods of rapidly rising commodity prices. There are risks associated with 
restructuring hedge positions and associated debt covenants which the firm may not 
be able to comply with over a longer time frame. Recent collapses of Australian gold 
production companies such as Sons of Gwalia Ltd and Croesus Mining Ltd provide 
evidence of risks associated with restructured hedge arrangements (West Australian, 
2006). These collapses appear to result from the existence of highly structured hedge 
arrangements in place, an inability of the firm to meet repayments on project 
financing, poor consideration of associated risks and a marked downgrade in reserve 
inventory (West Australian, 2006). For the aforementioned reasons, a separate 
examination of resource firm’s derivative and hedge accounting disclosures leading 
up to and post-IFRS adoption is vital. Testing used data from the annual reports of 81 
Australian listed resource firms with open derivative or hedge positions at the 
financial year end.  
 
The extent of derivative and hedge accounting disclosure (DHAD) is measured using 
a DHAD Index (DHADI) comprising 38 derivative and hedge accounting disclosure 
items (14 mandatory and 24 discretionary). Items used to construct DHADIS are 
provided in Appendix F. Mandatory derivative and hedge accounting information 
includes (a) a description of the hedge; (b) financial instruments designated as 
hedging instruments; (c) the nature of the risk being hedged; (d) gains and losses of 
hedge positions; (e) hedge maturity or contract period and; (f) fair value information 
relating to financial derivative or hedging instruments, assets and liabilities. 
Mandatory derivative and hedge accounting information was obtained from the 
relevant accounting standards on financial instrument disclosures – AASB 1033 (pre-
IFRS) and AASB 132 (post-IFRS). The mandated disclosures of derivative and 
hedge accounting information under AASB 1033 and AASB 132 are very similar. 
Discretionary derivative and hedge accounting information includes (a) a description 
of the firm’s hedge or treasury policy; (b) a discussion of hedge designation; (c) 
documentation and effectiveness; (d) compliance with financial covenants; (e) hedge 
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adjustments; (f) qualitative and quantitative information relating to changes in 
derivative or hedge accounting policies and; (g) information relating to the volume 
and prices achieved of the underlying hedged item. Discretionary derivative and 
hedge accounting information was derived from extant literature (for example, 
Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004), AASB 7 requirements (effective from 1 January 
2007) which are discretionary for the study period and company media releases.  
 
For each DHADI item disclosed by a firm in its annual report a dichotomous score of 
one is assigned, otherwise a score of zero is assigned. Assignment of scores was 
made irrespective of the quantum of information relating to a particular attribute 
within the annual report. A DHADI score (DHADIS) was computed for all years by 
summing all information items disclosed divided by the maximum number of items 
that could be disclosed. The DHADIS score is mathematically represented as 
follows: 
 
Where DHADISjt = Derivative and Hedge Accounting Disclosure Index Score for   
firm j in period t. 
 
DHADIS in turn can be split into mandatory (MDHADIS) and discretionary 
(DDHADIS) indices. A paired t-test was performed to test for differences between 
the means of the DHADIS, MDHADIS and DDHADIS for consecutive financial 
years over the study period. The results are shown in Table 6.4.  
 
The difference in means of DHADIS between the Yr 1 and Yr 2 and between Yr 3 
and Yr 4 is statistically significant at the 1% level. The largest change (32.937%) in 
mean DHADIS occurs between Yr 3 (pre-IFRS adoption period) and Yr 4 (post-
IFRS adoption period). The general research proposition is again supported by the 
results. In Table 6.4, (Panels B and C), paired t-tests are also performed to test 
whether the mean of the distribution of differences in MDHADIS and discretionary 
DDHADIS are zero. The increase in MDHADIS from Yr 1 to Yr 2 and from Yr 3 to 
Yr 4 is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 24.409% increase in MDHADIS 
from Yr 3 (pre-IFRS) to Yr 4 (post-IFRS) mirrors the marked increase in total 
DHADIS from Yr 3 to Yr 4. The mean MDHADIS in Yr 4 is 77.324% compared to 
DHADISjt  = Total number of items disclosed  Maximum number of items 
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62.15% in Yr 3. There is a marked increase in DDHADIS from Yr 1 to Yr 4 with the 
12.825% increase from Yr 1 to Yr 2 and the 39.757% increase from Yr 3 to Yr 4 
being statistically significant. The two important changes in the extent of information 
disclosed occur from Yr 1 to Yr 2 and from Yr 3 to Yr 4. The statistically significant 
increase in DDHADIS from Yr 1 to Yr 2 coincides with a marked increase in the 
corporate governance structure of resource firms, as measured by CGS, following the 
release of the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s corporate governance best 
practice principles and recommendations. Additionally, firms are disclosing far more 
derivative and hedge accounting information of both a mandatory and discretionary 
nature in the post IFRS adoption period compared to the pre-IFRS adoption period 
despite the fact that disclosure requirements mandated under AASB 1033 (pre-IFRS) 
and AASB 132 (IFRS) are very similar. 
 
Multivariate analysis using ordinary least square regressions (OLS) was then 
performed which allows simultaneous testing of derivative and hedge accounting 
disclosures against the independent variables – CGS, CMS, OvList, ITSt and ITSe. 
For each of the four years, estimates of the following model were obtained: 
 
DHADISjt = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 
FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndt + β10 ROAjt + εj          [2]   
 
Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
DHADISjt = Derivative and Hedge Accounting Disclosure Index for firm j in 
year t; 
Independent Variables: 
CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; (maximum 13 
variables); 
CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); 
OvListjt = Listing on the ASX and an overseas exchange for firm j in year t;  
ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 
variables); 
ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; (maximum 2 variables); 
Control Variables: 
FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; 
Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity + 
total liabilities) for firm j in year t; 
Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; 
SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); 
ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year t truncated at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles; 
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αj = intercept; 
β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; 
εj  = error term 
 
 
TABLE 6.4: Paired t-Tests: Mean DHADI Scores 
Panel A: DHADIS  Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean DHADIS 45.690 50.000 51.532 68.505
Variance 259.440 252.466 240.945 230.535
Observations 58 58 67 63
% change DHADISt-DHADISt-1  9.434 3.064 32.937
Hypothesised Mean Difference  0 0 0
t Stat  -2.927 -1.006 -9.263
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.002 0.159 0.000
t Critical one-tail   1.672 1.668 1.670
 
Panel B: MDHADIS Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean MDHADIS 57.759 60.961 62.154 77.324
Variance 324.534 225.950 228.842 231.303
Observations 58 58 67 63
% change DHADISt-DHADISt-1  5.544 1.957 24.409
Hypothesised Mean Difference  0 0 0
t Stat  -1.849 -0.730 -6.429
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.035 0.234 0.000
t Critical one-tail 1.672 1.668 1.670
 
Panel C: DDHADIS Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean DDHADIS 38.649 43.606 45.336 63.360
Variance 313.592 364.410 358.019 300.828
Observations 58 58 67 63
% change DDHADISt-DDHADISt-1  12.825 3.966 39.757
Hypothesised Mean Difference  0 0 0
t Stat  -2.763 -0.962 -9.210
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.003 0.169 0.000
t Critical one-tail   1.672 1.668 1.669
Legend: Paired t-test results for mean derivative and hedge accounting disclosures for all sample 
firms: both mandatory and discretionary disclosures (Panel A); mandatory disclosures (Panel B) and 
discretionary disclosures (Panel C). For companies with a 30 June year end, Yr 1 is the 2003 financial 
year and Yr 4 is the 2006 financial year. For companies with a 31 December year end, Yr 1 is the 
2002 financial year and Yr 4 is the 2006 financial year. For both June and December balancing 
companies, Yr 1 to Yr 3 are pre-IFRS and Yr 4 is post-IFRS. The t-test was performed by comparing 
Yr 1 with Yr 2, Yr 2 with Yr 3 and Yr 3 with Yr 4. The Yr 1 to Yr 2 t-test involved 58 companies, Yr 
2 to Yr 3 t-test involved 67 companies and the Yr 3 to 4 t-test involved 63 companies. The difference 
in number of pairs from one year to the next relates largely to takeover and mergers of companies. 
Thus not all 81 companies are represented in each of the study years. Also shown is the percentage 
change in derivative and hedge accounting disclosures between consecutive years. 
 
Multiple regression equation 2 results shown in Table 6.5 indicates that there is a 
positive and statistical significant (p < 0.10) association between the strength of 
corporate governance structure of sample firms and total derivative and hedge 
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accounting disclosures (DHADIS) for Yr 1 and Yr 2 (pre-IFRS) only. Additionally, 
there is a positive and statistically significant association between the CGS and 
mandatory derivative and hedge accounting disclosures (DDHADIS) for Yr 2. 
Although the results are mixed, these data confirm the significant association 
between the strength of corporate governance structure of resource firms and their 
financial instrument information disclosure patterns.  
 
A positive and statistical association between DHADIS, MDHADIS or DDHADIS 
and ITSe is evident in Yr 2 and Yr 3. Overseas exchange listing and disclosure 
patterns exhibit a negative and statistically significant association in Yr 3 only. 
Derivative and hedge accounting disclosures are associated with the capital 
management exposure, as measured by CMS, in Yr 1 (where a weak negative 
association is evident) and in Yr 4 with a positive association between MDHADIS 
and CMS evident. A positive and statistically significant association between 
DHADIS and leverage is achieved for Yr 2, Yr 3 and Yr 4. FSize and SubInd are 
statistically significant predictor variables of the extent of disclosures in Yr 1 while 
ROA is a significant predictor of disclosures in Yr 3 and Yr 4. 
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TABLE 6.5: Multiple Regression: Derivative and Hedge Accounting Disclosures  
Panel A: Yr 1 DHADIS           MDHADIS       DDHADIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value      Coefficients                   t Stat  P-value 
Intercept -33.109 -1.557 0.126 -11.849 -0.434 0.666 -45.511 -1.945 0.058***
CGS 0.164 1.695 0.097*** 0.171 1.373 0.176 0.160 1.505 0.139
CMS -0.140 -2.193 0.033** -0.240 -2.918 0.005* -0.082 -1.170 0.248
OvList -5.103 -1.323 0.192 -6.687 -1.351 0.183 -4.179 -0.985 0.330
ITSt -0.068 -1.095 0.279 0.017 0.213 0.832 -0.118 -1.720 0.092***
ITSe 0.136 2.177 0.035** 0.064 0.803 0.426 0.178 2.587 0.013**
FSize 3.363 2.407 0.020** 2.773 1.546 0.129 3.707 2.412 0.020**
Lev 0.618 0.580 0.565 2.219 1.621 0.112 -0.315 -0.269 0.789
SubInd 7.799 2.045 0.046** 12.272 2.507 0.016** 5.189 1.237 0.222
Top20 0.008 0.097 0.923 -0.088 -0.848 0.401 0.064 0.717 0.477
ROA 0.007 0.081 0.936 0.121 1.074 0.288 -0.059 -0.615 0.542
 Adjusted R Square 0.509  Adjusted R Square 0.353  Adjusted R Square 0.508  
 Observations 58  Observations 58  Observations 58  
 F Statistic 6.905  F Statistic 4.107  F Statistic 6.887  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.5: Multiple Regression: Derivative and Hedge Accounting Disclosures continued 
Panel B: Yr 2 DHADIS           MDHADIS          DDHADIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value   Coefficients                 t Stat  P-value 
Intercept -17.029 -0.697 0.489 -7.307 -0.267 0.790 -22.701 -0.780 0.439
CGS 0.224 2.643 0.011** 0.123 1.293 0.201 0.283 2.805 0.007*
CMS -0.074 -1.010 0.316 -0.066 -0.812 0.420 -0.078 -0.898 0.373
OvList -4.679 -1.185 0.241 -5.335 -1.207 0.232 -4.296 -0.914 0.365
ITSt 0.020 0.327 0.745 0.051 0.746 0.459 0.002 0.026 0.980
ITSe 0.071 1.178 0.243 -0.049 -0.728 0.469 0.142 1.966 0.054***
FSize 1.614 1.095 0.278 2.010 1.218 0.228 1.383 0.788 0.434
Lev 2.043 1.817 0.074*** 2.910 2.312 0.024 1.537 1.148 0.256
SubInd 4.118 1.018 0.313 2.822 0.623 0.536 4.874 1.012 0.316
Top20 0.089 0.923 0.360 0.110 1.012 0.316 0.078 0.672 0.504
ROA 0.083 0.913 0.365 0.083 0.809 0.421 0.084 0.770 0.444
 Adjusted R Square 0.354  Adjusted R Square 0.131  Adjusted R Square 0.369  
 Observations 70  Observations 70  Observations 70  
 F Statistic 4.774  F Statistic 2.044  F Statistic 5.029  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.5: Multiple Regression: Derivative and Hedge Accounting Disclosures continued 
Panel C: Yr 3         DHADIS             MDHADIS         DDHADIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value      Coefficients                  t Stat  P-value 
Intercept -16.465 -0.660 0.512 10.168 0.378 0.707 -32.000 -1.074 0.287
CGS 0.181 1.557 0.125 0.144 1.153 0.253 0.202 1.457 0.150
CMS 0.053 0.697 0.488 -0.096 -1.183 0.241 0.139 1.548 0.127
OvList -7.008 -1.902 0.062*** -10.303 -2.594 0.012** -5.085 -1.156 0.252
ITSt 0.012 0.198 0.844 0.086 1.282 0.205 -0.031 -0.413 0.681
ITSe 0.046 0.778 0.440 -0.002 -0.032 0.974 0.074 1.048 0.299
FSize 1.322 0.874 0.386 1.847 1.132 0.262 1.016 0.562 0.576
Lev 1.987 1.807 0.076*** 0.984 0.830 0.410 2.572 1.959 0.055***
SubInd 0.148 1.641 0.106 0.008 0.081 0.936 0.230 2.134 0.037**
Top20 5.760 1.442 0.154 5.162 1.199 0.235 6.108 1.281 0.205
ROA 0.185 1.940 0.057*** 0.195 1.892 0.063*** 0.180 1.576 0.120
 Adjusted R Square 0.349  Adjusted R Square 0.200  Adjusted R Square 0.368  
 Observations 73  Observations 73  Observations 73  
 F Statistic 4.859  F Statistic 2.799  F Statistic 5.185  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.006*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.5: Multiple Regression: Derivative and Hedge Accounting Disclosures continued 
Panel D: Yr 4          DHADIS           MDHADIS          DDHADIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value      Coefficients                   t Stat  P-value 
Intercept 18.896 0.766 0.447 37.547 1.451 0.152 8.016 0.273 0.786
CGS 0.077 0.642 0.523 0.036 0.283 0.778 0.101 0.711 0.480
CMS 0.106 1.656 0.103 0.117 1.751 0.085*** 0.099 1.306 0.197
OvList 0.563 0.165 0.870 -3.179 -0.887 0.379 2.745 0.676 0.502
ITSt -0.026 -0.435 0.665 0.008 0.133 0.895 -0.047 -0.649 0.519
ITSe 0.059 1.123 0.266 -0.003 -0.060 0.952 0.095 1.528 0.132
FSize 0.074 0.053 0.958 -0.479 -0.329 0.743 0.396 0.240 0.811
Lev 4.668 4.882 0.000* 5.078 5.066 0.000* 4.429 3.899 0.000*
SubInd 5.731 1.396 0.168 4.832 1.123 0.266 6.256 1.283 0.205
Top20 -0.034 -0.369 0.714 0.037 0.389 0.698 -0.075 -0.692 0.492
ROA 0.156 1.910 0.061 0.211 2.458 0.017 0.124 1.281 0.205
 Adjusted R Square 0.380  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.312  Adjusted R Square 0.333  
 Observations 67  Observations 67  Observations 67  
 F Statistic 5.051  F Statistic 3.998  F Statistic 4.300  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
Legend: The regression equation (Equation 2) is stated as: 
DHADISjt (MDHADISjt; DDHADISjt)= αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj     
 
Where: Dependent Variables: DHADISjt = Derivative and Hedge Accounting Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; MDHADISjt = Mandatory Derivative and Hedge 
Accounting Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; DDHADISjt = Discretionary Derivative and Hedge Accounting Disclosure Index for firm j in year t;  Independent Variables: 
CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; (maximum 13 variables); CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); OvList = 
Overseas Listingjt ( Listing on the ASX and an overseas exchange for firm j in year t); ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); 
ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; (maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root 
of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity + total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j 
engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles; αj = intercept; β = estimated coefficient for 
each item or category; εj  = error term 
 
Equation 2 tested the association between total, mandatory and discretionary derivative and hedge accounting disclosures for all sample firms over each of the four years 
(Panel A: Yr 1; Panel B: Yr 2; Panel C: Yr 3 and Panel D: Yr 4) and the independent variables against the control variables. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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6.3.2 Financial Risk Management Information 
Resource companies are subject to a range of financial risks37 that arise as a result of 
engaging in exploration, production and financing activities. These financial risks 
include foreign exchange risk, commodity price risk, credit risk, liquidity risk and 
interest rate risk. Financial risk management is concerned with the identification of 
these financial risks by both the management of the firm and the board of directors 
and the management of exposures. Effective financial risk management ensures that 
operations and the firm’s objectives are not jeopardised. This requires: 1) 
identification of financial risks and associated costs or potential costs of exposures; 
2) installing internal controls and other mechanisms to mitigate exposures and; 3) 
adequately communicating exposures or likely exposures to stakeholders. Resource 
firms commonly participate in hedging of commodity prices, interest rates and 
foreign exchange rates and often utilise financial derivatives to hedge their exposure 
to financial risk (PWC, 2005b).  
 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council (2007, p. 3) states that “effective corporate 
governance structures encourage companies to …. provide accountability and control 
systems commensurate with the risks involved and meeting the information needs of 
a modern investment community is also paramount in terms of accountability and 
attracting capital”. Risk management, effective oversight, internal control and 
financial reporting integrity are integral components of these best practice principles 
and recommendations38. However, the ASX Corporate Governance Council notes 
that in 2006, in excess of 30% of Australian listed companies did not disclose 
information about risk management policies (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2006).  
 
A 2004 survey by KPMG of the top 130 companies by market capitalisation found 
that only 18% of companies disclosed their risk profile and only 32% disclosed a 
detailed description of the system of risk management and internal control. Despite 
the importance to financial reporting users, only 44% of companies disclosed that the 
board had received CEO or CFO sign-off on the effectiveness of the company’s risk 
                                                 
37 Risk can be defined as any event that, if it occurs, will have a material impact on the ability of the 
company to achieve its objectives. These events can be financial, organisational or operational in 
nature (Cabedo and Tirado, 2003). 
38 Risk management is encapsulated in Principle 7 and is also addressed in the other principals. 
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management and internal control systems. Other than a core group of companies, 
disclosure of the effectiveness of risk management and internal control systems 
(recommendation 7.2 from the ASX best practice corporate governance 
recommendations) was limited and generic in nature (KPMG, 2005). These 
observations provide support for a separate examination of the financial risk 
management disclosures of resource companies.  
 
The extent of financial risk management disclosure (FRMD) was measured using the 
FRMD Index (FRMDI) comprising 27 financial risk management disclosure items 
(13 mandatory and 14 discretionary). The items used to construct FRMDI are 
provided in Appendix G. Mandatory financial risk management information 
comprises: (a) a discussion of the extent to which the entity is exposed to foreign 
exchange; (b) commodity price; (c) credit; (d) liquidity and; (e) interest rate risk. In 
addition, mandatory financial risk management information comprises (f) a reference 
to the firm’s financial risk management objectives; (g) effective interest rates; (h) 
maturity dates and; (i) financial assets and liabilities exposed to interest rate risk; (j) 
financial assets exposed to credit risk; and (k) areas of significant credit risk 
concentration. Mandatory financial risk management information was obtained from 
the relevant accounting standards on financial instrument disclosures – AASB 1033 
(pre-IFRS) and AASB 132 (post-IFRS). The mandated disclosures of derivative and 
hedge accounting information under AASB 1033 and AASB 132 are very similar.  
 
Discretionary financial risk management information comprises a reference to that 
entity’s maximum exposure to credit risk, a discussion of controls put in place to 
manage financial risk exposure, quantitative data on any financial risk, sensitivity 
analysis and a discussion of methods and assumptions, how credit, liquidity and 
interest rate risk arose, a maturity analysis of any financial risk, methods used to 
measure financial risk and changes in the fair value of loans, receivables and credit 
derivatives with respect to credit risk. Discretionary financial risk management 
information was derived from extant literature (for example, Chalmers and Godfrey, 
2004) or from AASB 7 (effective 1 January 2007). For each FRMDI item disclosed 
by a firm in its annual report a dichotomous score of one [1] is assigned, otherwise a 
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score of zero [0]. Each item was treated equally39. A FRMDI score (FRMDIS) is 
computed for all years by summing all information items disclosed divided by the 
maximum number of items that could be disclosed. The FRMDIS score is 
mathematically represented as follows: 
 
Where FRMDISjt = Financial Risk Management Disclosure Index for firm j in 
period t. 
 
FRMDIS is also split into mandatory (MFRMDIS) and discretionary (DFRMDIS) 
indices. A paired t-test was performed to test for differences between the means of 
the FRMDIS for consecutive financial years over the study period. The results are 
shown as Table 6.6. Paired t-tests were also performed to test whether the mean of 
the distribution of differences in mandatory FRMDIS (MFRMDIS) and discretionary 
FRMDIS (DFRMDIS) is zero (Table 6.6). The difference in means of FRMDIS 
between the years is statistically significant at the 1% level with the largest change 
(26.185%) in mean FRMDIS occurring between Yr 3 (pre-IFRS adoption period) 
and Yr 4 (post-IFRS adoption period). The results provide additional evidence in 
support of the general research proposition. The increases in mandatory FRMDIS 
from Yr 1 to Yr 3 during the pre-IFRS adoption period, whilst being statistically 
significant at the 1% level, is not as pronounced as the 17.663% increase from Yr 3 
(pre-IFRS) to Yr 4 (post-IFRS). The mean mandatory FRMDIS in Yr 4 is 67.479% 
compared to 57.350% in Yr 3. There is a marked increase in discretionary FRMDIS 
with a 41.11% increase from Yr 3 to Yr 4 being statistically significant (Table 6.5). 
Firms disclose far more financial risk management information of both a mandatory 
and discretionary nature in the post-IFRS adoption period compared to the pre-IFRS 
adoption period, despite the fact that disclosure requirements mandated under AASB 
1033 (pre-IFRS) and AASB 132 (IFRS) are very similar. A notable example is the 
disclosure of information relating to liquidity risk. Although disclosure of the extent 
of liquidity risk is required under both AASB 1033 and AASB 132, far more 
                                                 
39 Past research has shown that weighted and un-weighted scores give the same results where there 
are a large number of items (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley, 2004). The 
focus of this research is not on one particular user group and consequently, weighting of disclosure 
scores was not undertaken. 
 
FRMDISjt  = 
Total number of items disclosed 
Maximum number of items 
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extensive disclosure of this particular risk is evident in the immediately post-IFRS 
adoption period (Yr 4). 
 
Multivariate analysis using OLS is then performed which allows simultaneous 
testing of financial risk management disclosures against the hypothesised variables – 
CGS, CMS, OvList, ITSt and ITSe. For each of the four years, estimates of the 
following model were obtained: 
 
FRMDISjt = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 
FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj                    [3] 
 
Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
FRMDISjt = Financial Risk Management Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; 
Independent Variables: 
CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; (maximum 13 
variables); 
CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); 
OvListjt = Listing on the ASX and an overseas exchange for firm j in year t;  
ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 
variables); 
ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; (maximum 2 variables); 
Control Variables: 
FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; 
Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity + 
total liabilities) for firm j in year t; 
Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; 
SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); 
ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year t truncated at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles; 
αj = intercept; 
β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; 
εj  = error term 
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TABLE 6.6: Paired t-Tests: Mean Financial Risk Management Disclosures 
Panel A: FRMDIS Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean 37.496 40.917 42.661 53.832
Variance 276.642 263.633 269.344 305.505
Observations 105 105 108 101
% change FRMDISt-FRMDISt-1  9.125 4.262 26.185
Hypothesised Mean Difference  0 0 0
df  104 107 100
t Stat  -4.220 -2.717 -8.329
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.000 0.004 0.000
t Critical one-tail   1.660 1.659 1.660
 
Panel B: MFRMDIS Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean 51.062 55.531 57.350 67.479
Variance 280.068 262.837 264.526 276.782
Observations 105 105 101 101
% change MFRMDISt-MFRMDISt-1  8.752 3.275 17.663
Hypothesised Mean Difference 0 0 0
df  104 107 100
t Stat  -4.364 -2.206 -6.354
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.000 0.015 0.000
t Critical one-tail   1.660 1.659 1.660
 
Panel C: DFRMDIS            Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Mean 24.898 27.347 29.167 41.160
Variance 397.483 426.273 419.726 545.050
Observations 105 105 108 101
% change DFRMDISt-DFRMDISt-1  9.836 6.654 41.119
Hypothesised Mean Difference  0 0 0
df  104 107 100
t Stat  -2.486 -1.970 -7.952
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.007 0.026 0.000
t Critical one-tail   1.660 1.659 1.660
Legend: Paired two sample t-test results for mean financial risk management disclosures for all 
sample firms: both mandatory and discretionary disclosures (Panel A); mandatory disclosures (Panel 
B) and discretionary disclosures (Panel C). For companies with a 30 June year end, Yr 1 is the 2003 
financial year and Yr 4 is the 2006 financial year. For companies with a 31 December year end, Yr 1 
is the 2002 financial year and Yr 4 is the 2006 financial year. For both June and December balancing 
companies, Yr 1 to Yr 3 are pre-IFRS and Yr 4 is post-IFRS. The t-test was performed by comparing 
Yr 1 with Yr 2, Yr 2 with Yr 3 and Yr 3 with Yr 4. The Yr 1 to Yr 2 t-test involved 104 companies, 
Yr 2 to Yr 3 t-test involved 107 companies and the Yr 3 to 4 t-test involved 100 companies. The 
difference in number of pairs from one year to the next relates largely to takeover and mergers of 
companies. Thus not all 111 companies are represented in each of the study years. Also shown is the 
percentage change in derivative and hedge accounting disclosures between consecutive years. 
 
The results of regression equation 3 are provided in Table 6.7. The multiple 
regression results support the predictions of a positive association between the 
corporate governance structure of sample firms and total and mandatory financial 
risk management disclosures (MFRMDs) in Yr 1, Yr 2 and Yr 3 (pre-IFRS). There is 
a positive and statistically significant association between the strength of corporate 
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governance and discretionary financial risk management disclosures (DFRMDs) in 
Yr 1 and Yr 2. The association between CGS and FRMDIS in Yr 4 is not statistically 
significant. Consequently, the positive and statistically significant association 
between the strength of a firm’s corporate governance structure and its financial risk 
management disclosures does not cover the transitional period (Yr 3 and Yr 4) of 
IFRS adoption. As with derivative and hedge accounting disclosures, factors other 
than strength of corporate governance account for financial risk management 
disclosures. 
 
A positive and statistically significant association between CMS and total financial 
risk management disclosure is achieved in Yr 4 only. There is a statistically 
significant and negative association between firms with overseas stock exchange 
listing or listings and the extent of total and mandatory financial risk management 
disclosure in Yr 1, Yr 2 and Yr 3. Financial risk management disclosure has a 
negative and statistically significant association with ITSt and positive and 
statistically significant association with ITSe in Yr 2 only. 
 
FSize is positively associated with FRMDIS at a statistically significant level in Yr 1, 
Yr 3 and Yr 4. Lev is positively and statistically significantly associated with total, 
mandatory and discretionary financial risk management disclosure in Yr 3 (pre-
IFRS) and Yr 4 (post-IFRS). This association is not statistically significant in Yr 1 
and Yr 2. ROA is positively and statistically significantly associated with mandatory 
financial risk management disclosure in Yr 4 only. Top20 shareholder concentration 
is not statistically significantly associated with financial risk management disclosures 
in any of the years.  
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TABLE 6.7: Multiple Regression: Financial Risk Management Disclosures  
Panel A: Yr 1          FRMDIS            MFRMDIS        DFRMDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value     Coefficients             t Stat P-value 
Intercept -43.193 -3.471 0.001* -20.203 -1.269 0.208 -64.540 -4.359 0.000* 
CGS 0.194 3.024 0.003* 0.217 2.642 0.010* 0.173 2.262 0.026** 
CMS 0.068 1.528 0.130 0.071 1.236 0.220 0.066 1.243 0.217 
OvList -5.862 -2.169 0.033** -7.371 -2.131 0.036** -4.462 -1.387 0.169 
ITSt -0.039 -0.847 0.399 -0.024 -0.411 0.682 -0.053 -0.963 0.338 
ITSe 0.045 1.036 0.303 -0.036 -0.638 0.525 0.121 2.316 0.023** 
FSize 3.807 4.878 0.000* 3.345 3.349 0.001* 4.237 4.561 0.000* 
Lev 0.728 1.417 0.160 0.672 1.023 0.309 0.780 1.275 0.205 
SubInd -1.813 -0.646 0.520 -2.502 -0.696 0.488 -1.174 -0.351 0.726 
Top20 -0.017 -0.296 0.768 0.002 0.031 0.975 -0.035 -0.510 0.611 
ROA -0.052 -1.211 0.229 -0.044 -0.807 0.422 -0.059 -1.157 0.250 
 Adjusted R Square 0.604  Adjusted R Square 0.360  Adjusted R Square 0.610  
 Observations 105  Observations 105  Observations 105  
 F Statistic 16.884  F Statistic 6.856  F Statistic 17.268  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.7: Multiple Regression: Financial Risk Management Disclosures continued 
Panel B: Yr 2         FRMDIS             MFRMDIS       DFRMDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value    Coefficients              t Stat P-value 
Intercept -53.470 -3.186 0.002* -19.405 -0.956 0.342 -85.101 -3.810 0.000* 
CGS 0.165 2.875 0.005* 0.158 2.279 0.025** 0.171 2.242 0.027** 
CMS 0.047 0.924 0.358 0.075 1.226 0.223 0.021 0.304 0.762 
OvList -6.396 -2.362 0.020** -8.231 -2.512 0.014** -4.691 -1.302 0.196 
ITSt -0.091 -1.868 0.065*** -0.097 -1.651 0.102 -0.085 -1.313 0.192 
ITSe 0.087 2.045 0.044** 0.050 0.966 0.337 0.122 2.148 0.034** 
FSize 4.741 4.459 0.000* 3.744 2.910 0.004* 5.666 4.005 0.000* 
Lev 0.061 0.086 0.932 -0.049 -0.057 0.955 0.163 0.173 0.863 
SubInd 1.147 0.386 0.700 1.984 0.552 0.582 0.371 0.094 0.926 
Top20 -0.077 -1.108 0.271 -0.080 -0.948 0.345 -0.074 -0.805 0.423 
ROA -0.019 -0.353 0.725 -0.001 -0.014 0.989 -0.036 -0.499 0.619 
 Adjusted R Square 0.541  Adjusted R Square 0.320  Adjusted R Square 0.488  
 Observations 109  Observations 109  Observations 109  
 F Statistic 13.721  F Statistic 6.071  F Statistic 11.274  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.7: Multiple Regression: Financial Risk Management Disclosures continued 
Panel C: Yr 3          FRMDIS            MFRMDIS       DFRMDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value     Coefficients             t Stat P-value 
Intercept -58.437 -3.148 0.002* -21.469 -1.051 0.296 -92.765 -3.943 0.000* 
CGS 0.166 2.430 0.017** 0.224 2.985 0.004* 0.112 1.291 0.200 
CMS -0.025 -0.444 0.658 -0.048 -0.769 0.444 -0.004 -0.055 0.956 
OvList -5.749 -2.083 0.040** -7.810 -2.571 0.012** -3.834 -1.096 0.276 
ITSt -0.025 -0.477 0.634 -0.042 -0.723 0.471 -0.009 -0.143 0.887 
ITSe 0.043 0.967 0.336 0.021 0.425 0.672 0.064 1.129 0.262 
FSize 4.539 3.969 0.000* 3.344 2.657 0.009* 5.650 3.898 0.000* 
Lev 1.321 1.975 0.051*** 0.734 0.997 0.321 1.867 2.202 0.030** 
SubInd -0.004 -0.052 0.959 0.017 0.230 0.818 -0.023 -0.264 0.792 
Top20 1.268 0.401 0.689 1.965 0.565 0.573 0.620 0.155 0.877 
ROA -0.007 -0.102 0.919 -0.006 -0.082 0.934 -0.007 -0.090 0.929 
 Adjusted R Square 0.470  Adjusted R Square 0.302  Adjusted R Square 0.455  
 Observations 109  Observations 109  Observations 109  
 F Statistic 10.577  F Statistic 5.677  F Statistic 10.003  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.7: Multiple Regression: Financial Risk Management Disclosures continued 
Panel D: Yr 4           FRMDIS            MFRMDIS           DFRMDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value       Coefficients          t Stat P-value 
Intercept -34.732 -1.846 0.068 41.596 1.838 0.069 -105.609 -4.277 0.000 
CGS 0.118 1.496 0.138 0.131 1.387 0.169 0.105 1.018 0.311 
CMS 0.099 1.935 0.056*** 0.102 1.659 0.101 0.096 1.431 0.156 
OvList -0.879 -0.313 0.755 -2.812 -0.831 0.408 0.916 0.248 0.804 
ITSt -0.088 -1.650 0.103 -0.076 -1.183 0.240 -0.100 -1.417 0.160 
ITSe 0.053 1.181 0.241 0.053 0.992 0.324 0.052 0.892 0.375 
FSize 3.341 2.900 0.005* 0.324 0.233 0.816 6.143 4.062 0.000* 
Lev 2.630 4.050 0.000* 2.057 2.633 0.010* 3.162 3.709 0.000* 
SubInd 1.846 0.538 0.592 0.519 0.126 0.900 3.078 0.684 0.496 
Top20 -0.074 -1.031 0.306 -0.095 -1.100 0.274 -0.054 -0.578 0.565 
ROA 0.105 1.553 0.124 0.151 1.861 0.066*** 0.062 0.698 0.487 
 Adjusted R Square 0.496  Adjusted R Square 0.194  Adjusted R Square 0.513  
 Observations 101  Observations 101  Observations 101  
 F Statistic 10.825  F Statistic 3.413  F Statistic 11.526  
 Significance 0.000  Significance 0.000  Significance 0.000  
Legend: The regression equation (Equation 3) is stated as: 
FRMDISjt (MFRMDISjt;  DFRMDISjt) = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj     
 
Where: Dependent Variables: FRMDISjt = Financial Risk Management Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; MFRMDISjt = Mandatory Financial Risk Management 
Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; DFRMDISjt = Discretionary Financial Risk Management Disclosure Index for firm j in year t;Independent Variables: CGSjt = corporate 
governance score for firm j in year t; (maximum 13 variables); CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); OvList =Overseas Listingjt  
(Listing on the ASX and an overseas exchange for firm j in year t); ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); ITSejt = income tax 
score (exposure) for firm j in year t; (maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + 
equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity + total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in 
mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles; αj = intercept; β = estimated coefficient for each item or 
category; εj  = error term. 
 
Equation 3 tested the association between total, mandatory and discretionary financial risk management disclosures for all sample firms over each of the four years (Panel A: 
Yr 1; Panel B: Yr 2; Panel C: Yr 3 and Panel D: Yr 4) and the independent variables against the control variables. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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6.3.3 Financial Ratio Information 
The association of financial ratio information disclosed within the annual reports and 
the independent and control variables was examined. Financial ratio information is 
important as it allows users to assess the firm’s current financial performance, its 
ability to meet current and foreseeable obligations and the nature and extent of 
financial risks faced by the company (Mitchell, 2006). Disclosure of financial ratio 
information is important as this form of discretionary disclosure is typically 
undertaken by firm management to highlight favourable financial performance 
(Mitchell, 2006). Disclosure of financial ratio information is therefore context driven 
as disclosure may relate to particular capital management events such as the issue of 
new shares, debt financing, growth prospects, restructuring, significant asset sales 
and acquisitions. For these reasons, a separate examination of financial ratio 
information disclosures was considered warranted40.  
 
An examination of the annual reports of Australian listed resource firms indicates 
that financial ratio information relates to measures of financial performance, liquidity 
and gearing and comprises eight discretionary items of information from which a 
financial ratio disclosure index (FRDI) was constructed (Appendix H). A FRDI score 
was computed for all years by summing all information items disclosed divided by 
the maximum number of items that could be disclosed. The FRDI score (FRDIS) is 
mathematically represented as follows: 
 
Where FRDISjt = Financial Ratio Disclosure Index for firm j in period t. 
 
Multivariate analysis using OLS was performed which allows simultaneous testing 
of financial ratio disclosures against the hypothesised variables – CGS, CMS, 
OvList, ITSt and ITSe. For each of the four years, estimates of the following model 
were obtained: 
 
FRDISjt = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt 
+ β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj                                         [4] 
 
                                                 
40 Further, there is a paucity of recent literature that explores the nature and extent of financial ratio 
information disclosures in the Australian context (Mitchell, 2006). 
FRDISjt  = 
Total number of items disclosed 
Maximum number of items 
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Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
FRDISjt = Financial Ratio Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; 
Independent Variables: 
CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; (maximum 13 
variables); 
CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); 
OvListjt = Listing on the ASX and an overseas exchange for firm j in year t;  
ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 
variables); 
ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; (maximum 2 variables); 
Control Variables: 
FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; 
Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity + 
total liabilities) for firm j in year t; 
Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; 
SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); 
ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year t truncated at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles; 
αj = intercept; 
β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; 
εj  = error term 
 
The results of the OLS regression are provided in Table 6.8. The extent of financial 
ratio information disclosed (FRDIS) is significantly positively associated with FSize 
and ITSe and significantly negatively associated with ITSt for all years. FRDIS is 
significantly negatively associated with overseas listing status in Yr 3 and Yr 4 only. 
The strength of corporate governance and return on assets are not significant 
predictor variables of financial ratio information disclosed in annual reports. The 
later result is consistent with the findings of Linden and Matolcsy (2004) who found 
no statistically significant relationship between accounting based performance 
measures and corporate governance scores.  
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TABLE 6.8: Multiple Regression: Financial Ratio Disclosures  
FRDIS Yr 1     Yr 2     Yr 3     Yr 4   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -68.727 -4.229 0.000* -123.071 -6.113 0.000* -112.106 -5.421 0.000* -131.583 -6.277 0.000* 
CGS -0.081 -0.972 0.334 -0.112 -1.628 0.107 -0.043 -0.566 0.573 -0.043 -0.493 0.623 
CMS 0.039 0.660 0.511 -0.070 -1.142 0.256 -0.077 -1.207 0.230 -0.119 -2.084 0.040** 
OvList -5.034 -1.426 0.157 -5.175 -1.593 0.114 -5.874 -1.910 0.059*** -6.222 -1.986 0.050** 
ITSt -0.120 -1.979 0.051*** -0.131 -2.239 0.027** -0.122 -2.087 0.039** -0.233 -3.911 0.000* 
ITSe 0.125 2.190 0.031** 0.096 1.880 0.063*** 0.137 2.765 0.007* 0.137 2.748 0.007* 
FSize 4.554 4.466 0.000* 8.168 6.404 0.000* 7.290 5.722 0.000* 8.324 6.482 0.000* 
Lev -0.485 -0.723 0.472 -1.160 -1.361 0.177 -0.326 -0.438 0.663 -0.222 -0.307 0.759 
SubInd -2.751 -0.750 0.455 -1.082 -0.304 0.762 -0.084 -1.108 0.271 -5.401 -1.414 0.161 
Top20 0.043 0.571 0.570 0.004 0.048 0.962 -2.605 -0.740 0.461 -0.003 -0.041 0.967 
ROA -0.002 -0.044 0.965 -0.078 -1.198 0.234 -0.094 -1.297 0.198 -0.122 -1.624 0.108 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 0.372  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.433  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.436  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.502  
 Observations 105  Observations 109  Observations 109  Observations 101  
 F Statistic 7.163  F Statistic 9.250  F Statistic 9.343  F Statistic 11.088  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
Legend: The regression equation (Equation 4) is stated as: 
FRDISjt = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj     
 
Where: Dependent Variables: FRDISjt = Financial Ratio Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; Independent Variables: CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year 
t; (maximum 13 variables); CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); OvList = Overseas Listingjt (Listing on the ASX and an overseas 
exchange for firm j in year t); ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; 
(maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity 
+ total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); ROAjt = 
return on assets for firm j in year truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles; αj = intercept; β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; εj  = error term. 
 
Equation 4 tested the association between total, mandatory and discretionary financial ratio disclosures for all sample firms over each of the four years and the independent 
variables against the control variables. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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6.3.4 Financing Arrangements 
Given the capital intensive nature of the resources industry, the long lead time in the 
development of projects and the consequent requirement to engage in protracted 
financial arrangements to support exploration, production and acquisition activities, a 
separate study of the disclosures of financial arrangements was considered important.  
 
The association of financial arrangement information disclosed within the annual 
reports and the independent and control variables was examined. Financial 
arrangement information comprises (a) significant loan terms and conditions 
(principle amount, maturity, expiry, early settlement options, interest rates and 
payments); (b) collateral held or pledged; (c) covenants and; (d) economic substance 
and legal form of financial instruments. In addition, financial arrangement 
information comprises (e) credit standby arrangements; (f) used and unused loan 
facilities; (g) compliance with loan agreements; (h) the nature and source of 
borrowings; (i) associated borrowing costs; (j) restructuring of loans and; (k) 
business objectives of those loans. This information was used to derive a financial 
arrangement disclosure index (FADI). A FADI score (FADIS) was computed for all 
years by summing all information items disclosed divided by the maximum number 
of items that could be disclosed. The FADI comprised 15 mandatory items and 9 
discretionary items (Appendix I) The FADIS score is mathematically represented as 
follows: 
 
Where FADISjt = Financial Arrangement Disclosure Index for firm j in period t. 
 
FADIS in turn can be split between mandatory (MFRDIS) and discretionary 
(DFRDIS). Multivariate analysis using OLS regressions was performed which allows 
simultaneous testing of financial arrangement disclosures against the hypothesised 
variables – CGS, CMS, OvList, ITSt and ITSe. For each of the four years, estimates 
of the following model were obtained: 
 
 
 
FADISjt  = 
Total number of items disclosed 
Maximum number of items 
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FADISjt = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt 
+ β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj                                         [5] 
 
 
Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
FADISjt = Financial Arrangement Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; 
Independent Variables: 
CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; (maximum 13 
variables); 
CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); 
OvListjt = Listing on the ASX and an overseas exchange for firm j in year t;  
ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 
variables); 
ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; (maximum 2 variables); 
Control Variables: 
FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; 
Levjt = square root of (debt/debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity + 
total liabilities) for firm j in year t; 
Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; 
SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); 
ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year t truncated at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles; 
αj = intercept; 
β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; 
εj  = error term 
 
Results of the OLS regression are provided in Table 6.9. The findings indicate that 
the strength of a firm’s corporate governance structure has a positive and statistically 
significant association with mandatory financial arrangement disclosures only. In Yr 
1, income tax exposure and income tax transparency are significant predictors of 
financial arrangement disclosures. Financial arrangements, in particularly debt 
financing arrangements, are often closely tied in with tax considerations. In Yr 2, 
income tax exposure had a positive and statistically significant association with 
financial arrangement disclosures. As expected, Lev is the only variable consistently 
associated with financial arrangement disclosures over the four year period. ROA is 
an additional significant predictor variable of disclosure patterns with a positive 
association evident. In Yr 3, CGS, CMS, FSize, SubInd and ROA were positive and 
statistically significantly associated with FADIS. The strength of a firm’s corporate 
governance structure, however, was not statistically significantly associated with 
discretionary financial arrangement disclosures in that year. In Yr 4, CMS and 
OvList were positively and statistically significantly associated with FADIS. 
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TABLE 6.9: Multiple Regression: Financial Arrangement Disclosures  
Panel A: Yr 1          FADIS          MFADIS      DFADIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients               t Stat  P-value 
Intercept 5.185 0.310 0.757 17.241 1.052 0.295 -14.907 -0.624 0.534
CGS 0.074 0.863 0.390 0.083 0.981 0.329 0.060 0.489 0.626
CMS 0.085 1.412 0.161 0.060 1.015 0.313 0.127 1.475 0.144
OvList -0.530 -0.146 0.884 -0.407 -0.114 0.909 -0.736 -0.142 0.887
ITSt -0.148 -2.378 0.019** -0.154 -2.528 0.013** -0.137 -1.546 0.125
ITSe 0.155 2.644 0.010* 0.133 2.304 0.023** 0.193 2.298 0.024**
FSize 0.611 0.583 0.562 0.368 0.358 0.721 1.015 0.678 0.500
Lev 3.753 5.439 0.000* 3.342 4.939 0.000* 4.438 4.500 0.000*
SubInd -0.089 -0.024 0.981 0.677 0.183 0.855 -1.367 -0.254 0.800
Top20 -0.085 -1.098 0.275 -0.149 -1.967 0.052*** 0.022 0.201 0.841
ROA 0.019 0.329 0.743 0.030 0.539 0.591 0.000 -0.003 0.998
 Adjusted R Square 0.443  Adjusted R Square 0.367  Adjusted R Square 0.387  
 Observations 105  Observations 105  Observations 105  
 F Statistic 9.258  F Statistic 7.022  F Statistic 7.571  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.9: Multiple Regression: Financial Arrangement Disclosures continued 
Panel B: Yr 2          FADIS            MFADIS      DFADIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients                t Stat  P-value 
Intercept 14.048 0.680 0.498 19.480 0.995 0.322 4.994 0.162 0.872
CGS 0.094 1.337 0.184 0.161 2.411 0.018** -0.017 -0.164 0.870
CMS 0.033 0.528 0.599 0.041 0.695 0.489 0.019 0.207 0.837
OvList -1.120 -0.336 0.738 0.734 0.232 0.817 -4.209 -0.845 0.400
ITSt -0.057 -0.959 0.340 -0.085 -1.493 0.139 -0.012 -0.131 0.896
ITSe 0.096 1.822 0.072*** 0.057 1.140 0.257 0.161 2.043 0.044**
FSize -0.783 -0.598 0.551 -0.950 -0.765 0.446 -0.504 -0.258 0.797
Lev 5.542 6.336 0.000* 5.140 6.196 0.000* 6.212 4.748 0.000*
SubInd -0.897 -0.245 0.807 -0.796 -0.230 0.819 -1.065 -0.195 0.846
Top20 0.076 0.887 0.377 0.024 0.299 0.766 0.162 1.266 0.208
ROA 0.112 1.680 0.096*** 0.074 1.170 0.245 0.176 1.758 0.082***
 Adjusted R Square 0.460  Adjusted R Square 0.414  Adjusted R Square 0.386  
 Observations 105  Observations 105  Observations 105  
 F Statistic 10.208  F Statistic 8.644  F Statistic 7.783  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.00*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.9: Multiple Regression: Financial Arrangement Disclosures continued 
Panel C: Yr 3        FADIS            MFADIS       DFADIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients                t Stat  P-value 
Intercept 29.749 1.439 0.153 31.466 1.571 0.119 26.887 0.868 0.388
CGS 0.213 2.806 0.006* 0.295 4.001 0.000* 0.078 0.682 0.497
CMS 0.205 3.233 0.002* 0.194 3.144 0.002* 0.225 2.366 0.020**
OvList 1.125 0.366 0.715 0.920 0.309 0.758 1.466 0.318 0.751
ITSt -0.019 -0.334 0.739 -0.064 -1.134 0.259 0.055 0.628 0.532
ITSe 0.014 0.285 0.776 0.013 0.274 0.784 0.016 0.211 0.833
FSize -2.296 -1.803 0.074*** -2.228 -1.806 0.074*** -2.410 -1.262 0.210
Lev 4.563 6.125 0.000* 3.923 5.436 0.000* 5.630 5.042 0.000*
SubInd 0.181 2.390 0.019** 0.103 1.401 0.164 0.311 2.743 0.007*
Top20 1.041 0.296 0.768 2.092 0.614 0.541 -0.711 -0.135 0.893
ROA 0.195 2.699 0.008* 0.109 1.555 0.123 0.339 3.127 0.002*
 Adjusted R Square 0.474  Adjusted R Square 0.416  Adjusted R Square 0.399  
 Observations 105  Observations 105  Observations 105  
 F Statistic 10.734  F Statistic 8.690  F Statistic 8.158  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 6.9: Multiple Regression: Financial Arrangement Disclosures continued 
Panel D: Yr 4         FADIS            MFADIS       DFADIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients               t Stat  P-value 
Intercept -7.395 -0.347 0.730 7.982 0.363 0.717 -33.023 -1.121 0.265
CGS 0.052 0.584 0.561 0.046 0.502 0.617 0.062 0.502 0.617
CMS 0.175 3.020 0.003* 0.146 2.434 0.017** 0.225 2.804 0.006*
OvList 6.187 1.941 0.055*** 4.215 1.283 0.203 9.474 2.152 0.034**
ITSt -0.059 -0.980 0.330 -0.081 -1.298 0.198 -0.023 -0.277 0.782
ITSe 0.063 1.248 0.215 0.069 1.319 0.191 0.054 0.769 0.444
FSize 0.688 0.526 0.600 0.444 0.330 0.742 1.093 0.606 0.546
Lev 3.811 5.176 0.000* 3.326 4.384 0.000* 4.618 4.541 0.000*
SubInd 5.988 1.540 0.127 8.005 1.998 0.049** 2.627 0.489 0.626
Top20 0.019 0.234 0.815 -0.073 -0.877 0.383 0.173 1.543 0.126
ROA 0.061 0.794 0.429 0.073 0.926 0.357 0.040 0.382 0.703
 Adjusted R Square 0.440  Adjusted R Square 0.324  Adjusted R Square 0.419  
 Observations 105  Observations 105  Observations 105  
 F Statistic 8.869  F Statistic 5.803  F Statistic 8.208  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
Legend: The regression equation (Equation 5) is stated as: 
FADISjt (MFADISjt; DFADISjt) = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj     
 
Where: Dependent Variables: FADISjt = Financial Arrangement Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; MFADISjt = Mandatory Financial Arrangement Disclosure Index for 
firm j in year t; DFADISjt = Discretionary Financial Arrangement Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; Independent Variables: CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j 
in year t; (maximum 13 variables); CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); OvList = Overseas Listingjt (Listing on the ASX and an 
overseas exchange for firm j in year t); ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in 
year t; (maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total 
liabilities/total equity + total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = 
yes, no = 0); ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles; αj = intercept; β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; εj  = error 
term. 
 
Equation 5 tested the association between total, mandatory and discretionary financial ratio disclosures for all sample firms over each of the four years and the independent 
variables against the control variables. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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6.3.5 Expected and Actual IFRS Impacts  
Corporate disclosure policy as it relates to financial instruments can be further 
investigated by examining the (a) expected impacts pre-IFRS adoption (specifically 
AASB 132 and AASB 139) and the (b) actual impacts on the firm of adoption of 
AASB 132 and AASB 139 post-IFRS adoption. Disclosure of the expected impacts 
of the IFRS is required to be disclosed in the annual report under AASB 1047 
leading up to IFRS adoption. The detail of information disclosed on these expected 
impacts is discretionary in nature. The association of expected and actual impacts of 
AASB 132 and AASB 139 and the independent and control variables provides an 
ideal means of investigating managerial discretionary disclosure policy of resource 
firms. 
 
Financial instrument impacts or changes relating to the adoption of AASB 132 and 
AASB 139 comprise (a) narrative and/or quantitative data concerning changes in 
accounting policy with respect to financial instruments; (b) volatility in retained 
earnings and; (c) impacts on net assets or equity as a result of changes in accounting 
standards. In addition, financial instrument impacts or changes relating to the 
adoption of AASB 132 and AASB 139 comprise impacts on (d) profitability; (e) 
borrowings or cash flows; (f) financial instrument classification or measurement 
changes on dividend policy; (g) on the recognition or de-recognition of financial 
assets and financial liabilities and; (h) tax flow-on consequences of adoption of 
accounting standards in relation to financial instruments. This information was used 
to derive an International Financial Reporting Standard Disclosure Index (IFRSDI). 
An IFRSDI score (IFRSDIS) was computed for all years by summing all information 
items disclosed divided by the maximum number of items that could be disclosed. 
The IFRSDI comprised 11 discretionary items (Appendix I). The IFRSDIS score is 
mathematically represented as follows: 
 
Where: IFRSDISjt = International Financial Reporting Standard Disclosure Index 
for firm j in period t. 
 
Multivariate analysis using ordinary OLS regressions was performed which allows 
simultaneous testing of financial instrument accounting standard disclosures against 
IFRSDISjt  = 
Total number of items disclosed 
  Maximum number of items 
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the hypothesised variables – CGS, CMS, OvList, ITSe and ITSt. For each of the four 
years, estimates of the following model were obtained: 
 
IFRSDISjt = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 
FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj                       [6] 
 
Where:  
Dependent Variables: 
IFRSDISjt = International Financial Reporting Standard Disclosure Index for 
firm j in year t; 
Independent Variables: 
CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; (maximum 13 
variables); 
CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); 
OvListjt = Listing on the ASX and an overseas exchange for firm j in year t;  
ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 
variables); 
ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; (maximum 2 variables); 
Control Variables: 
FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; 
Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio(total liabilities/total equity + 
total liabilities) for firm j in year t; 
Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; 
SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); 
ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year t truncated at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles; 
αj = intercept; 
β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; 
εj  = error term 
 
Results of the OLS regression presented in Table 6.10 indicate that FSize is the only 
predictor variable that is positively and significantly associated with disclosures of 
expected impacts or changes relating to financial instrument on IFRS adoption in Yr 
1 and Yr 2 (both pre-IFRS). However, in Yr 3 (immediate pre-IFRS adoption 
period), FSize, Top20 shareholder concentration and ROA are significantly 
associated with disclosures of expected impacts or changes relating to financial 
instrument on IFRS adoption. In Yr 3, FSize is positively associated with IFRSDIS 
and Top20 shareholder concentration and ROA are negatively associated with 
IFRSDIS.  Larger firms with a dispersed shareholder base and lower return on assets 
tend to disclosure more extensively the expected impacts of adoption of AASB 132 
and AASB 139. In Yr 4 post-IFRS adoption, the strength of corporate governance 
structure, capital management structure, Lev and ROA are positive and significantly 
associated with disclosures of actual impacts or changes relating to financial 
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instrument on IFRS adoption. Clearly factors other than FSize play a role in 
influencing managerial disclosure policy in the immediate pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption periods. FSize is an important determinant of expected impacts pre-IFRS 
which is probably due to the greater resourcing capacity of larger firms and the 
potentially material impacts of transactions and earnings relating to adoption of 
standards dealing with financial instruments of these firms. Governance mechanisms, 
capital management exposure and the closely related firm leverage and ROA are 
important drivers of disclosures of actual impacts post-IFRS adoption. A possible 
reason for this observation is the actual impacts of accounting standards on the 
financial position and performance on the firm and the overarching governance 
mechanisms put in place to ensure that adequate disclosures relating to these impacts 
have been made. 
 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter provides further evidence of the extent of financial instrument 
disclosures over the period encompassing the 2003 to 2006 years and association of 
these disclosures with governance, capital management and income tax predictor 
variables. Table 6.11 summarises the results of the regression main model. The 
strength of a firm’s corporate governance structure, FSize and Lev are factors that 
are consistently and significantly associated with the extent of financial instrument 
disclosures, as measured by FIDIS. H1 is accepted in both the pre-IFRS and post-
IFRS adoption periods. Capital management structure, income tax exposure and 
income tax transparency are additional factors that are variably significantly 
associated with the extent of financial instrument disclosures. H2a, H3a and H3b are 
variably accepted over the study period. Statistically significant associations are 
achieved for pooled regression results. These results are consistent with the 
regression results obtained on panel data. 
 
 
 181
TABLE 6.10: Multiple Regression: Disclosure Expected and Actual IFRS Impacts  
 IFRSDIS Yr 1   Yr 2   Yr 3   Yr 4     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -73.602 -4.008 0.000* -59.661 -2.774 0.007* -66.347 -2.434 0.017** -47.007 -1.376 0.172 
CGS -0.060 -0.630 0.530 0.085 1.150 0.253 0.162 1.607 0.111 0.255 1.783 0.078*** 
CMS -0.057 -0.825 0.411 -0.057 -0.847 0.399 0.020 0.237 0.813 0.165 1.774 0.080*** 
OvList -0.007 -0.002 0.999 -2.312 -0.655 0.514 1.701 0.407 0.685 -4.084 -0.800 0.426 
ITSt -0.038 -0.559 0.577 0.018 0.284 0.777 -0.004 -0.051 0.959 -0.090 -0.923 0.359 
ITSe 0.031 0.473 0.637 -0.060 -1.078 0.284 -0.089 -1.365 0.176 -0.054 -0.664 0.508 
FSize 4.468 3.880 0.000* 3.543 2.615 0.010* 4.227 2.518 0.013** 3.270 1.563 0.122 
Lev 0.035 0.046 0.963 1.303 1.412 0.161 1.449 1.459 0.148 4.176 3.541 0.001* 
SubInd 0.038 0.446 0.656 -0.041 -0.458 0.648 0.077 0.767 0.445 8.049 1.293 0.199 
Top20 4.669 1.126 0.263 4.234 1.062 0.291 -9.530 -1.980 0.051*** -0.120 -0.922 0.359 
ROA -0.058 -0.911 0.364 -0.079 -1.143 0.256 -0.172 -1.799 0.075*** 0.272 2.220 0.029** 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 0.192  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.126  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.193  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.304  
 Observations 104  Observations 104  Observations 104  Observations 101.000  
 F Statistic 3.445  F Statistic 2.479  F Statistic 3.466  F Statistic 5.374  
 Significance 0.001*  Significance 0.011**  Significance 0.001*  Significance 0.000*  
Legend: The regression equation (Equation 6) is stated as: 
IFRSDISjt = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj     
 
Where: Dependent Variables: IFRSDISjt = International Financial Reporting Standard Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; Independent Variables: CGSjt = corporate 
governance score for firm j in year t; (maximum 13 variables); CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); OvList = Overseas Listingjt  
(Listing on the ASX and an overseas exchange for firm j in year t); ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); ITSejt = income tax 
score (exposure) for firm j in year t; (maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + 
equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity + total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in 
mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles; αj = intercept; β = estimated coefficient for each item or 
category; εj  = error term. 
 
Equation 6 tested the association between disclosures of expected and actual IFRS impacts for all sample firms over each of the four years and the independent variables 
against the control variables. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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TABLE 6.11 Summary of Multiple Regression Main Model Results  
Hypothesis Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
1 A A A A 
2a NA NA NA A 
2b NA NA NA NA 
3a A NA NA NA 
3b A A NA NA 
Adjusted R Squared 0.708 0.671 0.618 0.624 
Control Variables     
FSize P P P P 
Lev P P P P 
SubInd NP NP P NP 
Top20 NP NP NP NP 
ROA NP NP NP P 
Legend: Table 6.10 summarises the Equation 1 OLS regression results. A = Accepted; NA = Not 
Accepted; P = Significant Predictor Variable; NP = Not a Significant Predictor Variable. 
 
The control variables FSize and Lev are additional factors that consistently are 
associated with the extent of financial instrument disclosures pre-IFRS and post-
IFRS adoption. Stepwise regression marginally enhances the overall predictive 
nature of regression equation 1. Interaction effects between the independent variables 
and control variables were not statistically significant predictor variables when 
incorporated into regression equation 1. 
 
The extent of disclosures of five very important categories of financial instrument 
information and their association with firm specific variables highlighted the 
significant increase in the extent of disclosures over the study period. Derivative and 
hedge accounting, financial risk management, financial ratio, financial arrangement 
disclosures and disclosures of expected and actual IFRS impacts provide additional 
supporting evidence for the research proposition and hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
7.0 Introduction 
The trend in financial instrument disclosures and association between the extent of 
disclosures and firm specific variables over the study period were examined within 
chapters 5 and 6. To provide a robustness check of the general research proposition 
and the hypotheses, further analysis was undertaken to test the: 
a) association between financial instrument disclosures and individual variables 
that made up the corporate governance, capital management and income tax 
scores to determine if there was a particular strong predictor variable or 
variables that contributed to the observed disclosure patterns (Section 7.1);  
b) association between the change in dependent and independent variables 
(Section 7.2); 
c) influence of endogeneity on the preceding analysis provided in Chapter 6 
(Section 7.3);  
d) difference in disclosure patterns between firms that are financially distressed 
compared to those that are not (Section 7.4);  
e) difference in disclosure patterns between firms belonging to the mining and 
petroleum (oil and gas) sub-industries (Section 7.5);  
f) association of individual financial instrument information items and firm 
specific variables over the study period using a logistic regression (Section 
7.6); and 
g) financial instrument disclosures of a sub-set of companies that actively use all 
financial instruments and are engaged in debt financing (Section 7.7).  
 
7.1 Independent Variable Scores  
Further statistical analysis was undertaken to test the association between financial 
instrument disclosures and individual variables that made up the corporate 
governance, capital management and income tax scores to determine if there was a 
particular strong predictor variable or variables that contributed to the observed 
disclosure patterns. 
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First, a Pearson correlation matrix of constituent variables that made up the corporate 
governance score, capital management score and income tax scores and the 
dependent and control variables was constructed to examine the level of influence 
and directionality of  associations for each of the study years. The correlation matrix 
for each year is provided as Table 7.1. 
 
Corporate governance items that comprise the CGS tend to be weakly positively 
correlated with correlation coefficients typically less than 0.25.  However, corporate 
governance items CG5 and CG12 are moderately to strongly correlated in all years 
with correlation coefficients of 0.484 in Yr 1, 0.699 in Yr 2, 0.568 in Yr 3 and 0.599 
in Yr 4. An increasing positive correlation is evident between CG9 and CG10 from 
Yr 1 to Yr 4. Corporate governance items CG9 and CG10 are moderately to strongly 
correlated in Yr 2 (correlation coefficient of 0.586), Yr 3 (correlation coefficient of 
0.661) and Yr 4 (correlation coefficient of 0.718). Corporate governance items are 
moderately correlated in Yr 2, Yr 3 and Yr 4 with correlation coefficients ranging 
from 0.475 in Yr 2 to 0.579 in Yr 4. Minor corporate governance items exhibit a 
weak negative correlation in each of the years. 
 
Capital management item CM3 (existence of overseas operations), income tax 
transparency variable ITSt1 (foreign source income), income tax exposure items 
ITSe1 (thin capitalisation) and ITSe2 (withholding taxes) are moderately to strongly 
correlated in all four years. The directionality and size of the correlations are as 
expected. For instance, firms with overseas operations (CM3) are expected to have 
foreign source income (ITSt1). Income tax transparency items ITSt3 (financing 
entity in tax haven), ITSe1 and ITSe2 are consistently weakly positively associated 
with the thirteen corporate governance items over the observation period. Correlation 
coefficients between the capital management items and corporate governance items 
tend to be very low and either positive or negative in sign. 
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TABLE 7.1: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Independent Items  
Panel A: 
Yr 1 CG1 CG2 CG3 CG4 CG5 CG6 CG7 CG8 CG9 CG10 CG11 CG12 CG13 CM1 CM2 CM3 OvList 
ITS 
t1 
ITS 
t2 
ITS 
t3 
 
ITS 
e1 
ITS 
e2 
CG1 1.000                      
CG2 0.372¥ 1.000                     
CG3 0.468¥ 0.155 1.000                    
CG4 0.285θ 0.186 0.2163 1.000                   
CG5 0.317¥ 0.281θ 0.182 0.306¥ 1.000                  
CG6 0.099 0.008 0.232θ  0.110 -0.021 1.000                 
CG7 0.299¥ 0.261θ 0.000 0.256θ 0.229β 0.131 1.000                
CG8 0.212 0.199β 0.274θ 0.288θ 0.432¥ 0.149 0.307¥ 1.000               
CG9 0.202 0.133 0.148 0.419¥ 0.262θ  0.146 0.348¥ 0.344¥ 1.000              
CG10 0.165 0.073 0.036 0.079 0.168 0.108 0.059 0.091 0.057 1.000             
CG11 0.141 0.161 0.029 0.390¥ 0.367¥ 0.189β 0.317¥ 0.371¥ 0.358¥ 0.126 1.000            
CG12 0.238θ 0.186 0.075 0.233θ 0.484¥ 0.110 0.256θ 0.198β 0.174 0.183 0.343¥ 1.000           
CG13 0.257θ 0.138 0.160 0.187θ 0.222β 0.138 0.237θ 0.292θ 0.318¥ 0.279θ 0.262θ 0.187β 1.000          
CM1 0.049 0.000 0.025 0.018 0.039 0.149 -0.025 -0.032 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.108 0.076 1.000         
CM2 0.146 0.138 -0.067 0.125 0.008 -0.132 0.067 0.022 0.025 0.154 0.037 -0.059 0.115 -0.032 1.000        
CM3 0.224β -0.015 0.155 0.337¥ 0.176 0.025 0.130 0.272θ 0.283θ 0.145 0.175 0.160 0.126 0.039 0.179 1.000       
OvList 0.150 0.015 0.076 0.230β 0.053 0.081 -0.027 0.197 0.226β -0.118 0.065 0.070 0.096 -0.038 -0.032 0.325¥ 1.000      
ITSt1 0.224β 0.042 0.241θ 0.440¥ 0.269θ 0.012 0.267θ 0.291θ 0.269θ 0.018 0.182 0.211β 0.122 -0.073 0.122 0.750¥ 0.320¥ 1.000     
ITSt2 0.212 0.022 0.350¥ 0.213  0.170 0.033 -0.011 0.213β 0.108 0.091 0.144 0.213β 0.211β -0.019 0.085 0.480¥ 0.205β 0.392¥ 1.000    
ITSt3 0.202 0.117 0.327¥ 0.210β 0.112 -0.054 0.057 0.171 0.104 0.060 0.064 0.210β 0.098 -0.012 0.098 0.377¥ 0.172 0.415¥ 0.660¥ 1.000   
ITSe1 0.297θ 0.117 0.338¥ 0.521¥ 0.327¥ 0.174 0.267θ 0.347¥ 0.303¥ 0.175 0.277θ 0.319¥ 0.296θ 0.214β 0.114 0.617¥ 0.215β 0.691¥ 0.458¥ 0.474¥ 1.000  
ITSe2 0.265θ 0.109 0.326¥ 0.349¥ 0.229β 0.163 0.267θ 0.332¥ 0.269θ 0.111 0.182 0.257θ 0.232θ 0.089 0.067 0.631¥ 0.128 0.670¥ 0.392¥ 0.415¥ 0.781¥ 1.000 
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TABLE 7.1: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Independent Items continued   
Panel B: 
Yr 2 CG1 CG2 CG3 CG4 CG5 CG6 CG7 CG8 CG9 CG10 CG11 CG12 CG13 CM1 CM2 CM3 OvList 
ITS 
t1 
ITS 
t2 
ITS 
t3 
 
ITS 
e1 
ITS 
e2 
CG1 1.000                      
CG2 0.339¥ 1.000                     
CG3 0.432¥ 0.112 1.000                    
CG4 0.246θ 0.236θ 0.106 1.000                   
CG5 0.199β 0.361¥ 0.111 0.268θ 1.000                  
CG6 0.130 -0.038 0.159 0.009 0.025 1.000                 
CG7 0.239θ 0.300¥ -0.043 0.246θ 0.245θ 0.091 1.000                
CG8 0.314¥ 0.2123 0.300¥ 0.283θ 0.359¥ 0.141 0.180 1.000               
CG9 0.118 0.181 0.154 0.409¥ 0.344¥ 0.087 0.251θ 0.196β 1.000              
CG10 -0.057 0.129 -0.023 0.168 0.317¥ 0.065 0.179 0.114 0.586¥ 1.000             
CG11 0.123 0.117 0.037 0.460¥ 0.410¥ 0.155 0.245θ 0.475¥ 0.349¥ 0.316¥ 1.000            
CG12 0.189β 0.235θ 0.090 0.171 0.699¥ 0.034 0.330¥ 0.206β 0.406¥ 0.329¥ 0.436¥ 1.000           
CG13 0.201β 0.060 0.226 0.179 0.195 0.089 0.082 0.259θ 0.142 0.145 0.229β 0.133 1.000          
CM1 0.100 0.017 0.064 0.050 -0.067 0.130 0.092 0.095 0.118 0.063 0.163 0.149 0.041 1.000         
CM2 0.176 0.074 -0.074 0.080 0.049 -0.113 0.163 0.112 0.035 0.052 0.007 0.016 0.136 0.023 1.000        
CM3 0.142 -0.046 0.169 0.226β -0.027 -0.018 -0.046 0.035 0.105 -0.117 -0.017 0.039 0.146 0.103 -0.003 1.000       
OvList 0.083 -0.098 0.008 0.111 0.033 -0.042 -0.109 0.045 -0.046 -0.158 -0.010 0.045 0.115 0.083 -0.030 0.284θ 1.000      
ITSt1 0.117 -0.054 0.2432 0.341¥ -0.020 -0.042 -0.005 0.125 0.069 -0.198 0.056 -0.008 0.136 0.077 -0.007 0.813¥ 0.321¥ 1.000     
ITSt2 0.128 0.045 0.326¥ 0.154 0.033 0.022 -0.109 0.093 0.126 -0.069 0.079 0.089 0.234θ 0.083 0.027 0.457¥ 0.141 0.410¥ 1.000    
ITSt3 0.101 0.129 0.246 θ 0.157 0.037 -0.098 0.048 0.045 0.188 0.049 0.015 0.079 0.137 0.101 0.040 0.347¥ 0.107 0.381¥ 0.686¥ 1.000   
ITSe1 0.249θ 0.082 0.346¥ 0.280θ 0.102 0.127 0.111 0.206β 0.230θ 0.011 0.209β 0.179 0.278θ 0.249θ 0.129 0.635¥ 0.206β 0.664¥ 0.490¥ 0.475¥ 1.000  
ITSe2 0.169 0.078 0.2682 0.209θ -0.009 0.022 0.052 0.221β 0.161 -0.016 0.187β 0.123 0.179 0.169 0.133 0.640¥ 0.176 0.669¥ 0.442¥ 0.429¥ 0.814¥ 1.000 
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TABLE 7.1: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Independent Items continued  
Panel C: 
Yr 3 CG1 CG2 CG3 CG4 CG5 CG6 CG7 CG8 CG9 CG10 CG11 CG12 CG13 CM1 CM2 CM3 OvList 
ITS 
t1 
ITS 
t2 
ITS 
t3 
 
ITS 
e1 
ITS 
e2 
CG1 1.000                      
CG2 0.412¥ 1.000                     
CG3 0.462¥ 0.112 1.000                    
CG4 0.332¥ 0.119 0.193β 1.000                   
CG5 0.192 0.247θ 0.074 0.159 1.000                  
CG6 0.127 -0.021 0.128 0.029 0.070 1.000                 
CG7 0.266θ 0.3433 0.006 0.235θ  0.252θ 0.159 1.000                
CG8 0.3593 0.107 0.299θ 0.286θ 0.267θ 0.226β 0.169 1.000               
CG9 0.059 0.074 0.037 0.292θ 0.374¥ 0.050 0.297¥ 0.242θ 1.000              
CG10 -0.072 -0.027 -0.103 0.119 0.319¥ 0.062 0.152 0.201β 0.661¥ 1.000             
CG11 0.248θ 0.170 0.128 0.349¥ 0.254θ 0.285θ 0.331¥ 0.565¥ 0.313¥ 0.220β 1.000            
CG12 0.119 0.126 -0.020 -0.009 0.568¥ 0.038 0.322¥ 0.140 0.392¥ 0.352¥ 0.315¥ 1.000           
CG13 0.207β 0.149 0.099 0.112 0.074 0.077 0.065 0.243θ 0.066 0.095 0.191 0.061 1.000          
CM1 0.152 0.166 0.143 -0.027 0.025 0.076 0.096 0.140 0.040 -0.049 0.033 -0.051 0.056 1.000         
CM2 -0.039 0.053 0.031 -0.034 -0.014 0.063 0.045 0.041 0.086 -0.004 -0.011 -0.141 0.304¥ 0.123 1.000        
CM3 0.202β -0.027 0.284θ 0.414¥ 0.125 0.003 0.053 0.114 0.238θ -0.028 0.091 0.067 0.095 -0.011 -0.004 1.000       
OvList 0.024 -0.118 0.219β 0.189β 0.190 -0.095 -0.093 0.256θ 0.176 0.075 0.124 0.094 0.093 -0.057 0.017 0.357¥ 1.000      
ITSt1 0.168 -0.041 0.214β 0.442¥ 0.074 -0.076 0.056 0.172 0.197β -0.026 0.099 -0.074 0.096 0.075 -0.017 0.800¥ 0.345¥ 1.000     
ITSt2 0.222β 0.122 0.217β 0.315¥ 0.152 0.066 0.141 0.262θ 0.152 0.101 0.172 0.126 0.260θ -0.015 0.122 0.441¥ 0.190β 0.407¥ 1.000    
ITSt3 0.153 0.129 0.246θ 0.243θ 0.104 0.047 0.171 0.209β 0.108 0.106 0.151 -0.001 0.125 0.085 0.073 0.326¥ 0.174 0.363¥ 0.669¥ 1.000   
ITSe1 0.262θ 0.160 0.270θ  0.421¥ 0.153 0.047 0.193β 0.273θ 0.285θ 0.113 0.330¥ 0.029 0.181 0.219β 0.168 0.628¥ 0.262θ 0.672¥ 0.485¥ 0.511¥ 1.000  
ITSe2 0.168 0.021 0.214β 0.366¥ 0.025 -0.016 0.157 0.217 0.236θ 0.124 0.232θ 0.051 0.096 0.152 0.090 0.650¥ 0.222β 0.693¥ 0.407¥ 0.419¥ 0.834¥ 1.000 
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TABLE 7.1: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Independent Items continued 
Panel D: 
Yr 4 CG1 CG2 CG3 CG4 CG5 CG6 CG7 CG8 CG9 CG10 CG11 CG12 CG13 CM1 CM2 CM3 OvList 
ITS 
t1 
ITS 
t2 
ITS 
t3 
 
ITS 
e1 
ITS 
e2 
CG1 1.000                      
CG2 0.410¥ 1.000                     
CG3 0.440¥ 0.199β 1.000                    
CG4 0.310¥ 0.148 0.276θ 1.000                   
CG5 0.024 0.105 0.070 0.074 1.000                  
CG6 0.093 -0.085 0.009 0.209β 0.163 1.000                 
CG7 0.112 0.030 0.188 0.134 0.211β 0.114 1.000                
CG8 0.316¥ 0.158 0.257θ 0.354¥ 0.072 0.019 -0.014 1.000               
CG9 0.104 0.029 0.179 0.167 0.365¥ 0.116 0.319¥ 0.076 1.000              
CG10 0.041 -0.031 0.082 0.086 0.375 0.114 0.297θ 0.015 0.718¥ 1.000             
CG11 0.265θ 0.024 0.225β 0.271θ 0.212 0.143 0.020 0.579¥ 0.312¥ 0.270θ 1.000            
CG12 0.066 0.024 0.128 -0.006 0.599¥ 0.062 0.094 0.060 0.502¥ 0.453¥ 0.309¥ 1.000           
CG13 0.210β 0.131 0.075 0.075 0.201θ -0.027 0.168 0.176 0.060 0.112 0.100 0.100 1.000          
CM1 0.087 0.041 -0.023 0.123 0.038 -0.015 -0.061 0.045 -0.023 -0.102 0.052 -0.044 -0.012 1.000         
CM2 0.043 0.173 -0.002 -0.136 0.080 0.122 -0.059 0.041 0.041 -0.041 0.009 0.161 0.086 0.244θ 1.000        
CM3 0.208 0.002 0.290θ 0.235θ -0.078 -0.058 0.085 0.175 0.241θ 0.046 0.109 0.063 0.056 -0.097 -0.029 1.000       
OvList 0.002 -0.041 0.240θ 0.210β 0.020 -0.130 0.061 0.214β 0.109 0.061 0.139 -0.004 0.171 -0.007 -0.015 0.306¥ 1.000      
ITSt1 0.126 -0.007 0.357¥ 0.352¥ -0.100 -0.089 0.102 0.218β 0.282θ 0.055 0.158 -0.075 0.108 0.125 -0.180 0.726¥ 0.337¥ 1.000     
ITSt2 0.091 0.144 0.120 0.183 0.018 -0.088 0.030 0.202β 0.212β 0.080 0.1923 0.136 0.176 0.042 0.089 0.406¥ 0.158 0.382¥ 1.000    
ITSt3 -0.001 0.105 0.155 0.107 -0.006 -0.087 0.039 0.191β 0.176 0.018 0.152 0.015 0.042 0.039 -0.048 0.271 0.146 0.336¥ 0.728¥ 1.000   
ITSe1 0.247θ 0.112 0.406¥ 0.343¥ 0.062 0.002 0.182 0.354¥ 0.380¥ 0.230θ 0.360¥ 0.117 0.086 0.180 -0.082 0.571¥ 0.257θ 0.674¥ 0.385¥ 0.352¥ 1.000  
ITSe2 0.147 0.020 0.363¥ 0.277θ -0.057 -0.057 0.199β 0.364¥ 0.315¥ 0.151 0.259θ 0.029 -0.043 0.114 -0.153 0.562¥ 0.259θ 0.703¥ 0.373¥ 0.353¥ 0.764¥ 1.000 
Legend: Table 7.1 provides the Pearson correlation matrix of constituent variables of the corporate governance score, capital management score and income tax scores for each of the 
study years. Items CG1…CG13 are the thirteen corporate governance items that comprise the CGS. Items CM1..CM3 are the three capital management items that comprise CMS. OvList 
refers to overseas listing. Items ITSt1..ITSt3 are the three income tax items that comprise the ITSt. Items ITSe1..ITSe2 are the two income tax items that comprise the ITSe. Correlation 
coefficients with superscript ¥, θ and β are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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7.2  Change in Dependent and Independent Variables 
A multivariate regression model was constructed and performed (herein referred to 
as equation 7) to test the association between the change in the value of financial 
instrument disclosures and the change in the value of each of the independent and 
control variables between consecutive years. The purpose of this equation is to test 
whether changes in any of the variables over consecutive reporting years are 
associated. Changes in the dependent variable were regressed against the change in 
all independent and control variables to capture the changes in disclosures that could 
occur with changes in operational, regulatory, legislative and pronouncements over 
the study period. Equation 7 is stated as:  
 
ΔFIDISjt = αj + β1 ΔCGSjt + β2 ΔCMSjt + β3 ΔOvListjt – β4 ΔITStt + β5 ΔITSejt + 
β6 ΔFSizejt + β7 ΔLevjt + β8 ΔTop20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ΔROAjt + εj              [7] 
                                                                                                                               
 
Where: 
Dependent Variable: 
ΔFIDISjt = Change in Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; 
Independent Variables: 
ΔCGSjt = Change in corporate governance score for firm j in year t; (maximum 
13 variables); 
ΔCMSjt = Change in capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 
variables); 
ΔOvListjt = Change in listing on the ASX and in an overseas exchange or 
exchanges for firm j in year t;  
ΔITStjt = Change in income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; 
(maximum 3 variables); 
ΔITSejt = Change in income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; (maximum 2 
variables); 
Control Variables: 
ΔFSizejt = Change in natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; 
ΔLevjt = Change in square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total 
equity + total liabilities) for firm j in year t; 
ΔTop20jt = Change in top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; 
SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); 
ΔROAjt = Change in return on assets for firm j in year t, truncated at the 5th and 
95th percentiles; 
αj = intercept; 
β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; 
εj  = error term 
 
The multiple regression results based on equation 7 are reported in Table 7.2. The 
association between the change in FIDIS and the change in CMS is negative and 
statistically significant (p < 0.10) between Yr 2 and Yr 3. The association between 
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the change in FIDIS and the change in CGS is not statistically significant between 
consecutive reporting periods pre-IFRS and post-IFRS adoption.  
 
The results reported in Table 7.2 (Panel A) indicate that there is a positive and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) association between the change in FIDIS, 
MFIDIS and DFIDIS and the change in FSize and change in Lev between YR 1 and 
Yr 2. The change in FIDIS and MFIDIS is positively and statistically significantly 
(at the 5% level) associated with the change in FSize between Yr 2 and Yr 3. The 
change in total and discretionary financial instrument disclosures is positively and 
statistically significantly (at the 10% level) associated with the change in Lev 
between Yr 2 and Yr 3. The change in FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS is positively and 
statistically significantly (at the 1% level) associated with the change in Lev between 
Yr 3 and Yr 4.  
 
The change in FIDIS is significantly and positively associated with the change in 
Lev on transition to IFRS adoption (pre-IFRS Yr 3 and post-IFRS Yr 4). The change 
in FSize, whilst being an important predictor variable of the change in FIDIS pre-
IFRS, is no longer a statistically significant predictor variable of the change in 
disclosures on transition to IFRS adoption. Lev has changed as a direct consequence 
of IFRS adoption. Several key IFRS including AASB 132 and AASB 139 changed 
the quantum of existing liabilities and equity and resulted in the recognition of new 
liabilities and equity in the balance sheet (Ahmed and Goodwin, 2006). A 
consequence of this is that key accounting and financial ratios may change impacting 
on existing debt covenants and credit ratings (Honey, 2004).  Changes in Lev may 
therefore be an important factor in determining managerial disclosure policy on 
transition to IFRS. 
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TABLE 7.2: Multiple Regression: Change in Dependent and Independent Variables  
Panel A: ΔYr 1-2 ΔFIDIS          ΔMFIDIS        ΔDFIDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value       Coefficients            t Stat P-value 
Intercept 1.093 0.842 0.402 0.478 0.315 0.754 1.649 1.118 0.266 
ΔCGS 0.005 0.156 0.876 -0.017 -0.432 0.667 0.025 0.665 0.508 
ΔCMS 0.031 1.246 0.216 0.048 1.651 0.102 0.015 0.549 0.584 
ΔOvList 0.125 0.027 0.978 1.692 0.317 0.752 -1.293 -0.249 0.804 
ΔITSt -0.063 -0.437 0.663 -0.162 -0.969 0.335 0.028 0.170 0.865 
ΔITSe 0.002 0.083 0.934 0.001 0.034 0.973 0.003 0.108 0.914 
ΔFSize 2.387 3.593 0.001* 2.265 2.911 0.005* 2.497 3.307 0.001* 
ΔLev 1.522 5.398 0.000* 1.818 5.505 0.000) 1.255 3.914 0.000* 
SubInd 1.551 1.123 0.264 2.080 1.286 0.202 1.072 0.683 0.496 
ΔTop20 0.080 1.326 0.188 0.099 1.397 0.166 0.063 0.920 0.360 
ΔROA -0.005 -0.210 0.834 0.006 0.211 0.833 -0.015 -0.548 0.585 
 Adjusted R Square 0.376  Adjusted R Square 0.349  Adjusted R Square 0.266  
 Observations 105  Observations 105  Observations 105  
 F Statistic 7.279  F Statistic 6.585  F Statistic 4.776  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 7.2: Multiple Regression: Change in Dependent and Independent Variables continued 
Panel B: ΔYr 2-3 ΔFIDIS          ΔMFIDIS       ΔDFIDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value      Coefficients              t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.357 0.189 0.850 0.509 0.277 0.782 0.220 0.093 0.926 
ΔCGS 0.053 1.239 0.218 0.052 1.250 0.214 0.054 1.007 0.316 
ΔCMS -0.047 -1.789 0.077*** -0.034 -1.329 0.187 -0.059 -1.791 0.076*** 
ΔOvList -3.226 -1.127 0.262 -3.271 -1.175 0.243 -3.186 -0.890 0.376 
ΔITSt 0.119 0.882 0.380 0.004 0.030 0.976 0.222 1.323 0.189 
ΔITSe 0.011 0.186 0.853 -0.008 -0.151 0.880 0.028 0.390 0.698 
ΔFSize 2.628 2.109 0.037** 3.088 2.550 0.012** 2.212 1.420 0.159 
ΔLev 0.699 1.753 0.083*** 0.477 1.232 0.221 0.899 1.804 0.074*** 
SubInd -0.003 -0.057 0.955 -0.073 -1.305 0.195 0.059 0.831 0.408 
ΔTop20 -0.032 -0.530 0.597 -0.082 -1.404 0.163 0.014 0.180 0.858 
ΔROA -0.007 -0.224 0.823 -0.024 -0.780 0.437 0.008 0.208 0.836 
 Adjusted R Square 0.078  Adjusted R Square 0.061  Adjusted R Square 0.068  
 Observations 108  Observations 108  Observations 108  
 F Statistic 1.909  F Statistic 1.700  F Statistic 1.779  
 Significance 0.053***  Significance 0.091***  Significance 0.075***  
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TABLE 7.2: Multiple Regression: Change in Dependent and Independent Variables continued 
Panel C: ΔYr 3-4 ΔFIDIS          ΔMFIDIS        ΔDFIDIS   
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value      Coefficients             t Stat P-value 
Intercept 11.586 3.878 0.000* 10.997 3.476 0.001* 12.119 3.528 0.001* 
ΔCGS 0.102 1.091 0.278 0.058 0.587 0.559 0.141 1.318 0.191 
ΔCMS 0.006 0.167 0.868 -0.005 -0.118 0.906 0.016 0.375 0.709 
ΔOvList 0.191 0.047 0.963 -0.944 -0.219 0.827 1.218 0.260 0.795 
ΔITSt -0.030 -0.440 0.661 0.002 0.031 0.976 -0.060 -0.754 0.453 
ΔITSe 0.001 0.026 0.979 -0.004 -0.077 0.939 0.006 0.107 0.915 
ΔFSize 1.389 0.613 0.542 2.884 1.201 0.233 0.037 0.014 0.989 
ΔLev 2.074 3.820 0.000* 1.907 3.318 0.001* 2.224 3.564 0.001* 
SubInd 0.063 0.508 0.613 0.024 0.183 0.855 0.097 0.689 0.493 
ΔTop20 0.023 0.195 0.846 -0.030 -0.236 0.814 0.071 0.519 0.605 
ΔROA 0.048 1.117 0.267 0.054 1.195 0.235 0.042 0.855 0.395 
 Adjusted R Square 0.102  Adjusted R Square 0.078  Adjusted R Square 0.078  
 Observations 101  Observations 101  Observations 101  
 F Statistic 2.140  F Statistic 1.847  F Statistic 1.845  
 Significance 0.029**  Significance 0.063***  Significance 0.064***  
Legend: The regression equation (Equation 7) is stated as: 
ΔFIDISjt (ΔMFIDISjt; ΔDFIDISjt) = αj + β1 ΔCGSjt + β2 ΔCMSjt + β3 ΔOvList jt – β4 ΔITStjt + β5 ΔITSejt + β6 ΔFSizejt + β7 ΔLevjt + β8 ΔTop20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ΔROAjt + εj      
Where: Dependent Variables: ΔFIDISjt = change in Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j between consecutive reporting periods; ΔMFIDISjt = Change in 
Mandatory Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j between consecutive reporting periods; ΔDFIDISjt = Change in Discretionary Financial Instrument Disclosure 
Index for firm j between consecutive reporting periods; Independent Variables: ΔCGSjt = change in corporate governance score for firm j between consecutive reporting 
periods; (maximum 13 variables); ΔCMSjt = change in capital management  score for firm j between consecutive reporting periods; (maximum 3 variables); ΔOvListjt = 
Change in overseas Listing (Listing on the ASX and an overseas exchange) for firm j between consecutive reporting periods; ΔITStjt = change in income tax score 
(transparency) for firm j between consecutive reporting periods; (maximum 3 variables); ΔITSejt = change in income tax score (exposure) for firm j between consecutive 
reporting periods; (maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: ΔFSizejt = change in natural log of total assets for firm j between consecutive reporting periods; ΔLevjt = 
change in square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity + total liabilities) for firm j between consecutive reporting periods; ΔTop20jt = change in top 
20 shareholder concentration for firm j between consecutive reporting periods; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); ΔROAjt = change in return on 
assets (truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles) for firm j between consecutive reporting periods; αj = intercept; β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; εj  = 
error term. Panel A shows the results of regression Model 2 between years 1 and 2; Panel B for years 2 and 3 and Panel C for years 3 and 4. Associations *, ** and *** are 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
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7.3 Endogeneity 
The multivariate analysis provided in chapter 6 (equation 1 to equation 6) assumes 
that the corporate governance, capital management and income tax variables that 
comprise the respective scores are exogenously determined. Furthermore, a potential 
correlated omitted variable problem may occur if governance, capital management, 
overseas listing and income taxes are endogenously determined. There are potentially 
factors that may affect governance, capital management, overseas listing and income 
tax that also affect financial instrument disclosure patterns simultaneously. If this is 
the case, then the analysis provided in chapter 6 may suffer from a potential 
correlated omitted variable problem.  
 
It has been shown that endogeneity caused by unobservable firm specific factors and 
omitted variables such as operational characteristics between firms may cause a 
bias41 in OLS regressions (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Nikolaev and Vent, 2005; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond, 2006; Chenhall and Moers, 2007; Larcker, 
David and Rusticus, 2007). Prior empirical studies indicate that corporate 
governance structure is endogenously determined by firms’ contracting arrangements 
(Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith, 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond, 
2006). Capital management characteristics such as capital raisings may also be 
endogenously determined (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Nikolaev and Vent, 2005). 
Capital management characteristics and financial instrument disclosures may be 
correlated in cross-sectional analysis. However, the driver of the extent of disclosures 
may be caused by an omitted factor such as cost of disclosure within the annual 
report. For instance, Nikolaev and Vent (2005) state in their investigation of the 
endogeneity bias in the relation between cost of debt capital and corporate disclosure 
policy that one example of unobserved heterogeneity that may lead to this bias is the 
difference in the cost of disclosure amongst firms. Whilst disclosure levels and cost 
of capital may appear correlated in a cross-sectional analysis, this association could 
possibly be caused by another factor such as the actual cost of disclosure.  
 
One way to alleviate any concern over possible endogeneity bias in the OLS 
regressions is to incorporate potential competing explanatory variables as control 
                                                 
41 Endogeniety may cause the parameter estimates to be inconsistent leading to uncertainty when 
interpreting the results. 
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variables in the regression model (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond, 2006). 
This has been achieved in this thesis with the inclusion of such variables as Lev and 
ROA as control variables in the regression model which are negatively correlated 
(see Table 5.4). Another method to determine if correlated omitted variables are 
driving the results is to examine whether the individual variables that comprise the 
scores within the regression model themselves have significant predictive power. 
Each constituent variable that comprises the corporate governance score, capital 
management score and income tax scores was included in regression equation 8 on a 
separate basis to determine if financial instrument disclosures were significantly 
associated with that variable. For each of the four years, estimates of the following 
equation were obtained: 
 
FIDISjt = αj + β1 Varjt + β2 FSizejt + β3 Levjt + β4 Top20jt + β5 SubIndjt + β6 
ROAjt + εj               [8] 
 
Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
FIDISjt = Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; 
Independent Variables: 
Varjt = Distinct corporate governance item (13), capital management item (3) or 
income tax item (3 and 2) for firm j in year t;  
Control Variables: 
FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; 
Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity + 
total liabilities) for firm j in year t; 
Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; 
SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); 
ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year t truncated at the 5th and 95th 
percentile;  
αj = intercept; 
β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; 
εj  = error term 
 
Regression results based on equation 8 are reported in Table 7.3. In each year of the 
study period, there are a suite of weakly correlated corporate governance variables 
that have a positive and statistical significant association with financial instrument 
disclosures. For instance, in Yr 1 to Yr 3 (pre-IFRS), corporate governance features 
relating to the composition and structure of the board such as the existence of an 
independent chairman (CG1), separation of the roles of the chairman and managing 
director (CG2) and the existence of a formal policy for director appointments held by 
the nomination committee (CG4) are important determinants of financial instrument 
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disclosures. In Yr 2, Yr 3 (pre-IFRS) and Yr 4 (post-IFRS), corporate governance 
features relating to the existence of a formal code of conduct relating to behaviour of 
directors and key executives (CG5), a plan or policy relating to equity based 
remuneration (CG6) and the existence of an audit committee charter (CG11) and 
formal written disclosure policy (CG12) are factors that exhibit significant 
explanatory power. Thus, it appears unlikely that there are omitted factors that could 
simultaneously be correlated with this set of corporate governance variables as well 
as the dependent variable FIDIS that would also be able to explain the observed 
disclosure patterns and provide an alternative explanation for the results. Thus, it is 
highly unlikely that potential correlated omitted variables are responsible for the 
observed disclosure patterns in this study.  
 
Similar results were also obtained for the constituent variables of the capital 
management and income tax scores. Discrete variables that comprise the CMS are 
statistically significantly associated with financial instrument disclosure patterns in 
Yr 1 and Yr 4. For instance, the occurrence of a capital raising event (CM1) has a 
positive and statistically significant association with FIDIS in Yr 1 and Yr 4 and is 
not significantly correlated with any items that comprise the independent scores. 
Discrete variables that comprise the ITSe (ITSe1 and ITSe2) are statistically 
significantly associated with financial instrument disclosure patterns in Yr 1. Again it 
would appear unlikely that there are omitted factors that could simultaneously be 
correlated with these discrete variables (e.g. CM1, ITSe1 and ITSe2) and the 
dependent variable, FIDIS that would also be able to explain the observed disclosure 
patterns.  
 
In addition to these results, there is evidence from the annual reports of the resource 
firms themselves that provides evidence that governance and capital management 
features are an important input into the choice of and controls related to the use of 
financial instruments and associated financial risks. An example (Onesteel Limited) 
is provided as follows: 
 
The main risks arising from the Group’s financial instruments are interest 
rate risk, liquidity risk, foreign currency risk, commodity risk and credit risk. 
The Board reviews and agrees policies for managing each of these risks. The 
Group’s exposure to the risk of changes in market interest rates relates 
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primarily to the Group’s long-term debt borrowings. The objective of Group 
policy is to neutralise exposures within levels of tolerance acceptable to the 
Board, minimising interest rate expense whilst ensuring that an appropriate 
level of flexibility exists to accommodate potential changes in funding 
requirements (Onesteel Limited, 2006, p 59). 
 
The statement by Onesteel Limited clearly indicates that governance and capital 
management factors are direct inputs contributing to financial instrument disclosure 
patterns. Funding requirements (capital raisings) constitute an important component 
of capital management that will provide an important input into the type of financial 
instruments issued and managed. This choice may in turn influence the extent of 
financial instrument disclosures. 
 
Another mechanism to address potential endogeneity is to examine the association 
between change in the levels of governance (e.g. Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), 
capital management exposure and income tax exposure over the study period. The 
rationale for this approach is that there is less likely to be a corresponding change in 
any potential omitted variable that is correlated with both the dependent and 
independent variable or variables. The problem with this approach is that the change 
in independent variables may be relatively minor between consecutive years 
compared to the change in the dependent variable. The results of this approach are 
provided in Table 7.2 where the change in dependent, independent and control 
variables was examined between consecutive reporting periods. No significant 
associations between the change in the dependent variable (FIDIS) and independent 
variables were observed, other than the change in capital management score between 
Yr 1 and Yr 2. 
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TABLE 7.3: Multiple Regression: Independent Items  
Item Yr 1   Yr 2   Yr 3   Yr 4   
 Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
CG1 3.266 1.840 0.069*** 2.593 1.456 0.148 3.544 1.765 0.080 3.546 1.317 0.191 
CG2 8.244 3.077 0.003* 7.935 3.072 0.003* 6.458 2.205 0.030** 1.742 0.372 0.711 
CG3 1.387 0.777 0.439 2.645 1.282 0.203 0.097 0.048 0.962 1.346 0.496 0.621 
CG4 4.789 2.259 0.026** 3.039 1.720 0.088 4.196 2.136 0.035** 0.798 0.319 0.750 
CG5 1.060 0.600 0.550 3.610 1.951 0.054*** 4.901 2.010 0.047** 8.277 2.529 0.013** 
CG6 1.386 0.698 0.487 5.014 2.138 0.035** 5.307 1.852 0.067*** 8.866 2.066 0.042** 
CG7 3.858 2.222 0.029** 2.351 1.140 0.257 1.684 0.665 0.508 9.892 2.638 0.010* 
CG8 0.625 0.332 0.740 3.708 1.888 0.062*** 3.365 1.456 0.149 -2.634 -0.798 0.427 
CG9 1.274 0.635 0.527 2.365 1.371 0.173 3.294 1.560 0.122 0.814 0.292 0.771 
CG10 -1.312 -0.360 0.720 2.016 1.210 0.229 2.676 1.426 0.157 1.240 0.485 0.629 
CG11 0.828 0.444 0.658 4.037 2.367 0.020** 4.263 1.919 0.058*** 0.831 0.273 0.785 
CG12 2.118 1.096 0.276 3.697 2.227 0.028** 4.536 2.261 0.026** 5.772 2.077 0.041** 
CG13 -0.530 -0.220 0.827 1.270 0.537 0.592 4.356 1.709 0.091*** 1.497 0.471 0.639 
CM1 4.219 2.712 0.008* 2.329 1.318 0.190 2.080 1.067 0.288 4.904 2.018 0.046** 
CM2 -0.262 -0.117 0.907 -3.398 -1.588 0.115 0.265 0.101 0.920 5.274 2.068 0.041** 
CM3 0.693 0.391 0.697 1.074 0.593 0.554 1.608 0.805 0.423 -1.209 -0.457 0.649 
ITSt1 1.018 0.529 0.598 0.903 0.468 0.641 1.628 0.795 0.429 -0.845 -0.316 0.753 
ITSt2 -1.598 -0.817 0.416 -2.931 -1.438 0.154 -0.831 -0.365 0.716 -3.856 -1.258 0.211 
ITSt3 -1.630 -0.625 0.534 -2.996 -1.138 0.258 -1.929 -0.660 0.511 -4.633 -1.252 0.214 
ITSe1 5.733 2.485 0.015** 2.193 0.888 0.376 1.532 0.608 0.545 -0.592 -0.181 0.857 
ITSe2 4.972 2.453 0.016** 2.018 0.948 0.345 1.093 0.476 0.635 1.465 0.512 0.610 
Legend: The coefficients, t-statistic and p-values of discrete variables that comprise the corporate governance, capital management and income tax scores when included in 
this regression equation 8 for each year: FIDISjt= αj + β1 Varjt + + β2 FSizejt + β3 Levjt + β4 Top20jt + β5 SubIndjt + β6 ROAjt+ εj Where: Dependent Variable: FIDISjt = 
Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; Independent Variable: Varjt = Distinct corporate governance variable (13), capital management variable (3) or 
income tax variable (3 and 2) for firm j in year t; Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root of  debt/(debt + equity) ratio 
(total liabilities/total equity + total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t 
(1 = yes, no = 0); ROAjt = return on assets for firm j in year t truncated at the 5th and 95th percentile; αj = intercept; β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; εj  = 
error term. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Sample FSize consists of 105, 109, 109 and 101 companies in years 1, 2, 3 
and 4 respectively. Years 1 to 3 relate to the pre-IFRS adoption period and Yr 4 is post-IFRS adoption (i.e. full year report prepared under IFRS). 
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7.4 Financial Instrument Disclosures and Audit Qualification 
A sub-sample of 18 companies with an ‘inherent uncertainty regarding continuation 
of the entity as a going concern’ audit qualification was also examined. The inherent 
uncertainty regarding going concern audit qualification refers to the significant 
uncertainty as to whether the entity will be able to continue as a going concern. Thus, 
this assumption indicates whether the entity will be able to pay its debts as and when 
the debts become due and payable, and whether the firm will realise its assets and 
extinguish its liabilities in the normal course of business (Alfredson, Leo, Picker, 
Pacter, Radford and Wise, 2007).  
 
The purpose of this additional analysis was to determine how the financial 
instrument disclosures of these companies compared to those companies without that 
audit qualification. This is important as there is a close connection between the 
ability of the firm to meet its obligations, maintain a cash flow or liquidity position to 
meet its operational, investing and financing activities and financial risk management 
(Cabedo and Tirado, 2003). Firms subject to this audit qualification are potentially 
subject to a higher degree of financial distress than firms without that audit 
qualification (Beasley et. al. 2000). Financial risk management data were derived 
from 30 annual reports for 18 companies (i.e. some companies had an audit 
qualification over consecutive years) which had an audit qualification. Comparative 
descriptive statistics are provided in Table 7.4.  
 
Total financial instrument disclosures of audit qualified firms (36.333%) are lower 
than those non-audit qualified firms (41.523%). Clearly, those firms with an audit 
qualification regarding continuation of that entity as a going concern do not have an 
effective disclosure framework in place - this is reflected in less extensive financial 
instrument disclosures within the annual reports of these firms. Stakeholders of audit 
qualified firms are not being provided with complete information regarding the 
financial instrument types, terms, conditions, associated risks and risk mitigation 
activities of these companies. There is some evidence of selective disclosure of 
financial instrument information depending on the particular circumstances of a firm. 
As an example, one particular gold mining company disclosed information 
concerning credit risk of financial instruments in the annual financial report for all 
years except in the financial reporting year immediately prior to that company going 
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into administration. Management reputation may account for the reduced disclosures 
of this firm during a period of financial distress.  Tufano (1996) indicates that gold 
mining firms may reduce the likelihood of costly financial distress through risk 
management activities. This may induce firm management to disclose risk 
information more extensively. Alternatively, Tufano (1996) posits that management 
reputation may account for the existence and nature of financial risk management 
activities undertaken by gold mining companies. 
 
As expected, audit qualified firms have a weaker corporate governance structure 
(50.256% for audit qualified firms as compared to 60.074% for non-audit qualified 
firms). Audit qualified firms also have considerably more debt in their capital 
structure with mean Lev of 7.584 compared to 5.519 for non-audit qualified firms 
(Table 7.4). Return on assets of audit qualified firms (-36.047%) is fundamentally 
lower than that of non-audit qualified firms (-4.071%). This difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et. al. (2006) who demonstrated a positive association between 
firms with strong corporate governance and their credit ratings. Ashbaugh-Skaife et. 
al. (2006) found that firms with a stronger corporate governance structure had a 
higher overall creditworthiness as reflected in their capacity to satisfy their financial 
obligations. Specifically, firms’ overall credit ratings were found to be positively 
associated with board independence, board stock ownership and board expertise and 
negatively associated with CEO power on the board, return on assets, leverage and 
firm size. Ashbaugh-Skaife et. al. (2006) also provide evidence that firms with weak 
governance incur higher debt financing costs since governance is an important 
determinant of credit ratings and therefore impacts on the firms’ external financing 
costs. 
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TABLE 7.4: Descriptive Statistics: Firms With and Without a Going Concern Uncertainty Assumption 
Panel A: Going Concern FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 36.333 51.988 22.169 50.256 41.111 23.333 31.667 17.144 7.584 58.910 -36.047
Median 34.583 49.123 19.841 53.846 33.333 0.000 0.000 17.274 7.561 55.310 -36.088
Standard Deviation 13.046 13.317 14.182 17.811 28.612 37.293 44.496 1.745 2.917 21.712 28.887
Sample Variance 170.192 177.345 201.125 317.214 818.646 1390.805 1979.885 3.045 8.511 471.398 834.448
Kurtosis -1.041 -1.061 -0.722 -0.350 0.516 0.056 -1.239 8.376 -0.109 -0.821 -1.322
Skewness 0.430 0.305 0.654 -0.474 0.915 1.279 0.825 -2.114 0.213 0.223 -0.112
Range 40.833 42.105 47.619 69.231 100.000 100.000 100.000 10.049 12.447 80.250 88.065
Minimum 19.167 33.333 4.762 15.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.136 1.539 18.320 -77.056
Maximum 60.000 75.439 52.381 84.615 100.000 100.000 100.000 20.185 13.986 98.570 11.009
Count 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Conf. Level(95.0%) 4.871 4.973 5.296 6.651 10.684 13.926 16.615 0.652 1.089 8.107 10.787
 
Panel B: No Going Concern FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 41.523 56.029 28.398 60.074 44.332 24.958 35.279 18.541 5.519 61.721 -4.071
Median 40.000 57.018 25.397 61.538 33.333 0.000 0.000 18.385 5.696 62.755 2.418
Standard Deviation 15.978 14.507 18.298 24.147 27.787 33.126 45.107 1.999 1.977 20.320 24.497
Sample Variance 255.287 210.450 334.810 583.092 772.142 1097.326 2034.655 3.994 3.908 412.910 600.081
Kurtosis -0.831 -0.786 -0.613 -0.713 -0.566 0.215 -1.492 0.498 -0.548 -0.778 1.973
Skewness 0.284 -0.036 0.540 -0.381 0.113 1.177 0.615 0.580 -0.224 -0.127 -1.471
Range 72.500 70.175 79.365 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 11.517 10.672 87.810 104.101
Minimum 10.833 21.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.376 0.878 12.040 -77.056
Maximum 83.333 91.228 79.365 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.893 11.550 99.850 27.045
Count 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394
Conf. Level(95.0%) 1.583 1.437 1.812 2.392 2.752 3.281 4.468 0.198 0.196 2.013 2.426
Legend: Financial instrument disclosure characteristics of firms with an “inherent uncertainty regarding continuation of the entity as a going concern” (Panel A) compared to 
firms without a going concern audit qualification (Panel B). MFIDIS, DFIDIS and FIDIS refer to mandatory, discretionary and total financial instrument disclosures 
respectively. Also shown for each sub-sample is return on assets (ROA) = pretax profits divided by total assets truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles, FSize = natural log of 
total assets, Lev = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities divided by total liabilities plus total equity) and Top20 = equity interest of the Top 20 shareholders. 
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TABLE 7.5: t-Test: Firms With and Without a Going Concern Uncertainty Assumption  
Panel A: Dependent Variables FIDIS (GC) FIDIS (NGC) MFIDIS (GC) MFIDIS (NGC) DFIDIS (GC) DFIDIS (NGC) 
Mean 36.333 41.523 51.988 56.029 22.169 28.398 
Variance 170.192 255.287 177.345 210.450 201.125 334.810 
Observations 30 394 30 394 30 394 
Pooled Variance 249.439  208.174  325.623  
Hypothesised Mean Difference 0  0  0  
df 422  422  422  
t Stat -1.735  -1.479  -1.823  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.042**  0.070***  0.035**  
t Critical one-tail 1.648  1.648  1.648  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.083*** 0.140 0.069***
t Critical two-tail 1.966  1.966  1.966  
 
 
Panel B: Independent Variables CGS (GC) CGS (NGC) CMS (GC) CMS (NGC) ITSt (GC) ITSt (NGC) ITSe (GC) ITSe (NGC) 
Mean 50.256 60.074 41.111 44.332 23.333 24.958 31.667 35.279 
Variance 317.214 583.092 818.646 772.142 1390.805 1097.326 1979.885 2034.655 
Observations 30 394 30 394 30 394 30 394 
Pooled Variance 565  775  1117  2031  
Hypothesised Mean Difference 0  0  0  0  
df 422 422 422 422
t Stat -2.181  -0.611  -0.257  -0.423  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.015**  0.271  0.399  0.336  
t Critical one-tail 1.648  1.648  1.648  1.648  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.030**  0.542  0.798  0.672  
t Critical two-tail 1.966  1.966  1.966  1.966  
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Table 7.5: t-Test: Firms With and Without a Going Concern Uncertainty Assumption continued 
Panel C: Control Variables FSize (GC) FSize (NGC) Lev (GC) Lev (NGC) Top20 (GC) Top20 (NGC) ROA (GC) ROA (NGC) 
Mean 17.144 18.541 7.584 5.519 58.910 61.721 -36.047 -4.071 
Variance 3.045 3.994 8.511 3.908 471.398 412.910 834.448 600.081 
Observations 30 394 30 394 30 394 30 394 
Pooled Variance 3.929  4.224  416.929  616.187  
Hypothesised Mean 
Difference 0  0  0  0  
df 422  422  422  422  
t Stat -3.721  5.304  -0.727  -6.801  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000*  0.000*  0.234  0.000*  
t Critical one-tail 1.648  1.648  1.648  1.648  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000*  0.000*  0.468  0.000*  
t Critical two-tail 1.966  1.966  1.966  1.966  
Legend: t-Test assuming equal sample variances for companies with a going concern assumption regarding continuation as a going concern (denoted GC) and 
without a (denoted NGC) going concern assumption. The results provide the mean, variance and statistical significance of differences for the dependent variables 
(Panel A), independent variables (Panel B) and the control variables (Panel C). MFIDIS, DFIDIS and FIDIS refer to mandatory, discretionary and total financial 
instrument disclosures respectively. Also shown for each sub-sample is return on assets (ROA) measured as pretax profits divided by total assets truncated at the 5th 
and 95th percentiles, FSize measured as the natural log of total assets, Lev measured as the square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total liabilities 
plus total equity) and Top20 shareholder concentration. Hypothesised mean differences denoted *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
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The statistical significance of differences in mean financial instrument disclosures of 
firms with a going concern audit qualification and firms without that audit 
qualification was determined using a t-test assuming equal sample variances. The 
results of the t-test are provided in Table 7.5. There is a statistically significant 
difference (at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels) between the mean FIDIS, MFIDIS, 
DFIDIS, corporate governance score, FSize, Lev and ROA between audit qualified 
and non-audit qualified firms. 
 
7.5 Comparative Petroleum and Mining Sub-Industry Disclosures 
Potentially, differences in operational, investing and financing activities between 
mining and petroleum (oil and gas) sub-industries may play a role in influencing 
management’s disclosure policy (Godfrey and Chalmers, 2004). For this reason, a 
separate examination of financial instrument disclosures of the mining and petroleum 
sub-industries was considered important. 
 
Descriptive statistics of petroleum firms (26) and mining firms (85) for each of the 
study years are provided in Table 7.6. The descriptive statistics indicate that mean 
total, mandatory and discretionary financial instrument disclosures are very similar in 
each year for both petroleum and mining firms. However, mining firms relative to 
petroleum firms exhibit a lower mean corporate governance score, capital 
management score and ROA and higher mean Lev and Top20 shareholder 
concentration. Petroleum firms, in general, have a stronger corporate governance 
structure, greater capital management exposure and have a more dispersed 
shareholder ownership structure compared to mining firms. Despite the differences, 
the mining and petroleum sub-industries exhibit very similar financial instrument 
disclosure patterns. 
 
7.6 Disclosure Patterns: December versus June Year End Firms 
Corporate groups belonging to the resource industry may either have a 31 December 
or 30 June financial year end. The balance sheet date often depends on the 
jurisdiction of the head company of the corporate group. Potentially, differences in 
financial year end of a corporate group may reflect underlying variations in 
operational and regulatory characteristics which may in turn influence managerial 
disclosure policy (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). For this reason, a separate 
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examination of financial instrument disclosures of the corporate groups with either a 
31 December or 30 June financial year end was considered important. 
 
As is evident from the t-test results reported in Table 7.7, the differences in mean 
total, mandatory and discretionary financial instrument disclosures between the 31 
December financial year end and 30 June financial year companies is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Mean FIDIS is 45.941% and 39.233% for the December 
and June financial year end companies respectively.  Similarly, there is a statistically 
significant difference for each of the independent variables between December and 
June financial year end companies. In particular, mean ITSt and ITSe are 
significantly higher (at the 1% level) than that for the June financial year end 
companies. For instance, mean ITSe is 61.574% for December year end companies 
compared to 26.646% for June year end companies. This statistically significant 
difference relates to the multinational operational, investing and financing activities 
of December year end corporate groups. Further, December year end companies are 
larger, have a greater Top20 shareholder concentration and greater ROA compared to 
that of the June year end companies. Mean Lev is not statistically significantly 
different between the two groups. 
 
7.7 Analysis of Individual Financial Instrument Items 
The next stage in the analysis involved testing the association of individual financial 
instrument information items and firm specific variables over the study period using 
a logistic regression. The items selected include: a) fair value measurement of 
financial instruments; b) hedge accounting qualification and associated impacts on 
the financial statements; and c) disclosure of information on controls relating to use 
of financial instruments. This additional analysis enabled testing of the significance 
of associations between these key items of financial instrument information and the 
independent variables with the control variables. Results are provided in Table 7.8.  
 
Although each item of financial instrument information generally is not consistently 
associated with a particular independent variable or control variable over the four 
year period, corporate governance, FSize and Lev tend to be the more common 
predictor variables. For instance, financial instrument information item 100 which 
refers to a discussion of controls in place in relation to the use of financial  
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TABLE 7.6: Descriptive Statistics: Petroleum versus Mining Firms 
Panel A: Yr 1: 
Petroleum Firms FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 35.729 51.827 21.164 55.128 41.667 30.556 29.167 18.399 5.151 46.261 -5.117
Standard Error 2.662 2.510 2.987 4.576 4.597 6.926 8.987 0.441 0.432 3.930 4.232
Median 33.333 51.754 19.048 53.846 33.333 33.333 0.000 17.978 5.074 43.395 1.204
Standard Deviation 13.043 12.297 14.635 22.417 22.522 33.932 44.027 2.161 2.118 19.253 20.735
Sample Variance 170.128 151.212 214.196 502.530 507.246 1151.369 1938.406 4.670 4.487 370.671 429.926
Kurtosis -0.729 -1.091 -0.466 -0.490 -0.666 0.053 -0.986 -0.158 -0.789 0.919 5.567
Skewness 0.516 0.178 0.720 -0.203 -0.346 0.988 0.975 0.711 0.004 0.877 -2.131
Range 42.500 38.596 49.206 84.615 66.667 100.000 100.000 7.759 7.470 80.300 92.208
Minimum 18.333 33.333 1.587 7.692 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.824 1.539 18.320 -77.056
Maximum 60.833 71.930 50.794 92.308 66.667 100.000 100.000 22.582 9.009 98.620 15.152
Count 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Conf. Level(95.0%) 5.508 5.192 6.180 9.466 9.510 14.328 18.591 0.913 0.894 8.130 8.755
 
Panel B: Yr 1: Mining 
Firms FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 33.693 49.448 19.440 40.551 40.741 21.399 31.481 17.654 5.832 62.636 -13.096
Standard Error 1.538 1.502 1.699 2.418 3.261 3.625 4.847 0.254 0.263 2.143 3.381
Median 31.667 49.123 15.873 38.462 33.333 0.000 0.000 17.267 5.703 62.500 -2.072
Standard Deviation 13.838 13.522 15.290 21.758 29.345 32.621 43.621 2.287 2.364 19.290 30.428
Sample Variance 191.492 182.834 233.782 473.391 861.111 1064.129 1902.778 5.231 5.588 372.117 925.850
Kurtosis -0.816 -1.036 -0.017 -0.552 -0.522 0.896 -1.203 1.678 0.566 -0.773 0.081
Skewness 0.510 0.106 0.945 0.396 0.334 1.436 0.806 0.239 0.368 -0.034 -1.117
Range 54.167 54.386 63.492 92.308 100.000 100.000 100.000 14.333 12.192 79.380 104.095
Minimum 10.833 21.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.136 0.878 19.190 -77.056
Maximum 65.000 75.439 63.492 92.308 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.469 13.070 98.570 27.038
Count 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
Conf. Level(95.0%) 3.060 2.990 3.381 4.811 6.489 7.213 9.645 0.506 0.523 4.265 6.728
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TABLE 7.6: Descriptive Statistics: Petroleum versus Mining Firms continued 
Panel C: Yr 2: 
Petroleum Firms FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 37.853 53.171 23.993 67.456 50.000 33.333 36.538 18.720 5.170 48.153 -4.017
Standard Error 2.484 2.385 2.794 4.316 4.623 6.667 9.429 0.405 0.380 3.274 4.297
Median 34.583 52.632 20.635 69.231 66.667 33.333 0.000 18.501 5.241 47.030 1.502
Standard Deviation 12.665 12.163 14.249 22.007 23.570 33.993 48.078 2.065 1.940 16.693 21.911
Sample Variance 160.399 147.927 203.039 484.297 555.556 1155.556 2311.538 4.262 3.764 278.673 480.074
Kurtosis -0.729 -0.820 -0.013 0.602 -0.014 -0.481 -1.735 -0.130 -1.189 -0.255 4.249
Skewness 0.344 -0.003 0.738 -0.792 -0.368 0.735 0.594 0.358 -0.120 0.037 -1.811
Range 45.000 42.105 53.968 92.308 100.000 100.000 100.000 8.082 6.273 65.850 104.095
Minimum 16.667 31.579 3.175 7.692 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.625 1.960 13.440 -77.056
Maximum 61.667 73.684 57.143 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 22.707 8.233 79.290 27.038
Count 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Conf. Level(95.0%) 5.115 4.913 5.755 8.889 9.520 13.730 19.419 0.834 0.784 6.743 8.850
 
Panel D: Yr 2: Mining 
Firms FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 37.681 53.054 23.771 57.646 41.767 22.088 33.133 18.185 5.673 65.620 -4.171
Standard Error 1.474 1.437 1.631 2.562 3.122 3.671 4.870 0.201 0.199 2.038 2.672
Median 36.667 54.386 22.222 61.538 33.333 0.000 0.000 17.951 5.891 67.140 2.772
Standard Deviation 13.428 13.087 14.861 23.337 28.439 33.446 44.363 1.827 1.815 18.563 24.347
Sample Variance 180.319 171.279 220.857 544.629 808.764 1118.621 1968.116 3.338 3.295 344.586 592.753
Kurtosis -0.847 -1.037 -0.440 -0.611 -0.409 0.702 -1.345 1.849 -0.253 -0.878 1.561
Skewness 0.277 -0.101 0.583 -0.245 0.329 1.395 0.725 1.127 -0.276 -0.168 -1.288
Range 55.000 50.877 58.730 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 9.337 8.875 70.470 104.095
Minimum 12.500 26.316 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.187 0.971 28.210 -77.056
Maximum 67.500 77.193 58.730 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.524 9.846 98.680 27.038
Count 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
Conf. Level(95.0%) 2.932 2.858 3.245 5.096 6.210 7.303 9.687 0.399 0.396 4.053 5.316
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TABLE 7.6: Descriptive Statistics: Petroleum versus Mining Firms continued 
Panel E: Yr 3: 
Petroleum Firms FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OvList ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 42.333 55.579 30.349 73.846 50.667 0.320 36.000 38.000 19.163 5.154 50.627 0.254 
Standard Error 2.821 2.451 3.312 3.635 4.761 0.095 6.918 9.695 0.399 0.419 3.861 3.349 
Median 43.333 56.140 28.571 76.923 33.333 0.000 33.333 0.000 18.898 4.944 50.360 2.225 
Standard Deviation 14.103 12.257 16.561 18.176 23.805 0.476 34.588 48.477 1.996 2.097 19.306 16.744 
Sample Variance 198.900 150.231 274.276 330.375 566.667 0.227 1196.296 2350.000 3.983 4.397 372.737 280.351 
Kurtosis -1.318 -0.693 -1.404 0.200 -0.052 -1.447 -0.802 -1.823 -0.314 -1.151 0.785 -0.258 
Skewness 0.045 -0.285 0.144 -0.960 0.297 0.822 0.559 0.526 0.407 -0.110 0.260 -0.503 
Range 45.000 42.105 53.968 69.231 100.000 1.000 100.000 100.000 7.234 6.764 84.710 60.720 
Minimum 20.000 31.579 4.762 30.769 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.571 1.559 15.010 -35.401 
Maximum 65.000 73.684 58.730 100.000 100.000 1.000 100.000 100.000 22.805 8.323 99.720 25.319 
Count 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 5.822 5.059 6.836 7.503 9.826 0.197 14.277 20.010 0.824 0.866 7.969 6.911 
 
Panel F: Yr 3: Mining 
Firms FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OvList ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 40.506 55.054 27.343 63.553 39.286 0.286 22.619 34.524 18.447 5.464 65.198 -5.788 
Standard Error 1.502 1.441 1.694 2.396 2.996 0.050 3.622 4.936 0.198 0.220 2.173 2.827 
Median 42.917 57.895 25.397 69.231 33.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.306 5.585 68.515 -0.395 
Standard Deviation 13.770 13.207 15.526 21.957 27.458 0.454 33.197 45.241 1.815 2.016 19.915 25.909 
Sample Variance 189.625 174.430 241.046 482.097 753.968 0.207 1102.027 2046.758 3.295 4.064 396.590 671.301 
Kurtosis -0.641 -0.875 -0.227 0.043 -0.358 -1.093 0.673 -1.466 1.283 0.377 -0.830 1.659 
Skewness 0.092 -0.304 0.513 -0.637 0.317 0.966 1.364 0.660 0.898 0.044 -0.318 -1.393 
Range 60.000 50.877 68.254 100.000 100.000 1.000 100.000 100.000 8.992 10.812 75.880 104.095 
Minimum 12.500 26.316 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.515 1.049 22.970 -77.056 
Maximum 72.500 77.193 68.254 100.000 100.000 1.000 100.000 100.000 24.506 11.862 98.850 27.038 
Count 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Conf. Level(95.0%) 2.988 2.866 3.369 4.765 5.959 0.099 7.204 9.818 0.394 0.437 4.322 5.623 
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TABLE 7.6: Descriptive Statistics: Petroleum versus Mining Firms continued 
Panel G: Yr 4: 
Petroleum Firms FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OvList ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 52.900 64.912 42.032 74.462 64.000 0.360 30.667 46.000 19.435 5.588 50.788 2.982
Standard Error 3.133 2.265 4.101 3.787 4.683 0.098 6.061 9.967 0.379 0.347 4.036 2.636
Median 55.000 66.667 41.270 76.923 66.667 0.000 33.333 0.000 19.183 5.579 48.070 2.628
Standard Deviation 15.665 11.325 20.503 18.936 23.413 0.490 30.307 49.833 1.894 1.735 20.178 13.178
Sample Variance 245.377 128.245 420.366 358.580 548.148 0.240 918.519 2483.333 3.587 3.010 407.148 173.657
Kurtosis -1.410 -0.883 -1.456 -0.317 -0.816 -1.762 0.342 -2.098 -0.498 -1.303 0.571 0.769
Skewness -0.127 -0.313 -0.003 -0.618 0.112 0.621 0.890 0.171 0.444 -0.137 0.352 -0.376
Range 49.167 42.105 63.492 69.231 66.667 1.000 100.000 100.000 6.380 5.547 87.810 58.079
Minimum 27.500 40.351 11.111 30.769 33.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.503 2.663 12.040 -31.041
Maximum 76.667 82.456 74.603 100.000 100.000 1.000 100.000 100.000 22.883 8.210 99.850 27.038
Count 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Conf. Level(95.0%) 6.466 4.675 8.463 7.816 9.664 0.202 12.510 20.570 0.782 0.716 8.329 5.440
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TABLE 7.6: Descriptive Statistics: Petroleum versus Mining Firms continued 
Panel H: Yr 4: Mining 
Firms FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OvList ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
             
Mean 52.292 65.328 40.497 65.587 45.614 0.355 23.684 38.158 18.908 6.256 68.365 -4.312
Standard Error 1.968 1.774 2.250 2.365 3.295 0.055 3.940 5.119 0.205 0.271 2.254 2.833
Median 55.000 66.667 43.651 69.231 33.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.845 6.680 72.635 1.068
Standard Deviation 17.154 15.465 19.615 20.621 28.722 0.482 34.347 44.623 1.783 2.359 19.649 24.696
Sample Variance 294.243 239.160 384.748 425.205 824.951 0.232 1179.727 1991.228 3.179 5.563 386.070 609.892
Kurtosis -0.956 -0.770 -0.914 -0.358 -0.598 -1.664 0.370 -1.581 1.478 0.614 -0.703 0.425
Skewness -0.351 -0.435 -0.142 -0.448 0.100 0.617 1.289 0.490 0.770 -0.089 -0.435 -0.988
Range 67.500 61.404 76.190 84.615 100.000 1.000 100.000 100.000 9.509 12.905 78.380 104.095
Minimum 15.833 29.825 3.175 15.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.384 1.081 20.720 -77.056
Maximum 83.333 91.228 79.365 100.000 100.000 1.000 100.000 100.000 24.893 13.986 99.100 27.038
Count 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Conf. Level(95.0%) 3.920 3.534 4.482 4.712 6.563 0.110 7.849 10.197 0.407 0.539 4.490 5.643
Legend: FIDIS=Financial Instrument Disclosure Index, MFIDIS=Mandatory Financial Instrument Disclosure Index, DFIDIS=Discretionary Financial Instrument Disclosure 
Index. CGS=Corporate Governance Score, CMS=Capital Management Score, ITSt = Income Tax Score (transparency), ITSe = Income Tax Score (exposure). FSize is 
measured as the natural log of total assets (used to avoid skewness issues), Lev = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total liabilities plus total equity), 
Top20 refer to the percentage ownership of ordinary share capital held by the 20 shareholders respectively and return on assets (ROA), measured as pretax profit/total assets 
truncated at the  5th percentile and 95th percentile. A t-test showed that the mean FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS between mining firms and petroleum firms are not significant 
for both one tail and two tailed tests.  
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TABLE 7.7: t-Test: 31 December versus 30 June Year End Firms  
Panel A FIDIS (Dec) FIDIS (June) MFIDIS (Dec) MFIDIS (June) DFIDIS (Dec) DFIDIS (June) 
Mean 45.941 39.323 58.415 54.650 34.656 25.457 
Variance 201.442 255.509 151.550 222.950 290.452 318.534 
Observations 108 319 108 319 108 319 
Pooled Variance 241.897  204.974  311.464  
Hypothesised Mean 
Difference 0  0  0  
df 425  425  425  
t Stat 3.822  2.362  4.682  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000  0.009  0.000  
t Critical one-tail 1.648  1.648  1.648  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000  0.019  0.000  
t Critical two-tail 1.966  1.966  1.966  
 
Panel B CGS (Dec) CGS (June) CMS (Dec) CMS (June) ITSt (Dec) ITSt (June) ITSe (Dec) ITSe (June) 
Mean 63.319 58.187 52.160 42.111 40.432 20.167 61.574 26.646 
Variance 629.991 546.767 607.957 796.229 1267.932 958.183 2037.686 1740.601
Observations 108 319 108 319 108 319 108 319 
Pooled Variance 567.720  748.829  1036.167  1815.396  
Hypothesised Mean 
Difference 0  0  0  0  
df 425  425  425  425  
t Stat 1.935  3.299  5.655  7.364  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.027  0.001  0.000  0.000  
t Critical one-tail 1.648  1.648  1.648  1.648  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.054  0.001  0.000  0.000  
t Critical two-tail 1.966  1.966  1.966  1.966  
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TABLE 7.7: t-Test: 31 December versus 30 June Year End Firms continued 
Panel C FSize (Dec) FSize (June) Lev (Dec) Lev (June) Top20 (Dec) Top20 (June) ROA (Dec) ROA (June) 
Mean 19.634 18.014 5.697 5.587 70.815 57.897 0.434 -8.604 
Variance 3.516 3.582 2.872 5.095 390.515 379.274 508.112 718.435 
Observations 108 319 108 319 108 319 108 319 
Pooled Variance 3.565  4.535  382.104  665.483  
Hypothesised Mean 
Difference 0  0  0  0  
df 425  425  425  425  
t Stat 7.707  0.461  5.936  3.147  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000  0.323  0.000  0.001  
t Critical one-tail 1.648  1.648  1.648  1.648  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000  0.645  0.000  0.002  
t Critical two-tail 1.966  1.966  1.966  1.966  
Legend: t-test assuming equal sample variances for companies with a 31 December financial year end (Dec) and for companies with a 30 June financial year end (June). The 
results provide the mean, variance and statistical significance of differences for the dependent variables (Panel A), independent variables (Panel B) and the control variables 
(Panel C). MFIDIS, DFIDIS and FIDIS refer to mandatory, discretionary and total financial instrument disclosures respectively. Also shown for each sub-sample is return 
onassets (ROA) measured as pretax profits divided by total assets truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles, FSize is measured as the natural log of total assets, Lev is 
measured as the square root of total liabilities divided by total liabilities plus total equity and Top20 = equity interest of the Top 20 shareholders. ITSt refers to income tax 
score transparency and ITSe refers to income tax score exposure. 
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TABLE 7.8: Logistic Regression Results 
ITEM 47: Fair Value 
Methodologies Yr 1  Yr 2  Yr 3  Yr 4   
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept -4.741 0.096 -10.864 0.004 -8.796 0.023 -6.001 0.212
CGS 0.032 0.028** 0.015 0.223 0.019 0.141 0.022 0.170 
CMS 0.002 0.851 0.007 0.675 -0.003 0.852 0.021 0.303 
overseas listing 0.340 0.562 0.640 0.341 0.033 0.956 1.681 0.032** 
ITSt 0.060 0.520 -0.004 0.678 -0.003 0.764 -0.002 0.886 
ITSe -0.011 0.248 -0.016 0.069*** -0.006 0.440 -0.007 0.526 
FSize 0.196 0.256 0.386 0.092*** 0.419 0.082*** 0.188 0.546 
Lev 0.007 0.951 0.264 0.071*** -0.136 0.292 0.278 0.034** 
SubInd -1.536 0.019** 0.048 0.936 0.494 0.382 -0.210 0.799 
Top20 -0.008 0.532 0.015 0.285 0.004 0.728 -0.011 0.510 
ROA 0.000 0.959 -0.007 0.531 0.007 0.568 0.027 0.088 
Nagelkerke R squared 0.187  0.227  0.210  0.330  
Observations 105  109  109  101  
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TABLE 7.8: Logistic Regression Results continued 
ITEM 48: Fair Value 
Assumptions Yr 1  Yr 2  Yr 3  Yr 4  
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept -6.640 0.036 -9.177 0.025 -4.864 0.207 -4.989 0.214 
CGS 0.027 0.093*** 0.032 0.035** 0.012 0.428 0.033 0.085***
CMS -0.020 0.067*** -0.011 0.565 -0.037 0.072*** 0.045 0.021** 
overseas listing 0.735 0.279 0.447 0.582 0.140 0.837 2.257 0.004* 
ITSt 0.004 0.728 0.004 0.725 0.014 0.166 0.004 0.772 
ITSe -0.001 0.920 -0.009 0.371 -0.006 0.492 0.001 0.918 
FSize 0.269 0.153 0.240 0.327 0.091 0.711 -0.349 0.204 
Lev -0.045 0.726 0.142 0.403 0.323 0.034** 0.511 0.002* 
SubInd -0.782 0.241 -0.516 0.449 0.372 0.546 -0.309 0.679 
Top20 0.001 0.937 0.017 0.288 0.009 0.545 0.042 0.014** 
ROA -0.005 0.587 0.004 0.759 0.046 0.006* 0.024 0.099***
Nagelkerke R squared 0.190  0.209  0.264  0.529  
Observations 105  109  109  101  
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TABLE 7.8: Logistic Regression Results continued 
ITEM 85: Hedge Effectiveness Yr 1  Yr 2  Yr 3  Yr 4  
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept -5.000 0.103 -6.602 0.124 -4.167 0.257 -17.081 0.002 
CGS 0.005 0.740 0.035 0.017** 0.025 0.069*** 0.035 0.042** 
CMS 0.003 0.784 0.067 0.000* 0.031 0.080*** 0.001 0.958 
overseas listing -0.490 0.430 2.427 0.004* 0.734 0.246 -0.034 0.961 
ITSt -0.011 0.280 0.004 0.709 -0.001 0.880 -0.019 0.169 
ITSe 0.014 0.161 -0.003 0.810 -0.005 0.555 0.004 0.679 
FSize 0.146 0.441 0.032 0.906 -0.004 0.985 0.688 0.036** 
Lev 0.024 0.859 0.081 0.637 0.014 0.921 0.309 0.028** 
SubInd 1.128 0.083*** -0.751 0.276 -0.019 0.973 0.280 0.718 
Top20 0.008 0.575 -0.024 0.180 0.018 0.168 0.008 0.641 
ROA -0.008 0.445 0.010 0.469 0.011 0.435 0.016 0.291 
Nagelkerke R squared 0.213  0.463  0.235  0.548  
Observations 105  109  109  101  
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TABLE 7.8: Logistic Regression Results continued 
ITEM 86:Hedge Designation Yr 1  Yr 2  Yr 3  Yr 4  
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept -15.852 0.000 -16.682 0.001 -5.455 0.178 -11.067 0.018 
CGS 0.024 0.167 0.022 0.112 0.019 0.181 0.019 0.229 
CMS 0.005 0.693 0.020 0.257 0.034 0.076*** -0.005 0.782 
overseas listing 1.628 0.054** 3.042 0.002* -1.895 0.010* 0.093 0.890 
ITSt -0.002 0.877 -0.005 0.675 -0.013 0.241 -0.007 0.566 
ITSe -0.006 0.632 0.003 0.777 0.010 0.274 -0.004 0.709 
FSize 0.651 0.013** 0.532 0.085*** 0.101 0.695 0.435 0.136 
Lev 0.063 0.681 0.228 0.179 0.038 0.793 0.288 0.024** 
SubInd -0.296 0.694 -0.491 0.492 -0.227 0.722 0.634 0.405 
Top20 0.005 0.745 0.013 0.460 0.021 0.140 0.018 0.245 
ROA 0.009 0.469 -0.001 0.931 0.008 0.568 0.026 0.071 
Nagelkerke R squared 0.447  0.496  0.394  0.429  
Observations 105  109  109  101  
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TABLE 7.8: Logistic Regression Results continued 
ITEM 87: Hedge Accounting 
Impacts Yr 1  Yr 2  Yr 3  Yr 4  
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept -13.228 0.001 -10.316 0.024 -8.007 0.099 -10.600 0.036 
CGS 0.006 0.681 0.035 0.013* 0.029 0.079*** 0.022 0.188
CMS 0.002 0.873 0.022 0.215 0.041 0.056*** 0.019 0.326 
overseas listing 0.686 0.336 0.720 0.357 -1.807 0.027** 1.681 0.030** 
ITSt 0.001 0.941 -0.009 0.465 0.020 0.112 0.001 0.926 
ITSe 0.002 0.817 0.007 0.518 -0.010 0.300 0.003 0.793 
FSize 0.550 0.028** 0.255 0.373 -0.006 0.985 0.287 0.373 
Lev 0.194 0.194 0.342 0.051*** 0.605 0.002* 0.391 0.004* 
SubInd 0.417 0.561 -0.558 0.411 0.797 0.261 0.307 0.707 
Top20 0.006 0.708 0.003 0.852 0.013 0.473 0.004 0.823 
ROA 0.019 0.150 0.024 0.103 0.050 0.006* 0.023 0.123
Nagelkerke R squared 0.472  0.508  0.552  0.500  
Observations 105  109  109  101  
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TABLE 7.8: Logistic Regression Results continued 
ITEM 100: Financial Instrument 
Controls Yr 1  Yr 2  Yr 3  Yr 4  
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept -26.948 0.001 -15.951 0.001 -13.519 0.006 -13.323 0.002 
CGS -0.010 0.590 0.031 0.055*** 0.026 0.141 0.021 0.145
CMS 0.013 0.368 0.006 0.774 0.022 0.309 -0.010 0.523 
OvList 0.790 0.393 0.897 0.333 -1.300 0.106 -0.107 0.857 
ITSt -0.015 0.333 -0.002 0.875 -0.012 0.323 -0.004 0.722 
ITSe 0.004 0.747 -0.007 0.530 -0.005 0.605 -0.009 0.264 
FSize 1.359 0.003* 0.684 0.018** 0.564 0.062*** 0.664 0.011** 
Lev 0.291 0.169 0.004 0.984 0.029 0.873 0.104 0.381 
SubInd 1.787 0.060*** 0.244 0.720 -0.599 0.363 -0.193 0.762 
Top20 -0.032 0.166 -0.010 0.588 0.006 0.725 -0.002 0.881 
ROA 0.047 0.047 0.008 0.648 0.013 0.508 0.007 0.589
Nagelkerke R squared 0.643  0.421  0.425  0.308  
Observations 105  109  109  101  
Legend: The logistic regression equation is stated as: 
FIjt = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 Overseas Listingjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj     
 
Where:Dependent Variables: FIjt = Financial Instrument Information Item for firm j in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); Independent Variables: CGSjt = corporate governance score 
for firm j in year t; (maximum 13 variables); CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); OvList = Overseas Listingjt (Listing on the ASX 
and an overseas exchange for firm j in year t); ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for 
firm j in year t; (maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total 
liabilities/total equity + total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = 
yes, no = 0); ROAjt = return on assets, measured as pretax profit/total assets with values truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles for firm j in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); αj = 
intercept; β = estimated coefficient for each item or category; εj  = error term. 
 
This model tested the association between discrete financial instrument information item for sample firms and the independent variables against the control variables. 
Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Refer to Appendix B for a description of each financial instrument item.
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instruments has a positive and statistically significant association with FSize across 
all four years. 
 
Specifically, Item 47 refers to the disclosure of fair value methodologies such as 
published price quotations or valuation techniques. Item 48 deals with disclosure of 
significant assumptions when determining the fair value (or net fair value) of 
financial assets and liabilities. Fair value financial instrument disclosures 
exemplified by Items 47 and 48 were considered important given that management 
has considerable discretion in determining how the fair value of significant financial 
assets and liabilities are to be calculated and what assumptions are used in any 
valuation models. Furthermore, fair value measurement of financial instruments 
potentially can have an important impact on the value of assets, liabilities and equity 
reported in the balance sheet, profit and volatility in profit and key financial ratios 
(Honey, 2004). Item 47 is positively and statistically significantly associated with the 
strength of a firm’s corporate governance structure in Yr 1. Item 48 is positively and 
statistically significantly associated with the strength of a firm’s corporate 
governance structure in Yr 1, Yr 2 and Yr 4. Capital management exposure, overseas 
listing status, FSize and leverage are also variably associated with Items 47 and 48 
across the study period.  
 
Items 85, 86 and 87 deal with disclosures of hedge accounting documentation, 
effectiveness and designation issues. Hedge accounting attempts to match the 
offsetting changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedged item with changes in 
the fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument and recognise these changes in 
the income statement or equity42. Hedge effectiveness refers to the degree to which 
the changes in fair value or cash flows attributable to a hedge risk are offset by 
changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument (AASB, 2004b). 
Hedge effectiveness is assessed by examining the changes in fair value of the 
hedging instrument and the designated hedge item. Each hedge contract must be 
designated to an underlying asset, liability or income stream (AASB, 2004b). At the 
inception of the hedge, there is formal designation and documentation of the hedging 
relationship and the entity’s risk management objective and strategy for undertaking 
                                                 
42 Hedge items are primary financial instruments such as receivables, payables and equity securities 
and hedging instruments are derivative financial instruments. 
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the hedge (AASB, 2004b). The significant attributes of the hedging arrangement that 
require documentation are (a) identification of the hedged item or transaction, (b) the 
hedging instrument, (c) the nature of the risk being hedged and (d) an assessment of 
hedge effectiveness. In order to qualify for hedge accounting, a hedge is expected to 
be highly effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair value or cash flows 
attributable to the hedged risk, consistent with the originally documented risk 
management strategy for that hedging relationship (AASB, 2004b). It is expected 
that the formal documentation requirements and associated system developments 
necessary to track hedge effectiveness and designation data will have a flow-on 
impact in terms of increasing discretionary disclosures of this information 
specifically and hedge accounting information generally in reporting media. For 
these reasons, Items 85, 86 and 87 were considered to be sufficiently important for 
separate consideration. The strength of a firm’s corporate governance structure, 
capital management exposure and overseas listing are positive and statistically 
significant predictor variables of information items 85, 86 and 87. These results, 
however, are mixed as associations are not statistically significant across all years. 
FSize and leverage are also variably significant predictor variables of Items 85, 86 
and 87. 
 
Item 100 deals with disclosures of controls put in place relating to the use of 
financial instruments. An example is the disclosure of board limits put in place on the 
use of derivative financial instruments. This item was considered important for 
separate examination as it provides evidence of documentation put in place by 
management or the board to deal with financial risks arising from the use of 
particular financial instruments. FSize is an important determinant of Item 100 
disclosures. Sub-industry and strength of governance structures are additional 
significant predictor variables of Item 100 disclosures, although the results are 
mixed. 
 
7.8 Financial Instrument Disclosure Applicability  
The preceding statistical analysis and conclusions drawn assumes that all items of 
information that comprise the disclosure index are applicable to all sample 
companies. The issue of applicability of disclosure to all sample companies has been 
largely overcome by focussing on those companies that are extractive or production 
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companies within the mining and petroleum sub-industries. However, a potential bias 
may be introduced in the study as several disclosing firms did not actively use a 
particular financial instrument or engaged in a particular financial arrangement or are 
exposed to risks relating to financial instruments (Frankel et. al. 1995). For this 
reason, a separate study of financial instrument disclosures relating to sample firms 
that actively used all financial instruments such as derivative and hedge instruments 
was made. 
 
7.8.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of a subset of firms that actively use financial instruments is 
provided as Table 7.10. Mean total, mandatory and discretionary financial instrument 
disclosures for a subset of sample firms that actively use all financial instruments are 
significantly higher than that of all sample firms. For instance, in Yr 4 (2006 
financial year), mean FIDIS is 61.928% for firms that actively use all financial 
instruments (n = 67) and 52.442% for all sample firms (n = 101) (compare Table 
7.10 with Table 5.2). Mean mandatory financial instrument disclosures peak in Yr 4 
at 72.951% for firms that actively use all instruments compared to 65.225% for all 
sample firms (compare Table 7.10 with Table 5.2). A potential disclosure 
compliance gap is still evident for firms that actively use all financial instruments. A 
disclosure compliance gap represents the material financial instrument information 
required to be disclosed in the annual financial report under accounting standards but 
not specifically disclosed. The important observation here is that the trend in mean 
total, mandatory and discretionary financial instrument disclosures increased 
significantly over the four year period for firms engaged in active use of all 
instruments.  
 
7.8.2 Correlation Coefficients 
Pearson correlation coefficients for a subset of firms engaged in active use of all 
financial instruments is provided as Table 7.11. These were compared with the 
correlation coefficients for all sample firms provided as Table 5.3. Statistically 
significant correlation coefficients are very similar in absolute value and direction 
between the subset of firms that actively use all financial instruments and all sample 
firms in each of the years. Minor differences are evident such as the negative 
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correlation between FIDIS and MFIDIS and overseas listing status in Yr 1, Yr 2 and 
Yr 3 for the subset of firms.  
 
7.8.3 Multiple Regression Results  
Multiple regression results using the Main Model for a subset of firms (58 in Yr 1, 70 
in Yr 2, 73 in Yr 3 and 67 in Yr 4) engaged in active use of all financial instruments 
is provided as Table 7.12. These were compared with the regression results for all 
sample firms provided as Table 6.1. A summary of hypotheses accepted or rejected 
for this subset of firms is provided as Table 7.13.  
 
Similar to the full sample set, corporate governance, capital management and income 
tax considerations are significant predictor variables (at the 1% or 5% levels) of 
financial instrument disclosures. Also similar to the full sample set is the significance 
(at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels) of FSize and Lev as predictor control variables. 
However, there are minor important differences between the regression results 
between the two sample sets. For the subset of firms that actively use all financial 
instruments, strength of corporate governance is not a significant predictor of FIDIS 
in Yr 1 and Yr 4, ITSt is a significant predictor variable of disclosures in Yr 4 and 
SubInd is a significant predictor (at the 5% or 10% levels) control variable of 
disclosures in Yr 1, Yr 2 and Yr 4. Overall, the regression results between all sample 
firms (Table 6.1) and a subset of firms that actively use all financial instruments 
(Table 7.12) are very similar. 
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TABLE 7:9: Descriptive Statistics: Firms Disclosing All Financial Instruments  
Panel A: Yr 1 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 43.046 58.409 29.146 52.520 46.552 31.034 45.690 18.991 6.540 62.376 -3.439
Standard Error 1.496 1.364 1.832 2.926 3.927 4.771 6.184 0.265 0.255 2.816 2.848
Median 43.750 58.772 25.397 53.846 33.333 33.333 50.000 18.651 6.459 66.995 3.253
Standard Deviation 11.391 10.387 13.951 22.282 29.905 36.334 47.095 2.015 1.940 21.448 21.689
Sample Variance 129.765 107.888 194.640 496.497 894.334 1320.159 2217.937 4.059 3.765 460.021 470.428
Kurtosis -0.855 0.007 -0.695 -0.795 -0.727 -0.517 -1.888 0.323 1.913 -0.868 5.000
Skewness 0.000 -0.566 0.403 -0.006 0.020 0.898 0.176 0.739 0.658 -0.287 -2.181
Range 45.833 45.614 58.730 84.615 100.000 100.000 100.000 9.189 10.566 79.430 104.095
Minimum 19.167 29.825 4.762 7.692 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.280 2.505 19.190 -77.056
Maximum 65.000 75.439 63.492 92.308 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.469 13.070 98.620 27.038
Count 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
Conf. Level(95.0%) 2.995 2.731 3.668 5.859 7.863 9.554 12.383 0.530 0.510 5.639 5.703
 
Panel B: Yr 2 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 44.845 60.426 30.748 67.253 49.524 29.048 45.000 18.999 6.145 64.111 2.137
Standard Error 1.257 1.094 1.596 2.478 3.305 4.286 5.679 0.218 0.191 2.264 2.238
Median 44.167 59.649 30.159 69.231 33.333 16.667 25.000 18.594 6.430 66.620 5.189
Standard Deviation 10.520 9.151 13.349 20.735 27.653 35.857 47.510 1.823 1.596 18.941 18.721
Sample Variance 110.674 83.739 178.205 429.956 764.665 1285.714 2257.246 3.322 2.548 358.756 350.476
Kurtosis -0.789 0.493 -0.525 0.151 -0.478 -0.358 -1.895 0.888 0.168 -0.719 5.796
Skewness 0.129 -0.517 0.322 -0.577 0.125 0.982 0.204 1.019 -0.401 -0.272 -1.973
Range 40.833 47.368 52.381 84.615 100.000 100.000 100.000 8.294 7.625 75.740 104.095
Minimum 26.667 29.825 6.349 15.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.230 2.221 20.710 -77.056
Maximum 67.500 77.193 58.730 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.524 9.846 96.450 27.038
Count 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Conf. Level(95.0%) 2.508 2.182 3.183 4.944 6.594 8.550 11.328 0.435 0.381 4.516 4.464
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TABLE 7.9: Descriptive Statistics: Firms Disclosing All Financial Instruments continued 
Panel C: Yr 3 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 47.865 61.956 35.116 72.287 46.119 28.311 41.096 19.172 5.914 65.158 0.886
Standard Error 1.249 1.038 1.631 1.885 3.227 4.095 5.547 0.218 0.180 2.221 2.346
Median 46.667 61.404 33.333 69.231 33.333 0.000 0.000 18.753 5.933 68.160 4.776
Standard Deviation 10.675 8.868 13.933 16.102 27.572 34.992 47.392 1.861 1.539 18.973 20.044
Sample Variance 113.946 78.646 194.140 259.270 760.189 1224.421 2246.005 3.463 2.370 359.968 401.764
Kurtosis -0.360 0.342 -0.432 0.417 -0.394 -0.322 -1.815 0.421 -0.694 -0.577 5.021
Skewness -0.011 -0.510 0.160 -0.501 0.232 0.977 0.368 0.752 -0.085 -0.274 -1.870
Range 45.833 43.860 63.492 76.923 100.000 100.000 100.000 8.610 5.971 82.210 104.095
Minimum 26.667 33.333 4.762 23.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.896 2.756 17.510 -77.056
Maximum 72.500 77.193 68.254 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.506 8.727 99.720 27.038
Count 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73
Conf. Level(95.0%) 2.491 2.069 3.251 3.757 6.433 8.164 11.057 0.434 0.359 4.427 4.677
 
Panel D: Yr 4 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 ROA 
Mean 61.928 72.951 51.955 75.086 55.721 29.353 50.000 19.725 6.781 69.442 1.888
Standard Error 1.277 1.154 1.607 1.984 3.354 4.284 5.726 0.204 0.212 2.151 2.595
Median 62.500 75.439 53.968 76.923 66.667 33.333 50.000 19.473 7.136 72.420 4.989
Standard Deviation 10.454 9.443 13.155 16.240 27.456 35.067 46.872 1.670 1.732 17.606 21.239
Sample Variance 109.285 89.179 173.052 263.743 753.807 1229.710 2196.970 2.790 3.000 309.976 451.095
Kurtosis -0.057 -0.146 -0.288 0.332 -0.289 -0.293 -1.895 0.957 1.245 -0.860 2.939
Skewness -0.474 -0.484 -0.107 -0.562 -0.322 0.970 0.000 0.900 -0.897 -0.222 -1.600
Range 49.167 45.614 55.556 69.231 100.000 100.000 100.000 8.454 8.651 66.710 104.095
Minimum 34.167 45.614 23.810 30.769 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.439 1.300 33.140 -77.056
Maximum 83.333 91.228 79.365 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 24.893 9.950 99.850 27.038
Count 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
Conf. Level(95.0%) 2.550 2.303 3.209 3.961 6.697 8.554 11.433 0.407 0.423 4.294 5.181
Legend: Descriptive statistics of a subset of firms that actively use all financial instruments. 
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TABLE 7:10: Pearson Correlation Coefficients: Firms Disclosing All Financial Instruments  
Panel A: Yr 1 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OL ITSt ITSe FSize Lev SubInd Top20 ROA 
FIDIS 1.000             
MFIDIS 0.894* 1.000            
DFIDIS 0.953* 0.716* 1.000           
CGS 0.564* 0.502* 0.539* 1.000          
CMS 0.297 0.123 0.380*** 0.351*** 1.000         
OvList -0.070 -0.169 0.005 0.077 0.159 1.000        
ITSt 0.290 0.150 0.351*** 0.391*** 0.513* 0.182 1.000       
ITSe 0.641* 0.436** 0.703* 0.528* 0.602* 0.098 0.712* 1.000      
FSize 0.728* 0.514* 0.786* 0.665* 0.420** 0.278 0.494** 0.697* 1.000     
Lev 0.399** 0.447** 0.320 0.029 0.054 -0.180 -0.053 0.178 0.228 1.000
SubInd 0.118 0.090 0.123 -0.198 0.058 0.122 -0.039 0.067 -0.043 0.164 1.000   
Top20 0.143 -0.020 0.235 0.000 0.160 0.097 0.154 0.286 0.224 0.091 0.367 1.000  
ROA 0.065 0.044 0.072 0.239 0.069 0.049 0.151 0.159 0.224 -0.465* -0.086 -0.069 1.000 
 
Panel B: Yr 2 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OL ITSt ITSe FSize Lev SubInd Top20 ROA 
FIDIS 1.000             
MFIDIS 0.880* 1.000 
DFIDIS 0.956* 0.700* 1.000           
CGS 0.486** 0.454** 0.448** 1.000          
CMS 0.317 0.284 0.300 0.173 1.000         
OvList -0.054 -0.145 0.008 0.014 0.216 1.000        
ITSt 0.301 0.111 0.383*** 0.138 0.461** 0.193 1.000       
ITSe 0.546* 0.345*** 0.605* 0.256 0.632* 0.166 0.696* 1.000      
FSize 0.628* 0.414** 0.686* 0.483** 0.404** 0.315 0.564* 0.691* 1.000     
Lev 0.478** 0.525* 0.392*** 0.128 0.267 -0.084 0.015 0.244 0.211 1.000    
SubInd 0.063 0.055 0.061 -0.154** -0.111** 0.070 -0.099 -0.025 -0.159** 0.040 1.000   
Top20 0.213 0.116 0.248 0.013 0.200 0.091 0.218 0.369*** 0.236 -0.044 0.393*** 1.000  
ROA -0.011 -0.091 0.041 0.086 0.021 0.110 0.126 0.106 0.265 -0.328* -0.064 0.213 1.000 
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Table 7.10: Pearson Correlation Coefficients: Firms Disclosing All Financial Instruments continued 
Panel C: Yr 3 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OL ITSt ITSe FSize Lev Top20 SubInd ROA 
FIDIS 1.000             
MFIDIS 0.869* 1.000            
DFIDIS 0.959* 0.693* 1.000           
CGS 0.456** 0.408** 0.431** 1.000          
CMS 0.413** 0.246 0.460** 0.232 1.000         
OvList -0.007 -0.167 0.086 0.193 0.274 1.000        
ITSt 0.375*** 0.218 0.421** 0.331*** 0.499* 0.236 1.000       
ITSe 0.535* 0.342*** 0.584* 0.372*** 0.620* 0.214 0.699* 1.000      
FSize 0.663* 0.476** 0.693* 0.559* 0.501* 0.284 0.547* 0.694* 1.000     
Lev 0.413** 0.405** 0.369*** 0.038 0.188 -0.105 0.066 0.214 0.169 1.000
SubInd 0.231 0.107 0.275 -0.025 0.108 -0.011 0.155 0.322 0.229 -0.013 1.000   
Top20 -0.080 -0.017 -0.107 -0.238** -0.137*** 0.048 -0.111 -0.001 -0.216 0.016 0.268 1.000  
ROA 0.222 0.179 0.220 0.231 -0.012 0.204 0.135 0.202 0.456** -0.248* 0.097 -0.111*** 1.000 
 
Panel D: Yr 4 FIDIS MFIDIS DFIDIS CGS CMS OL ITSt ITSe FSize Lev SubInd Top20 ROA 
FIDIS 1.000             
MFIDIS 0.871* 1.000 
DFIDIS 0.948* 0.669* 1.000           
CGS 0.200 0.023 0.287 1.000          
CMS 0.214 0.153 0.224 0.024 1.000         
OvList 0.194 0.049 0.262 0.262 0.203 1.000        
ITSt 0.033 -0.084 0.104 0.287 0.356*** 0.202 1.000       
ITSe 0.438** 0.255 0.497* 0.398*** 0.314*** 0.205 0.645* 1.000      
FSize 0.483** 0.206 0.598* 0.563* 0.265 0.289 0.432** 0.657* 1.000     
Lev 0.561* 0.586* 0.468** 0.035 -0.068 -0.021 -0.199 0.167 0.076 1.000    
SubInd 0.064 0.186 -0.023 -0.312 -0.234 0.043 -0.100 -0.111 -0.193 0.146 1.000   
Top20 -0.009 -0.016 -0.004 0.015 -0.115 -0.010 0.077 0.124 0.090 0.041 0.347*** 1.000  
ROA 0.204 0.124 0.228 0.162 -0.084 0.204 0.113 0.226 0.390* -0.111*** -0.166*** 0.153 1.000 
Legend: *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OL = overseas listing. 
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TABLE 7:11: Multiple Regression: Firms Disclosing All Financial Instruments  
Panel A: Yr 1 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -26.295 -2.138 0.038** 17.680 1.255 0.216 -66.082 -4.708 0.000*
CGS 0.076 1.358 0.181 0.150 2.340 0.024** 0.009 0.142 0.887
CMS -0.033 -0.889 0.379 -0.058 -1.377 0.175 -0.010 -0.233 0.817
OvList -5.595 -2.509 0.016** -4.639 -1.816 0.076*** -6.460 -2.538 0.015**
ITSt -0.066 -1.835 0.073*** -0.039 -0.952 0.346 -0.090 -2.198 0.033**
ITSe 0.095 2.630 0.012** 0.060 1.441 0.156 0.127 3.081 0.003*
FSize 3.300 4.085 0.000* 1.444 1.561 0.125 4.979 5.400 0.000*
Lev 0.565 0.917 0.364 1.587 2.247 0.029** -0.359 -0.510 0.612
SubInd 4.849 2.199 0.033** 4.662 1.846 0.071*** 5.018 1.994 0.052***
Top20 -0.062 -1.327 0.191 -0.093 -1.734 0.090*** -0.034 -0.640 0.525
ROA -0.032 -0.638 0.526 0.022 0.376 0.709 -0.081 -1.407 0.166
 Adjusted R Square 0.672  Adjusted R Square 0.482  Adjusted R Square 0.715  
 Observations 58  Observations 58  Observations 58  
 F Statistic 12.655  F Statistic 6.299  F Statistic 15.283  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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TABLE 7.11: Multiple Regression: Firms Disclosing All Financial Instruments continued 
Panel B: Yr 2 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -30.387 -2.228 0.030** 6.778 0.493 0.624 -64.012 -3.687 0.000*
CGS 0.108 2.287 0.026** 0.122 2.556 0.013** 0.096 1.590 0.117
CMS -0.004 -0.094 0.925 0.041 0.988 0.327 -0.044 -0.849 0.399
OvList -5.230 -2.374 0.021** -5.011 -2.256 0.028** -5.427 -1.935 0.058***
ITSt -0.020 -0.596 0.554 -0.030 -0.865 0.390 -0.012 -0.271 0.787
ITSe 0.039 1.167 0.248 0.002 0.068 0.946 0.073 1.697 0.095***
FSize 2.816 3.426 0.001* 1.577 1.902 0.062*** 3.937 3.763 0.000*
Lev 1.764 2.813 0.007* 2.016 3.187 0.002* 1.537 1.925 0.059***
SubInd 3.916 1.736 0.088*** 2.940 1.292 0.201 4.799 1.671 0.100***
Top20 0.014 0.263 0.794 0.013 0.232 0.817 0.016 0.227 0.821
ROA -0.030 -0.580 0.564 -0.021 -0.413 0.681 -0.037 -0.572 0.569
 Adjusted R Square 0.578  Adjusted R Square 0.432  Adjusted R Square 0.575  
 Observations 70  Observations 70  Observations 70  
 F Statistic 10.434  F Statistic 6.252  F Statistic 10.332  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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Table 7.11: Multiple Regression: Firms Disclosing All Financial Instruments continued 
Panel C: Yr 3 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept -28.389 -1.993 0.051*** 7.461 0.553 0.582 -60.824 -3.228 0.002*
CGS 0.137 2.074 0.042** 0.160 2.560 0.013** 0.116 1.330 0.188
CMS 0.058 1.352 0.181 0.044 1.079 0.285 0.071 1.249 0.216
OvList -4.733 -2.251 0.028** -6.608 -3.321 0.002* -3.036 -1.092 0.279
ITSt 0.005 0.136 0.893 0.003 0.096 0.924 0.006 0.133 0.894
ITSe -0.004 -0.126 0.900 -0.021 -0.668 0.507 0.011 0.251 0.802
FSize 2.462 2.852 0.006* 1.517 1.857 0.068*** 3.317 2.905 0.005*
Lev 2.153 3.432 0.001* 1.955 3.294 0.002* 2.333 2.811 0.007*
SubInd 0.055 1.069 0.289 0.001 0.015 0.988 0.104 1.529 0.131
Top20 1.837 0.806 0.423 3.521 1.632 0.108 0.313 0.104 0.918
ROA 0.052 0.954 0.344 0.071 1.374 0.174 0.035 0.485 0.630
 Adjusted R Square 0.541  Adjusted R Square 0.404  Adjusted R Square 0.529  
 Observations 73  Observations 73  Observations 73  
 F Statistic 9.485  F Statistic 5.890  F Statistic 9.081  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
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Table 7.11: Multiple Regression: Firms Disclosing All Financial Instruments continued 
Panel D: Yr 4 FIDIS   MFIDIS   DFIDIS     
  Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.936 0.062 0.951 44.573 2.938 0.005* -38.546 -2.033 0.047**
CGS 0.000 -0.005 0.996 0.023 0.306 0.761 -0.021 -0.228 0.820
CMS 0.079 2.028 0.047** 0.096 2.455 0.017** 0.063 1.285 0.204
OvList 0.589 0.283 0.778 -1.613 -0.768 0.446 2.581 0.983 0.330
ITSt -0.068 -1.834 0.072*** -0.051 -1.357 0.180 -0.083 -1.786 0.079***
ITSe 0.051 1.599 0.115 0.036 1.115 0.270 0.064 1.608 0.114
FSize 1.970 2.330 0.023** 0.156 0.182 0.856 3.612 3.386 0.001*
Lev 2.814 4.833 0.000* 2.865 4.874 0.000* 2.768 3.768 0.000*
SubInd 4.310 1.724 0.090*** 6.348 2.515 0.015** 2.466 0.782 0.438
Top20 -0.078 -1.404 0.166 -0.085 -1.512 0.136 -0.072 -1.025 0.310
ROA 0.083 1.670 0.101 0.115 2.293 0.026** 0.054 0.862 0.392
 Adjusted R Square 0.532  Adjusted R Square 0.416  Adjusted R Square 0.530  
 Observations 67  Observations 67  Observations 67  
 F Statistic 8.500  F Statistic 5.692  F Statistic 8.431  
 Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  Significance 0.000*  
Legend: The regression equation (using Model 1) is stated as: 
FIDISjt (MFIDISjt; DFIDISjt) = αj + β1 CGSjt + β2 CMSjt + β3 OvListjt – β4 ITStjt + β5 ITSejt + β6 FSizejt + β7 Levjt + β8 Top20jt + β9 SubIndjt + β10 ROAjt + εj     
 
Where: Dependent Variables: FIDISjt = Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; MFIDISjt = Mandatory Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in 
year t; DFIDISjt = Discretionary Financial Instrument Disclosure Index for firm j in year t; Independent Variables: CGSjt = corporate governance score for firm j in year t; 
(maximum 13 variables); CMSjt = capital management score for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); OvList = Overseas Listingjt  (Listing on the ASX and an overseas 
exchange for firm j in year t); ITStjt = income tax score (transparency) for firm j in year t; (maximum 3 variables); ITSejt = income tax score (exposure) for firm j in year t; 
(maximum 2 variables); Control Variables: FSizejt = natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; Levjt = square root of debt/(debt + equity) ratio (total liabilities/total equity 
+ total liabilities) for firm j in year t; Top20jt = top 20 shareholder concentration for firm j in year t; SubIndjt = firm j engaged in mining in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); ROAjt = 
return on assets, measured as pretax profit/total assets with values truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles for firm j in year t (1 = yes, no = 0); αj = intercept; β = estimated 
coefficient for each item or category; εj  = error term. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 7.12 Summary of Hypotheses Testing for Applicable Firms  
Hypothesis Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
1 NA A A NA 
2a NA NA NA A 
2b NA NA NA NA 
3a A NA NA A 
3b A NA NA NA 
Adjusted R Squared 0.672 0.578 0.541 0.532 
Control Variables     
FSize P P P P 
Lev P P P P 
SubInd P P NP P 
Top20 NP NP NP NP 
ROA NP NP NP NP 
Legend: Table 7.12 summarises the Main Model OLS regression results for firms that actively use all 
financial instruments. A = Accepted; NA = Not Accepted; P = Significant Predictor Variable; NP = 
Not a Significant Predictor Variable. 
 
7.9 Summary 
This chapter provides further evidence of the extent of financial instrument 
disclosures over the period encompassing the 2003 to 2006 years and association of 
these disclosures with governance, capital management and income tax predictor 
variables. Discrete items that comprise the independent scores are themselves 
significant predictors that contributed to observed disclosure patterns. These are 
corporate governance items relating to (a) board composition and structure, (b) the 
existence of nomination committees, (c) formal codes of management and board 
conduct and remuneration structure, (d) a capital management item (capital raisings) 
and (e) income tax exposure items (thin capitalisation and withholding taxes). 
Endogeneity is unlikely to be a significant driver of observed disclosure patterns. 
Change in FSize and change in Lev are the only factors that predict the change in 
financial instrument disclosures over consecutive years. 
 
The extent of financial instrument information is significantly lower with firms 
exhibiting financial distress as evidenced by an audit qualification regarding 
continuation as a going concern and higher levels of debt in their capital structure. 
The extent of financial instrument disclosures is not significantly different between 
mining and petroleum firms across all years. However, there is a statistically 
significant difference between FIDIS, MFIDIS and DFIDIS of December financial 
year end and June financial year end companies with the former disclosing far more 
information. Specific financial instrument items are significantly associated with the 
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strength of governance structure, capital management, overseas listing status and 
income tax variables.    
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, CONTRIBUTION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.0 Thesis Objective 
This study provides a longitudinal examination of the extent of financial instrument 
disclosures of 111 extractive resource companies over an important four year period 
encompassing the 2003 to 2006 financial years. The study related the extent of 
financial instrument disclosures to five key factors: the strength of corporate 
governance structure, capital management exposure, overseas listing status, income 
tax exposure and income tax transparency. The 111 extractive resource companies 
represent the complete population of extractive mining and petroleum (oil and gas) 
companies listed on the ASX during that period. To generate important insights, this 
study measures financial instrument disclosures three years pre-IFRS adoption given 
the preparations (including disclosures) firms made leading up to formal adoption of 
IFRS.  
 
8.1 Extent of Financial Instrument Disclosure Patterns 
The findings show disclosures of financial instrument information (FIDIS) of 
extractive resource firms increased over the period encompassing the 2003 (Yr 1) to 
2006 (Yr 4) financial years. A statistically significant increase of both mandatory and 
discretionary disclosures was recorded between all consecutive reporting periods 
with the greatest percentage increase recorded on transition to IFRS adoption. Total 
financial instrument disclosures increased by 10.293%, 8.098% and 28.771% 
between the 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 financial years. The mean total 
financial instrument disclosures increased from 40.725% in the 2005 financial year 
(Yr 3) to 52.442% (Yr 4). This coincided with preparation of the first full year report 
prepared in accordance with the IFRS. Thus, the general research proposition is 
supported as there is an increase in financial instrument disclosures over the four 
year period leading up to and immediately following IFRS adoption in Australia.  
 
Although mandated disclosures of financial instruments are very similar pre-IFRS 
under AASB 1033 and post-IFRS under AASB 132, there has been a significant 
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increase in disclosures being made by resource companies within the first year 
annual report prepared with IFRS. There are a number of possible reasons for the 
observed disclosure patterns. First, the introduction of AASB 139 appears to have 
resulted in more transparent reporting of risk management policies relating to 
hedging activities, particularly given the requirement to document the effectiveness 
of hedging arrangements in offsetting risk on an ongoing basis.  
 
Second, the introduction of IFRS overall is likely to facilitate comparability and 
understandability of financial statements internationally (Palmer, 2006). The 
introduction of IFRS in Australia itself is akin to the introduction of a new form of 
regulation. This has provided impetus for firm management and the board to: (a) 
refurbish existing treasury policies and to (b) create new treasury policies. This in 
turn has created greater transparency, reduced uncertainty and increased the flow of 
information to capital market participants. The introduction of IFRS potentially 
created greater transparency and comparability from the market because companies, 
auditors, analysts, investors and shareholders examine firm performance 
internationally (Palmer, 2006). This greater pressure to be transparent in the post-
IFRS adoption environment may in turn have been an important driver of disclosure 
practices (Jubb, 2005, 2006). Clearly, changes to accounting policies and associated 
documentation and system requirements with respect to financial instrument use and 
controls appears to have changed the mindset of executives and the board of directors 
to one of disclosing more with consequent changes in the recording and reporting of 
key financial transactions and events. The implementation of IFRS itself has 
facilitated the communication process between managers and external stakeholders.  
 
Overall, it can be concluded that the implementation of the IFRS increases financial 
instrument disclosures. Firms appear to be engaging in relatively more costly 
monitoring and specific information gathering activities of financial instrument 
information in the immediate post-IFRS environment. In doing so, IFRS provides 
timely and useful information to investors as well as confirms information that was 
available pre-IFRS adoption. This conclusion is consistent with recent studies on 
IFRS adoption in Australia which have found that adoption of IFRS is value relevant 
to investors. 
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8.2 Association of Observed Disclosures with Firm Specific Variables 
8.2.1 Governance Structure, Disclosure Compliance and Regulation 
There is a positive and statistically significant association between the strength of 
corporate governance structure and the extent of total, mandatory and discretionary 
financial instrument disclosures by Australian listed resource firms in the pre-IFRS 
adoption period (Yr 1, Yr 2 and Yr 3) and in the post-IFRS adoption period (Yr 4). 
OLS regression tests provide evidence that CGS is a statistically significant (at the 
1% or 5% levels) predictor of disclosures pre-IFRS and post-IFRS. An examination 
of the relationship between corporate governance and managerial behaviour, as 
reflected in disclosure policy is of fundamental importance to regulators, academics, 
investors, auditors and the board of directors (Brown et. al. 2004). Over the past five 
years, regulatory bodies such as The Group of 100, the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council and the ASIC have emphasised the importance of corporate governance as a 
mechanism to enhance the quality of financial reporting. The common argument 
promoted by these regulatory bodies is that corporate governance plays a critical role 
in ensuring the credibility of financial statement information. In particular, the 
heightened regulatory environment in Australia following implementation of CLERP 
9 in 2004 is forcing companies to focus on corporate governance and disclosure 
policy.  
 
Effective corporate governance structures have appeared to assist firms in their 
financial instrument disclosure policies and practices generally. However, corporate 
governance systems do not appear to be as important in influencing disclosure policy 
with respect to derivative and hedge accounting disclosures in the period 
immediately proceeding (Yr 3) and immediately following (Yr 4) IFRS adoption. 
Similarly, corporate governance structures are not a statistically significant predictor 
variable of financial risk management disclosures in the year immediately following 
IFRS adoption (Yr 4). A possible reason for this is that adoption of IFRS itself has 
been influential in improving disclosure policy. For instance, documentation changes 
mandated under AASB 139 with respect to hedge accounting qualification of 
derivative financial instruments may assist in improving disclosures. Consequently, 
adoption of these new accounting standards may have resulted in refurbishment of 
existing treasury policies or the development of new treasury policies which in turn 
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have had an impact on enhancing derivative and hedge accounting and financial risk 
management disclosure policy.  
 
Whilst effective corporate governance structures have appeared to assist firms in 
disclosure policies and practices, there exists a substantial disclosure gap relating to 
provision of mandatory financial instrument information within annual reports over 
the study period. For instance, disclosure of mandatory financial instrument 
information peaks at 65.225% in the immediate post-IFRS adoption period. This 
disclosure gap could relate in part to company concerns with providing information 
of a proprietary and confidential nature in the public domain. Alternatively, sample 
firms may have severely under-estimated the disclosure requirements under both 
AASB 132 and AASB 1047. There are also economic consequences and costs 
relating to disclosure of financial instrument information. The implication here is one 
of disclosure compliance and raises a number of questions. For example,  
 Should further regulation of financial reporting disclosures be implemented in 
order to reduce information asymmetry issues, particularly in relation to 
derivative and hedge arrangements as well as the nature and exposure of the firm 
to financial risks? 
 Can audit committees, external auditors and financial intermediaries play a more 
proactive role in ensuring effective financial instrument disclosures?   
 
A possible reason for the overall low disclosure level of mandatory (and 
discretionary) financial instrument information is that sample firms have under-
estimated the depth and nature of information that external stakeholders such as 
investors, analysts and auditors consider important (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). 
Further, the timetable43 for adoption of IFRS in Australia was extremely short. Thus, 
firm management had only a limited amount of time to become familiar with the 
depth and complexity of the new financial accounting standards.  
 
This raises questions concerning the role of regulatory and accounting bodies in 
assisting firms to grasp the depth and complexity of certain accounting standards 
                                                 
43 The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) announced on 3 July 2002 that Australia would formerly 
adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for reporting periods commencing on or 
after 1 January 2005. The FRC reconfirmed this decision in its meeting of 31 March 2004 (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2005). 
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under IFRS. Also, questions are raised as to whether more resources should be 
devoted to monitor compliance with these accounting standards. Disclosure of the 
effects of changes in accounting policy and procedures with respect to financial 
instruments is an area of risk that needs to be carefully considered by firm 
management. It is for this reason that an effective corporate governance structure for 
the firm is important (Beekes and Brown, 2006).  
 
Despite the rhetoric surrounding the plethora of regulations that a listed corporation 
faces in Australia, the low level of mandatory financial instrument disclosures 
achieved for all sample resource firms suggests that further regulation and 
monitoring of accounting disclosure in respect of financial instruments may be 
required. The univariate and multivariate results provide some evidence that these 
regulations do in fact assist in the provision of a highly structured and systematic 
corporate governance framework which in turn facilitates financial communication 
and transparency. Regulated financial information is therefore of value to investors. 
This finding is consistent with that of recent empirical disclosure studies such as 
Healy and Palepu (2001). 
 
8.2.2 Capital Management, Overseas Listing Status and Disclosure Policy 
In addition to corporate governance structures, a firm’s capital management and 
income tax exposure are potentially important drivers of financial instrument 
disclosure policy (Frankel et. al. 1995, Beattie et. al. 2006). The concept of capital 
management has several key elements incorporating capital raisings, takeovers and 
mergers and existence of international operations.  
 
Financial institutions often require resource companies to implement sufficient 
hedging to cover repayments of project financing with these conditions being 
stipulated in debt covenants (Frankel, 1995; Douglas, 2003). Companies that raise 
capital are likely to be more motivated to disclose information concerning financial 
risk management practices. For example, Mercer (2005) propose that more highly 
leveraged firms incur more monitoring costs and seek to reduce these costs by 
disclosing more information within annual reports.  
 
 238
Merger and acquisition activity amongst resource companies may involve the use of 
capital raisings, use of derivatives such as equity swaps or interest rate swaps, 
restructuring of hedge positions or acquisition of hedge books from target companies 
(Brennan, 1999). Consequently, it is expected that financial instrument disclosures 
will be greater in the presence of merger and acquisition activity given the important 
role financial instruments play in this process.  Companies with operations in foreign 
jurisdictions will have additional policies and procedures for complying with legal 
requirements (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001; Lang et. al. 2006). These operations involve use 
of additional financial instruments, may involve international financing arrangements 
and have associated financial risks.  
 
A significant positive association was found between firm capital management 
structure and financial instrument disclosures in Yr 4 (post-IFRS) of the study 
period. Companies with multi-jurisdictional listing are expected to disclose more 
information concerning these financial instruments (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001; Lang et. 
al. 2006). For example, companies with foreign exchange transactions (i.e. 
companies with multinational operations) will have to consider hedging strategies for 
foreign exchange risk under AASB 139. Companies with extensive hedging 
programs, holding a large number of derivatives or with operations across a number 
of jurisdictions are expected to disclose more information concerning financial 
instruments under IFRS. Whilst IFRS aids in harmonising Australian and 
international accounting practices, Australian firms with international operations are 
still likely to have to have to address a wider set of investor needs than domestically 
operating firms.  
 
8.2.3 Income Tax Exposure, Income Tax Transparency and Disclosure Policy 
International income tax structures can potentially influence disclosure policy and 
practices (Shackelfield and Shevlin, 2001). The thin capitalisation rules apply to 
entities whose assets are funded by a high level of debt and relatively little equity. 
Resource firms that use debt to finance projects or investments do so to maximise the 
tax deductibility of interest payments in Australia (Leyden and Croft, 2004). For 
instance, larger multinational mining and oil and gas companies commonly 
undertake recapitalisation programs whereby debt to capital ratios of 50% to 75% are 
maintained for the Australian corporate group.  
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Closely related to thin capitalisation is the application of Australian withholding 
taxes. Firms that borrow overseas to fund Australian projects, for example, are 
subject to interest withholding tax. Resource firms operating in the international 
market place may strategise where to borrow the capital to fund Australian or 
overseas projects based on the international tax treatment of those financing 
arrangements. Re-characterisation of payments made offshore or received in 
Australia based on debt and equity tax rules can also be part of any international tax 
planning process. These arrangements are expected to enhance financial instrument 
transparency. The multivariate regression results show support for this (Table 7.1). A 
statistically significant and positive association was found between firms with thinly 
capitalised structures and those subject to the Australian withholding tax regime, as 
measured by the income tax score ITSe and financial instrument disclosures in the 
pre-IFRS adoption period (Yr 1 and Yr 2).  
 
Further, firms operating globally have the incentive to shift income and tax 
deductible amounts amongst jurisdictions to achieve the best tax outcome (Newberry 
and Dhaliwal, 2001). These arrangements are closely tied in with financing and 
transparency policy, particularly where significant investments or capital are 
channeled through entities within the corporate group that are incorporated in a tax 
haven (ATO, 2004). In particular, if there are companies within the corporate group 
incorporated in a tax haven that also have control of service or treasury operations 
for the group as a whole, this may have an important influence on transparency 
policy. Corporate groups with tax haven incorporated subsidiaries are considered to 
be less likely to disclose financial instrument information in part relating to the 
specific tax implications of the financing arrangements themselves and in part due to 
the minimal disclosures and transparency required in jurisdictions with tax haven 
status. The multivariate regression results (Table 7.1) provide support for this 
assertion.  A significant negative association was found between ITSt and the extent 
of financial instrument disclosures in the pre-IFRS adoption period (Yr 1). Thus, 
taxation arrangements may impact managements’ financial instrument disclosure 
incentives. This may manifest itself in the preparation of separate financial 
statements for tax reporting and management control purposes (Negrea, 2005).  
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8.2.4 Control Variables and Disclosure Policy 
The control variables provide additional explanatory power relating to financial 
instrument disclosures. In line with extant literature, FSize is an important 
determinant of financial instrument disclosures (Mallin et. al., 2004). Larger firms 
tend to have the financial resources and have more extensive and complex operations 
and consequently this will be an important motivating factor of financial instrument 
disclosures. Leverage is an important determinant of financial instrument disclosures. 
Firms that raise debt capital are subject to the scrutiny of their bankers and 
compliance with debt covenants and consequently, firms that are more highly 
leveraged will be more motivated to disclose financial instrument information. Sub-
Industry categorisation, Top20 shareholder concentration and ROA are not consistent 
predictor variables over the observation period.  
 
8.3 Implications 
In summary, this thesis has contributed to positive accounting theory and the 
accounting literature. Specifically, this study addressed the following research 
questions:  
1. Does the adoption of IFRS have a significant affect on the pattern of financial 
instrument disclosures (mandatory and discretionary) by Australian resource 
firms? 
2. Are firm’s corporate governance structure, capital management exposure, 
overseas listing status and income tax characteristics significant determinants 
of financial instrument disclosure practices (mandatory and discretionary) by 
Australian resource firms both pre- and post-IFRS adoption? 
The management of extractive resource firms listed on the ASX is faced with a 
complex array of financial reporting disclosure choices. Disclosures of financial 
instrument information have increased over the period encompassing the 2003 to 
2006 financial years with a significant increase in disclosures of both a mandatory 
and discretionary nature recorded in the first full year annual report prepared 
following adoption of IFRS. The introduction of AASB 132 and AASB 139 appear 
to have resulted in more rigorous and transparent reporting of information with 
respect to financial instrument practices. It is likely that changes to accounting 
policies and associated documentation and system requirements in respect of 
financial instruments have changed the mindset of executives and the board of 
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directors to one of disclosing more with consequent changes in the recording and 
reporting of key financial transactions and associated risks. The introduction of IFRS 
has placed greater pressure on resource firms creating more scrutiny from both 
capital markets and by senior executives and directors. Further, the introduction of 
IFRS is likely to facilitate comparability and understandability of financial 
statements internationally. This then allows stakeholders (including senior 
management and the board of directors) to compare the financial statements of a 
particular resource firm with that of other resource firms operating in the 
international arena. This enhanced comparability and understandability may in turn 
be an important driver of disclosure practices. Senior executives and boards of 
directors appear to have embraced the adoption of IFRS by ensuring disclosure of 
issues concerning financial instruments. Overall, it can be concluded that the 
implementation of the new IFRS fundamentally increases financial instrument 
disclosures; new regulation makes a difference. 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) state that contracts between the firm and its creditors (debt 
contracts) and contracts between management and shareholders (compensation 
contracts) and political and legal issues such as management’s concern regarding 
taxation, reputation and regulation drive managements motives for making financial 
disclosure decisions. Corporate governance, capital management and international 
income tax strategies are important factors affecting decisions by managers on 
financial reporting and disclosure of financial instrument information. Table 8.1 
restates the hypotheses developed to test the association of strength of corporate 
governance structure, capital management exposure, overseas listing status and 
income tax exposure and income tax transparency and financial instrument 
disclosures. As outlined in chapter 6, firm management has incentives to disclose 
financial instrument information for corporate governance, contracting and political 
reasons.  
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TABLE 8.1 Summary of Hypotheses  
  Hypothesis 
H1 
There is a positive association between the strength of corporate governance 
structure and the extent of financial instrument disclosures (mandatory and 
discretionary) by Australian listed resource firms.  
H2a 
There is a positive association between the capital management exposure and 
the extent of financial instrument disclosures (mandatory and discretionary) by 
Australian listed resource firms.  
H2b 
There is a positive association between firms with overseas listing status and the 
extent of financial instrument disclosures (mandatory and discretionary) by 
Australian resource firms. 
H3a 
There is a positive association between the income tax exposure and the extent 
of financial instrument disclosures (mandatory and discretionary) by Australian 
resource firms. 
H3b 
There is a negative association between the income tax transparency and the 
extent of financial instrument disclosures (mandatory and discretionary) by 
Australian resource firms. 
 
Multiple regression main Model results (Table 6.1) support the predictions of a 
positive association between the total and mandatory financial instrument disclosures 
and strength of corporate governance structure (CGS) of all sample firms for all 
years of the observation period. The association between total and mandatory 
financial instrument disclosures and corporate governance is statistically significant 
at the 1% or 5% levels. Further, there is a positive and statistical significant (at the 
5% or 10% levels) association between discretionary financial instrument disclosures 
and CGS in Yr 2, Yr 3 and Yr 4 (Table 6.1). Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported in each 
year of the observation period. Although a causal link between disclosures and the 
strength of corporate governance structure cannot be ascertained, these results 
nevertheless suggest that the strength of a firm’s corporate governance structure is a 
potentially important determinant of a firm’s financial instrument disclosure policy. 
Resource firms that have the necessary policies, procedures, plans, systems and 
governance tools in place that constitute part of an effective corporate governance 
framework appear to influence management to document and disclose more 
extensively financial instrument information. 
 
A positive and statistically significant association between sample firms’ total, 
mandatory and discretionary financial instrument disclosures and capital 
management exposure exists in the immediate post-IFRS (Yr 4) adoption period. 
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Although the association between total, mandatory and discretionary financial 
instrument disclosures and CMS is positive in Yr 1, Yr 2 and Yr 3, this association is 
not statistically significant. The statistically significant and positive association 
between FIDIS and CMS in Yr 4 is potentially related to the marked increase in 
merger and acquisition activity of resource firms in that year (refer to Table 6.7, 
Panel B). Firms engaged in merger and acquisition activity (28.71% in Yr 4) may 
utilise specific financial instruments such as derivatives (e.g. equity swaps or interest 
rate swaps) as part of the scheme of consolidation, require additional financing (debt 
or equity) or restructuring of existing financial arrangements, may necessitate 
restructuring of financial instruments which in turn may expose the firm to new and 
different levels of financial risks. Firm management would also be acutely aware that 
the firm is exposed to additional capital market scrutiny during the course of this 
type of activity. This linkage may account for the observed association. 
Alternatively, the higher level of merger and acquisition activity in Yr 4 may be 
related to higher metal and petroleum prices, increased revenue and profitability in 
the Australian resources sector and this coincides with the transition to IFRS.  
 
Hypothesis 2b is not supported by the results as there is a negative and statistical 
significant association between financial instrument disclosures and overseas listing 
status in Yr 2 and Yr 3. The association between financial instrument disclosures and 
overseas listing status is not statistically significant in years 1 and 4. Firms with an 
overseas listing status are consistently negatively associated with Lev in each of the 
four years (refer to Table 6.3). Consequently, firms with lower leverage tend to be 
listed on overseas stock exchanges.  
 
There is a positive and statistically significant association between sample firms’ 
total and discretionary financial instrument disclosures and ITSe in Yr 1 and Yr 2 
only (Table 6.1). Resource firms subject to thin capitalisation and Australian 
withholding tax provisions have more extensive financial instrument disclosures in 
Yr 1 and Yr 2. Credit risk and tax risk may potentially be the drivers behind firm 
managements’ incentives to disclose financial instrument information.  
 
There is a negative and statistically significant (at the 5% level) association between 
sample firms’ total and discretionary financial instrument disclosures and ITSt in Yr 
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1 only (Table 6.1). ITSt and mandatory financial instrument disclosures are 
statistically significantly associated in Yr 4 only. Resource firms deriving foreign 
source income and with a capital structure that includes at least one subsidiary in a 
corporate group with OECD tax haven status and a financing and/or service company 
within tax haven status have less extensive financial instrument disclosures in Yr 1 
(and Yr 4). Reduced transparency with respect to their financing arrangements and 
financial instruments are likely drivers of observed associations. 
 
Statistically significant associations between FIDI and the independent variables are 
achieved for pooled regression results. These results are consistent with the 
regression results obtained on panel data. H1, H2a, H3a and H3b are supported for 
pooled regression results. FIDI is consistently and positively associated with FSize 
and Lev. Similar results are achieved for associations between MFIDI and DFIDI 
and the independent and control variables. 
 
The main model regression results relating to panel or year by year data are   
This research employs agency theory as the conceptual framework for examining 
variables associated with financial instrument disclosure practices. Agency theory 
suggests that managers or agents possess and utilise information that the owners or 
principals (such as shareholders, creditors, bondholders, analysts and investors) do 
not possess to pursue personal objectives. Monitoring mechanisms such as the 
strength of corporate governance structure are potential determinants of managerial 
disclosure incentives (Jensen, 1986). Agency theory can also be used as the 
conceptual framework for explaining managerial disclosure behaviour in relation to 
the tax impacts and tax minimisation strategies of firms, particularly where tax 
strategies relate to financing methods, type and source and associated use of financial 
instruments. Recent studies (e.g. Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001; Crocker and 
Slemrod, 2004; Tzovas, 2005) used agency theory as a framework for explaining 
corporate tax minimisation or tax evasion.  
 
There are a number of policy implications arising from the results. For example, the 
findings of this research have direct implications on corporate governance issues. 
The empirical findings of a strong and positive association between the strength of 
corporate governance structure and financial instrument disclosures in general 
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provide evidence that an effective governance structure improves financial reporting 
and disclosure. This evidence is consistent with the views advanced in the corporate 
governance and accounting disclosure literature (e.g. Beekes and Brown, 2006). An 
effective corporate governance structure may assist in the management of complex 
financial instruments such as derivatives and with hedge accounting issues including 
the reporting of that information. This is important because there have been some 
notable Australian examples where mid tier to large tier gold producers have gone 
into administration as a direct result of mismanagement of hedge books. Further, this 
study provides evidence that an effective corporate governance structure assists with 
financial risk management reporting and disclosures. In particular, corporate 
governance attributes relating to the structure and composition of the board of 
directors (such as the existence of an independent chairman, separation of the roles 
of the chairman and managing director and the existence of a formal policy for 
director appointments held by the nomination committee) are important determinants 
of financial instrument disclosures in the pre-IFRS adoption period (Yr 1 to Yr 3). In 
Yr 2 and Yr 3 (pre-IFRS) and Yr 4 (post-IFRS), corporate governance features 
relating to the existence of a formal code of conduct relating to behaviour of 
directors and key executives, a plan or policy relating to equity based remuneration, 
the existence of an audit committee charter and formal written disclosure policy are 
factors that exhibit significant explanatory power. These corporate governance 
attributes are important components of the ASX best practice principles and 
recommendations. Collectively, these attributes constitute important policies, 
procedures, structure and tools that assist in ameliorating agency related problems 
and enhancing the extent of financial instrument disclosures. 
 
There are income tax implications arising from a firm’s financing strategy, policies 
and procedures. For instance, Australian resource companies commonly undertake 
debt financing both in Australia and in the U.S. to fund operations and investments 
globally and hence tax strategies and impacts could be an important influence on 
reporting in the public domain. Tax planning considerations are an important driver 
of financial accounting choices and “tax minimization strategies often result in 
lowering reported income” (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001, p. 326). A key 
implication of the tax and reporting related research (Slemrod, 2001; Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Mills and Newberry, 2004, 2005; Tzovas, 2005; Beuselinck et. al. 
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2005; Negrea, 2005 and Dhaliwal et. al. 2005) is that tax considerations could be 
potentially a major determinant of managerial financial reporting decision making. 
The importance of tax considerations in influencing financial disclosure incentives is 
reflected in the empirical evidence. For example, OLS regressions provide evidence 
of a significant positive association between the income tax exposure and firm size 
and financial ratio disclosures over the period encompassing the 2003 to 2005 period. 
OLS regressions also provide evidence of a significant and negative association 
between income tax transparency characteristics and financial ratio disclosure 
patterns. 
 
This thesis generates evidence that extractive resource firms facing liquidity 
problems disclose financial instrument information less extensively. A possible 
reason is that firm management does not want to divulge information relating to 
credit risk to financing intermediaries. These resource firms are characterised with an 
inherent uncertainty regarding continuation as a going concern audit assumption. In 
some instances, there is evidence of selective reporting of information or non-
disclosure of financial instrument information in the annual report by these firms. An 
example is the non-disclosure of credit risk information in the annual report by a 
gold producer in the year prior to that firm going into administration. This suggests 
that the stakeholders of these firms are not provided with sufficient information 
regarding the nature and use of financial instruments, financing arrangements and 
associated financial risks for them to make informed investment decisions. 
 
The results of this study are likely to be of interest to policy makers. This is because 
the results clearly demonstrate a systematic association between effective governance 
structures and the extent of financial disclosures for Australian listed resource firms. 
This association provides evidence on the role of governance structures in 
diminishing agency related conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. 
The evidence is also likely to be of interest to equity analysts and investors. This is 
because the results provide a basis for assessing the nature and extent of financial 
instrument information disclosed within annual reports. The findings are also 
potentially useful to managers because the results provide guidance on financial risk 
management activities and disclosures that the firm should pay careful consideration 
to. Further, these results extend the scope of academic research by enhancing an 
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understanding of the link between governance structures, capital management 
structures and international income tax strategies and arrangements and financial 
instrument disclosures.  
 
8.4 Limitations 
As with all disclosure indices, there are some limitations with the development of the 
120 item disclosure index FIDI. There may be specific disclosures relating to 
financial instruments, for example, the success or lack of success of hedging 
arrangements or the nature and extent of financing activities that are detailed in 
media releases, analyst reports, internal treasury reports and manuals or web based 
announcements that may not be incorporated within the annual report. However, the 
120 item index used alleviates these problems to some extent in that the overall 
disclosure score with not be as significantly impacted if only a few items are either 
not incorporated in the annual report or not recorded as being disclosed in the annual 
report. Further, other measures of disclosure could have been examined such as the 
frequency with which information was disclosed to gain an insight into the quality of 
disclosure. However, no fully accepted methodology exists for such an approach. 
Another limitation is the study period selected with three years pre-IFRS and one 
year post-IFRS. However, further changes to mandated financial instrument 
disclosures have occurred following IFRS adoption highlighting the evolutionary 
status of these disclosures. 
 
It is acknowledged that caution should be exercised in inferring a causal link between 
the extent of financial instrument disclosures and the independent (and control) 
variables. For instance, a positive and statistically significant association between 
FIDIS and CGS does not necessarily mean that corporate governance attributes 
determine the extent of information disclosed within the annual report. Endogeniety 
is a potential problem that is not specifically addressed in this study. Furthermore, 
there could be correlated omitted variables that account for statistically significant 
associations. For instance, costs of disclosure may be an important issue in driving 
statistically significant associations. Further, increased disclosures and stronger 
corporate governance structures may both be the result of regulatory pressures. These 
issues have gained increasing recognition in empirical accounting studies over the 
past five years, particularly with respect to corporate governance and capital 
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management considerations. Other factors not included in the regression models such 
as auditor quality, audit type, risk and growth may be important in contributing to 
disclosure patterns. This study has attempted to address any potential endogeneity or 
correlated omitted variable problem through examining regressions on a year by year 
basis, changes in variables between consecutive years, incorporating several control 
variables in the analysis and examination of association between independent 
variable scores as well as independent items that comprise these scores and FIDIS. 
The evidence suggests that endogeneity may not be a significant factor driving the 
results. 
 
8.5 Future Research 
Further research in the area of financial instrument disclosures could be undertaken 
following adoption of AASB 7 in Australia. AASB 7, applicable to annual reporting 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2007, requires the disclosure of significant 
financial instruments with respect to the financial position and performance of an 
entity, and the qualitative and quantitative information about its exposure to risks 
arising from them. An entity that is required to disclose considerably more 
information concerning its exposure to financial risks and disclose more information 
concerning the impacts of significant financial instruments on an entity’s financial 
position and performance compared to AASB 132. Further work could be undertaken 
to determine the extent of change of financial risk disclosures and the disclosure of 
the impacts of financial instruments on the financial position and performance of 
extractive resource firms in light of the mandated requirements under AASB 7. 
 
Additional research could examine the financial instrument disclosures 
internationally. For instance, financial instrument disclosures of extractive 
companies from Australia, Canada, United States, European countries and China 
could be compared. The purpose of such a study would be to evaluate financial 
instrument disclosures post-IFRS adoption in each of these countries and also to 
relate disclosures to firm specific variables such as corporate governance regimes, 
capital management and income tax incentives. This would enable comparison of 
financial reporting disclosure incentives between regulated capital markets and those 
that are not as well regulated. 
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Future research on financial instrument disclosures could also focus on management 
forecasts of financial instrument contracts and loan agreements. Typically, 
information on the term of hedging contracts, the volume and dollar amount of the 
hedged item, exposure to financial risks and forecasts of revenue and conditions 
relating to loan agreements can be precisely measured and provides a proxy measure 
of voluntary disclosures (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The nature of this information 
and its relation to firm specific variables might provide a powerful test of motivation 
for voluntary disclosures.  
 
8.6 Contribution of this Thesis  
This thesis has contributed to the body of accounting disclosure literature in a 
number of ways. First, this study is the first comprehensive analysis of financial 
instrument disclosures within the mining and petroleum sub-industries leading up to 
and immediately following formal adoption of IFRS. Adoption of IFRS has had a 
profound impact on recognition, measurement and disclosure of financial 
instruments (Jubb, 2005, 2006). Clear and distinct differences in disclosure patterns 
pre and post-IFRS are highlighted. 
 
Second, past disclosure studies of financial instrument information (e.g. Chalmers, 
2001; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004) utilised only a relatively small number of items 
of financial instrument information to derive a disclosure index. Also, these studies 
focussed on disclosures in relation to derivative financial instruments only. This 
study utilised a comprehensive 120 item checklist of both mandatory and 
discretionary financial instrument information to derive a disclosure index examining 
all categories of financial instruments. 
 
Third, this study examined the relation between the key areas of strength of corporate 
governance structure of a firm, its capital management exposure and income tax 
characteristics and financial instrument disclosures. The findings especially 
demonstrated the positive impact of improved corporate governance systems on 
disclosure patterns. 
 
Fourth, empirical evidence of the relationship between financial instrument 
disclosures and income tax characteristics of firms within the Australian context is 
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limited or non-existent (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). Empirical tax research in 
accounting is gaining momentum (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). The interaction 
between financial accounting and taxation in Australia is important given that several 
key Australian income tax provisions rely directly on the definition, recognition and 
measurement criteria of assets, liabilities and equity in accordance with accounting 
standards. Income tax considerations are important when determining the source 
jurisdiction, nature of financing and financial risks and associated use of financial 
instruments. The relation between financial reporting disclosures and income tax 
characteristics or preferences of firms has only recently received some attention 
internationally (e.g. Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). This study has attempted to fill 
that gap in knowledge through an examination of the relationship between financial 
instrument disclosures and specific income tax characteristics of firms, in particular, 
international tax arrangements and strategies.  
 
Finally, this thesis makes an important contribution to the extant financial accounting 
literature. By focussing on financial instruments, this research examines a very 
important form of business transaction. The time period studied provided a unique 
opportunity to track the impact of IFRS adoption. Further, the examination of 
corporate governance, capital management, overseas listing and income tax 
considerations provides crucial new insights for the accounting profression. 
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APPENDIX A: ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations as at August 2007  
 
Principle 1: Lay solid foundations for management and oversight 
 Recommendation 1.1: Companies should establish the functions reserved to the 
Board and those delegated to senior executives and disclose those functions. 
 Recommendation 1.2: Companies should disclose the process for evaluating the 
performance of senior executives. 
 Recommendation 1.3: Companies should provide the information in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 1 
 
Principle 2: Structure the board to add value. 
 Recommendation 2.1: A majority of the board should be independent directors. 
 Recommendation 2.2: The chair should be an independent director. 
 Recommendation 2.3: The roles of chair and chief executive officer should not be 
exercised by the same individual. 
 Recommendation 2.4: The board should establish a nomination committee. 
 Recommendation 2.5: Companies should disclose the process for evaluating the 
performance of the board, its committees and individual directors. 
 Recommendation 2.6: Companies should provide the information in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 2. 
  
Principle 3: Promote ethical and responsible decision-making. 
 Recommendation 3.1: Companies should establish a code of conduct and disclose 
the practices necessary to maintain confidence in the company’s integrity, the 
practices necessary to take into account their legal obligations and the reasonable 
expectations of their stakeholders and the responsibility and accountability of 
individuals for reporting and investigating reports of unethical practices. 
 Recommendation 3.2: Companies should establish a policy concerning trading in 
company securities by directors, senior executives and employees, and disclose 
the policy or a summary of that policy. 
 Recommendation 3.3: Companies should provide the information in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 3. 
 
Principle 4: Safeguard integrity in financial reporting.  
 Recommendation 4.1: The board should establish an audit committee. 
 Recommendation 4.2: The audit committee should be structured so that it 
consists only of non-executive directors, consists of a majority of independent 
directors, is chaired by an independent chair, who is not chair of the board and 
has at least three members. 
 Recommendation 4.3: The audit committee should have a formal charter. 
 Recommendation 4.4: Companies should provide the information in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 4. 
 
Principle 5: Make timely and balanced disclosure. 
 Recommendation 5.1: Companies should establish written policies designed to 
ensure compliance with ASX Listing Rule disclosure requirements and to ensure 
accountability at a senior executive level for that compliance and disclose those 
policies. 
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 Recommendation 5.2: Companies should provide the information in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 5. 
 
Principle 6: Respect the rights of shareholders. 
 Recommendation 6.1: Companies should design a communications policy for 
promoting effective communication with shareholders and encouraging their 
participation at general meetings and disclose their policy. 
 Recommendation 6.2: Companies should provide the information in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 6. 
  
Principle 7: Recognise and manage risk. 
 Recommendation 7.1: Companies should establish policies for the oversight and 
management of material business risks and disclose a summary of those policies. 
 Recommendation 7.2: The board should require management to design and 
implement the risk management and internal control system to manage the 
company’s material business risks and report to it on whether those risks are 
being managed effectively. The board should disclose that management has 
reported to it as to the effectiveness of the company’s management of its material 
business risks. 
 Recommendation 7.3: The board should disclose whether it has received 
assurance from the CEO (or equivalent) and the CFO (or equivalent) that the 
declaration provided in accordance with section 195A of the Corporations Act is 
founded on a sound system of risk management and internal control and that the 
system is operating effectively in all material respects in relation to financial 
reporting risks. 
 Recommendation 7.4: Companies should provide the information in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 7. 
 
Principle 8: Renumerate fairly and responsibly. 
 Recommendation 8.1: The board should establish a remuneration committee. 
 Recommendation 8.2: Companies should clearly distinguish the structure of non-
executive director’s remuneration from that of executive directors and senior 
executives. 
 Recommendation 8.3: Companies should provide the information in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 8. 
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APPENDIX B: Financial Instrument Disclosure Index (FIDI) 
Financial Instrument Disclosure Items AASB  Standard Reference 
MANDATORY 
USE and SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Discussion of the extent to which financial 
instruments are used or significance/objectives to 
the entity. 
 
 
2. Information regarding the nature of financial 
instruments used. 
 
RISK and RISK MANAGEMENT 
3. Extent of market risk (currency risk or foreign 
exchange risk) in relation to the use of financial 
instruments. 
 
4. Extent of market risk (commodity price risk) in 
relation to the use of financial instruments. 
 
5. Extent of credit risk in relation to the use of 
financial instruments. 
 
6. Extent of liquidity risk in relation to the use of 
financial instruments. 
 
7. Extent of interest rate risk in relation to the use of 
financial instruments. 
 
8. An entity shall describe its financial risk 
management objectives and policies and procedures 
for controlling risks associated with financial 
instruments e.g. reporting of risks, policies and 
practices for dealing with risks. 
 
 
9. Interest rate risk – maturity dates and/or contractual 
repricing. 
 
10. Interest rate risk – effective interest rates. 
 
 
11. Indicates which of its financial assets and financial 
liabilities are exposed to interest rate risk. 
 
12. Indicates which of its financial assets are exposed to 
credit risk. 
 
13. Areas of significant concentrations of credit rate 
risk. 
 
14. Master netting arrangements to mitigate exposure to 
credit loss. 
 
15. Maximum exposure to credit risk 
 
HEDGE ACCOUNTING 
16. A description of the hedge. 
 
 
 
1033.5.1.1, 1055.5.3, 132.57,132.60(a) 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.1.1, 132.53, 132.60(a) 
 
 
 
1033.5.1.1, 132.52(a)(i), 7.32, 7.33(a) 
 
 
 
1033.5.1.2(a)(iii), 132.52(a)(iii), 7.32, 
7.33(a) 
 
1033.5.1.2(b), 132.52(b), 132.77 
 
 
1033.5.1.2(c), 132.52(c) 
 
 
1033.5.12(a)(ii), 132.52(a)(ii), 132.52(d), 
132.68 
 
1033.5.1.1, 132.56, 132.57, 7.32, 7.33(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.4(a), 1033 5.4.9(a)(b), 132.67(a), 
132.69, 132.70 
 
1033.5.1.2(a), 1033.5.4(b), 132.67(b) 
 
 
1033.5.4.4, 132.71 
 
 
1033.5.5, 132.76 
 
 
1033.5.5(b), 132.76(b) 
 
 
1033.5.5.5, 132.81 
 
 
1033.5.5(a), 132.76(a) 
 
 
1033.5.8, 132.58(a), 7.22(a) 
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17. A description of the financial instruments 
designated as hedging instruments  
 
18. Disclosure of net fair values or fair values of 
hedging instruments at reporting date. 
 
19. Nature of the risk being hedged. 
 
20. Amount of gain/loss arising (or expected to arise) 
from hedging activities 
 
21. Period of time to which hedge transaction relates or 
maturity 
 
SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES and 
METHODS 
22. Criteria applied in determining when to recognise a 
financial asset or financial liability. 
 
23. Criteria applied in determining when to derecognise 
a financial asset or financial liability  
 
24. The basis of measurement applied to financial assets 
and financial liabilities on initial recognition. 
 
25. The basis on which income and expenses arising 
from financial assets and financial liabilities are 
recognised and measured. 
 
26. Disclose for each category of financial asset, 
whether regular way purchases and sales of 
financial assets are accounted for at trade date or at 
settlement date. 
 
27. Reasons for reclassifications of financial assets to 
cost or amortised cost rather than fair value (or net 
fair value) 
 
28. Material items of income and expense resulting 
from financial assets and financial liabilities.  
 
29. Material items of gains and losses resulting from 
financial assets and financial liabilities. 
 
30. Nature and amount of impairment losses relating to 
financial assets 
 
31. An entity shall disclose the carrying amount of 
financial assets pledged as collateral for liabilities or 
contingent liabilities. 
 
TERMS and CONDITIONS 
32. Information about the significant terms and 
conditions of financial instruments that may affect 
the amount, timing and certainty of future cash 
flows – including principal amount. 
 
33. Carrying amount of each category of financial 
assets and financial liabilities used by the entity  
 
1033.5.8(b), 132.58(b), 7.22(b) 
 
 
1033.5.8.2, 132.58(b), 7.22(b) 
 
 
1033.5.8, 132.58(c), 7.22(c) 
 
1033.5.8(c), 132.59 
 
 
1033.5.8(a), 132.58(d) 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.2(a), 1033.5.2.7(a), 132.60(b), 
132.66(a) 
 
1033.5.2.4. 132.60(b), 132.66(a), 
132.94(a), 7.13 
 
1033.5.2(a), 1033.5.2.7(c), 132.66(b) 
 
 
1033.5.2.7(c), 132.66(c) 
 
 
 
1033.5.2.8, 132.61, 139.38  
 
 
 
 
1033.5.7, 132.94(g), 7.12 
 
 
 
1033.5.10.1(a), 132.94(h) 
 
 
1033.5.10.1(b), 132.94(h)(ii), 7.20(a) 
 
 
1033.5.2.10, 132.94(i), 7.16 
 
 
1033.5.5.7, 132.94(b), 7.14(a) 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.2(b), 132.60(a), 132.62, 132.63(a) 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.6.9, 1033.5.7, 132.86), 132.94(e) 
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34. Terms and conditions – date of maturity, expiry or 
execution. 
 
35. Terms and conditions – early settlement options 
held by either party to the instrument including the 
period or date at which the options can be exercised 
and the exercise price or range of prices. 
 
36. Terms and conditions – options held by either party 
to the instrument to convert the instrument into, or 
exchange it for, another financial instrument or 
some other asset or liability. 
 
37. Terms and conditions – amount and timing of future 
cash receipts or payments of the principal amount of 
the instrument. 
 
38. Terms and conditions – rate or amount of interest 
amounts and timing of payments. 
 
39. Terms and conditions – rate or amount of dividend 
amounts and timing of payments. 
 
40. Terms and conditions – collateral held (financial 
asset) or pledged (financial liability) 
 
41. Terms and conditions – functional currency 
(currency in which payments and receipts are 
required). 
 
42. Terms and conditions – any conditions of the 
instrument or associated covenant that, if 
contravened, would alter the terms. 
 
43. Discussions concerning economic substance and/or 
legal form of financial instruments such as debt and 
equity classification of financial instruments. 
 
FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING 
44. For each class of financial assets and financial 
liabilities, the net fair value or fair value shall be 
disclosed. 
 
45. If investments in unquoted equity instruments or 
derivatives linked to such equity instruments are 
measured at cost because their fair value cannot be 
reliably measured, that fact shall be disclosed 
together with a description of the financial 
instruments. Additional information could include 
that financial instrument’s carrying amount, an 
explanation of why fair value (net fair value) cannot 
be measured reliably and the range of estimates 
within which fair value (net fair value) is highly 
likely to be.  
 
46. Methods applied in determining fair value (net fair 
value) of financial assets or financial liabilities 
 
 
 
1033.5.2.3(a), 132.63(b) 
 
 
1033.5.2.5(b), 132.63(c) 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.2.3(b), 132.63(d) 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.2.2(a), 1033.5.2.3(c), 132.63(e) 
 
 
 
1033.5.2.2(b), 132.63(f) 
 
 
1033.5.2.2(b), 132.63(f) 
 
 
1033.5.1.1, 1033.5.2.2(d), 132.63(g), 
7.14(b), 7.15(a-c) 
 
1033.5.2.3(d), 132.63(h) 
 
 
 
1033.5.2.3(e), 132.63(j) 
 
 
 
1033.6.4.1, 132.64 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.6(a), 132.86, 7.25 
 
 
 
1033.5.6.6, 1033.5.6.7, 1033.5.6.9, 
132.90, 7.29, 7.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.6(b), 132.92(a)7.11(a), 7.27(a) 
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47. An entity shall disclose whether fair values (net fair 
value) of financial assets and financial liabilities are 
determined directly by reference to published price 
quotations in an active market or are estimated 
using a valuation technique. 
 
48. Disclosure of the significant assumptions made in 
application of fair value (net fair value) of financial 
assets and financial liabilities.  
 
49. Disclosure of the effect on the fair value (net fair 
value) of a range of reasonably possible alternative 
assumptions. 
 
50. The total amount of the change in fair value (net fair 
value) estimated using a valuation technique that 
was recognised in profit or loss during the period. 
 
51. An entity shall make a comparison between 
carrying amount and fair value (net fair value) of 
financial assets and liabilities. 
 
52. Disclosure of the fair value (net fair value) of 
collateral accepted, sold, repledged and material 
terms and conditions associated with the use of 
collateral  
 
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS  
53. Details of credit standby arrangements including the 
nature of each arrangement and total amount of 
credit unused. 
 
54. Summary of the used and unused loan facilities and 
the extent to which these can be continued or 
extended. 
 
55. Defaults and breaches on loan agreements 
 
STRUCTURED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS  
56. An entity shall disclose the existence of embedded 
derivatives within compound financial instruments 
or converting financial instruments. 
 
PERFORMANCE 
57. Performance measurement-earnings (or loss) per 
share. 
 
DISCRETIONARY 
TAXATION IMPACTS 
58. Tax issues/impacts in respect of use and accounting 
for financial instruments 
 
ISSUES CONCERNING CHANGES IN 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
59. Discussion of compliance or non-compliance in 
relation to AASB 1033 or AASB 132 and AASB 
139. For example,  information to the effect that the 
company does not require the restatement of 
comparative information for financial instruments 
within the scope of AASB 132 and AASB 139 in 
1033.5.6.3-5.6.6, 1033.5.2.9, 132.92(b), 
7.27(b), 7.28(a) 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.6.3, 1033.5.2.9, 132.92(a), 
132.92(c), 132.93, 7.11(b), 7.27(a), 
 
 
1033.5.6(c), 132.92(c) 
 
 
 
1033.5.10.1(a), 132.92(d), 7.27(d) 
 
 
 
1033.5.6.9, 1033.5.7, 132.86), 132.94(e) 
 
 
 
1033.5.5.7, 132.94(c)(i), 7.15(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.4.3, 132 (Aus94.1(a)) 
 
 
 
1033.5.4.3, 132 (Aus94.1(b)) 
 
 
 
1033.5.5.1, 132.94(j), 7.18 
 
 
1033.6.6, 132.94(d), AASB 7.17 
 
 
 
 
AASB 133 
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accordance with the transition rules contained 
within AASB 101 and/or sign-off in respect to the 
new standards dealing with financial instruments.   
 
60. General discussion of concerns, problems or issues 
in relation to adoption of AASB 1033, AASB 139, 
AASB 132 or AASB 7.  
 
61. Comments concerning changes in accounting policy 
in respect of financial instruments. 
 
62. Discussion of volatility in retained earnings or 
EBITDA or change in amount of retained earnings 
as a result of use of financial instruments.  
 
63. Discussion of impacts (volatility, absolute amount) 
on net assets or equity (including reserves) as a 
result of the requirements of accounting standards in 
relation to financial instruments.  
 
64. Discussion of or quantify the impact on profitability 
or profits as a result of the requirements of 
accounting standards in relation to financial 
instruments.  
 
65. Discussion of impact on borrowings (loans and 
advances) or financing strategy such as restrictions 
on the level of borrowings, change in maturity 
profile of borrowings as a result of the requirements 
of accounting standards in relation to financial 
instruments.  
 
66. Discussion of impacts of classification and 
measurement changes of financial instruments on 
dividend policy such as franking, payout ratio or 
adjustments to retained earnings that may influence 
the ability to pay dividends. 
 
67. Discussion of impacts of classification and 
measurement changes of financial instruments on 
derecognition of assets, recognition of new assets 
and liabilities 
 
68. Quantitative disclosures of information relating to 
fair value valuation and measurement models 
including revaluations. 
 
69. Discussions concerning the tax flow-on 
consequences of adoption of accounting standards 
in relation to the use of financial instruments. 
 
PERFORMANCE 
70. Return on total assets or other profitability ratios 
 
71. Dividend payout ratio 
 
72. Return on shareholders equity. 
 
73. Return on capital employed 
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74. Return on operating revenue 
 
75. Interest cover 
 
76. Liquidity ratios. 
 
77. Gearing/leverage ratios. 
 
HEDGE ACCOUNTING 
78. Hedge accounting or treasury/hedging arrangement 
policy   
 
79. Purpose of the hedge 
 
80. Concerns or problems in relation to hedge 
accounting – impacts, ability to meet hedge 
accounting requirements 
 
81. Changes or adjustments made (rollovers, 
extensions, conversions, redesignations, 
revaluations, restructure, close-outs, novations, 
reductions) to hedged instrument. 
 
82. Compliance of hedge accounting with financial 
covenants and debt funding commitments. 
 
83. Classification of hedge (specific, non-specific, cash 
flow, fair value or hedge of net foreign investment) 
 
84. Discussion of documentation issues surrounding 
hedge accounting.  
 
85. Discussion of effectiveness issues surrounding 
hedge accounting.  
 
86. Discussion of designation issues surrounding hedge 
accounting.  
 
87. Discussions concerning the impact of hedge 
accounting on the balance sheet or income 
statement. 
 
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS  
88. Financing source-borrowings, capital raisings 
 
89. Nature of loans (e.g. secured, unsecured, senior) 
 
90. Loan repayment terms, principle amounts, 
recognition, treatment, conditions. 
 
91. Purpose of loans 
 
92. Borrowing costs – discussion and quantify 
 
93. Disclosure of whether the terms of loans payable 
were renegotiated/restructured or cancelled. 
 
94. Disclosure of reason for renegotiation/restructure of 
loan. 
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STRUCTURED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
95. Impact on embedded derivatives once separated and 
recorded at fair value. 
 
96. Economic characteristics, terms, conditions and 
risks associated with an embedded derivative. 
 
97. Discussion of the rights, obligations, settlement 
conditions and any contingencies in relation to 
significant financial instruments. 
 
98. Discussion of the nature of structured financial 
instruments such as structure (collars, floors, flat 
structure, linkages) of derivatives 
 
99. Costs, premiums and fees arising from financial 
assets or financial liabilities 
 
 
RISK and RISK MANAGEMENT 
100. Discussion of controls in place in respect of 
financial instruments. 
 
101. An entity shall disclose a sensitivity analysis for 
each type of market risk to which the entity is 
exposed at reporting date showing how profit or loss 
and equity would have been affected by changes in 
the relevant risk. 
 
102. Methods and assumptions used in preparing the 
sensitivity analysis 
 
103. How credit risk arose. 
 
104. In respect of credit risk exposure, a description of 
collateral held as security and other credit 
enhancements. 
 
105. Information about credit quality of financial assets 
that are neither past due nor impaired 
 
106. An entity shall disclose an analysis of the age of 
financial assets that are past due as at the reporting 
date but not impaired. 
 
107. An entity shall disclose an analysis of financial 
assets that are individually determined to be 
impaired as at reporting date 
 
108. Exposure to liquidity risk in relation to the use of 
financial instruments and how it arose. 
 
109. Disclosure of a maturity analysis for financial 
liabilities that shows the remaining contractual 
liabilities. 
 
110. How interest rate risk arose. 
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Item 93 and items 101 to 118 inclusive are mandated under AASB 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures effective 1 January 2007. Disclosure of these items was not specifically mandated under 
AASB 132: Disclosure and Presentation, effective 1 January 2005 and were therefore discretionary in 
nature under the observation period 2003 to 2006.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111. An entity shall describe the methods used to 
measure risk arising from use of financial 
instruments. 
 
112. Changes in exposure and/or changes in objectives, 
policies and processes to risk relating to use of 
financial instruments from the previous period. 
 
113. Summary quantitative data about entity’s exposure 
to any risk in respect of financial instrument use. 
 
114. Amount by which any related credit derivatives or 
similar instruments mitigate the maximum exposure 
to credit risk. 
 
115. Amount of change in the fair value of loan or 
receivable attributable to changes in credit risk of 
financial asset 
 
116. Amount of change in the fair value of any related 
credit derivatives or similar instruments since loan 
or receivable was designated 
 
117. Amount of change in the fair value of financial 
liability attributable to changes in credit risk 
 
 
118. The difference between the financial liabilities 
carrying amount and the amount the entity would be 
contractually required to pay at maturity to the 
holder of the obligation. 
 
119. Amount by which any related derivatives or similar 
instruments mitigate the maximum exposure to 
interest rate risk 
 
120. Indicates which of its financial assets and financial 
liabilities are exposed to foreign exchange risk. 
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APPENDIX C: Frequency distribution of Control Variables 
 
Frequency distribution of Firm Size (Total Assets) 
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Frequency Distribution of Leverage  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
Leverage TL/(TL + TE)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
 
 
Frequency Distribution of Square Root of Leverage 
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Frequency Distribution of Return on Assets 
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Frequency Distribution of Return on Assets (Truncated)  
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Frequency Distribution of Top20 Shareholder Concentration 
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The frequency distributions of the control variables: firm size, leverage, return on 
assets (ROA) and top 20 shareholder concentration assume normality. However, 
outliers are clearly evident from the frequency distributions for FSize, leverage and 
ROA. An outlier is defined as a value that is more than 1.5 times the inter-quartile 
range, smaller that the value at the 25th percentile or larger than the value at the 75th 
percentile. For each of these control variables, outliers are delineated in accordance 
with method followed by Lind et. al. (2005) as follows: 
Statistic 
FSize (Natural 
log of total 
assets)
Square root of 
Leverage
ROA 
(truncated) Top20
25th percentile 17.069 4.309 -14.506 45.605
75th percentile 19.523 7.137 9.309 77.642
Interquartile Range 2.454 2.828 23.815 32.037
Outliers > 23.205 11.38 45.032 125.698
Outliers < 13.388 0.067 -50.230 -2.45
Number of Outliers 10 5 40 0
 
Outliers will be present, particularly in the case of ROA, regardless of the degree of 
transformations and truncations made to the data. The number of outliers is not likely 
to pose any major problem in the statistical analysis. The transformations and 
truncation made represents a balance between achieving a normal distribution 
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without adjusting the original data too much. Further, these outliers are a unique part 
of the original dataset.  
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APPENDIX D: Frequency Disclosure of Financial Instrument Information 
Items  
 
Financial Instrument 
Item Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
% change 
Yr4-Yr1
ITEM1 22.857 26.606 32.110 75.248 229.208
ITEM2 29.524 32.110 37.615 72.277 144.810 
ITEM3 44.762 51.376 57.798 79.208 76.954 
ITEM4 36.190 45.872 52.294 68.317 88.770 
ITEM5 90.476 93.578 91.743 95.050 5.055 
ITEM6 6.667 13.761 19.266 57.426 761.386 
ITEM7 95.238 97.248 98.165 98.020 2.921 
ITEM8 44.762 53.211 59.633 67.327 50.411 
ITEM9 67.619 71.560 70.642 78.218 15.674 
ITEM10 86.667 90.826 90.826 90.099 3.960 
ITEM11 86.667 90.826 90.826 90.099 3.960 
ITEM12 13.333 18.349 15.596 33.663 152.475 
ITEM13 40.000 40.367 44.037 60.396 50.990 
ITEM14 4.762 3.670 5.505 1.980 -58.416 
ITEM15 46.667 52.294 50.459 57.426 23.055 
ITEM16 55.238 65.138 69.725 66.337 20.092 
ITEM17 51.429 64.220 66.972 66.337 28.988 
ITEM18 40.952 49.541 51.376 64.356 57.149 
ITEM19 52.381 63.303 63.303 65.347 24.752 
ITEM20 52.381 61.468 61.468 67.327 28.533 
ITEM21 40.952 53.211 56.881 60.396 47.479 
ITEM22 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 
ITEM23 0.010 0.917 7.339 51.485 514751.485 
ITEM24 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 
ITEM25 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 
ITEM26 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 
ITEM27 0.952 0.000 11.009 38.614 3954.455 
ITEM28 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 
ITEM29 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 
ITEM30 8.571 7.339 7.339 40.594 373.597
ITEM31 20.952 19.266 22.018 26.733 27.588
ITEM32 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 
ITEM33 99.048 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.962 
ITEM34 63.810 72.477 77.064 82.178 28.787 
ITEM35 20.952 21.101 22.936 21.782 3.960 
ITEM36 30.476 33.028 34.862 37.624 23.453 
ITEM37 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 
ITEM38 72.381 77.982 78.899 83.168 14.904 
ITEM39 97.143 97.248 97.248 98.020 0.903 
ITEM40 61.905 65.138 70.642 70.297 13.557 
ITEM41 74.286 76.147 77.064 83.168 11.957 
ITEM42 25.714 27.523 28.440 32.673 27.063 
ITEM43 12.381 11.927 13.761 29.703 139.909 
ITEM44 40.000 46.789 54.128 75.248 88.119 
ITEM45 10.476 11.927 11.927 45.545 334.743 
ITEM46 38.095 44.037 43.119 71.287 87.129 
ITEM47 40.000 42.202 44.954 77.228 93.069 
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Financial Instrument 
Item Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
% change Yr 
4-Yr 1 
ITEM48 27.619 23.853 29.358 49.505 79.242 
ITEM49 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.921 792079.200 
ITEM50 0.952 0.917 2.752 8.911 835.644 
ITEM51 93.333 95.413 92.661 98.020 5.021 
ITEM52 2.857 5.505 5.505 2.970 3.960 
ITEM53 28.571 24.771 31.193 38.614 35.149 
ITEM54 49.524 55.963 62.385 69.307 39.947 
ITEM55 3.810 4.587 2.752 14.851 289.851 
ITEM56 16.190 21.101 28.440 47.525 193.535 
ITEM57 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 
ITEM58 2.857 5.505 9.174 23.762 731.683 
ITEM59 11.429 12.844 57.798 89.109 679.703
ITEM60 9.524 34.862 59.633 82.178 762.871
ITEM61 19.048 55.046 63.303 83.168 336.634 
ITEM62 6.667 7.339 14.679 37.624 464.356 
ITEM63 5.714 10.092 23.853 74.257 1199.505 
ITEM64 6.667 13.761 20.183 63.366 850.495 
ITEM65 0.000 1.835 7.339 29.703 297029.700 
ITEM66 0.000 2.752 1.835 4.950 4950049.500 
ITEM67 14.286 7.339 22.936 65.347 357.426 
ITEM68 12.381 5.505 16.514 63.366 411.805 
ITEM69 0.952 0.000 5.505 45.545 4682.178 
ITEM70 5.714 9.174 6.422 6.931 21.287 
ITEM71 2.857 2.752 3.670 9.901 246.535 
ITEM72 16.190 17.431 20.183 15.842 -2.155 
ITEM73 6.667 7.339 9.174 8.911 33.663 
ITEM74 2.857 1.835 2.752 3.960 38.614 
ITEM75 9.524 8.257 8.257 9.901 3.960 
ITEM76 1.905 2.752 2.752 2.970 55.941 
ITEM77 19.048 21.101 18.349 21.782 14.356 
ITEM78 66.667 75.229 81.651 83.168 24.752 
ITEM79 57.143 64.220 67.890 65.347 14.356 
ITEM80 3.810 18.349 20.183 48.515 1173.515 
ITEM81 22.857 21.101 22.936 32.673 42.946 
ITEM82 11.429 15.596 17.431 22.772 99.257 
ITEM83 25.714 37.615 43.119 64.356 150.275 
ITEM84 2.857 13.761 15.596 37.624 1216.832 
ITEM85 24.762 36.697 36.697 58.416 135.910 
ITEM86 27.619 40.367 44.037 67.327 143.769 
ITEM87 33.333 44.954 44.954 66.337 99.010 
ITEM88 52.381 55.046 61.468 54.455 3.960 
ITEM89 66.667 71.560 74.312 69.307 3.960 
ITEM90 51.429 55.046 60.550 59.406 15.512
ITEM91 43.810 44.954 47.706 52.475 19.780 
ITEM92 70.476 74.312 78.899 77.228 9.580 
ITEM93 18.095 19.266 22.936 24.752 36.790 
ITEM94 9.524 11.927 13.761 11.881 24.752 
ITEM95 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.941 594059.400 
ITEM96 0.952 0.000 1.835 3.960 315.842 
ITEM97 20.952 24.771 30.275 36.634 74.842 
ITEM98 17.143 21.101 29.358 28.713 67.492 
 277
Financial Instrument 
Item Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
% change Yr 
4-Yr 1 
ITEM99 34.286 45.872 53.211 87.129 154.125 
ITEM100 25.714 25.688 28.440 53.465 107.921 
ITEM101 2.857 4.587 4.587 11.881 315.842 
ITEM102 2.857 3.670 2.752 11.881 315.842 
ITEM103 40.952 41.284 49.541 52.475 28.137 
ITEM104 35.238 39.450 44.037 64.356 82.633 
ITEM105 8.571 11.009 13.761 17.822 107.921 
ITEM106 0.952 1.835 2.752 6.931 627.723 
ITEM107 0.000 1.835 3.670 62.376 623762.400 
ITEM108 2.857 2.752 4.587 39.604 1286.139 
ITEM109 40.000 44.954 44.954 48.515 21.287 
ITEM110 42.857 44.037 44.037 65.347 52.475
ITEM111 79.048 86.239 88.073 93.069 17.738
ITEM112 2.857 2.752 2.752 6.931 142.574 
ITEM113 33.333 39.450 42.202 47.525 42.574 
ITEM114 11.429 12.844 14.679 20.792 81.931 
ITEM115 11.429 14.679 20.183 25.743 125.248 
ITEM116 14.286 18.349 18.349 32.673 128.713 
ITEM117 12.381 14.679 16.514 22.772 83.930 
ITEM118 4.762 5.505 6.422 6.931 45.545 
ITEM119 19.048 19.266 22.018 23.762 24.752 
ITEM120 41.905 46.789 43.119 59.406 41.764 
Appendix C provides the frequency of each of the financial instrument items that comprise FIDIS for 
each of the years and the percentage change in frequency from Yr 1 (2003 financial year) to Yr 4 
(2006 financial year). Items 1 to 57 inclusive are mandatory (derived from AASB 1033 or AASB 
132); items 58 to 120 are discretionary and were derived from AASB 7 (which was not effective or 
made use of by companies prior to 1 January 2007), extant literature, company media releases, 
announcements and analyst reports. 
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APPENDIX E: Multiple Regression Main Model: Normality of 
Residuals 
Year1 
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Yr 2 
Scatter Plot of Residuals of FIDIS 
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Yr 3 
Scatter Plot of Residuals of FIDIS 
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Yr 4 
Scatter Plot of Residuals of FIDIS 
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APPENDIX F: Derivative and Hedge Accounting Disclosure Index 
Items 
Derivative and Hedge Accounting Disclosure 
Items 
AASB  Standard Reference 
 
MANDATORY 
1. A description of the hedge. 
2. A description of the financial instruments 
designated as hedging instruments  
3. Disclosure of net fair values or fair values of 
hedging instruments at reporting date. 
4. Nature of the risk being hedged. 
5. Amount of gain/loss arising (or expected to arise) 
from hedging activities 
6. Period of time to which hedge transaction relates or 
maturity 
7. For each class of financial assets and financial 
liabilities, the net fair value or fair value shall be 
disclosed. 
8. If investments in unquoted equity instruments or 
derivatives linked to such equity instruments are 
measured at cost because their fair value cannot be 
reliably measured, that fact shall be disclosed. 
together with a description of the financial 
instruments, their carrying amount, an explanation 
of why fair value (net fair value) cannot be 
measured reliably and the range of estimates within 
which fair value (net fair value) is highly likely to 
be.  
9. Methods applied in determining fair value (net fair 
value) of financial assets or financial liabilities. 
10. An entity shall disclose whether fair values (net fair 
value) of financial assets and financial liabilities are 
determined directly by reference to published price 
quotations in an active market or are estimated using 
a valuation technique. 
11. Disclosure of the significant assumptions made in 
application of fair value (net fair value) of financial 
assets and financial liabilities.  
12. Disclosure of the effect on the fair value of a range 
of reasonably possible alternative assumptions. 
13. The total amount of the change in fair value (net fair 
value) estimated using a valuation technique that 
was recognised in profit or loss during the period. 
14. An entity shall disclose the carrying amount of 
financial assets and liabilities and make a 
comparison with fair value (net fair value) of these 
financial assets and liabilities.  
 
DISCRETIONARY 
15. Reference to hedge accounting or treasury policy   
16. Reference to the purpose of the hedge 
17. Concerns or problems in relation to hedge 
accounting – impacts, ability to meet hedge 
accounting requirements 
18. Changes or adjustments made (rollovers, extensions, 
conversions, redesignations, revaluations, 
restructure, close-outs, novations, reductions) to 
 
 
1033.5.8, 132.58(a)  
1033.5.8(b), 132.58(b)  
 
1033.5.8.2, 132.58(b)  
 
1033.5.8, 132.58(c)  
1033.5.8(c), 132.59 
 
1033.5.8(a), 132.58(d) 
 
1033.5.6(a), 132.86  
 
 
1033.5.6.6, 1033.5.6.7, 1033.5.6.9, 
132.90 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
1033.5.6(b), 132.92(a)  
 
1033.5.6.3-5.6.6, 1033.5.2.9, 
132.92(b)  
 
 
 
1033.5.6.3, 132.92(a), 132.92(c), 
132.93  
 
1033.5.6(c), 132.92(c) 
 
1033.5.10.1(a), 132.92(d),  
 
 
1033.5.6.9, 1033.5.7, 132.86 
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Legend: Derivative and hedge disclosure items used to construct the derivative and hedge accounting 
disclosure index (DHADIS). The DHADIS comprises 14 items mandated in AASB 1033 (pre-IFRS) 
and AASB 132 (post-IFRS) and an additional 24 discretionary items derived from accounting 
literature (for example, Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004) and media releases and publicly available 
reports. A dichotomous score of one [1] s assigned to each item disclosed in the firm’s annual report; 
otherwise zero is assigned against that item. A DHADIS score is computed for all years by summing 
all information items disclosed divided by the maximum number of items that could be disclosed. 
 
 
 
hedged instrument. 
19. Compliance of hedge accounting with financial 
covenants and debt funding commitments. 
20. Classification of hedge (specific, non-specific, cash 
flow, fair value or hedge of net foreign investment) 
21. Discussion of documentation issues surrounding 
hedge accounting.  
22. Discussion of effectiveness issues surrounding 
hedge accounting.  
23. Discussion of designation issues surrounding hedge 
accounting.  
24. Discussions concerning the impact of hedge 
accounting on the balance sheet or income 
statement. 
25. Summary quantitative data about entity’s exposure 
to any risk in respect of derivative financial 
instrument use. 
26. Amount by which any related credit derivatives or 
similar instruments mitigate the maximum exposure 
to credit risk. 
27. Amount of change in the fair value of any related 
credit derivatives or similar instruments since loan 
or receivable was designated 
28. Quantify the effective and /or non-effective portions 
of the hedge 
29. Quantify the percentage or dollar amount of 
underlying hedged item that is hedged using the 
hedge instrument 
30. Premiums, discounts and costs in respect to hedging 
arrangements 
31. Forward looking projections re hedge arrangements 
of future anticipated hedge transactions 
32. Amount by which any related derivatives or similar 
instruments mitigate the maximum exposure to 
interest rate risk 
33. Indicates which of its financial assets and financial 
liabilities are exposed to foreign exchange risk. 
34. Internal controls relating to and the reporting of 
information in respect to hedging arrangements to 
internal stakeholders. 
35. Discussions concerning changes in hedge 
accounting policy. 
36. Quantitative data relating to changes in hedge 
accounting policy. 
37. Discussion concerning margin calls relating to 
hedge position exposure.  
38. Prices or dollar amounts of the hedged item 
achieved by a hedging arrangement. 
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APPENDIX G: Financial Risk Management Disclosure Index 
Financial Risk Management Disclosure 
Items 
AASB  Standard Reference 
 
MANDATORY 
1. Extent of market risk (currency risk or foreign 
exchange risk) in relation to the use of financial 
instruments. 
 
2. Extent of market risk (commodity price risk) in 
relation to the use of financial instruments. 
 
3. Extent of credit risk in relation to the use of 
financial instruments. 
 
4. Extent of liquidity risk in relation to the use of 
financial instruments. 
 
5. Extent of interest rate risk in relation to the use 
of financial instruments. 
 
6. An entity shall describe its financial risk 
management objectives and policies and 
procedures for controlling risks associated with 
financial instruments e.g. reporting of risks, 
policies and practices for dealing with risks. 
 
7. Interest rate risk – maturity dates and/or 
contractual repricing. 
 
8. Interest rate risk – effective interest rates. 
 
 
9. Indicates which of its financial assets and 
financial liabilities are exposed to interest rate 
risk. 
 
10. Indicates which of its financial assets are 
exposed to credit risk. 
 
11. Areas of significant concentrations of credit 
rate risk. 
 
12. Master netting arrangements to mitigate 
exposure to credit loss. 
 
13. Maximum exposure to credit risk 
 
DISCRETIONARY 
 
13. Discussion of controls put in place to manage 
financial instrument risk exposure. 
 
14. An entity shall disclose a sensitivity analysis 
for each type of market risk to which the entity 
is exposed at reporting date showing how profit 
or loss and equity would have been affected by 
changes in the relevant risk. 
 
 
 
1033.5.1.1, 132.52(a)(i), 7.32, 7.33(a) 
 
 
 
1033.5.1.2(a)(iii), 132.52(a)(iii), 7.32, 
7.33(a) 
 
1033.5.1.2(b), 132.52(b), 132.77 
 
 
1033.5.1.2(c), 132.52(c) 
 
 
1033.5.12(a)(ii), 132.52(a)(ii), 132.52(d), 
132.68 
 
1033.5.1.1, 132.56, 132.57, 7.32, 7.33(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.4(a), 1033 5.4.9(a)(b), 132.67(a), 
132.69, 132.70 
 
1033.5.1.2(a), 1033.5.4(b), 132.67(b) 
 
 
1033.5.4.4, 132.71 
 
 
 
1033.5.5, 132.76 
 
 
1033.5.5(b), 132.76(b) 
 
 
1033.5.5.5, 132.81 
 
 
1033.5.5(a), 132.76(a) 
 
 285
Legend: Financial Risk Management disclosure items used to construct the financial risk management 
disclosure index (FRMDIS). The FRMDIS comprises 13 items mandated in AASB 1033 (pre-IFRS) 
and AASB 132 (post-IFRS) and an additional 13 discretionary items derived from accounting 
literature (for example, Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004) and media releases and publicly available 
reports. A dichotomous score of one [1] s assigned to each item disclosed in the firm’s annual report; 
otherwise zero is assigned against that item. A FRMDIS score is computed for all years by summing 
all information items disclosed divided by the maximum number of items that could be disclosed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Methods and assumptions used in preparing the 
sensitivity analysis 
 
16. How credit risk arose. 
 
17. In respect of credit risk exposure, a description 
of collateral held as security and other credit 
enhancements. 
 
18. Exposure to liquidity risk in relation to the use 
of financial instruments and how it arose. 
 
19. Disclosure of a maturity analysis for financial 
liabilities that shows the remaining contractual 
liabilities. 
 
20. How interest rate risk arose. 
 
21. An entity shall describe the methods used to 
measure risk arising from use of financial 
instruments. 
 
22. Summary quantitative data about entity’s 
exposure to any risk in respect of financial 
instrument use. 
 
23. Amount of change in the fair value of loan or 
receivable attributable to changes in credit risk 
of financial asset 
 
24. Amount of change in the fair value of any 
related credit derivatives or similar instruments 
since loan or receivable was designated 
 
25. Amount of change in the fair value of financial 
liability attributable to changes in credit risk 
 
26. The difference between the financial liabilities 
carrying amount and the amount the entity 
would be contractually required to pay at 
maturity to the holder of the obligation. 
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APPENDIX H: Financial Ratio Disclosure Index 
Legend: Financial Ratio disclosure items used to construct the financial ratio disclosure index 
(FRDIS). The FRDIS comprises 8 discretionary items derived from accounting literature and media 
releases and publicly available reports. A dichotomous score of one [1] s assigned to each item 
disclosed in the firm’s annual report; otherwise zero is assigned against that item. A FRDIS score is 
computed for all years by summing all information items disclosed divided by the maximum number 
of items that could be disclosed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial Ratio Disclosure Items 
 
DISCRETIONARY 
1. Return on total assets or other profitability ratios 
 
2. Dividend payout ratio 
 
3. Return on shareholders equity. 
 
4. Return on capital employed 
 
5. Return on operating revenue 
 
6. Interest cover 
 
7. Liquidity ratios. 
 
8. Gearing/leverage ratios. 
 
 287
APPENDIX I: Financial Arrangement Disclosure Index 
Financial Arrangement Disclosure Items AASB  Standard Reference 
 
MANDATORY 
1. An entity shall disclose the carrying amount of 
financial assets pledged as collateral for 
liabilities or contingent liabilities. 
 
2. Information about the significant terms and 
conditions of financial instruments that may 
affect the amount, timing and certainty of future 
cash flows – including principal amount. 
 
3. Terms and conditions – date of maturity, expiry 
or execution. 
 
4. Terms and conditions – early settlement options 
held by either party to the instrument including 
the period or date at which the options can be 
exercised and the exercise price or range of 
prices. 
 
5. Terms and conditions – options held by either 
party to the instrument to convert the 
instrument into, or exchange it for, another 
financial instrument or some other asset or 
liability. 
 
6. Terms and conditions – amount and timing of 
future cash receipts or payments of the principal 
amount of the instrument. 
 
7. Terms and conditions – rate or amount of 
interest amounts and timing of payments. 
 
8.  Terms and conditions – collateral held 
(financial asset) or pledged (financial liability) 
 
9.  Terms and conditions – any conditions of the 
instrument or associated covenant that, if 
contravened, would alter the terms. 
 
10. Discussions concerning economic substance 
and/or legal form of financial instruments such 
as debt and equity classification of financial 
instruments. 
 
 
11. Details of credit standby arrangements 
including the nature of each arrangement and 
total amount of credit unused. 
 
12. Summary of the used and unused loan facilities 
and the extent to which these can be continued 
or extended. 
 
13. Defaults and breaches on loan agreements 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.2(b), 132.60(a), 132.62, 132.63(a) 
 
 
 
1033.5.6.9, 1033.5.7, 132.86), 132.94(e) 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.2.5(b), 132.63(c) 
 
 
1033.5.2.3(b), 132.63(d) 
 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.2.2(a), 1033.5.2.3(c), 132.63(e) 
 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.2.2(b), 132.63(f) 
 
 
 
1033.5.2.2(b), 132.63(f) 
 
 
1033.5.2.3(d), 132.63(h) 
 
 
1033.6.4.1, 132.64 
 
 
 
1033.5.6(a), 132.86, 7.25 
 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.4.3, 132 (Aus94.1(a)) 
 
 
 
1033.5.4.3, 132 (Aus94.1(b)) 
 
 
 
1033.5.5.1, 132.94(j), 7.18 
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Legend: Financial arrangement disclosure items used to construct the financial arrangement disclosure 
index (FADIS). The FADIS comprises 15 items mandated in AASB 1033 (pre-IFRS) and AASB 132 
(post-IFRS) and an additional 9 discretionary items derived from accounting literature and media 
releases and publicly available reports. A dichotomous score of one [1] s assigned to each item 
disclosed in the firm’s annual report; otherwise zero is assigned against that item. A FADIS score is 
computed for all years by summing all information items disclosed divided by the maximum number 
of items that could be disclosed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. An entity shall disclose the existence of 
embedded derivatives within compound 
financial instruments or converting financial 
instruments. 
 
15. Material items of income and expense resulting 
from financial assets and financial liabilities. 
 
DISCRETIONARY 
 
16. Financing source-borrowings, capital raisings 
 
17. Nature of loans (e.g. secured, unsecured, 
senior) 
 
18. Loan repayment terms, principle amounts,  
recognition, treatment, conditions. 
 
19. Purpose of loans 
 
20. Borrowing costs – discussion and quantify 
 
21. Disclosure of whether the terms of loans 
payable were renegotiated/restructured or 
cancelled. 
 
22. Disclosure of reason for 
renegotiation/restructure of loan. 
 
23. Costs, premiums and fees arising from financial 
assets or financial liabilities. 
 
24. The difference between the financial liabilities 
carrying amount and the amount the entity 
would be contractually required to pay at 
maturity to the holder of the obligation. 
 
 
1033.6.6, 132.94(d), AASB 7.17 
 
 
 
 
1033.5.10.1(a), 132.94(h) 
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APPENDIX J: Expected and Actual IFRS Impacts Disclosure Index 
Legend: The expected (pre-IFRS) and actual (post-IFRS) disclosure items used to construct the 
International Financial Reporting Standard Disclosure Index (IFRSDIS). The IFRSDIS comprises 11 
discretionary items derived from accounting literature and media releases and publicly available 
reports. A dichotomous score of one [1] s assigned to each item disclosed in the firm’s annual report; 
otherwise zero is assigned against that item. An IFRSDIS score is computed for all years by summing 
all information items disclosed divided by the maximum number of items that could be disclosed. 
 
Financial Arrangement Disclosure Items 
 
DISCRETIONARY 
1.           Discussion of compliance or non-compliance in relation to AASB 1033 or AASB 132 
and AASB 139. For example, information to the effect that the company does not 
require the restatement of comparative information for financial instruments within the 
scope of AASB 132 and AASB 139 in accordance with the transition rules contained 
within AASB 101.   
2.           General discussion of concerns, problems or issues in relation to adoption of AASB 
1033, AASB 139, AASB 132 or AASB 7.  
3.           Comments concerning changes in accounting policy in respect of financial instruments. 
4.           Discussion of volatility in retained earnings or EBITDA or change in amount of retained 
earnings as a result of use of financial instruments.  
5.           Discussion of impacts (volatility, absolute amount) on net assets or equity (including 
reserves) as a result of the requirements of accounting standards in relation to financial 
instruments.  
6.           Discussion of or quantify the impact on profitability or profits as a result of the 
requirements of accounting standards in relation to financial instruments.  
7.           Discussion of impact on borrowings (loans and advances) or financing strategy such as 
restrictions on the level of borrowings, change in maturity profile of borrowings as a 
result of accounting standards in relation to financial instruments. 
8.           Discussion of impacts of classification and measurement changes of financial 
instruments on dividend policy such as franking, payout ratio or adjustments to retained 
earnings that may influence the ability to pay dividends. 
9.           Discussion of impacts of classification and measurement changes of financial 
instruments on derecognition of assets, recognition of new assets and liabilities 
10. Quantitative disclosures of information relating to fair value valuation and measurement 
models including revaluations. 
11.         Discussions concerning the tax flow-on consequences of adoption of accounting 
standards in relation to the use of financial instruments. 
 
